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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the movement of the Yellow and Red Shirts in their early 
periods. Sondhi Limthongkul created the ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ group. This was 
the initial group of the Yellow Shirts, while the Red Shirts was originally started as 
the several anti-coup groups.  
In a successful social movement the leaders need to ensure long lasting support, 
thus a large number of participants are vital to enlarge and strengthen the 
movements. To achieve this, framing becomes a significant tool for the leader to 
select and highlight effective issues and events, and frame them to resonate with 
their followers and bystanders. In Thai social movements, frames have been 
employed into many movements, particularly nationalist frames.  Four nationalist 
symbols the king, nation, religion, and democracy/modernization metaframes have 
become sources of mobilizing frames which stem from these metaframes.  
To understand social movements in Thailand, the cases of Sondhi Limthongkul and 
the anti-coup groups were selected for investigation through social movement and 
framing theories, including the Thai metaframes concept.  The questions asked by 
this research focus on how the metaframes and mobilizing frames of Sondhi 
Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were applied, focused on, and adjusted in 
their early movements. In addition, the different identities which derived from 
framing are questioned and explored. To investigate the framing tactics the timeline 
of the two studied cases are divided into two phases. In each phase, the focus of 
frames in each group is revealed to see the differences of frames, framing tactics, 
and the diverse identities of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups.  
The results tell that the focus on the metaframes and mobilizing frames of the two 
groups are different. The movement of Sondhi concentrated on the king, religion, 
and nation metaframes, while the democracy/modernization and nation 
metaframes were emphasized by the anti-coup groups. The mobilizing frames that 
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were mostly used by Sondhi were the king, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and corruption, 
while the anti-coup groups concentrated on the anti-coup, anti-amat, and people’s 
democracy mobilizing frames. The problem definition, causal attribution, and moral 
evaluation functions are heavily focused on in the framing of the two groups. 
Notably, the two groups enhance the power of the frames by promoting them 
together as a package, while the culprits were blamed individually for clear and 
simple recognition.  
Another major result of this study is that the different focuses on frames bring about 
different identities. Sondhi Limthongkul focuses on the three nationalist symbols of 
the king, religion, and nation, and persuades his participants to protect these 
symbols. Thus, his identity is focused on being a ǲtrue Thaiǳ. In contrast, the 
democracy symbol is emphasized the most in the framing of the anti-coup groups. 
They demand the restoration of democracy, the 1997 constitution, and the elected 
government.  As a result, the ǲdemocratic Thaiǳ is framed as the identity of the anti-
coup groups.  The different identity of the two groups results from the different 
focus on the metaframes and mobilizing frames. Framing identity could create 
strong bonds between the movement and the participants and increase support. He 
cost of doing so was a deeply rooted sometimes violent conflict based on diverging 
identities.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Thaksin Shinawatra, a key Thai political figure, has had an influence on Thai politics 
for a decade. He was a former prime minister and mastermind of the governments 
which ruled by his relatives and subordinates. Accordingly, those so-called nominee 
governments had been protested by his rivals such as the Yellow Shirts, elites, 
royalists, activists, scholars, Democrat Party, business factions, and the middle class.  
 
From the time Thaksin Shinawatra was elected as prime minister in 2001, Thailandǯs politics have been centred around him and his family. Thaksin was the 
leader of the Thai Rak Thai Party and the twice elected former prime minister who 
was accused of corruption and of violations of King Bhumibolǯs royal supremacy, 
serious allegations which led to the overthrow of his government. Throughout a 
decade, the battles between Thaksin and his rivals have caused the deeply rooted 
and sometimes violent conflicts which have widen into many parts of Thai society. 
The first major opponent of Thaksin which succeeded in uprooting his government 
was the Peopleǯs Alliance of Democracy or the Yellow Shirts. To fight back, the 
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) or the Red Shirts was 
established by Thaksin and his supporters. A lengthy battle, as a result, brought 
about the deaths and injuries of both the Yellow and Red Shirts. The violent fights 
between the two groups have appeared in major cities, especially in the voting bases 
of Thaksin Shinawatra. The frequency of the fight increased during the 
demonstrations of them. To illustrate the conflicts that led them to a long term 
battle, in this chapter the backdrop of the two rival groups will be provided.   
 
Political life of Thaksin began in the era of the Democrat-led government of 1997-
2001. The difficulties in the Asian economies in 1997 led then Prime Minister Chuan 
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Leekpai and Finance Minister Tarrin Nummanahaeminda to address the crisis with ǲa pro-liberalization program and by closely following the IMF prescriptionsǳ (Dixon 
2004). The government had been criticized hard over their policies while the 
dissatisfaction was mostly concentrated on the 1998 bankruptcy reforms and the 
selling of assets that followed the foreign advice. Several factions started to 
campaign against the foreign economic programs.  
 
During this time, Thaksin saw a chance and formed the Thai Rak Thai Party to 
challenge the Democrat Party. He announced the ǲeconomic nationalist policyǳ to 
oppose the Western measures and protect local business. Furthermore, Thaksin 
promised to relieve the debts of the business factions of the elites (2004).  
Consequently, he was voted prime minister in 2001 and re-elected in 2005. In 
Hewisonǯs view (Hewison 2010) Thaksin was elected because of his alternative 
policies to the ǲneo-liberalismǳ of the Democrat Party that had caused massive 
dissatisfaction among the public. His most famous campaigns (2010) were a 
universal health care program, a farmer debt moratorium, and soft loans for the 
community. He became personally popular among the grassroots. For the middle 
class, he promised to provide them with more credit for small and medium 
enterprises. Thaksin was the first prime minister who benefitted from the 1997 
constitution in that he could have ǲa stronger executive and party systemǳ. 
 
Throughout his premiership he ruled the government with toughness which led to 
authoritarianism and a neglect of human rights (as cited in Hewison, 2010). He used 
state power to ǲintimidate, harass or even eliminate those he deemed 
troublemakersǳ (Kazmin 2007).  Hewison (2010) described Thaksin in the later era 
thus: ǲThis parliamentary power and evident popularity sent shockwaves through 
the conservative establishment. The result was that potentially positive 
developments came to be wound back by a combination of Thaksinǯs political flaws 
and by a conservative reaction against him and his partyǳ. His policy and practices 
were seen as a threat to elites and royalists who were close to the royal family. Some 
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acts were considered by this enemies to be intended to undermine the royal power 
of King Bhumibol.  
 
At that time, Sondhi Limthongkul, a media mogul and former colleague of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, started to criticized Thaksin and the government on his televised 
political show ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ.  Allegations of corruptions and violations of 
King Bhumibolǯs royal prerogative were levelled at Thaksin and his associates. They 
had been colleagues for a period of time and ended their good relationships due to 
business conflicts. This became the motivation of Sondhi  Limthongkul to begin his 
war against Thaksin through his media network. In September 2005 Thaksin 
responded by terminating the show and stopped it airing on Channel 9, the state- 
owned television station. The battle between Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin 
Shinawatra thus began. 
 
The most crucial event that triggered the anti-Thaksin protest was the selling of 
Shin Corporation to Temasek, a Singapore government investment company, in 
January 2006. Thaksin was accused of tax evasion and condemned for selling an 
important Thai company to foreigners. Ultimately, the anti-Thaksin forces formed a 
movement group, under the leadership of Sondhi Limthongkul and four others. 
Kasian (2006, p. 35) explained the opponents of Thaksin as a group which ranged 
from old-time bureaucrats and officers, Thaksinǯs business antagonists, opposition 
politicians, conservative technocrats, NGO activists, liberal intellectuals, lawyers, 
doctors, scholars, students, and general people.  
 
The first major movement to overthrow Thaksin, in February 2006, was undertaken 
by the Yellow Shirts, or the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). They (Kengkij 
and Hewison 2009) were a loose collaboration of two major factions. The first group 
was the royalists along with some elites and middle classes lead by Sondhi 
Limthongkul, while the other faction consisted of NGOs, activists, and trade 
unionists.  The five key leaders of PAD or the Yellow Shirts were the media mogul 
Sondhi Limthongkul, the former Buddhist politician Chamlong Srimuang, the leader 
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of the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) Pipop Thongchai, Somsak Kosaisuk 
of the State Enterprise Labour Relations Confederation (SELRC), and Somkiat 
Pongpaiboon the advisor of the Assembly of the Poor.  Their coalition was called ǲPhanthamit Prachachon Phuea Prachathippataiǳ or the ǮǮPeopleǯs Alliance for 
Democracy,ǯǯ they claimed the main goal being to protect the King and the nation 
from Thaksin and his associates.  
 
During the four months of demonstrations in 2006, they (Rojanaphruk 2006) 
campaigned to oust Thaksin and demanded a second wave of political reform (the 
first reform occurred after uprising of the people in Bangkok to oust Prime Minister 
General Suchinda Kraprayoon in May 1992). The group (Pye and Schaffer 2008) was 
able to assemble participants estimated at 50,000 to 300,000 people. They (Kengkij 
and Hewison 2009) were parties of businessmen, politicians, and some royalists 
that had close relationships with the palace-connected individuals. This faction (Pye 
and Schaffer 2008) were portrayed as ǲdissatisfied business groups that had lost the 
political patronage necessary for economic success and the old network of civil 
servants around the king, who were losing out to the Thai Rak Thaiǯs takeover of the 
state apparatusǳ. Besides, the middle class participants (Kasian 2006) had concern 
on the modernization plan that Thaksin and his associates might sell Thailandǯs 
assets to foreign investors, which would destroy the country. All of this brought 
them to take part in the movement of the Yellow Shirts and other movement groups 
in the late eras.  
The Yellow Shirts blamed on Thaksin and his colleagues by serious allegations 
which primary produced by Sondhi Limthongkul. They, furthermore, demanded the 
restoration of King Bhumibolǯs royal prerogative and intervention by the King to 
unseat Thaksin and appoint a new premier. During the movement of the Yellow 
Shirts, Thaksin and his associates were framed as a great threat to Thailand. A 
serious allegation was levelled by the Yellow Shirts that Thaksin and his colleagues 
had an evil plan to destroy the monarchy and Somdet Pra Sangkarat, or the High 
Patriarch. Additionally, the corruptions of Thaksin and his colleagues in schemes 
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such as the state-owned enterprise privatization, populist policies, and the 
construction of Suvarnabhumi airport were given as examples to portray the 
crooked image of Thaksin. These corruptions caused frustrations for the movement 
participants. The coalition of heterogeneous groups of the Yellow Shirts brought 
about a unique movement for Thailand. Sometimes they rallied in major places 
without advance warning, blocking roads and Government House; some of the 
subgroups produced their own banners, posters, and t-shirts representing their own 
interests.   
 
The protest of the Yellow Shirts came to an end when the 19 September 2006 coup 
was staged under the leadership of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Thaksinǯs 
government was accused of corruption, of creating a split in Thai society, abuse of 
human rights, nepotism, and infringement of the royal supremacy of King Bhumibol. 
General Sonthi (Chairat 2009, p. 51) gave the public the reason for the coup thus: ǲI'd like to say two things about the military coup. First, I received calls for the coup 
from many people. Second, soldiers are obliged to protect national security, 
safeguard the nation and uphold loyalty to the monarchy. The military cannot 
tolerate any leaders who lack or have limited loyalty to the King.ǳ Thaksin, who was 
in New York at that time, went into exile. At this time the anti-coup groups, which 
some of them later turned to form the Red Shirt group, emerged to protest against 
the coup. 
 
The origins of the Red Shirts lie in the protest groups that formed after the 19 
September 2006 coup was staged. Some of the anti-coup groups joined the 
movement with some members of TRT party and formed the movement group 
which called Red Shirts later. However, during this early time, groups of activists, 
scholars, students, some middle class, and Thaksinǯs supporters started the protest 
only one day after the 2006 coup. They called for the restoration of democracy and 
the 1997 constitution, a new election, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
They (Bhumiprabhas 2007) announced that: ǲWe want to topple the 2007 draft 
constitution, because it isn't democratic. The CNS must get out, and we'll protest 
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against anyone who tries to stage another coup".  When the members of the Thai 
Rak Thai party united with the other protest groups, on June 15, 2007, the official 
Red Shirts group was established under the body of the Democratic Alliance Against 
Dictatorship (DAAD). Later, in 2009, the name of the group was changed into the 
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD).  
 
During his premiership, Thaksin had ideas targeted at reducing the poverty of the 
grassroots and aiding them with social welfare programs. Consequently the Red 
Shirts regarded Thaksin as the only prime minister who offered them benefits 
through his populist policies. It is not surprising that he was elected twice with the 
support of these grassroots. In Hewison's view (2014), Thaksinǯs policies seemed to 
challenge King Bhumibolǯs state welfare which caused the dissatisfaction of the 
conservative group. Hewison claimed that ǲthe conservatives rejected Thaksinǯs mix 
of social welfare and grassroots capitalism and feared his popularity amongst the monarchyǯs self-claimed rural constituencyǳ.  In the Red Shirtǯs views (2014), this 
appeared to be the main reason for the conservative group, or amat, to stage the 
2006 coup to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra. The Red Shirts constructed the idea of 
the inequality between the elites and the grassroots through their protests. The 
protest leaders framed themselves and their followers as ǲphraiǳ, or commoners, 
while their enemies, who suppressed them, were the Ǯamatǳ, or the ruling 
aristocrats. The idea of a class war between the grassroots and the amat was 
constructed to frame their movements. 
 
During the early part of the movement, the prominent leaders of the anti-coup 
groups consisted of  the former Thai Rak Thai Party members Veera Musigapong, 
Jakrapob Penkair, Nattawut Saikue, and Jatuporn Prompan, the former senators 
Weng Tojirakarn and Prateep Ungsongtham Hata, the businessmen Wiphu 
Phalangphattanaphuntai and Nopporuj Vorachitvuttikul, the National Human Rights 
Commission member Jaran Ditthapichai. The adherents were mainly Thaksinǯs 
supporters from the poor in the north and north-east provinces, but also included 
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the lower class in Bangkok such as taxi drivers and motorcycle-taxi drivers. A 
description of the Red Shirts' followers (BBC 2012) was given thus:   
The red-shirts are formally known as the United Front for Democracy 
Against Dictatorship (UDD). The focus of many red-shirts' campaigning zeal 
is former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Members are mainly rural 
workers from outside Bangkok. But the red-shirt ranks also include students, 
left-wing activists and some business people who see attempts by the urban 
and military elite to control Thai politics as a threat to democracy.ǳ  
The fights between the Yellow and Red Shirts began since 2006. The anti-coup 
groups, which some supported Thaksin, attacked the Yellow Shirts as a group that 
performed the movement to overthrow Thaksin. Thus political messages that 
produced from this initial Red Shirts were focused on against the Yellow Shirts and 
some elites. A year after the 2006 coup the Peopleǯs Power Party, a new party 
supported by Thaksin, was elected as the government. This came up with the return 
of the Yellow Shirts in 2008 to remove the so-called proxy prime minister of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. In November 2008, to put the pressure on the opponents, the Yellow 
Shirts seized the Government House and Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi airports. 
The Red Shirts also came out to protect their government, while there were 
movements from some shadowy groups, still unidentified, to harm the Yellow 
protestors. This event resulted in the loss of the protestersǯ lives and tremendous 
damage to the economy. Shortly after that the Yellow Shirts called off the protests 
the Peopleǯs Power Party (BBC 2012) was accused of electoral misdemeanours and 
was banned by the Constitutional Tribunal. In December 2008, with the support of 
the military, the leader of the Democrat Party, Abhisit Vejajiva, became the 27th 
prime minister, leading a coalition government. This caused a severe resentment 
among Thaksinǯs supporters which led to the massive protests of the Red Shirts in 
subsequent years. 
 
The controversial event began when they rallied over 100,000 protesters to 
gatecrash the ASEAN summit meeting in Pattaya in April 2009. They demanded for 
the resignation of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. They were at the centre of public 
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attention again when they occupied central Bangkok from March to May 2010. At 
that time, they demanded the premier Abhisit Vejjajiva to dissolve the parliament 
and arrange a new election. This led to the announcement of a state of emergency. 
The clashes between the Red Shirts and the military at this event (Eimer 2014) 
caused the death of 90 people which increased a remarkable of the Red Shirts' anger 
and loathing towards Abisith Vejajiva and the Democrat Party. Sombat Boon-ngam-
anong (Rojanaphruk 2010), an activist who protested the measure of Abisith, 
expressed his opinion thus: "He has unveiled his real face behind that good-looking 
face of his. The continued killings show us Abhisit's and the amat's behavior. Thai 
society is blind and we do not see the real truth. This government is an amat 
government, which is a brutal, tyrannical regime that sucks people's blood".  
 
At that time, the Yellow Shirts and some supporters of the Democrat Party criticized 
the movement of the Red Shirts through the media.  The major opponents of the Red 
Shirts were the Yellow Shirts because of their standpoints of ǲfighting for the Kingǳ, 
overthrowing Thaksin Shinawatra and his regime, and supporting the coup and the 
amat. The Red Shirts viewed the Yellow Shirts as the tool of amat, royalists, and the 
middle class which conducted protests to assist those groups. Worse, a leader of the 
Yellow Shirts (Forsyth 2010) once claimed that ǲthe rural voters could not be 
trusted to vote because they lacked sufficient knowledge and judgment.ǳ The class 
conflicts between the Yellow and Red Shirts had been constructed by the leaders in 
their early movements.  
 
Because of these political conflicts, Thailand was deeply divided into the Red faction 
of rural grassroots from the north and the north-east regions that supported 
Thaksin and the Yellow faction which was the groups of urban middle class, elite, 
and Democrat Party supporters from the south of the country. This division was 
portrayed by Haller (2014) as follows: ǲAfter years of conflict, it is noticeable that the color-coded division into red 
and yellow follows regional, ideological, and class identities: The reds are 
mostly from lower-income rural populations in the north and northeast and 
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speak with a Lanna (northern Thai) or Lao (northeastern Thai) accent. The 
majority of them favor Thaksin, since they benefitted from his social and 
economic policies. However, the red shirts are not limited to only farmers, 
but also include ǲurbanized villagersǳ from the lower-middle class. The 
yellow shirts are mostly members of the Bangkok middle class and Thais 
from the upper south who support the Democrat Party and perceive Thaksin 
as a threat to the monarchy, their economic privileges, and their political 
influence.  
While Ockey (2011) pointed to the ǲdeep divisions within families and communitiesǳ 
thus: 
The conflict between Red and Yellow runs deep, with each side firmly 
convinced that it holds the moral high ground, and each side determined that 
its sacrifices not be in vain. At the heart of the difference is a clash over the 
nature of democracy.  
The contradictory political beliefs, classes and regions of the two groups of Thai 
people brought about bitter results for Thai society. Doubts about what had 
prompted them to harm their antagonists have been lingering in peopleǯs minds.  
 
The movement of the two groups are astonishing in terms of rapid formation and 
stability. They established protests quickly and called them off without difficulty. 
When they announced further protests, their enthusiastic followers would 
immediately assemble. Although their groups were established almost a decade ago 
they were still powerful in terms of mobilizing protests. The numbers of the Yellow 
followers could be over 100,000 in the crucial protests. However, the strength of the 
Red Shirts could be seen when they assembled in Bangkok. Hewison (2014) 
portrayed the solidarity of the Red Shirts on 20 March 2010 thus: ǲFor much of that 
day, a red shirt convoy wound its way around Bangkok and received remarkable 
support from the crowds that lined the streets and who responded to red shirt 
rhetoric about status, class, and electoral democracy. Nothing like this had ever been 
seen before, not even in the early 1970s when the student movement built alliances 
with workers and peasantsǳ. It seemed the Red Shirts had performed the largest 
democratic movement since the 1973 student movement, if not larger. Unlike the 
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1973 movement, however, this one faces middle class resistance. In this thesis we 
explore the formation years of the two movements. 
 
Strategies which are used by the two groups to attract and form the huge mass 
movement must be studied from the beginning of the movement. In terms of the 
Yellow Shirts, it started from the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul to attack 
Thaksin Shinawatra. A reason which led him to perform the movement caused from 
the cancellation of his famous political television show ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ from 
Channel 9 in September 2005. From that time, he continued the live show at 
Thammasat University and Lumpini Park. Thaksin and his government had been 
criticized about the corruption of government projects, the populist policies, and the 
violation of King Bhumibolǯs royal supremacy through the show.  
 
Noticeably, his live political talk show was able to attract a high number of audience 
members such as urban middle class, elites, and general people.  During the show, 
many issues and events were framed to blame Thaksin and his colleagues. Issues 
that Sondhi selected to frame were engaged with the misconducts that Thaksin and 
his associates had done to the primary institutions, such as the infringement of the 
monarchy and the destruction of Buddhism and the nation. As well, nationalism was 
employed in his framing to construct identity of the group. When the number of 
audience increased, Sondhi moved the show to Lumpini Park. The movements to 
oust Thaksin were gradually formed from this point. Ultimately, Sondhi brought his 
audiences to collaborate with the other anti-Thaksin groups and leaders to formally 
establish the Yellow Shirts in February 2006.  
 
For the Red Shirts, they originated after Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted from the 
premiership by the 19 September 2006 coup, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. 
Groups of activists, scholars, students, and general people in Bangkok started to 
anti-coup and called for the restoration of democracy.  In the beginning of the 
movement, the number of protestors was small, most being based in Bangkok. The 
strictness of martial law in force at that time prevented people from the other 
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provinces from joining the protest. It is obvious that the anti-coup groups adopted 
and adjusted the protest tactics of Sondhi Limthongkul and the Yellow Shirts to 
meet their mobilizing goals. In addition, nationalism was also applied to construct 
frames with which to attack the coup makers. The movement of the anti-coup 
groups became fierce when Thaksin and his subordinates activated their 
movements. Some members of the Thai Rak Thai party such as Veera Musigapong, 
Jatuporn Phromphan, Jakraphob Penkair, and Natthawut Saikua set up a satellite 
television station, the PTV (Peopleǯs Television), to attack the junta. They were 
prominent in terms of budget, communication tools, and leadership skills. Finally, in 
June 2007, they collaborated with some anti-coup groups and established a formal 
movement to overthrow the amat and the coup makers. 
 
The longevity and success of the two mobilizing groups brings about the question of 
how they created the deep bonds between the followers and the movements, and 
what tactics the leaders applied to attract the immense numbers of the followers. 
Furthermore, the initial movements of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups laid the firm 
foundations for their later movements under the Yellow and Red Shirt bodies. 
Besides, their succeeded movement tactics and framing have been adopted by 
subsequent political movements as if an instant formula of Thai social movements.  
 
The early periods of the movements are significant in providing us with an outlook 
of the mobilizing tactics, used by the two groups at the forefront of the movements. 
It gives us traces of the underlying motivations which prompt the leaders and the 
followers to undertake the protests. They were able to attract vast numbers of 
followers to take part in the movements and rally in the streets. This has been 
happened by their framing messages which were powerful in persuasion.  
 
Accordingly this research seeks to answer many questions relating to the early 
period of the two movements. Thus, questions such as: how did the two movements 
became so large so rapidly? What strategy did the leaders apply to attract and unite 
their followers that resulted in the longevity of the movements? In what ways were 
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those strategies used to perform the movements? Did they construct specific 
messages to attract adherents, and if so, what type of messages were produced? And 
did they construct their identities to differentiate their groups from others? These 
questions will be explored and answered in this research.  
 
Furthermore, in the following chapter 2, I will provide a review of the literature 
which used to examine as a framework of this research. Also, in the latter part of the 
chapter the social movement theory, the framing concept, and the Thai metaframes 
will be described followed by the hypotheses, methodology and structure of the 
thesis in the end of the chapter.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature review and methodology 
 
This dissertation is based in the context of social movement studies. This chapter 
will thus first introduce the concept of social movement and the roles of the framing 
process in social movement studies. It will then move to the definitions of scholars 
on mobilizing frames and metaframes as essential instruments for creating large 
and stable social movements. The following major part of this chapter is a 
chronological background of the Thai metaframes which were founded on 
nationalism. It has been broadly applied into Thai political movements for a long 
period of time. Lastly, the hypotheses of this study will be presented in the next 
sections, followed by the methodology and structure of the thesis.  
 
2.1. Literature review    
 
2.1.1. Social movement concept 
 
What are the social movements? 
As stated by Freeman & Johnson (as cited in Christiansen 2009), a social movement 
is not similar to a stable political party or interest group that intends to access ǲpolitical power and political elitesǳ. Social movements are ǲnon- or extra-
institutional forms of politicsǳ that engage with ǲorganized groups and formal 
organizationsǳ.  They are organized and strategic and concentrate less on 
distributing goods, which differs from interest groups. Also, a social movement has a 
common political agenda and ǲa visible constituency or membership baseǳ with the 
collective goals, actions, and activities to change ǲinternal or external targetsǳ (Ganz 
2009; West 2008).  Social movements, besides, differ in levels of organization, forms 
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of action, and mobilizations in which alliances with other groups are significant for 
creating success of the movement. Social movements are also defined as a collective 
action of united people with the collective purposes to challenge the unfair 
repression of precise ways of life in terms of politics, society, and economics. 
Furthermore they are performed to ǲanti-systemicǳ and against current institutions 
that have ǲquasi-anarchist orientationǳ. They, on the other hand, can be used to 
promote both democratic doctrines and the benefits of the elites and rulers (Kengkij 
and Hewison 2009; West 2008; Horn 2013).  
 
Opp (2009) added that a social movement is a type of protest group but different in 
terms of the size, longevity, and degree of official organization, besides, ǲprotest 
actions may have many other features: they may be more or less organized, they 
may be more or less regular, and they may be legal or illegal, more or less legitimate, 
violent and so onǳ. He (2009) also describes a protest group as "a collective of actors 
who want to achieve their shared goal, or goals, by influencing decisions of a targetǳ. 
Social movements can be distinguished from riots, interest groups, mobs, fads or 
fashion by their organization. Fuller (2014) put that a faction of people that shares a 
set of beliefs with no collective action has not created a social movement. In sense, 
social movement groups must have a shared belief and collective action which is 
organized and strategized. 
 
Morris and Braine (as cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2004) categorize movements 
into three types. ǲLiberation movementsǳ are the first type, which are operated by 
oppressed groups, the second are ǲequality-based special issue movementsǳ that 
focus on specific issues affecting some oppressed groups, and the last type are ǲsocial responsibility movementsǳ which emerge to change some conditions that 
affect general people.   
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Emergence of social movements 
 
Social movements generally occur to oppose governments, elites, and antagonists 
when these institutions and groups have failed to fulfil a need for reform or 
revolution. Consequently, social movement actors will assert new values that will be 
translated into action through political, economic, and cultural mobilizations. Also, 
social movement participants will ǲmake moral claims based on renewed personal 
identities, collective identities, and public actionǳ (Ganz 2009; Horn 2013). The 
establishment of a social movement can be divided into four stages which begin 
with the emergence and go on to coalescence, bureaucratization, and finally decline.  
 
In social movement formation the emergence (as cited in Christiansen, 2009) is 
described by Blumer as the ǲsocial fermentǳ stage which focuses less on 
organization. Christiansen (2009) explains that in this stage some social movement 
participants may feel unsatisfied on some social issues or situations, but any action 
to relieve their grievances and frustrations are not taken. They may find solutions 
by commenting with friends, colleagues, and media, thus strategic collective action 
does not emerge at this stage. 
 
Stage two is known as the popular stage, or coalescence. Those issues or 
discontentments are defined as ǲwho and what is responsibleǳ. Hopper (as cited in 
Christiansen 2009) states that: ǲDiscontent is no longer uncoordinated and 
individual; it tends to become focalized and collective. This is the stage when 
individuals participating in the mass behavior of the preceding stage become aware 
of each otherǳ. This is the time that the leader of the group emerges with the 
strategies to figure out the problem. Furthermore, it is the time that demonstrations 
can be employed to express the power of the mass movement. Thus the organized 
and strategic movements including its prominent leaders are clearly appeared this 
time.  
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In terms of the third stage, Christiansen (2009) calls bureaucratization or, as Blumer 
puts it, ǲformalizationǳ, which organizations and followers of social movements are 
expanded. Accordingly they need more specialized and trained staff and an 
organized strategy to succeed the movement, since only having creative leaders and 
mass rallies are not sufficient to develop their goals and attract adherents. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to maintain the enthusiasm of the participants through 
the continued mobilization (as cited in Christiansen, 2009). Most social movements 
fail to formalize their organization, because the paid proficient staffs are needed to 
replace volunteers.  Besides, social movement leaders must regularly meet with ǲpolitical elitesǳ to increase their political power. For the last stage of the movement, 
the decline or ǲinstitutionalization,ǳ is not discussed here since it has not yet 
occurred in this study.  
 
Participation in social movements 
 
The number of followers has a crucial impact on the success and sustainability of 
social movements. Lofland (as cited in Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman, 2003) asserts 
that participants in a social movement are retained with values, beliefs, and 
emotional commitments, which in turn are fostered and nourished by ǲa wide range 
of cultural practices: prayer meetings, rallies, consciousness raising groups, late-
night  bull sessions, and the likeǳ. Importantly, cultural participation promotes both 
external and internal participation. Accordingly, it is very important to apply culture 
into social movements (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman, 2003, p. 312).  
 
To study participation in social movements, Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman propose ǲsets of variables as generic determinants of participationǳ which are described 
below.  
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Ideology  
Political ideology (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 2003) is vital to social movements 
since it is ǲthe expressed goalsǳ which focus on political, economic, and social 
change. The interest and agreement of social movementsǯ members on movement 
ideology ǲshould be positively related to their post recruitment participationǳ. 
Nonetheless, there are many types of member ideology such as general political 
ideology, beliefs in strategies and goals of their social movement organization, 
personal beliefs of members, and religious background of members and movements. 
Thus, ǲgreater participation should result when membersǯ various ideologies are 
closer to their social movement organizationsǯ ideologiesǳ.  
 
Microstructure 
Bonds or ties between members are emphasized in contemporary social-movement 
theory as a reason for one to participate in a movement. However, it is argued that 
social movements with national memberships (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 2003) 
have difficulties creating friendship and emotional commitment between 
participants since they hardly know each other. However, national social 
movements that develop from local movements can overcome this burden. 
Members can create friendships which increases post recruitment participation.  
 
Organizational Perceptions and Communication  
Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman (2003) assert that the perception of members toward 
their movement organization is relevant to their participation. The first perception 
is legitimacy which is the degree to which members trust their leaders and are eager 
to support their decisions. The next perception is the memberǯs assessment of the 
success of the movement to achieve their goals. The last one is the degree of the memberǯs loyalty and commitment toward their social movement organizations, 
which becomes the motivation for them to participate. Communication also 
becomes a major factor for increasing the participation of members when they have 
more communication with association leaders and staff members. 
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Leadership in social movements 
 
From the previous point, it is clear that leadership plays a crucial role in social 
movements. West (2008) asserts the Weberian concept of two ideal types of 
leadership. The first type is the formal leadership which is found in orthodox 
political institutions such as government, political parties, formally constituted 
organizations, judiciary etc. Hierarchies of leadership levels are generally found in 
this type of leadership. The second type, informal leadership, takes place in a 
different political context that mostly engages with social movements. Nonetheless, 
West (2008) emphasizes that ǲformal leadership still arises both within movement 
organizations and in their relations with political institutionsǳ.  
 
Morris and Staggenborg (2004) put that leaders ǲboth influence and are influenced 
by movement organization and environmentǳ.  Some leaders maintain the goals of 
social movement organization while pursuing their own interests. In contrast, some 
leaders only work for interests of their organizations. Besides, ǲdifferent types of 
leaders may dominate at different stages of a movement's development and 
sometimes come into conflict with one anotherǳ. Ganz (2009) asserts that the ǲstereotypical charismatic public personaǳ leadership is needed for social 
movements, because ǲsocial movements are organized by identifying, recruiting, 
and developing leadership at all levelsǳ. Those who work in this type of leadership 
(2009) are given various names such as ǲleaders, agents, organizers, lecturers, circuit 
riders, travellers, representatives, or field secretariesǳ. 
 
In terms of the social composition of leadership, the leaders (Morris and 
Staggenborg 2004) are not casually selected as a representative collection from the 
members. Principally, they must have higher education and social status than their 
supporters. The reason given that social movement leaders need to have financial 
resources, flexible schedules, social contacts, and be able to conduct intellectual 
activities, in order to accomplish crucial tasks, such as the following: 
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 …framing grievances and formulating ideologies, debating, interfacing with 
media, writing, operating, devising strategies and tactics, creatively 
synthesizing information gleaned from local, national and international 
venues, dialoguing with internal and external elites, improvising and 
innovating, developing rationales for coalition building and channeling 
emotions. 
 
However, there are leaders that come from the poor and working class. They 
(Morris and Staggenborg 2004) are not as well represented as the other leaders but 
they enjoy sharing interests with their class. Despite coming from the lower class, 
most have a formal university education. Some grow up in ǲmovement familiesǳ or 
gain movement experience from other leaders enabling them to obtain leadership 
skills.  
 
A successful social movement requires the leaders to have educational capital and 
hands-on movement experience which can be obtained from universities or, 
sometimes, an educational forum within the movement. Morris and Staggenborg 
(2004) give an example of the poor and uneducated people in the civil rights 
movement that they develop knowledge by joining the ǲcitizenship schools,ǳ which 
established in the movement.  As well, social movement leaders need to learn how 
to manage the movement, because they have to ǲassert a public voice and collective 
identityǳ. They (2004) must encourage the movement participation by moral 
persuasion. This tactic is a forceful mean for recruiting followers and authorizing 
the movement. Ganz (2009) interestingly describes the ǲprophetic imaginationǳ 
phrase used by Walter Brueggemann thus: 
 
Leadership in social movements requires learning to manage the core 
tensions at the heart of what theologian Walter Brueggemann calls the ǲprophetic imaginationǳ: a combination of criticality (experience of the worldǯs pain) with hope (experience of the worldǯs possibility), avoiding 
being numbed by despair or deluded by optimism. A deep desire for change 
must be coupled with the capacity to make change. Structures must be 
created that create the space within which growth, creativity, and action can 
flourish, without slipping into the chaos of structurelessness, and leaders 
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must be recruited, trained, and developed on a scale required to build the 
relationships, sustain the motivation, do the strategizing, and carry out the 
action required to achieve success.  
 
Relationships between leaders and members are very significant in social 
movements. A good relationship with the leaders, organization, and other members 
is the main reason for one to join a movement. Ganz (2009) points out that ǲa set of 
peer relationshipsǳ helps the members to build strong trust, motivation, and 
collective action. On the other hand, weak ties expand the access to prominent skills, 
learning, and information. He stresses both bonds as necessary to create the 
commitment and understanding that produce a successful movement. This is an 
important task for the leaders to accomplish.  
 
Some leaders (Morris and Staggenborg 2004), who lack movement experience, 
develop skills and knowledge from their cultural and political backgrounds. Some 
learn from their movement's previous organizations. Grievances of individuals and 
society are used to convince people to join movements which new and 
inexperienced leaders must understand this ǲpre-existing opportunityǳ and use it to 
create ǲpolitical and cultural opportunitiesǳ. 
 
Nevertheless, a goal of social movements is to appeal to more adherents as well as 
to sustain and enlarge the movements. To achieve this, the movement (Rucht 1996) 
requires ǲresources such as people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technical 
tools to process and distribute information and to influence peopleǳ. Thus, 
mobilization for action (Walgrave and Manssens 2005) requires motivational 
framing strategies to convince the potential participants that their presence at a 
protest can dispel the problem. It is essential for the leaders to realize the 
significance of frames and their persuasive force in social movements. Morris and 
Staggenborg (2004) explain how leaders engage with mobilizations and framing 
thus: 
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Leaders offer frames, tactics, and organizational vehicles that allow 
participants to actively construct a collective identity and participate in 
collective action at various levels. In doing so, leaders rely not only on their 
personal attractiveness and abilities, but also on previous experiences, 
cultural traditions, gender norms, social networks, and familiar organizing 
forms.  
 
From the above statement, leaders in social movements have a crucial obligation to 
create collective actions through framing process. They apply frames to convince 
participants and construct the collective identity of the groups. Not only do they 
have their own charismatic personalities, the leaders also employ past experiences, 
including cultural influences, to conduct the movement. In the following sections the 
means in which social movement leaders apply cultural traditions to mobilize 
people through frames and framing process will be examined and explained.  
 
2.1.2. Frames and social movements 
 
The term ǲframeǳ (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 3) was first introduced in 1954 by 
Gregory Bateson in his essay about epistemology and animal behavior. 
Subsequently, Todd Gitlin applied the term into his widely used terminology of 
social movement research. In 1980 Nisbet (2010) interestingly summarizes the 
usage of frames in various fields of study. According to Nisbetǯs explanations, 
experts apply frames to communicate with their audience and other experts, for 
example, journalists employ frames to shorten complicated issues into interesting 
news items, while audiences justify issues and events through frames as an 
interpretative schema. Thus, frames in communication are applied to unfold a 
sequence of events and promote particular definitions and interpretations of 
political issues (as cited in Chong and Druckman 2007).  
 
In terms of social movement studies, ǲframingǳ has been used as verb to signify a 
dynamic occurrence which indicates agency and conflict through reality 
construction in the work of social movement organizations. Thus, framing is the 
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process by which movement actors engage in interpretative work to produce and 
maintain meaning for movement participants and potential supporters, as well as 
antagonists (Benford &Snow 2000; Hewitt and McCommon 2005). In both the 
movements and counter-movements, framing (Hewitt and McCommon 2005, p.39) 
is a ǲcultural struggleǳ in which each of the factions must ǲfind ways to counter, 
combat, and/or reframe the claims of the otherǳ. Whereas Erving Goffman (as cited 
in Nisbet 2010) terms the meaning of frames as ǲschemata of interpretationǳ that is 
individual interprets the meaning of the occurrences and issues through ǲcultural 
beliefs and worldviewsǳ. To do this, those issues and events are framed then placed, 
recognized, classified, and branded through the framing process of the framers. 
 
The core functions of a frame in social movements are described by scholars.  For 
instance, Van Gorp (2010) provides an explanation that a core function of framing is 
used to define the problematic issues by indicating the roots of the problem and the 
consequences through a specific interpretation. Correspondingly, Entman (2004, 
p.5) gives the definition of framing as being the process of selecting, emphasizing, 
and connecting some aspects of occurrences or issues in order to raise a specific 
interpretation, evaluation and/or resolution of that issue or event. Also, this could 
be seen from Nisbet (2010) that frames help to define the importance and definition 
of the issues including the responsible agents, the problem, and the resolution of the 
issue. As a result, frames as part of the culture are used by the movement actors to 
accomplish the struggle by defining issues as functions and apply them into the 
movement. 
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2.1.3. Mobilizing frames and Metaframes  
 
Mobilizing frames 
 
Snow and Benford (2000, p.162) put that frames and framing have been used in the 
operation of social movements for a long period of time. Metaframes are applied to 
contribute to meaningful events, consolidate experiences, and guide actions, while 
mobilizing frames similarly act in this interpretative work by clarifying and 
summarizing the appearances of the ǲworld out thereǳ. From this, social movement 
actors produce collective action frames, or mobilizing frames, as ǲaction-oriented 
sets of beliefs and meaningsǳ. The successful mobilizing frames, furthermore, must 
be able to counter their rivalsǯ frames and undermine the arguments of their 
opponents in order to demobilize their movements. If frames have these capacities, 
it appears that they are likely to appeal to a greater number of participants (Benford 
and Snow 2000; Johnston and Noakes, 2005; Hewitt and McCommon 2005). 
 
In terms of the core tasks, mobilizing frames have crucial functions in diagnosing 
issues and events with a new interpretation. They also persuade potential 
constituents to mobilize by giving compelling reasons and solutions to the problem. 
In sum, the important issues and events are defined to convince the support from 
potential constituents, adherents, and bystanders. In framing, the leaders must 
specify their identity and opponents by differentiating ǲweǳ from ǲthemǳ. The 
potential participants must feel that they are responsible as agents, or ǲweǳ, to take 
part in changing their history. On the other hand, their opponents, or ǲthemǳ, must 
be blamed as ones who create the injustice that stimulate the mobilizations of ǲweǳ 
(as cited in Noakes & Johnston 2005, p. 6). 
 
In this dissertation, Entman's concept will be used to analyse the frames and 
framing strategies of Sondhi Limthongkul and those of the anti-coup groups. In 
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terms of frame analysis, Entman (as cited in Matthes and Matthias 2008) proposes 
that there are four functions of a frame: 
 
Problem definition is the first function that the frame producers must construct to 
point out the faults of issues and events. Gerhards (1995) explains the details of the 
functions as a framing strategy to produce effective frames. He puts that the 
problem must be empirical when appear in public. Thus, the problem of the issue 
will be blamed on the opposite. Also, he suggests that to make a problem more 
tangible it must be created to be close to ǲthe individualǯs own life-world 
experienceǳ in order to relate to the daily experience of frame receivers. Another 
suggestion from Gerhards is to highlight a problem that connects to ǲuniversal 
values or ideological frameworksǳ. Hence, culture plays a major part in this process. 
In addition, the problem should have a broad impact on society to make people 
concern, which leads to the awareness that something is wrong and needs to be 
solved quickly. Thus, the problem of the issues and relevant actors must be 
identified in this element or function. The branded antagonists of the frame 
producers are pointed out as the relevant actors, agents, and culprits who cause the 
problems. 
 
Causal interpretation is the next function to identify the reason of the culprits to 
cause the problem. Gerhards (1995) indicates that to mobilize effectively, the frame 
producers must externalize the cause as a broad societal problem, not for 
individuals, that the public would feel moved to solve the problems. Besides, the 
agents, or opponents, should be framed as ones whose pursuit of their personal 
interests caused the problem. 
 
The third function is moral evaluation which the agents or opponents (1995) will 
be judged on their morality and discriminated out of the moral community.  This can 
be done in a positive, negative, or neutral way, and can refer to different targets. 
Only blaming on the problem and point out to the culprits is not powerful enough, 
they must be branded or labeled their faults as bad persons. The frame producers 
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are able to brand their opponent as immoral people, on the other hand the framers 
can frame themselves as being on the moral side. 
 
Treatment recommendation is considered an important function in social 
movements. It is involved with offering the solution to the specified problem. This 
(Benford and Snow, 2000 p.216) could be ǲa plan of attack, and the strategies for 
carrying out the planǳ. For Gerhards (1995), he focuses on discrediting the 
government since social movements in modern societies are mainly involved with 
the political system, therefore the solution must be derived from the political system 
and the ruling government. Johnston and Noakes (2005, p.6), however, assert that 
only proposing a solution is not powerful enough to convince people to act, it must 
be promoted together with other functions.  
 
Metaframes 
 
To make a success in a mobilization, the leaders must be able to get people onto the 
streets, only pointing to the problem and questioning the ethics is not forceful 
enough to motivate people to take action. Walgrave and Manssens (2005, p. 115) 
explain in their work that movements with large numbers of participants would not 
get people into street if they could not achieve motivational framing. Thus, framing 
in social movements must bring attention to the grievances, unfairness, and 
suffering which lead to the creation of blame, responsibility, and the solution for 
these situations.  The key to motivate the collective action, according to Snow and 
Tarrow (as cited in Valocchi, 2005, 54), should resonate with the reminiscent 
cultural symbols of the potential constituents.  Thus, metaframes are engaged in this 
task. 
 
In social movement the frame promoters construct mobilizing frames in accordance 
with the metaframes or master frames.  The term master frame was created by 
David Snow and Robert Benford when describing ideal origins of a protest in which 
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ǲa master frame is essentially a collective action frame writ largeǳ (as cited in 
Stanbridge 2002). Master frames contribute a universally powerful set of ideas, 
cultural symbols, and interpretative packages that resonate with movement actorsǯ 
manipulation to promote their specific claims and objectives (Stanbridge 2002; 
Noakes & Johnston 2005). However, in this study the term ǲmetaframes” will be 
applied in place of ǲmaster frames". 
 
Generally, metaframes and mobilizing frames have both similarities and differences. 
Mobilizing frames (Stanbridge 2002) are constructed by frame promoters or 
movement actors to authorize their claims and objectives. They highlight the blame 
for that event or issue and connect it with the real world to create a specific 
meaning. Metaframes perform the same task, but at a general level. In addition, 
Tucker (2011) points out that metaframes and mobilizing frames have comparable 
purposes with different levels of function. She suggests that mobilizing frames are 
constructed by social movement activists aiming at recruitment, momentum, and 
construction of a collective identity. On the other hand, metaframes (2011) are not 
involved with creating a movement, but regularly pre-exist a movement and can be 
universally adopted and transferred to other mobilizations. Similarly, Swart (1995) 
asserts that: 
 
Both collective action frames (mobilizing frames) and master frames 
(metaframes) provide movement actors with specific schemes of 
interpretations that construct the legitimacy and goals of the movement. 
Master frames (metaframes), however, emerge when collective action frames 
(mobilizing frames) influence the focus and direction of other movements 
within the same time or space. In other words, master frames (metaframes) 
are schemes of interpretation that are utilized by a diversity of movements to 
frame grievances and goals. As such, master frames (metaframes) serve as 
the connective tissue between movements within a protest cycle.  
 
In his paper, Swart (1995) defines the metaframes concept based on ǲits resonance 
with the symbolic and political culture of the frame's historical contextǳ. He 
provides the reason the other social movements adopt the previous metaframes 
that: 
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They represent successful and culturally potent ideational themes. The 
resonance of a master frame (metaframes) with the social, cultural, and 
historical context in which it emerges plays a crucial role in its adoption by 
other movements. By utilizing a culturally resonant theme or master frame 
(metaframes) to make their specific historical situation meaningful, 
movement actors "keynote" these master frames. Other social movements 
may be drawn to utilize a master frame (metaframes) to organize their own 
grievances because it has proven successful. 
 
Besides, metaframes (Van Gorp 2010) influence the participants with their ǲcultural 
themesǳ that ǲmake an appeal to ideas the receiver is already familiar withǳ. They 
are constructed by the ǲearly-riser movementsǳ and then applied by ǲlate-comer 
movements". It is explained by Noakes (2005, p. 92) that to be successful in 
movements the movement leaders adopt existing metaframes as cultural values and 
dominant ideologies and transform them to give a new interpretation to issues and 
occurrences. This is done to motivate the participation of adherents.  
 
In terms of nationalism, as part of culture, it has been applied as a metaframe in 
many social movements including in Thai movements. Oliver and Johnston (2005, 
p.189) explain the usage of nationalism in social movements thus:  
 
Master frames (metaframes) were introduced to explain the clustering of social 
movements during cycles of protest…Even broader is the nationalism master 
frame (metaframes), which can be seen across epochs, regions, and cultures. 
Intellectuals of specific national movements elaborate ideologies within this 
frame drawing upon history, culture, and political context; typical actions are 
glorification of the past, exaltation of the language, drawing boundaries with 
other national groups, political contention based on national identity, and 
transcendence or coming to terms with class divisions.  
 
In Thailand the powerful metaframes have been applied to appeal a high number of 
participants. Metaframes, as the bigger frames, have been reshaped from Thai 
nationalism which consisted of the four nationalist symbols of king, nation, religion, 
and democracy. These nationalist symbols are transformed into the four 
metaframes: king, religion, nation, and democracy/modernization. Mobilizing 
frames, as well, are rooted from these metaframes. As a result, identity of the group 
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is originated from these frames which built on nationalism.  In the following 
sections I will provide the details of the Thai metaframes, as the framework of this 
research, which will be applied to analyze the framings of Sondhi Limthongkul and 
the anti-coup groups in the early periods of their movements.  
 
 
2.1.4. The Thai metaframes 
 
Nationalism is an important part of the movement process for political 
mobilizations in Thailand. It is employed by the movement leaders to create the 
metaframes and mobilizing frames. We will see in this chapter that in some 
movement, nationalism is either wholly or sometimes partially applied depending 
on the frame promoters, the mobilizing goals, and the participants. Generally, in 
Thai politics, the frame producers that use the metaframes principally come from 
the elite classes. This has been so seen since nationalism was initially introduced by 
King Mongkut, the fourth monarch of Chakkri dynasty. Initially nationalist ideals 
consisted of the nation, religion, and the king, with democracy being created as a 
new element after the 1932 revolution. It could be seen to be used in many major 
political movements including the protests of the Yellow and the Red Shirts a decade 
ago.  
 
In this chapter, it starts with the emergence of the three primary nationalist ideals: 
the nation, the religion and the king. This will be described the beginning from the 
reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV, 1851-1868) to that of King Chulalongkorn (Rama 
V, 1853-1910), and on to King Vajiravudh's (Rama VI, 1881-1925). Before we trace 
back into the chronology of Thai nationalism, the concise picture of the early era of 
nationalism must be provided here. In the next section, furthermore, the democracy 
ideal will be included and described as the fourth nationalist element. The section 
begins from the 1932 coup up to the student movement in 1973. In this way the rise 
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and decline of traditional nationalism, as well as the way the frame promoters 
employed them in each era by will be examined.  
 
The pre-official nationalism era 
 
Back in the early Ratanakosin period, in the nineteenth century, the reasons for 
constructing nationalism derived from imperialism in Southeast Asia. In the era of 
King Nungklao or Rama III (1787 –1851), he (Barmeǯ 1993, p. 16) realized that the 
major threats to Siam would derive from Westerners. King Nungklao (Wyatt, 1984, 
p.180) warned Phraya Sri Suriyawong (Chuang Bunnag) that:  
 
There will be no more wars with Vietnam and Burma. We will have them 
only with the West. Take care, and do not lose any opportunities to them. 
Anything that they propose should be held up to close scrutiny before 
accepting it: Do not blindly trust them.   
 
Threats from the West were evidently seen in the reign of King Mongkut (1851-
186); he undoubtedly understood the power of the Western nations at that time. He 
prepared himself, his close colleagues, and the elites to handle the expansion of 
colonialism by becoming siwilai (civilized). The progress of Western knowledge and 
practices had been studied throughout the era of King Mongkut. The King was well 
known for his interest in Western culture, especially in areas such as technology, 
science and languages. Simultaneously, he developed and changed many ǲuncivilizedǳ beliefs and practices in Siam to protect the occupation from the West.  
During that time, the West (Sattayanurak 2000) determined to colonize Asian 
countries by claiming that these countries were underdeveloped. In addition the 
Bowring Treaty, signed in the reign of King Mongkut, enabled Siam to gradually 
move forward on the path of civilization by increasing trade with Western countries. 
In this way Siam transformed herself to be on a par with the Western countries.  
 
Because of the threats, proto nationalism was originated. King Mongkut constructed 
a loving feeling toward the nation by writing historical books about Siam in order to 
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create national pride in the long history of Siam. Besides, the concept of Kingship 
had been created in order to develop the concept of absolute monarchy. 
Nonetheless, his famous work was in the reform of Siamese Buddhism when he 
established the new, rational Thammayut sect which was inherited by his son and 
successor, King Chulalongkorn or Rama V (1868-1910).   
 
In the reign of King Chulalongkorn, Siam was significantly endangered by 
imperialism. The King (Connors: 2003, p.34) followed his father's footsteps by 
modernizing Siam. His most renowned modernization was that of the 
administrative structure of the Thai nation-state, which he did to defend Siam from 
imperialism and establish rules to lessen the power of the noblemen. This 
modernization or technical reforms (Barme 1993, p. 7) were done between 1892 
and 1905. Another reason for King Chulalongkorn to reform the country was the 
menace caused by the elites. The regent Chao Praya Srisuriyawong and his 
associates were major opponents of King Chulalongkorn in the early period of his 
reign. When the regent passed away, the King decided to centralize his governing 
power to secure the throne. Additional occurrence was appeared in the form of a 
petition calling for a democratic regime (Engel: 1975, p. 18), proposed by a group of 
the Kingǯs brothers: Prince Phittayalap, Prince Naret, and Prince Sawat. They 
presented the petition to the King in 1887 requesting him to replace the absolute 
monarchy with a parliamentary system under a written constitution.  The statement 
(1975) indicated that Thailand was a small country with little power that was 
threatened aggressively by great, powerful countries; therefore, Thailand should 
follow Japanǯs path by Europeanizing the government system to protect Siam from 
European countries. Their main goal was to call for the promulgation of a 
constitution and the establishment of a parliament, with equal rights for all people 
under the law.   
 
King Chulalongkorn refused this proposal. In the Kingǯs view (1975), this 
westernization was a drastic change that would not provide beneficial outcomes for 
Siam.  His reply, to those modern thinking princes, was that the parliamentary form 
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of government was not yet appropriate for the incompetent Thai bureaucracy. It 
must be reformed before adopting the new system. Siam still lacked adequate wise-
men who could draft the new law, besides the Siamese only gave their trust to the 
monarchs, never to any members of a parliament.  In the King's view, the only 
change needed for Siam at the time was the reformation of the administrative 
system.  Even though King Chulalongkorn agreed to limit royal power (1975), he 
insisted that the monarchy was the central institution in the Thai society that could 
not be weakened or restrained by any laws or institutions.  For that reason, the king 
considered that Siam must be profoundly modernized to avoid colonialism and 
other threats.  
 
The abolition of Phrai, or the slavery system, was the key reformation strategy of 
King Chulalongkorn to consolidate his power, whilst also changing the systems of 
taxation and military draft. By doing this he determined to reduce the manpower 
under the control of the nobles, consequently the political power of the nobility was 
weakened. King Chulalongkorn, as a result, was able to reform the administration 
and modernize the country without opposition from the powerful nobles. It is 
interesting that King Chulalongkorn simultaneously gained the love and respect of 
the free Siamese and strengthened his ruling power. An important effect of the 
abolition of the Phrai, or slavery system, was that it laid the foundation for a 
democratic regime being applied in Siam later. From these observations, it can be 
seen that King Chulalongkorn applied the nation, democracy, and modernization 
metaframes to perform his power centralization.   
 
In conformity with King Chulalongkornǯs intention to strengthen Siam, the chat or 
nation idea appeared in this era through some writings of intellectuals. The idea of 
nation or ǲchatǳ was borrowed from the West when the Siamese came into contact 
with the Europeans in the nineteenth century. It was raised to public when the 
friction between Siam and France over territorial interests intensified in 1893.  
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Phraya Phatsakorawong, the leader of King Chulalongkornǯs administration wrote 
an article ǮVajirayan viset,ǯ a 1889 royal journal, by intertwining the nation with the 
King (Barme 1993, p. 16-17) thus: 
 
It is understood that all the land of the kingdom belongs solely to the king. 
The king abides by the royal customs established by our ancestors who came 
together to form a Chat. This gathering of people chose, from one family, a 
capable man to be the leader of the Chat. This man was very able and 
intelligent and one the people could rely on to be their protector. This chosen 
leader guarded both internal and external security and brought happiness to 
the people. This had not been brought about by the opinion of the majority; 
rather it had been through the leaderǯs own authority. The people who were 
organized into the Chat were loyal to him and followed his every advice. 
 
Furthermore, Luang Ratanayati (Barme 1993, p. 19), a British-educated official, 
wrote an article in the weekly newspaper ǲThammasat Winitchaiǳ persuaded the 
Thai people to oppose colonialism. He invited the people to show gratitude towards 
the King and Buddhism by protecting the freedom and independence of the Thai 
race and nation.  In agreement with Luang Ratanayati (1993), another reformist 
intellectual, Thianwan (T.W.S. Wannapho), also stated his standpoint through an 
article using the British nationalism slogan (God, King/Queen and Country). In his 
article, he encouraged Thais to love and help secure the nation (chat), the country 
(prathet), the religion, and the king 
 
Channels (Barme 1993, p.21) that were employed to distribute the messages of the 
four metaframes were textbooks written by Chaophraya Thammasakmontri and the 
Royal School. Juthangkun (as cited in Chaithong: 2012, p.3) asserted that during the 
reign of King Chulalongkorn the content of the royal text books aimed to cultivate 
values and political ideology in students.  They were taught to recognize the power 
of the modern state and how it was different from the traditional power. Students, 
besides, were taught to cherish, be devoted to, and be loyal to the national interests 
and the Thai monarchy. Nonetheless, the Thai government at that time did not 
purpose to expand the ideas into general education, they were limited to royalty and 
the nobility. Thai nationalism was gradually established and applied into Thai 
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society and was later strongly promoted during the reign of King Vajiravudh, the 
successor of King Chulalongkorn. 
 
The official nationalism of King Vajiravudh 
 
When King Vajiravudh or Rama VI (1881-1925) ascended the throne, he 
encountered major challenges with the expansion of Chinese communities in Siam 
and the instability of his throne. The reason, explained by Ratanapat (1990, p.41), 
was that the political situations in other countries impacted on the security of King Vajiravudhǯs power and led him to the formation of official nationalism in Thailand.  
At the time of King Vajiravudhǯs reign, revolutions had taken place in many 
countries with absolute monarchies such as Turkey, and Portugal. However the 
most significant ones were the overthrow of the Chinese dynasty to form a 
republican state, in 1911, followed by the Russian revolution in 1917.  These 
revealed to the world that the era of absolute monarchy was on the verge of ending. 
To prevent this happening in Siam, King Vajiravudh created nationalism to preserve 
the absolute monarchy and persuade Thai people to love and protect the nation. He 
also embarked on the nationalist regimen to challenge Westernization and the 
Chinese. This made him the crucial figure in Thai history (Vella and Vella 1978, 
p.14) that established official nationalism.  Nonetheless, his concept of nationalism 
(Ratanapat 1990, p. 41) was borrowed from the British Ideology of God, King and 
Country which was transformed into nation (Chat), religion (Sasana) and king (Phra 
Mahakasat) which will be explained in the below sections. 
 
The Chat idea 
During King Vajiravudhǯs reign, Siam faced two major problems: one from Chinese 
people in Thailand and the another from the political changes in China and the West 
that were harmful to the stability of the Thai nation. By this, King Vajiravudh 
(Ratanapat 1990, p. 113) concentrated on promoting the nation, or Chat, ideology.  
The Chinese threat came about when the Chinese population in Siam had vastly 
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increased and become the dominant force in the Siamese economy. The King was 
dissatisfied that some Chinese in Thailand distinguished themselves from the Thais. 
He deemed those Chinese came to Thailand to earn money and send it back to China. 
When they had earned enough money, they would unhesitatingly move back to their 
home country. The Chinese (1990, p. 116), according to the Kingǯs view, thought that 
they were more civilized than other races. Thailand, therefore, only existed to be 
cheated and outdone by them.  
 
To create discrimination against the Chinese, King Vajiravudh portrayed them, in his 
writings, as being similar to the Jews in how they perceived other races and their 
money-making orientation. For the King (Ratanapat 1990, p.114), the Chinese, and 
the Jews, faced difficulties integrating with the native people because ǲNo matter 
what nationality he adopts for the sake of convenience, the Chinese man always 
remains a Chinaman". For them (1990, p.117), ǲmoney is the be-all and the end-all, 
and they will do anything for the sake of moneyǳ. Besides, the laziness of the Thais, 
according to the King, resulted in the shifting of the Thai economy into Chinese 
hands which was dangerous for Siam.   
 
In addition, Chinese royalist and republican groups in Siam (1990, p. 121) set up 
schools, newspapers, and hidden political associations to support political change in 
China which threatened Siamǯs security. The key activist was Siew Hoot Seng the 
Chinese newspaper owner who was the major supporter of Sun yat-Sen and Yuan 
Shih Kai in the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese collected money and sent it back to 
support the revolution. In Vajiravudhǯs view, a revolution might happen in Siam and 
disrupt the institution of the Thai monarchy. During that time the Chinese in 
Bangkok also sparked off strikes, against the tax policy changes, which caused major 
turmoil in the capital city. The King confronted the strong sense of Chinese 
nationalism among the Chinese immigrants in Siam by issuing the 1913 Thai 
nationality law. It stated that any child born to a Thai parent either in Siam or 
abroad (Barme 1993, p. 25) was a Thai citizen. This law intended to oppose the 
Chinese Nationality Act as the solution to transform the Chinese, in Siam, into 
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Siamese. However Vella (1978, p.193) argued that the Chinese Statement of King 
Vajiravudh ǲwas made to help Thais realize who they were and what values Thai 
culture had so that the Thais would stir themselves to save themselvesǳ.   
 
Accordingly the nationalist sentiment of being Thai, while discriminating against 
non-Thai or Chinese, was created to encourage the Thais to harmonize and protect 
Siam from Chinese threats.  The themes of difference in languages, loyalty to Siam, 
and the domination of the Siamese economy were constructed and led to 
discrimination against the Chinese. Nonetheless, Seksan (as cited in Connors 2003, 
p.38) viewed the underlying logic behind King Vajiravudhǯs moves as follows:  
 
By dividing the Chinese into natives and aliens, the Thai state was able to 
weaken the capitalist class politically and re-establish its political dominance 
in the relationship with the local bourgeoisie, it was a situation in which 
capitalism was allowed to grow but not the political influence of the capitalist 
class. 
 
The adoption of Western culture became another threat to Siam. King Vajiravudh 
pointed out that some Siamese imitated the Westernersǯ lifestyles, because they 
longed for acceptance and respect from foreigners. King Vajiravudh understood the 
harm in adopting Western culture that thoughtless acceptance would result in the 
peril of Thai ways. Furthermore, major civilizing developments made in the eras of 
King Mongkut and Chulalongkorn had been diminished several traditional Thai arts 
and crafts to replace  by Western style ones. Although, King Vajiravudh applied 
Western means to enhance Thai national progress and pride, he determined to 
protect Thai culture from deterioration. He (Vella and Vella 1978, p.176) once stated 
that: 
 
I donǯt at all object to all Western knowledge, for I myself have obtained 
much knowledge from the West. So I donǯt take exception to the point that 
Westerners have much to offer in the way of techniques and abilities. But I do 
question that if something is good for Westerners it must necessarily be good 
for everyone else. 
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Because of all this, King Vajiravudh created the nation or ǮChatǯ nationalist idea. 
Vella explained the meaning of ǮChatǯ saying that in old Indic ǮChatǯ meant the origin 
of birth which was easy to infer as the nation, in the sense of race. In Vellaǯs words 
(1978, p. 177), ǲSiam was no longer just a country (prathet thai or muang thai) with 
a Thai population (chao thai or phonlamuang thai), it was now also a nation (chat 
thai) with its own identityǳ. To create the Chat idea, The King highlighted the kinship 
between a man and his nation that a nation was a manǯs family where each member 
must live in conformity and union. If one behaved badly toward the nation, he would 
ruin the nation (his family). Thus, one should love the nation as oneǯs father and 
mother. As well, the real patriots must love all their companions as if they were 
their brothers. King Vajiravudh (Vella and Vella1978, p. 178) emphasized that the 
Thais had different characteristics to those of the foreigners resulting from 
Thailand's long history that included Buddhism, the arts, language, literature, and 
the love for the royal monarchs, all of which encompassed the free spirit of the 
warriors and the ǲwild tigersǳ.  
 
He (Vella and Vella 1978 p, 32) formed the Wild Tiger Corps to spread national 
unity. By being a part of the Wild Tiger Corps one could prove his love toward the 
nation more than for himself. It was interesting that King Vajiravudh seemed to 
believe that this group had a major role in spreading nationalistic ideas to the 
public.  While Vella (1978, p, 52) deemed this organizationǯs movement was the first 
and the last way to successfully distribute an attitude of nationalism to Thai people. 
Even though the precise result had not been estimated, some of those who joined 
the corps shared the Kingǯs ideas of loving and protecting the three institutions of 
the king, the nation, and the religion.  
 
The religion idea 
 
This idea was engaged with protecting Buddhism which has been appeared since 
the earliest era of Thai history. Theravada Buddhist polities in Southeast Asia 
(Tambiah 1976, p. 162) had the idea that the King must be dedicated and 
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subordinate to the religion and frequently act as the political masters to purify the 
religion. The Thai monarchy and Buddhism (Vella and Vella 1978, p. 214) had been 
connected to each other in a symbiotic relationship. Thai monarchs must be 
Buddhists and remain Buddhists all their lives, whereas the Buddhist order 
supported the state, and the state supported the order. The relationship between 
the monarchs and Buddhism was described by Thambiah (1976) as follows: 
 
It had been the custom of kings from old times to preserve the Buddhist 
religion and to further its prosperity. The way of doing this was by keeping 
cohorts of good soldiers to form an army and by the accumulation of 
weapons, with the royal power at the head. Thereby he vanquished all his 
enemies in warfare, and he prevented the Buddhist religion from being 
endangered by the enemy, as kings have always done.  
 
In the reign of King Mongkut, Buddhism in Thailand (Keyes 1989, p.124) had been 
radically transformed. He devoted himself, as a monk, to study Buddhist 
foundations. He attempted to dismiss the traditional rites which hid the authentic 
messages from the Buddha. Besides, threats from the West were a major problem 
for Siam during his reign. British imperialism started in Ceylon and Burma, both 
Buddhist countries. He realized well how much damages the British had done to 
Buddhism in those two countries, thus it was necessary to create the universal 
religious image of Siamese Buddhism. The first move of reformation (1989, p.124) 
was to contact the Sinhalese monks to purify the Tripitaka, or the teachings of 
Buddha. After that the King adopted scientific thoughts from the West in trying to 
reform Siamese Buddhist principles. Christian missionaries became his mentors, 
helping him to comprehend Western notions such as science, languages, technology, 
and theology. The Christian missionaries had developed a good relationship with 
Prince Mongkut at that time. They encouraged him to become Christian but he 
resisted to preserve his Buddhist belief.   
 
To be on a par with the Western countries, or to be civilized, eventually, King 
Mongkut (Tambiah: 1976, p.212) established a new order of ǲThammayutǳ, or 
adhering to the dharma, which was different from the order of the majority of 
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monks which was ǮMahanikaiǳ, or the great order. This was the remarkable strategy 
of King Mongkut to defend Siam from colonialism. In the Sangha, he assembled 
monks, who had the same thoughts on eradicating the traditional practices, and 
asked them to join his new sect. In Mongkutǯs view, some traditional practices were 
unreasonable and obscured the real Buddhist principles. His reformation was 
described by Tambiah as scripturalism, intellectualism, euphemerism, and 
rationalism (Ibid). During The reigns of King Mongkut and his son, King 
Chulalongkorn, the number of Thammayut monks increased, especially in 
northeastern Thailand.  In addition, many of the reformations of King Chulalongkorn 
in areas such as bureaucracy, the military, provincial administration, and slavery 
abolition were influenced by the Thammayutǯs principles. It is apparent that Thai 
kings promoted Buddhism to expand royal virtues, national welfare, and state 
power (Vella 1978; Keyes 1989). 
 
King Vajiravudh esteemed Buddhism similar to his great predecessors. During his 
childhood in Britain, he (Vella and Vella 1978, p.214) had received traditional 
training in Buddhist principles. In his experience some young Thai students were 
insecure having arguments with Christians on Buddhist subjects because they 
lacked intensive knowledge of Buddhism. This might have caused him to establish 
the Buddhist nationalist idea. When he returned to Siam, King Vajiravudh spent four 
months being a monk. As well, he became Buddhismǯs prime patron, supporting the 
order which numerous Buddhist ceremonies were promoted into the royal calendar.  
 
In terms of nationalism, King Vajiravudh stated that a patriotic Thai must be loyal to 
the King, love the nation, and be a good Buddhist. Being ǲa good Buddhist" (1978, 
p.217) was composed of four elements which appeared many times in the Kingǯs 
plays, poems, speeches, and essays. The first element indicated that a good Buddhist 
must be a moral citizen who helped to strengthen the state, since every Thai citizen 
was a part of the nation. Thus, one had to behave morally for the benefit of the 
country because ǲa good nation is made up of moral peopleǳ. The next element 
(1978, p.218) was the belief that a moral state was strong and powerful and able to 
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compete with any state. King Vajiravudh deemed that sometimes an immoral state 
might succeed in competition, but sooner or later this immorality would lead to its 
downfall.  
 
The third element (1978, p.219) was that Buddhism was a better path to goodness 
than any other religion. For King Vajiravudh, Buddhism was the best religion, 
without a god demanding obedience or punishing any disobedience.  Moreover, Buddhaǯs teaching was about generous actions not commandments.  The King did 
not want to show disrespect to other religions, he wanted to make Buddhists proud 
of their religion. When some westernized Thais insulted Buddhism as old-fashioned, 
King Vajiravudh replied that morality had no time and was worldwide. It could be 
seen that civilization in every country must rely on peace and the order of morality. 
He (1978, p.221) said, ǲOneǯs religion is an element in oneǯs nationality. Religion and 
nation are inseparable. The Thais are fortunate in having a religious faith of such 
outstanding value, a religious faith that is truly in accord with a high state of 
civilizationǳ.  
 
The last element of being a Buddhist was the will to maintain and protect Buddhism. 
The King (1978, p.222) asserted that Siam was the last line of defence and fortress 
of Buddhism, accordingly Thais must be soldiers fighting opponents with the 
principles of Buddhism. True soldiers must protect the Buddhist state. To justify the 
use of fighting, the King stated that Buddha understood the necessity of national 
defense as a moral act. Soldiers, according to Vajiravudh, were moral because they 
had arms which gave them the right to harm the others. They (1978, p. 223) had to 
do this moral task to be worthy of receiving trust from others. Thai soldiers 
sacrificed themselves for the nation and gave a commitment to protect and preserve 
Buddhism faithfully. The King (Vella: 1978, p. 222) said, ǲThose who cited the 
Buddhist injunction against taking life as a proof that military duties were immoral 
could not be good Buddhists and had only a superficial knowledge of Buddhismǳ.  
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The King idea  
 
In Thailand, the monarchy has been the most significant institution, thus the king 
element of the nationalist idea is emphasized correspondingly. For more 
understanding, the long history of the Thai kingship including the relationship 
between the monarchy and Thai people must be provided here.  
 
Thailand, according to Phya Anuman Rajathon (Rajathon 1954), was ruled under a 
monarchy during the Sukhothai period (1238-1438). The relationship between the 
King and the people at that time was described, on a stone inscription, as father and 
children. The King was called by his people ǲPohǳ which meant father, thus ǲPoh 
khunǳ was a ǲfather rulerǳ. Prince Dhani (1947: 93) described the Patriarchal 
Sukhothai Kingship as being that the monarch was the leader in both battle and in 
peace times. Besides, he was a respected father all of whose judgments would be 
accepted by all. People who had troubles and sought the kingǯs support would come 
and hit a gong, which was hung up in front of the palace, and then presented their 
petitions to the King. A unique character of the Thai monarchs was explained by 
Phya Anuman Rajathon (Rajathon, 1954, p.2) thus, ǲIn the formal names of the Kings 
there appear the words ǮAnekchonnikorn samosorn sommotǯ which means elected by 
the peopleǳ. It could be understood that Thai people would elect their kings to be 
leaders to protect their lives and secure the land. This Patriarchal Sukhothai 
Kingship was adopted into the ruling concept of many rulers, for instance, King 
Vajiravudh and King Prajadhipok who replaced the gong with a gentleman-at-arms, 
or tamruad luang, to accept any writings from the people and submit them to the 
king. Also, some of the subsequent military rulers after the 1932 revolution claimed 
their authoritative ruling as being in the patriarchal style.  
 
The notion of Thai kingship was transformed in the succeeding Ayutthaya Kingdom, 
(1351-1767). Sattayanurak (2000) explained that the beliefs in this period were 
influenced by the cosmological book ǲTraiphum Phra Ruangǳ or ǲthe Three Worldsǳ. 
It was written by a former king of Sukhothai in 1345 as a reference source for Thai 
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kings. This book had influence in shaping Siamǯs cosmological moral origins and its 
kingship for some periods of time. According to this book, the ruler was considered 
to be a Ramathibodi, or Avatar of Vishnu on earth. In this regard (Sattayanurak 
2000), ǲIt was believed that the royal authority of the king spread in every direction 
without limitationǳ. In other words, the power of the king was without boundaries.  
 
In the early part of the Ratanakosin era (1782-present), the conceptualizations of 
state and monarchy were changed in the period of King Nangklao (Rama III, 1824-
1851). This could be seen from the book, Nang Nophamat (Lady Nophamat), which 
said that this world consisted of states of various sizes and that no one state 
controlled the rest, and there was no absolute royal power that could be spread 
throughout the world. When Siam started to trade with foreigners, Siamese Kings 
realized there were other states which were more progressive than Siam.  
 
It is interesting that the era of reason emerged in the reign of King Mongkut. Thai 
history was written for the first time by King Mongkut (Rama IV). He (Sattayanurak 
2000,) wrote prawatisat thai, or the History of Thai, using new concepts. He 
portrayed the kings as "doers" who led the rise of the state, preserved peace and 
harmony, and widened the scope of progress. He (Sattayanurak 2000) saw the king 
as a human being, which can be seen from the following: 
 
The Kings could do both good and evil. If there was more good than evil, the 
man who was king would rule the kingdom with power and kindness and 
even though occasional serious errors might be made, they could not do 
away with the good altogether. 
 
King Mongkut (Sattayanurak 2000) described the king as the protagonist who built 
the country, therefore the phrase of ǲphaendin phramahakasat," or ǲthe kingdom of 
the king,ǳ referred to the king who shaped the kingdom's history. King Mongkut 
believed that it was the king's obligation to shape history. He was immensely 
influenced by King Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke (Rama I, 1782–1809), the founder of 
Bangkok. Accordingly, King Mongkut (Sattayanurak 2000) determined to propagate 
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the proud sentiment of being descended from the great king. It could be seen from 
the emphasis he placed on that it was his responsibility to act in the benefit of the 
kingdom, furthermore as a member of the dynasty the king must enhance the 
dynasty's prestige and honor.  
 
Nonetheless, the notion of absolute monarchy was expressed by King Mongkut. He 
started to frame the kingǯs royal supremacy as an absolute power. From his writings 
(Sattayanurak 2000), all things in the kingdom were possessed by the king, and by 
this he could provide them to whoever he desired. This idea to centralize ruling 
power to the king might have been aimed at securing Siam, and his throne, from 
internal and external harms. It was important for Siam at that time to escape from 
the threat of imperialism. Revered and intelligent leaders were needed to make the 
Siamese safe and sound in the era of Western colonialism. Because of this, the Thai 
King must have a superior character in order to be the central institution of Siam. 
This could be seen from Joryǯs view (Jory 2001) that King Mongkut's image was that 
of the king who maintained Siamǯs independence from the colonial powers and also 
was the father of Thai science. Besides, he was also presented as the first Ǯmodernǯ 
king who was able to speak, read and write English as well as Latin and French.   
 
As for King Chulalongkorn, he was the most beloved monarch in Thailand who 
developed various modern projects to resist the colonialism of the West. His 
purpose (Vella and Vella 1978, p.XIV) was to ǲEuropeanize his countryǳ.  In his work 
Phya Anumarn Rajathon (Rajathon, 1954, p.5) said there were two great kings of 
Chakkri dynasty who deserved to be praised. They were King Mongkut and his son, 
King Chulalongkorn, who had done many things of benefit to Siam. From this, the 
programs of  technological advancement (1978, p.127) were continued by King 
Vajiravudh with the intention of creating nationalism.  
 
King Vajiravudh's notion of kingship was created using the traditional framework 
based on the ancient Buddhist theory of kingship. The king or ǮPhramahakasat,ǯ in 
his meaning, was the Ǯchief warriorǯ who was the leader of the Thai people 
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protecting the nation. The progress of Siam resulted from these wise kings, thus 
being loyal to the nation, the religion, and the king would lead the country to 
develop as a modern state (Barme: 1993, p. 29; Vella: 1978, p. 60). In King 
Vajiravudhǯs framing, the king was the significant symbol and the visible appearance 
of the land. The Thais (Vella and Vella 1978, p. 61) had a duty to protect the king. 
Harming the king was as good as harming the nation and the peace and welfare of 
the group. 
 
King Vajiravudh (Ratanapat 1990, p. 148) stressed the heroic and valuable actions 
that the kings had done for Siam by bringing up courageous stories of the great 
kings in history such as Phra Ruang, Phra Naresuan, Phra Chao Thaksin, and King 
Rama I, the founder of Chakri Dynasty in 1782 in order to create feelings of 
gratitude among the Thais. It seemed that King Vajiravudh had a wish to be a great 
king as his ancestors. Ratanapat (1990) stated that ǲVajiravudh was more concerned 
about the survival of the monarchy than the first two nationalist ideas, namely the 
country and the religionǳ. For the king, the survival of the monarchy was the 
outcome of the strength of the nation and Buddhism.  
 
King Vajiravudhǯs nationalism had been adopted by the late rulers as the most 
important and effective ideas to perform mobilizations. In the below sections the 
democracy idea which came up as the fourth metaframe will be explained.   
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The origin of democracy in Thailand 
 
In this section I determine to explore the fall of the king idea and the rise of 
democracy/modernization nationalist idea as the fourth metaframe. The details of 
the 1932 democratic revolution will be touched on briefly because the direction of 
this chapter is focused on nationalism and the metaframes.  
 
The notion of democracy and modernization originally appeared in the eras of King 
Mongkut and King Chulalongkorn. The reformation, westernization, and 
Europeanization by the two kings became the foundations of democracy and 
modernization.  Furthermore, the bureaucratic reformation of King Chulalongkorn 
brought about the changing of political environments in Siam. Peopleǯs political 
consciousness was transformed when the King introduced the new system of 
bureaucracy to them. Eventually it inspired and led some of them to overthrow the 
absolute monarchy afterwards.  
 
Some might argue that the primary modernization of King Chulalongkorn focused 
on governmental and administrative reform rather than pushing Siam into a 
representative political regime. In this regard, the king considered that Thailand 
was not yet mature enough for a democratic regime. Nonetheless, he said (Likhit: 
1992, p. 115), in a meeting of the ministers in 1910, ǲI will have my son, Vajiravudh, 
give Thai people a present upon his ascending the throne. That is, I will have him 
grant a parliament and a constitutionǳ. However, King Vajiravudh stated that Thai 
people were not qualified for democracy, because they lacked political knowledge. 
He (1992, p. 116) also criticized the dishonesty of the political parties that would 
bribe people to support them. Even though he built ǲDusitthani,ǳ the miniature city 
with an experimental democratic government, some my have seen it as his play 
thing. Those people, however, could not read his real mind, since the King also 
created projects (1992, p. 117) that were involved with liberty, freedom, and the 
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rights of the people, such as compulsory education, the Wild Tiger Corps, and 
freedom of the press, or the public's voice.    
 
After the death of King Vajiravudh, democracy emerged in Thailand in the reign of 
his successor, King Prajadhipok or Rama VII (1893-1941), the seventh king of 
Chakkri dynasty. He was the youngest son of King Chulalongkorn and the younger 
brother of King Vajiravudh. In the final years of Vajiravudh, the affairs of the 
monarchy and the country had been in an appalling state. In Suwannathatǯs words 
(Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p.73), King Vajiravudh ǲwas generous in not finding fault 
with his courtiers and favorites. He had never ceased to lavish them with his 
personal wealth and, often, at the state's expenseǳ. This regression of the economy 
had a huge impact on the administration of King Prajadhipok. To relieve the 
economic crisis, King Prajadhipok proposed strict economic plans for both the 
palace and the nation.  Many expenses, including some of the nationalism projects of 
King Vajiravudh, were reduced to balance the budgets. King Prajadhipok set about 
repairing the damage to the financial condition by implementing significant budget 
cuts and retrenching the expenses of nine to ten thousand officials. Undoubtedly, the 
plans caused immense conflicts between the new King and his civil servants and 
military elites. Furthermore, the King (Thananithichot 2011) improved the 
liberalization of the absolutist system by reinstating the Privy Council in 1927 and 
introducing a municipal system. He also set up the Supreme Council to ǲreturn to 
Chulalongkornǯs administrationǳ which had been a magnificent time of increasing 
confidence of the Thai people. Besides, it was a great augmentation to the security of 
the monarchy.   
 
This Supreme Council consisted of six senior and superior princes. They had a duty 
to minimize the power of the king, together with making suggestions to the king on 
how to prevent the sort of unwanted situations that used to happen in King Vajiravudhǯs era. The Supreme council committee had the style of a parliamentary 
debate and reflected some of the general public's opinions. Meanwhile, the Privy 
Council (Suwannathat-Pian: 2003, p.75) turned into a meeting for discussing 
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unimportant matters. Also, Prince Songkla (Barme, 1993, p.64), a brother of King 
Prajadhipok, informed Thai students and officials in Paris that the King ǲwill do 
something that no Thai king has done before, he will give the people a constitution 
in the manner of other civilized countriesǳ. However, it is interesting that there was 
no solid indication that King Prajadhipok would renounce his supra-legal status and 
promulgate the constitution. The King (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p. 77) seemed to 
believe in the absolute monarchy which was ǲvery good and very suitable for the 
country as long as we have a good kingǳ.   
 
This situation led to the increased anxiety of Pridi Phanomyong a Paris-based 
student lawyer. In 1927 he and his fellow Thai students, including Thatsanai 
Mitraphakdi and Prayun Phamonmontri, held a series of meetings with a young 
military officer, Phibun Songkram. The secret meetings (Barmeǯ, 1993: 64) 
concentrated on the crisis in the Thai economy and the lack of hope for political 
reform. As a result, the formation of the Khana Ratsadon (The Peopleǯs Party) whose 
aim was replacing the absolute monarchy with a representative political regime was 
originated.  
 
Finally, on the 24th of June 1932, the Peopleǯs Party (Barmeǯ, 1993: 64) moved 
against the throne of King Prajadhipok and seized the power of the state without 
bloodshed. The coup seemed to be very smooth and lacked complexity; however, 
there was a great build-up of friction and conflict between the Khana Ratsadon and 
the royalists. According to a British report, the Khana Ratsadon intended to abolish 
the monarchy forthwith and establish a republic. However, all of Siamǯs treaties with 
foreign countries were signed in the name of King Prajadhipok. Any sudden 
terminations of these agreements, due to the abolition of the monarchy, might cause 
serious interferences from the West. By this, the coup leaders had to preserve the 
existence of the monarchy. 
 
An announcement from the Peopleǯs Party affirmed the reasons for staging the coup 
that the monarchy had been deceitful, corrupt, and unconcerned about the peopleǯs 
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troubles. From this, the Peopleǯs Party (Connors: 2003, p. 39) declared the six 
principles of the group: to maintain the sovereignty of the nation, to provide 
employment, to formulate a national plan, to have equal rights, freedom, and liberty 
for all, and to provide full education to everyone. Formally, the role of the monarch 
was precisely limited by the permanent constitution that was promulgated on 
December 10, 1932.  The monarch (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p. 83), according to the 
traditional royal prerogatives, must be the outstanding figure when performing the royalǯs affairs of the country. King Prajadhipok did not want to be treated as a 
rubber stamp king for the Peopleǯs Party since the government refused to fulfil the 
monarchy's requirements.  In the end, on March 2, 1935, King Prajadhipok signed a 
document of abdication.  His nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol (2003, p.85) became 
his successor and the second constitutional monarch in Thai history. 
 
After the coup in 1932, Khana Ratsadon or the Peopleǯs Party determined to retain 
King Vajiravudhǯs nationalism and continued to employ it. The reason was to 
maintain peace, because they could not provide any reasonable alternative 
explanations for establishing their authority and legitimacy to rule the country. 
Moreover, the new idea of changing adherence from the King to the Constitution 
seemed like a novelty to Thai people, especially the peasants. Nithi (2007) assumed 
that shortly after the revolution it would be difficult for the people to be ruled under 
a military dictatorship. The Thai were forced to accept and believe in new 
institutions such as parliament, the prime minister, and even the concept of 
leadership. The feelings of uncertainty and curiosity of Thai people toward the new 
regime made Khana Ratsadon decided to continue with King Vajiravudhǯs 
traditional nationalism. Nevertheless, the democracy nationalist idea was formally 
generated this time to counterbalance the significance of the king idea.  
 
Explaining the utilization of nationalism, from the eras of the preceding monarchs, 
in the authoritarian government of the 1932 coup, Connors (2003, p.38) said, ǲIt 
was the disciplinary use of nationalism to stave off any challenges to power that 
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might come from the growing non-royalist fractions of the capitalist class, as well as 
potential political dissidenceǳ.  In the following governments, the nation was 
intertwined with economic development and modernization, and democracy was 
seen as a component of the modernity package of the elite rulers.  
 
The nationalism of the People’s Party 
 
The focus of the Peopleǯs Party on nationalism after the revolution was an attempt 
to make Thai people feel confident with the new constitution co-existing with the 
monarchy. As the awkward situation continued they realized that the people could 
not completely trust them.  At this point the coup leaders started framing the first 
constitution as part of the democratization. The Khana Ratsadorn or Peopleǯs Party   
(Likhit: 1992, p.121) familiarized Thai people with the coup and democratic ideas 
through propaganda. They distributed leaflets throughout Bangkok and broadcasted 
texts on the radio including the six principles that condemned the evil of the 
monarchy. This had been done to legitimize their coup. Pridi Phanomyong (Stowe: 
1991, p.12), a key leader of the Khana Ratsadorn, fully supported a constitutional 
government and the complete reformation of economic and social structures as 
concepts for the revolution. His political idea came from Western education and Sun 
Yat senǯs theory of a step-by-step approach to democracy. Accordingly, he intended 
to establish a republic, whereas some high-ranking military coup makers preferred 
to retain the presence of the monarchy in Thailand. Nonetheless, within six months 
of the coup the Khana Ratsadorn eradicated several longstanding bureaucratic 
departments administrated by the royalists. New units were established to support 
the governing of Khana Ratsadorn. Some influential royal family members were 
ordered to leave Thailand. At this time the significance of the monarchy was 
reduced which meant the king element of the nationalist idea was played down in 
importance. The democracy metaframe was fully employed to legitimize the 
authority of the Khana Ratsadorn.  
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To continue the propaganda, Luang Wichit Watakarn (Barme: 1993, p.104), an 
important nationalist, was appointed to be responsible for the construction of 
nationalist sentiments. From 1933 to 1938, the constitution was promoted 
intensively. Wichit used his work place at the Department of Fine Arts as the base to 
promote the importance of the constitution. In 1933, he (Barme, 1993: 108) wrote 
an article explaining the meaning of a charter:  
 
In order to bring about peace, justice for all, prevent oppression, stop the 
abuse of power and create political order, progressive countries all over the 
world have set down a law stating the power of government and the people. 
What is more, this law does not just apply to the government and people, but 
also the king, the leader of the country as well. This law is called a 
constitution. 
 
Even though the monarch was under the constitutional law, Wichit encouraged the 
public to believe that the King had remained as head of the state. He (Barme, 1993, 
108) explained: 
 
The King is still the head of the nation. He is the highest personage in the land 
and nobody may harm or criticize him. He is in charge of Siamǯs armed 
services. He uses his power to pass laws recommended to him by the 
National Assembly, and maintain orders in the Kingdom with the help of the 
Cabinet. He can initiate meetings of the Assembly. He can close it down and 
choose new members of the Cabinet. He has the right to impose martial law, 
and declare war. He has the right to make peace treaties and other forms of 
legal agreement with foreign powers. 
  
This article convinced people who were in doubt about the constitution and the role 
of the monarch in political affairs. Barme (1993, p.109) pointed out that Wichitǯs 
discourse showed that the constitutional system was the most appropriate regime 
leading to the most justifiable form of government.  In the conclusion of his article, 
Wichit (Barme, 1993, 109) summarized that: 
 
Let everybody be confident that this constitution will bring progress and 
happiness to our country. We must make our constitution secure as it is the 
basis of our nation. Anyone who is in opposition to the constitution is to be 
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considered an enemy of the nation. Anyone who loves the nation and has 
hope for the future must comply with the constitution.  
 
In this article the nation metaframe was connected to democracy. Wichit (Barme, 
1993, 109) stated that respecting the constitution was part of being in a group or 
the nation, individuals who opposed the constitution indicated they refused to have 
a relationship with society. Regarding this, Pridi, Wichit, and the other committee 
members agreed to promulgate the law on November 5, 1933 as the Act for the 
Protection of the Constitution.  Its goal (Barme, 1993, 110) was to ǲpromote a belief 
in the constitution, provide protection for its principles, and help the people 
understand the notions of constitutionalismǳ.  
 
For the rest of the nationalist ideas, Wichit published an article entitled latthi chu 
chat (Nationalism) to stress the importance of the development of the nation. He 
wrote about the four essential principles for securing the glory of the nation stating 
that: ǲthe supremacy of the nation is above all else: support for Buddhism as the 
national religion; respect for the constitution and the king; total opposition to 
communismǳ. It can be seen that the king metaframe was not the first in importance. 
In his book, "Universal History,ǳ Wichit described the history of Thailand as part of 
the universal history. Due to Soontravanich (as cited in Sattayanurak, 2010), Wichitǯs discourse focused on the history of warfare between Myanmar and 
Thailand during the Ayutthaya and early Rattanakosin periods. The bravery of and 
lessons learned by King Naresuan and King Taksin in the independence wars were 
particularly emphasized, which was definitely borrowed from King Vajiravudhǯs 
nationalism.  
 
In 1936, the Department of the Interior issued the ǲManual for Citizensǳ to help 
people understand the new democratic system. The first edition (Connors: 2003, 
p.45) stated that ǲSiam is no longer an absolute monarchy, but a system of 
democracy which is described as a government of the citizens by the citizensǳ. 
However, a year later, an improved edition told the people to be good citizens by 
loving the nation, the religion, the king and the constitution. The four metaframes 
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which were applied in this period concentrated on democracy/the constitution, the 
nation, the religion, and the king. 
 
The nationalism of Phibulsongkram  
 
During the era of Khana Ratsadorn, the rise of the military in the group led to the 
beginning of a military leadership. Field Marshal Phibulsongkram was another 
prominent coup leader who was the successor to Phraya Bahol, the former military 
leader of the Khana Ratsadorn. Phibulsongkram had become the premier from 
December 1938 to July 1944.  
 
Phibulsongkram was famous from creating a different style of nationalism in the 
late 1930s.  By attempting to replace the three ideologies of the nation, the religion, 
and the king with a leadership cult, Phibulsongkram became the first premier who 
emphasized the essential roles of the leader. In fact, the leader, in this sense, was 
him. He claimed that Japan had kept their King, whereas Thailand did not have a 
suitable ideology to follow suit. Therefore, during World War II, he developed a 
modern policy in nationalistic and democratic terms. The regime (Connors, 2003, 
41) was seen as encouraging xenophobic nationalism by introducing anti-Chinese 
procedures and promoting Thainess through state decrees or ǲRatthaniyomǳ. This 
was viewed by Likhit Dhiravegin (1992, p. 125) as an anti-Chinese administrative 
policy and a war policy of an alliance with Japan to defend Great Britain and the 
United States.  
 
Wichit still played an important role in Phibulsongkramǯs nationalist projects. He 
was assigned to introduce Ratthaniyom, or the state decrees, to the Thai people. The 
concept was explained by Phibulsongkram (Stowe: 1991, p. 124) saying that it was ǲsimilar to the proper type of etiquette observed by all civilized peopleǳ. Obviously, 
it was a patriotic code of behavior for Thai people. The standards of behavior 
involved dressing in modern clothing, eating and bathing manners, and being loyal 
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to the King, the nation, the Thai flag, and the national anthem. Moreover, the 
government (Stowe: 1991, p. 12) issued a Cultural Maintenance Act to declare that 
the Thais had the duty ǲto practice national customs and promote the prosperity of 
Thailand by conserving and revising existing customsǳ. Thak (1974, p.188) put that Phibulsongkramǯs nationalism purposed to increase the power of Thai state. 
 
In addition, Wichit proposed to change the name of the country from Siam to 
Thailand. He (Thak 1974, p.122) reasoned that Siam was named by the leaders of 
Cambodia and generally adopted by the Chinese and the Europeans, therefore to 
bond all Thais in the country and abroad in a similar way to Indo-China, British 
Burma and southern China, the name of the country needed to be changed. 
Referring to the anti-Chinese sentiments, Likhit (1992, p.125) thought that they 
were created to oppose the Chinese control over the Thai economy. Because of this, 
the Laws of Reservation of Occupations were issued in order to reserve some jobs 
only for Thais. Many Chinese schools were closed and discrimination against people 
of Chinese origin occurred.  
 Phibulsongkramǯs nationalism, according to Vella (1978, p.269), comprised of four 
elements: militarism, economic nationalism, chauvinism and cultural nationalism.  
Although, Phibulsongkram used Vajiravudhǯs ideas as a nationalist model in terms 
of language, historical magnificence, Buddhism, traditional Thai values and anti-
Chinese representations, his nationalism was based on militaristic and nationalistic 
ideas. Nevertheless, Phibulsongkram (Vella and Vella 1978, p.270) forced his 
program through by the use of fines, threats and assassinations which was 
dissimilar to King Vajiravudh who relied on voluntarism, persuasion and 
propaganda.  
 
The metaframes constructed by Phibulsongkram evidently concentrated on the 
nation symbol, since many programs had been designed to protect Thailand. The 
reason is Phibulsongkram was an autocratic premier who established the leadership 
cult in Thailand, therefore the democracy and king metaframes obviously became 
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less important and replaced by modernization.  Throughout his leadership, it was 
notable that Phibulsongkram (Stowe 1991, p. 128) was an anti-royalist. Many 
dominant royalists had been forced into exile in Malaya. Between 1939 and 1943, 
the government embarked on a policy of strengthening the power of the executives. 
It aimed to manage the expenses of the legislature and the monarchy, which the 
royal wealth was confiscated to prevent the funds being spent to oppose 
Phibulsongkram. 
 
The premiership of Phibulsongkram coincided with the early stage of King Bhumibolǯs reign. From Joryǯs work (as cited in Fong 2009), ǲthe representations of 
monarchs virtually disappeared from the Thai political scene between 1930s and 
1950s. Phibulsongkram at that time felt no desire to engage himself with the new 
boy monarchǳ. King Bhumibol once recalled an experience he had with the 
government of Phibulsongkram, he said: ǲWhen I opened my mouth, theyǯd say ǮYour majesty, you donǯt know anythingǯ. So I shut my mouth. I know things but I 
shut my mouthǳ. Accordingly, throughout the era of Phibulsongkram, King Bhumibol 
(Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p.149) had to follow the premierǯs rules, since the Kingǯs 
opinions were either politely or not so politely pushed aside.  Photos of King 
Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit were prohibited to be shown in peopleǯs houses and 
government offices.  The monarchǯs roles were minimized in this era, thus the king 
metaframe seldom applied in Phibulsongkramǯs nationalist movements. 
 Phibulsongkramǯs thought toward democracy was changed in the later years of his 
premiership in 1950s. He (Likhit: 1992, p. 140) embarked on a world tour to the 
United States, Spain, Britain, and some other countries from April to June 1955. 
During his tour, he had met many prominent leaders such as President Eisenhower, 
Queen Elizabeth, and also had an audience with the Pope. This experience, according 
to Likhit, ǲstirred up a democratic spirit in himǳ.  The Hyde Park speech in England 
(1992, p. 140) was very impressive for him, hence he permitted a Hyde Park-style 
debate in Bangkok at Sanamluang and in other provinces.  
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In 1955, Phibulsongkram announced a ǲNew Democracy Policyǳ to a class of newly 
commissioned naval officers in order to emphasize his being against the coup dǯetat. 
The democracy metaframe was applied which, in reality, was intended to prevent 
attacks from Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Police Chief Phao Sriyanont(Likhit: 
1992, p. 141), the two members of the triumvirate regime who rapidly expanded 
their power and challenged Phibulsongkram. Accordingly, Phibulsongkram (Ockey: 
2002, p.109) manipulated the public debate to attack the government policy in 
order to gain empathy and support from the people. In the early stages, the Hyde 
Park debate was the forum for discussing the government's policies and attracted 
various groups of people. From here, the first protest against the Social Security Act 
began in 1955.  Subsequently, according to Ockey (2002, p.109), ǲtopics began to 
focus less on policies, but more on personalities, particularly Police Chief Phao, and 
political reforms, including constitutional reformǳ. Moreover, many of the speakerǯs 
script writers were claimed to be hired by Phibulsongkram.  
 
Thak (1974, p. 138) said, in his work, that Phibulsongkram ordered his government 
officials to pay attention to the speakers. After he had been criticized, Phao fought 
back by hiring speakers to attack Phibulsongkram. Ultimately, the Hyde Park debate 
became a problem for Phibulsongkram when the anti-government and American 
protests were growing. He decided to ban all political activities. After he won the the 
dirty election in 1957, a group of 2,000 students from Chulalongkorn University 
formed a rally to protest against the government and demand his resignation. 
Finally, on September 16th, 1957, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Likhit: 1992, 144) 
staged a bloodless coup while Phibulsongkram and Phao fled abroad ending 
Phibulsongkram regime in Thailand.  
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The Seri Thai Movement 
 
A prominent movement conducted during Phibulsongkramǯs era was the Seri Thai, 
or Free Thai movement. It began during World War II when Thailand was occupied 
by Japan. At that time, the American and British armies (Stowe 1991, p.258) were 
being secretly assisted by some anti-Japanese Thais.  The most prominent of these 
was the Thai ambassador in Washington, Mom Rajawong Seni Pramoj who was a 
junior member of a Thai royal family. Seni held a press conference on December 11, 
1941 to renounce Phibulsongkramǯs collaboration with the Japanese since he 
believed that the United States would ultimately win the war. In this sense Seniǯs 
standpoint was similar to Phibulsongkramǯs in preferring the winning side. His goal 
(Stowe 1991, p.259) was to ǲdenounce Phibulsongkramǯs pro-Japanese stance and 
call on all Thais to unite in fighting for the restoration of their countryǯs 
independenceǳ.  Also, America recognized the movement of Seri Thai.  
 
In June 1942, the Free Thai movement headed by Seni Pramoj joined members from 
twenty-six countries to give an oath in the name of the United Nations.  Seni 
declared, on behalf of all Thais, to collaborate with other factions to conquer the 
Axis forces. According to Likhit (1992, p.126), Seni wished to liberate Thailand from 
Japan. The operation started with the participation of thirteen Thai students in a 
three month course of intensive military training under the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS). It was set up by General William Donovan with the blessing of 
Roosevelt. Most of the Thai students were postgraduates. Pridi, the regent of 
Thailand at that time, co-operated with the movement by conducting activities in 
Thailand with the other allies.  
 
According to Wimon (1997, p. 19), a former Seri Thai member, the Seri Thai and 
anti-Japanese activities emerged after Thailand was occupied by Japanese.  The 
members were based in Thailand, Britain and the United States. He explained that 
the main goal of the movement was to conduct any kind of activity to prove to the 
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allies that Thailand was not a party to the Japanese activities.  All Thais, from his 
announcement, refused to support the Japanese invaders and were willing to 
sacrifice their lives in collaborating with the allied nations in waging war against 
Japan. He (Wimon: 1997, p. 19) stated that the movement was ǲthe only way to 
contribute to the preservation of independence, sovereignty, pride and prestige of 
the nation after the war. The members were confident that the Allies would win 
eventuallyǳ.  
 
According to Boonrodǯs memorandum (Boonrod 1997, p. 71), another former Seri 
Thai member, he was worried about how the Thais felt about them. Some Thais 
might think the students were seeking benefits from the United States and was just 
mercenaries. However, he deemed that Thailand was under the control of Japan as a 
no-freedom state in a similar way to China and Korea. He (Boonrod 1997, p. 71) 
said: ǲJapan wanted to expand its areas of influence and domination.  If Japan were 
to win the war, Asia would fall, and Thailand would become only a stooge serving 
Japan for a long, long time to comeǳ. In view of Wimon (1997, p. 104), the success of 
this operation resulted in the ending of the war, after which the United States 
encouraged the allied forces not to examine and treat Thailand as a conquered 
country.  
 
When Thailand declared war against the anti-Japanese allied powers, the Seri Thai 
movement applied the nation and democracy metaframes as the key concepts to 
encourage their members, and other Thais, to react against Premier 
Phibulsongkram.  It was an interesting case of conflicts over the concept of ǲa good 
Thaiǳ in which Thai citizens had been encouraged by the elites to protect Thailand 
and be loyal to the nation. Phibulsongkram believed he protected the country by 
taking sides with Japan, on the other hand he was considered, by the Seri Thai, as a 
traitor who supported the evil fascist Japan. Interestingly, the Seri Thai framed 
themselves as a democratic movement that performed the honorable operation of 
liberating Thailand from the autocratic Axis which were seen by Phibulsongkram as 
the traitors. The two opponents each thought they were the ones who were on the 
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right and moral side. It seemed that the notion of being ǲa good Thaiǳ in this case 
was applied differently depending on the creators, operators, and objectives of the 
plan.  
 
The nationalism of Sarit Thanarat 
 
When Sarit staged a coup in 1957, he (Likhit 1992, p.144) followed the customary 
practice in of coup conducts by not assuming power right away but appointing a 
premier and calling an election. He established the National Society Party to support 
the stability of the government of Prime Minister Lieutenant General Thanom 
Kittikachorn. During his premiership, Thanom had struggled with problems from 
political parties, the military, and financial crisis. In 1958 Sarit staged another coup 
by claiming the Communist threat. This claim might have been be real or was just an 
excuse to get rid of his rivals. Sarit and his successors Thanom Kittikachorn and 
Prapass Charusathian had ruled Thailand for fifteen years. Besides, Sarit (Likhit: 
1992, p. 157-159) usually used the Article 17 of the interim Constitution as a 
measure to diminish the power of his opponents led to the ǲreign of terrorǳ in 
Thailand.   
 
Throughout the premiership, the modernization and nation metaframes were 
applied to his national development. It could be seen from his plans that he aimed to 
modernize Thailand using knowledge in the three areas of economy, education, and 
politics. Typically, the modernization metaframe was most used by the leaders who 
took over the country by coups to gain acknowledgement from the people. For 
example, Sarit (Srinara: 2011) provided Thailand with the national co-development 
scheme, while the revolutionary council applied the three nationalist ideologies of 
the nation, the religion, and the king to mobilize people. Evidently, role of the 
democracy/constitution metaframe was minimized in Saritǯs era which was similar 
to Phibulsongkramǯs. 
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The policies of the National Society Party (Srinara, 2011) turned into the foundation 
for Saritǯs political policies which contained the concepts of nationalism and 
socialism. Nationalism focused on honoring and respecting the nation, the religion, 
and the monarchical institutions; whereas socialism indicated that the 
administration of the government would take control of the economy in a way that 
would be to the benefit of individuals and communal groups. By this, the income and 
revenue would be shared and collected equally.  Accordingly, the nationalism 
concept of Sarit Thanarat was contained of nation, religion, king, and socialism.  
 
When Sarit required economic support from the United States, he had to change his partyǯs policy because of the anti-socialist policy of the United States. At that time, 
the United States had expanded their power in Southeast Asia after the end of World 
War II, since communism had become a major threat in the region. Saritǯs nationalist 
concept (Srinara, 2011) was changed to ǲnation, religion, king and the benefits of 
societyǳ.   
 
Even though Sarit was influenced by democratic ideas from the United States, he 
(Thak, 1974, p. 206) intended to restore Thai traditional centrality with the concept 
of Lakkhanmuang Thai or indigenous principles of state. According to Fong (2009), 
Sarit disagreed when Phibulsongkram followed the Western ideological path. He 
thought that Western values caused people to desire to destroy each other. He and 
the Revolutionary Council (Thak 1974, p. 209) announced that: 
 
The major principles of democracy established at that time (1932) were 
taken from the west, from England and France. Although there were many 
changes, those changes were made within the framework of Western 
democracy. Therefore, they were merely minor changes and could not be 
said to have been ǲrevolutionaryǳ. The Revolution of ǲOctober 20ǳ, although 
involving changes within the democratic system and not a change from 
democracy to another system, entails the transformation of the style and 
type of democracy. That is to say, it encompasses the overthrow of Western 
democracy and creates a democratic system suitable for the special 
conditions of Thailand. 
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Sarit Thanarat established his ǲThai style democracyǳ in 1957 that was different 
from the Western Democracy in some ways. This ǲThai style democracyǳ regime was 
not a parliamentary system with any opposition.  Most of the members of the 
administrative and legislative groups were not elected by the people, while the most 
powerful being the administrative group.  
 
Furthermore, Sarit adopted the Patriarchal Sukhothai regime into his ruling 
concept. The positive side was he acted as a father who cared for his children; on the 
other hand, it was combined with a Deva-raja regime which focused on absolutism.  
Kriangsak (1993: 131) described this old concept as being that the king and his 
citizens were Buddhists that belonged to the same world, therefore the monarchy 
had a close relationship with the people. The kings would extend the rights of 
administration to the public which meant that the people could have political 
parties, elections, and a parliament.  Nonetheless, an elected Prime minister was not 
necessary in this regime, whereas the king (Kriangsak 1993: 131) must be head of 
the country to control and maintain a political balance. It is interesting that the 
opinion of King Bhumibhol toward ǲThai style democracyǳ was in conformity with 
that of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The King (Hewison: 1997, p.68) said:  
We Thais need not to follow any kind of foreign democracy. We should try 
instead to create our own Thai style of democracy, for we have our own 
national culture and outlook and we are capable of following our own 
reasoning. 
 
Hewison (1997, p.68) explained that King Bhumibhol preferred not to define 
democracy in foreign terms and that democracy must be customized to correspond 
with Thai values and customs. Later, this ǲThai style democracyǳ has been adopted 
into Thai political discourse many times, mostly found in the faction that defend the 
regime and called for the original Western democracy regime.  
 
When Sarit (1974. p. 162)   staged a coup, he acted as a rescuer who got rid of the 
impurities of the system by eradicating the corruptions of the former government.  
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He seemed to know how to make use of the king metaframe. After the coup he went 
to have an audience with King Bhumibol and received a document appointing him as 
the Defender of the Capital. Sarit (Thak, 1974. p. 164) told the press that ǲI am the 
Defender of the Capital and can give order in accordance with the law because it is 
the royal commandǳ. We can see how King Bhumibol felt toward Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat. Their close relationship began when Sarit staged a coup. 
 
The king metaframe was a key frame for Sarit, and perhaps for King Bhumibol, to 
continue sovereignty. Sarit started to form a connection between the monarchy and 
the other national symbols by changing the national date from June 24 to December 
5, the birthday of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej. In other words, Sarit 
transformed the king into a symbol alongside the nation and constitution. He 
emphasized on binding the nation together with the monarchy, thus loving the King 
as good as loved the nation. Besides, Sarit authorized his regime through the 
approval of traditional legitimacy or the monarchy.  He (Connors 2003, p. 48) gave 
prominence to the monarchy institution resulted in the rise of King Bhumibolǯs roles 
in Thai society since then. Stithorn (2011, p.259) stated the view that with the 
strong support of Sarit ǲthe role of King Bhumibol became: a source of the economic 
and political goals of the regime, the ǮDevelopment Kingǯ as well as a symbol of 
national loyaltiesǳ. In Hannaǯs words (as cited Hewison 1997, p.88): 
 
The King and Sarit, surprisingly, hit it off quite well…Sarit seemed to have 
decided that a popular, indeed even a powerful king might be advantageous 
to the nation and himself. He removed many of the remaining obstructions, 
therefore, to the Kingǯs freedom of movement.  
 
The royal family became active in charities, education, organizations, public interest 
groups, religious groups, and secular ceremonies. Furthermore, the King became 
interested in development projects in the agricultural sector which earned him the 
image of ǲthe Development Kingǳ. Sarit (Thak 1974, p. 23) allowed the king to give 
audiences to the private sector; moreover he had a policy to enhance the popularity 
of the king by sending him abroad to promote the country. The Royal patronage 
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gave support to the government and private sectors. Connors (2003: 128) believed 
that in the mid-1970s the status of monarchy was insecure due to the movement of 
progressive intellectuals. In order to increase its stability, King Bhumiphol 
Adulyadej was raised to a God-like status by the official palaces and agencies along 
with being promoted as of head of state.  
 
After the Sarit regime ended, the King increased his involvement with students by 
doing activities such as the annual presentation of certificates and campus visits, 
which led to a more approachable image. During Thanomǯs government, the 
monarchy (Thak: 1974, p.424) moved closer to the army which could be seen from 
the number of military activities the king attended in 1963. In Thakǯs words (1974, 
p.25), ǲthe monarchy more and more plays the role of legitimizer of political power, 
supporter/legitimizer of broad regime policies, promoter and sanctioner of intra-
elite solidarity, symbolic focus of national unity, and broker for transferring funds 
from the private sector to the state treasuryǳ. In 1964 when Sarit was condemned 
by Thanom, for his corruptions, King Bhumibol gave his very first press conference 
to express his opinions and help Sarit from being dishonored by his scandals. 
Suwannathat-Pian (2003, p.163) wrote that: 
 
By going to the press the king had overcome the limitations put upon him as 
a constitutional monarch. Since then, His Majesty had given press conference 
to various foreign correspondents. Though His Majesty often stresses that he 
is above politics, his accessibility to the media is of political significance…His 
Majesty is no longer content to act strictly in accordance with the ground 
rules of a constitutional monarchy and confine himself to action behind the 
scenes when need arises. 
 
 
From this, the king metaframe was emphasized by Sarit Thanarat as the vital frame 
for mobilization, while modernization became the second most important frame. 
Obviously, the importance of democracy was lessened while Sarit created his ǲThai 
style democracyǳ to rule the country. In other words, the monarchy (Hewison1997, 
p.62) was seen as crucial to political stability and as such was the dominant 
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institution for Thai people and the country. In essence, the King was the nation 
embodied.  
 
The 1973 student movement  
 
After the death of Sarit, his paternal dictator legacy was inherited by his successors 
Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusathien. The first signs of the 
discontentment of university students and intellectuals towards the Thanom and 
Praphas regime emerged when the 1968 constitution was replaced by an interim 
charter in 1972. This led to the movement of students demanding a permanent 
constitution from the government.  They (Wittayakorn: 1995, p.119) had a major 
role in the struggle between the people requesting for a parliamentary democracy 
and the military juntas of Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusathien.  
 
The historical movement started when one hundred students, intellectuals, and 
politicians called for a permanent constitution and a parliamentary democracy. 
They distributed flyers and books about the constitution and democracy which led 
to arrests by the government. Consequently, the National Studentsǯ Center of 
Thailand (NSCT), which represented university students in Thailand, called for a 
demonstration with hundreds of thousands of Thammasat students and general 
public. They held a rally to demand a permanent constitution and the liberation of 
the arrested students. Wittayakorn (1995, p.122) explained that the motives behind 
this movement were a combination of various factors such as the disconnected 
developments in politics and the economy, the unequal distribution of property and 
income, the agony of living conditions, the monopoly of political power by the 
military and elite groups, and the expansion of corruption. Furthermore, the rapid 
growth of education and the media disseminated the idea of a liberal democracy. All 
of these created a substantial increase of resentment among people. In Likhitǯs 
reason, this democratic movement (Likit 1992, p. 197) began when Thanom 
government allowed The National Studentsǯ Centre of Thailand to have mild and 
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risk-free activities such as a demonstration to protest against Japanese goods, which 
was supported by the government. On the one hand, in the era of Sarit all political 
activities were banned, thus the students' activities had become more intensively 
engaged with politics. 
 
The rally of students and people resulted in a violent crackdown on 14 October 
1973 (Suwannathat-Pian 2003; Wittayakorn: 1995). On that day, one thousand 
demonstrators were injured while seventy were killed. The King (Hewison 1997, p. 
96) showed his opposition to the actions of the military dictatorship by opening the 
palace gates allowing the students to escape from the militaryǯs attack. The King 
could win the studentsǯ hearts from this situation. He also went on television to state 
his grief and shame about the violence. It is interesting that the King evidently 
supported the student movement. He (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p. 169) advised 
Thanom and Praphas to step down and leave Thailand before the intrusion of the 
communists and the leftist penetration in the country.  
 
We can see from that the movement of students in 1973 focused most on the 
democracy metaframe, while the king metaframe became the second most 
important. During their rallies, they always carried photos of the King and Queen. 
When the government forces attacked them, the students sought shelter at the 
palace. Thus, King Bhumibol was portrayed as a true constitutional monarch and as 
a force for democratization which his political role has been continued up to the 
present time.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This Thai metaframe section is ended with the 1973 student movement with the 
reason of this study which has not attempted to cover all protest movement just a 
sampling of some differed types. Besides, this 1973 student movement was 
considered as the remarkable democratic movement that emerged in the era of neo-
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Thai politics. Since the 1932 revolution Thailand has had a constitution and been 
ruled under a so-called democratic regime, most of the ruling governments came 
from coups. Therefore, junta governments have ruled Thailand at regular intervals. 
When the uprising of students and people occurred in 1973, it was the first of a new 
history of social movements.  
 
Before the 1973 movement,  people could not express their frustrations towards the 
social, economic, and political problems they had faced. The junta, furthermore, had 
failed to solve the economic crisis which led to a lack of trust from Thais. As a result, 
university students began to criticize the government and called for a change to the 
constitution. Likhit (1992, p. 196) claimed that this strategy was applied because the 
government felt insecure about this issue, and that the students were supported by 
the Thai people and some of the elites.  The major outcome of this movement was 
the overthrow of the junta government, and their powerful militant group, with 
them being replaced by a democratic regime and civic government.  
 
In terms of movement framing, the student leaders applied the ǲtrueǳ democracy 
metaframe to frame issues and events. This metaframe represented the rights of the 
people and a constitution that provided them with the power to vote for their 
democratic rulers.  The collaboration of students and people to fight for their beliefs 
originated at this time. Although there were social movements after this which 
called for democracy, this movement could be considered as the model for many of 
the later movements which all the nationalist metaframes and all social classes 
arranged in mobilization. More importantly,  this is the first widespread middle 
class based uprising. The success of the 1973 student uprising has lead to their 
tactics and framing being adopted in the demand for democracy of many 
movements in contemporary Thai politics, including those of the Yellow and Red 
Shirts. The two groups performed the unique movements to call for their political 
regimes resulted in the conflicts between classes, furthermore they applied 
movement tactics including framing which rooted from Thai nationalism to sustain 
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the movement. All of this movement will be explored through the research 
questions and methodology which provided in the follow sections. 
 
2.2. Research questions and hypotheses 
 
From the above literature, the framing perspective and the Thai metaframes  
provide the framework to the study of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup 
groups,the two opposite social movement groups in Thailand. Thus, to accomplish 
their movements the two groups apply the metaframes and mobilizing frames that  
reshaped from nationalism which results in the construction of identity that most 
appeal followers. Drawing on the previous mentioned literature and how framing is 
engaged in the social movements, consequently this study seeks to answer the 
following questions and hypotheses: 
 
H1:  In the earliest phases of social movements, as mobilizing frames are          
         being developed, metaframes must be heavily employed. 
 
RQ1: How did the social movement leaders in the early part of the   
movement employ the metaframes that were built on nationalism to 
create successful movements? And how did they construct the 
mobilizing frames?  
 
H2:  The most effective metaframes are those focused on identity. 
 
RQ2: What specific metaframes are applied and how are they engaged  
           with the mobilizing frames? In what ways do social movement  
           leaders highlight the problem definition, casual attribution, moral       
           evaluation, and treatment recommendation functions of mobilizing  
           frames?  
 
H3: As mobilizing frames develop, successful social movements will focus on  
        certain metaframes and mobilizing frames that appeal to participants.  
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H4: Successful social movements groups will adjust the focus of frames to  
        appeal participants. 
 
RQ3: Do the frames reshape a collective identity?  Do the different social      
          movement groups exhibit different identities? Does the different    
          identity result in conflicts?    
 
H5: Over time, the focus on identity metaframes may reshape the   
        identity of the participants.   
 
H6: In such cases, when social movement groups compete over identity, the  
        potential for conflict increases. 
 
 
2.3. Methodology  
 
This study explores two cases of political movements in Thailand. The first case is 
that of the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the People's 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the Yellow Shirts. The anti-coup groups which 
some of them being the initial movement groups of the National United Front of 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or the Red Shirts, will be examined as the 
second case. These two protest groups originated at different times, with different 
types of followers, and different goals. Despite these differences, they shared, or, 
indeed, borrowed from each other, some characteristics and strategies which make 
them exceptional and remarkable cases to be explored. The movement group of 
Sondhi Limthongkul was formed upon the audiences of ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ the 
famous political show, on the one hand the anti-coup groups were a collection of 
people who assembled to protest the 19 September 2006 coup. The similar goals of 
the two groups focussed on overthrowing the governments in power so as to 
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establish their ideal government and political regime. They have been major rivals 
attempted to attack each other which resulted in deep divisions in Thai society.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the framing of the two movement groups 
before they well organized and are recognized as huge mobilizations that drew 
much attention from the public. The metaframes and mobilizing frames used for the 
initial movements of the two groups are central to this study. 
 
The Cases 
 
The case of Sondhi Limthongkul  
 
The first case investigated is the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul. He started 
framing issues and events to, apparently, attack Thaksin Shinawatra and associates 
through his political show, ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ, in 2005. This show became the 
origin of the Yellow Shirts, whereas Sondhi, the host of the show, changed his role 
from a journalist to the leader of the famous movement group. The show was 
terminated from Channel 9 when Sondhi began criticizing Thaksin through the 
show. The last episode was broadcasted on September 9, 2005. After the 
cancellation, Sondhi held the show, live, at Thammasat University.  
The show had five episodes at Thammasat, later moved to Lumpini Park and 
continued for another twelve episodes before Sondhi led the demonstration on 
February 5, 2006.  
 
The contents of the show focused on informing the audiences about current political 
situations under the administration of Thaksin Shinawatra. During the show at 
Thammasat University, Sondhi presented issues as a veteran journalist. In addition, 
condemnations on issues such as populist policies, corruptions, and so forth were 
made on the show.  
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When the numbers in the audience increased, the show was moved to Lumpini Park 
which hosted the last ten episodes (and 2 special rallies) before a major movement 
in February.  In addition, frames that were produced during this time persuaded 
audiences to participate in movements that with the same issues. The pattern of the 
show at this time had been transformed in preparations for the future movements, 
thus some symbolic events and activities were performed. Sondhi also conducted 
some minor rallies around the park to exercise his ǲarmyǳ. 
                                                           
The case of the anti-coup groups  
 
The Red Shirts origins as a movement began in 2006 as the anti-coup groups. They 
emerged as groups of activists, students, scholars, and Thaksinǯs supporters against 
the 19 September 2006 coup. In the early part of the movement, the leaders of the 
groups came from various factions, although the members of the Thai Rak Thai 
Party had not yet joined the protests. They all had the same goals of demanding the 
restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution; however the call for the return 
of Thaksin Shinawatra had not yet been obvious. 
 
The protestors in the anti-coup groups were not massive in number because the 
protest began in Bangkok under strict martial law. They performed the protests in 
the central places of Bangkok to attract people and media attention. Issues and 
occurrences that were framed to attack their antagonists were condemnations of 
the undemocratic 2006 coup, corruption, and the lack of results of General Surayud 
Chulanont government. Also, General Prem Tinsulanonda and General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin were the major targets of their attacks.  
 
During this initial movement, Thaksin activated his movements to attack the junta 
and refute any accusations through international and local media and expressed his 
intention to return to Thailand. His subordinates in Thailand set up the PTV (Peopleǯs television) to broadcast political news which was banned from airing the 
programs. Subsequently, PTV started the protest to call for the freedom of 
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expression.  This time the demand for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra was 
intensified by PTV and Thaksinǯs supporters. PTV became a frontrunner among the 
anti-coup groups in attacking the junta and General Prem Tinsulanonda.  Later after 
this, some of the anti-coup groups were joined with the PTV and Thaksinǯs 
supporters to form the Red Shirtsǯ movement.      
 
Data Sources 
 
The case of Sondhi Limthongkul  
 
The data sources of the two cases are different since the frame producers come from 
different backgrounds, thus the channels they applied to disseminate the frames 
were dissimilar. The first data source for Sondhi Limthongkul's movement is his 
political show ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ, of which, Sondhi had his media network, all 
of the episodes were recorded, transcribed, and uploaded onto the Manager 
website. This study will examine the frames of Sondhi that were produced in the 
initial stages of the movement. As the originator of the Yellow Shirts, he was the first 
to construct the movement frames which were applied through the movements of 
the group. Furthermore, his political talk show ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ had been 
used as tool to disseminate the frames and the movements.  
 
As previously mentioned, during the early movement of Sondhi Limthongkul and his 
audiences, he reshaped metaframes and mobilizing frames around the idea of Thai 
nationalism. Thus, to clearly see the developments and alterations of Sondhiǯs 
framings through the movements I have divided the timeline of study into two 
phases, as per the table below: 
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The study timeline of Sondhi Limthongkul  
1. The first phase at Thammasat University:        
      9 September 2005 - 23 October 2005  
6 episodes: The last episode on 
Channel 9 and  5 episodes at 
Thammasat  
2. The second phase at Lumpini park: 
28 October 2005 - 5 February 2006 
12 episodes: 9 episodes at Lumpini, 1 
episode from Wat Pa Ban Tad, and 2 
special rally live shows 
 
Table1: The study timeline of Sondhi Limthongkul case 
The timeline begins from the last show on Channel 9, which was broadcasted on 
September 9, 2005, up to the last live show when Sondhi leads the movement as the 
first and last single leader on February 5, 2006. It is the period before the formal 
establishment of the Yellow Shirts. The first phase starts from the last show on 
Channel 9 up to the time that he hosts the final live show at Thammasat University. 
At this time Sondhi had not intentionally transformed his role into a protest leader, 
thus he constructs the frames as a journalist. However, when he moved the show to 
Lumpini, his frames were apparently altered to promote the mass movement. He 
undertook some major symbolic activities to prepare the audiences for the future 
protests. Consequently, the frames that he created during this time were 
determined to stimulate the anger of audience toward Thaksin and his associates.  
 
Another key data source includes a book, Prakottakarn Sondi: jak sueseeluang tueng 
papankor seefa (Sondhi phenomenon: from a yellow shirt to a blue scarf), written by 
Khamnoon Sidhisamarn, a former senator, columnist, and right-hand man of Sondhi 
Limthongkul. This book describes the event after the ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ was 
cancelled in 2005 up to the early movement of Yellow Shirts in 2006. In the book, 
the author provides an insider's view of the background, personal views, and 
movement ideas of Sondhi during his movements.  
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The case of the anti-coup groups  
 
The primary data source for the anti-coup groups is the Thai-E news website. The 
reason is that this website contained news and information from the various anti-
coup groups from the beginning of the protest in September 2006. This website 
collected information from other sources such as foreign news, web boards, Thai 
media outlets, and websites from the other anti-coup groups. The contents cover 
many topics from a variety of writers including famous scholars, politicians, 
professionals, and common people. Similar to Sondhiǯs movements, I have divided 
the timeline of the anti-coup groups into two phases of movements as per the 
following table: 
 
 
The study timeline of the anti-coup groups 
1. The first phase of the movement: 
     20 September 2006 - 31 March 2007 
The day after the coup was staged up to the 
last movement before the official launch of 
the PTV 
2. The second phase of the movement: 
    1 April 2007 – 15 June 2007 Begins from the founding of  PTV to the last movement before the formal establishment 
of the Red Shirts  
 
Table 2: The study timeline of the of anti-coup groups case 
 
The first phase of the study begins when the first protest was started a day after the 
coup was staged from 20 September 2006 to 31 March 2007. In this phase, we can 
see that their frames were constructed by general people, activists, some scholars, 
and students in order to oppose the coup and call for the restoration of democracy. 
On the one hand, the second phase covers the time from the launch of PTV, 1 April 
2007, up to the period before the establishment of the Red Shirts in early June 2007.  
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In this phase the movements and framing were changed when the PTV group was 
established by some members of the Thai Rak Thai party. However, PTV was 
prevented from airing which resulted in protests by PTV. Akin to the movement of 
Sondhi, the intensification of the protest and framing had been changed before the 
formation of the Red Shirts group. 
 
Method of analysis 
 
Mobilizing frames 
 
In this study, the definition of frame by Entman (as cited in Matthes and Kohring, 
2008, p. 264) gives a clear picture of the elements in a frame thus: ǲTo frame is to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item describedǳ.  This framing concept of Entman will be used to analyze each of the 
mobilizing frames which separated into elements or functions.  The reason to 
separately study each function of a frame is mentioned by Van Gorp (as cited in 
Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 263) that ǲa frame is a quite abstract variable that is 
both hard to identify and hard to code in content analysisǳ.   Accordingly, identifying 
the single elements of a frame could ǲmeasure a frame in a valid and reliable wayǳ 
(Matthes and Kohring 2008, p. 263).  Matthes and Kohring (2008, p. 263) 
recommend analyzing a frame by separating it into elements to reveal the pattern of 
their frames and framing. According to the definition of Entman, a frame consists of 
the four elements of problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and 
treatment recommendation. In this research I have defined these elements to 
analyze the mobilizing frames of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups, as 
explained in the below sections.  
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Problem definition: in this study this element or function identifies the definite 
problem associated with an issue or event that caused the perceived damage. In 
addition, the culprits, or the agents who caused the problem, will be identified as the 
target of attack. The identified target may be only one person, or several, however 
the major culprit must be pinpointed. Thus, any data that indicates the problem and 
the culprit will be considered.  
 
Causal attribution: this element indicates the cause of the mentioned problem. It 
(Matthes and Kohring 2008) could be the failure or success of a specific outcome. In 
the context of this study, the cause is framed by the frame producer to connect the 
reason to the problem.   
 
Moral evaluation: according to Matthes and Kohringǯs work (2008), this element 
can be a positive, negative, or neutral evaluation and can refer to different targets. In 
this research, moral judgements are applied by the frame producers to brand or 
label the agents regarding their practices. Their opponents are framed as immoral, 
while the frame producers can label their own groups as the moral ones. 
 
Treatment recommendation: this last function proposes the solution, or remedy, 
for the problem. Solutions that are asserted by frame producers could be 
suggestions to solve the problems or calls for action against their opponents. 
 
An important facet of the framing concept of Entman is that an issue or event can be 
constructed to be relevant to one or more frames. It is also possible that researchers 
may not discover all of the four elements in a frame. The frame producers may have 
considered only utilising those elements which were the most powerful in terms of 
their mobilizations. Furthermore, some of the movement leaders covered in this 
study is not activists or skilled social movement leaders, accordingly there are some ǲimperfectǳ frames studied in this research. 
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Metaframes 
 
Because of the substantial amount of data involved, the four Thai metaframes will 
be used to examine the information relating to both cases and deduce which of it 
should be concentrated on in this study. As mentioned before, the Thai metaframes 
concept consists of four nationalist elements: the king, the nation, religion, and 
democracy/modernization. Thus the metaframes which were employed by Sondhi 
Limthongkul, on the one hand, and the leaders of the anti-coup groups, on the other, 
will be grouped and analyzed using the Thai metaframes concept as explained 
below: 
 
The king metaframe: data that implies the monarchy, particularly King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej, issues such as the intention to protect and honor the royal supremacy, or 
actions that were framed as violations of the Kingǯs power fall into this king 
metaframe.  
 
The nation metaframe: data involved with the security, stability, and prosperity of 
the country such as the economy, corruption, and unrest events will be considered 
as engaging with this metaframe.  
 
The religion metaframe: data which is involved with Buddhism or any other 
religions. This could be monks, novices, laypeople, Buddhist principles and/or 
rituals.  
 
The democracy/modernization metaframe: data engaged with democratic ideas 
such as elections, the constitution, democratic regimes, freedom of expression, and 
human rights. Furthermore, any undemocratic practices are categorized in this 
metaframe such as the coup and the junta. In terms of modernization, it involves 
projects and ideas for aiming at modernize and develop the country.  
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2.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
In chapter 1, the reasons for the movements of Sonthi Limhongkul and the conflicts 
that caused the divisions between Sondhi and Thaksin are described, including the 
characteristics of the followers of the group. Also, the origin of the anti-coup groups 
and their followers are explained to emphasize the contrasting outlooks of the two 
groups. The deep conflicts between the Yellow and the Red Shirts are highlighted to 
draw questions on how the leaders of the movements constructed their messages to 
create strained loathing between them.  At the end of this chapter, the questions 
about the movements in the early periods that lead to the objectives of this 
dissertation are provided. 
 
The concepts of social movement, framings, and Thai metaframes have been 
described in this chapter 2. The history of Thai metaframes, or nationalism, started 
in the early period of the Ratanakosin Kingdom of King Mongkut (Rama V). This 
proto nationalism started with the three symbols of nation, religion (Buddhism), 
and king in order to protect Siam from colonialism and internal threats. Nationalism 
was officially promoted in the reign of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) by entwining 
these nationalist symbols into his plays, speeches, writings, and so forth. After the 
revolution in 1932 the democracy idea emerged, this nationalist ideology had been 
sometimes applied by the rulers to challenge the supremacy of the monarchy and 
king nationalist symbols. The historical periods of nationalism application as the 
metaframe to perform mobilizations is ended at the student movements of 1973, 
while in the following sections of this chapter hypotheses, methodology, and thesis 
structure are detailed. 
 
In chapter 3, the empirical results of Sondhi Limthongkulǯs frames are explored. The 
chapter has four parts. The first part starts with the backdrop of Sondhi 
Limthongkul and the conflicts with Thaksin Shinawatra. The next two parts are the 
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results of mobilizing frames and metaframes that Sondhi constructed during his 
early movement period. The last section is the conclusion of the chapter.   
 
Correspondingly, the frames of the anti-coup groups in the chapter 4 are examined. 
This chapter begins by providing the origin of the protests, which is the 19 
September 2006. In the next sections, the analyses of metaframes and mobilizing 
frames of the anti-coup groups are investigated, while the conclusion of the chapter 
is provided at the end. 
 
The final chapter integrates and discusses the findings from the previous chapters. 
In addition the answers to the research questions and the hypotheses are presented 
in this chapter. Finally, the limitations of the research and suggestions for future 
research are provided. 
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Chapter 3 
Framing and the identity of Sondhi Limthongkul 
 
In the previous chapter, I provided the definitions of nationalism and Thai 
metaframes as a theoretical framework of this study. Thai nationalism consists of 
nation, king, religion, and additional, intermittent democracy symbols which have 
been applied as the influential metaframes in political mobilizations. This is also 
adopted into the movements of Sondhi Limthongkul against Thaksin Shinawatra. 
The political movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the Peopleǯs 
Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow Shirts, has been outstanding in adopting the 
robust nationalist sentiments into its political messages. Besides, his long 
experience as a journalist results in his potency to construct the persuasive 
mobilizing frames which attracts large numbers of participants.  
In this chapter, I focus on the framing of Sondhi Limthongkul as a journalist in the 
early era of his movement. As a frame producer, Sondhi constructs the notable 
metaframes and mobilizing frames based on nationalism to mobilize the potential 
constituents and attack adversaries simultaneously.  In terms of the movement, 
Sondhi Limthongkul is widely recognized as the most significant figure of the Yellow 
shirts' five leaders. Before turning his role from a media tycoon into the Yellow Shirtsǯ leader, Sondhi hosted his political television show ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ on 
Channel 9. In 2005, he started to criticize the former Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his associates on major contentious issues such as defective 
administration, populism, corruption, and the disloyalty to King Bhumibol.  
The turning point occurred when Sondhiǯs popular political television program was 
unexpectedly cancelled in September 2005. Due to this, he took the show on the 
road and began to abundantly attack Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates with 
plenty of ǲclassified informationǳ. In relation to this, I believe that the primary 
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metaframes and mobilizing frames of the Yellow Shirts were originated by Sondhi 
Limthongkul during his initial movement. The frames were subsequently adopted 
by the Peopleǯs Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow Shirts when it was fully formed 
in February 2006.   
My aim in this chapter is to examine the metaframes and mobilizing frames applied 
by Sondhi Limthongkul. This was apparent that these frames originated from the 
time he hosted ǲMuang Thai Raisupda" or "Thailand Weeklyǳ that on Channel 9.  To 
clearly see the developments and alterations of frames, I have separated the 
timeline of study into two phases. The first phase starts when Channel 9 cancelled 
his political talk show led him to hold the mobile live show at the Auditorium Hall of 
Thammasat University in September 2005. In this preliminary era Sondhi 
Limthongkul framed messages as a journalist, thus the precise messages aimed at 
political mobilization had not obviously emerged. The second phase of study begins 
when the show was moved to a larger place, the Lumpini Park, due to the increased 
size of audience. At this time, Sondhi had changed his role from a journalist to the 
leader of the anti-Thakisn crusade. His frames had been transformed to provoke the 
anti-Thaksin movement and prepare for the next intensive movement as the Yellow 
Shirts.  
In this study, I opt to explore the mobilizing frames and its four functions. By doing 
this, elements of problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and 
treatment recommendation of each mobilizing frames are analyzed to reveal the 
framing process of Sondhi Limthongkul. As well, the four metaframes will be 
investigated in this chapter. 
As these frames were employed to attack Thaksin Shinawatra, the background of 
Sondhi, in terms of business and his relationship with Thaksin Shinawatra, must be 
provided here to understand the causes and conflicts that led to the lengthy battle 
between them. 
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Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra in the old days 
Since 2006, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the Yellow Shirts has been 
recognized as one of the major political groups conducting the remarkable 
movements against Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. Their movements 
primarily focused on overthrowing the Thaksin regime and the so-called Prime 
Minister Nominees of Thaksin. Sondhi Limthongkul is generally known as one of the 
key leaders of the Yellow Shirts. In fact, it is likely that he has been the most 
significant leader of this political group which sometimes was powerful in stirring 
up some governments.  
Nonetheless, before the media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul transformed himself into 
a political movement leader, he was a veteran journalist and multi-millionaire 
businessman, owning many media and non-media promising businesses. In terms of 
media business, apart from owning a publishing house under the Manager Group, he 
owned Asia Inc., a Hong Kong-based regional business magazine, Buzz magazine, 
and Asia Times a Bangkok-based regional newspaper. Accordingly, he was called ǲthe Asian Rupert Murdochǳ by the international press which would perfectly 
describe his fortune at the time. Sondhi (Speedy demise for Sondhi’s empire, 2002) 
talked about his success during Thailand's dramatic economic boom that "I am just a 
journalist who got lucky". Similar to Thaksin Shinawatra, Sondhi (Ǯthe good old days’, 
2005) moved into the telecom businesses which were criticized as following in Thaksinǯs footsteps. 
The particular causes of conflicts between Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin 
Shinawatra were hard to define. It is said that they had ǲa long love-hate 
relationshipǳ. In a news article (ǮThe Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi’, 2005), it was 
revealed that ǲthey were former business partners in telecoms firm International 
Engineering Company (IEC) and shared everything". A deep rift led to a deadly 
rivalry in the telecommunications sector which began when Thaksin moved away to 
start out on his own. Sondhi claimed that before he offered shares in his telecom 
80 
 
 
 
company, IEC, to the public in 1992, he allocated Thaksin a 17.5 per cent stake 
which Thaksin bought at only Bt10 (US$ 0.30)per share. When the IECǯs share price 
rose up to Bt250 (US$ 7.5) each Thaksin sold his shares receiving a huge profit of 
around Bt600 -700 million (US$ 20,800,000). Thus, Sondhi thought that he owed 
nothing to Thaksin Shinawatra when Thaksin became Prime Minister and supported 
some of Sondhiǯs businesses.  
 
Riding on Thailand's economic boom to become ǲa lucky journalistǳ, it is ironic that Sondhiǯs triumph in business faced a downfall due to the Asian economic crisis in 
1997. His Manager Media Group (ǮNew party, old friends aid Sondh’i, 2002)  fell into 
debt of around Bt 4.7 billion (US$ 158,000,000) , which led him to personally 
declare bankruptcy on March 17, 2000 under the amended Bankruptcy Act . During 
the economic crash period of 1997-2000, the government at the time was led by the 
Democrat party.  Sondhi (The Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi, 2005) believed that the 
Democrat government had a policy which allowed foreigners to destroy Thai-owned 
businesses, including his business. Therefore, it is possible that Sondhi might have 
blamed this government of being a partial cause of his business losses. As a result, 
the Democrat government was criticized hard on their economic crisis management 
by Manager Groupǯs media. Thus, when Thaksin Shinawatra was voted as the 
premier, he ("The Good Old Days," 2005) was enthusiastically supported by Sondhi 
and his media networks.  
In terms of Thaksin Shinawatraǯs political life, he was a businessman and the former 
leader of the Palang Dharma Party. He established his party the Thai Rak Thai party 
in 1998 with the slogan ǲthink new, act newǳ. Under an image of a smart and 
successful businessman, not surprisingly, he won the election and became the Prime 
Minister of Thailand in 2001. Thaksin Shinawatra was the first police officer to 
become the prime minister of Thailand. McCargo (2005, p.8)  portrayed Thaksinǯs 
background to entering a political career thus: 
Thaksin himself acknowledged that he never envisaged a lifelong career in 
the police. He saw it as a stepping stone to greater things. In order to advance 
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himself further, he needed to move beyond bureaucratic connections and 
gain clout with politicians…Thaksin decided to enter politics in his own right. 
In view of his considerable wealth, he was courted by various political 
parties in the early 1990s, including the Democrat party, New Aspiration and 
Palang Dharma. 
Most of his voters (BBC, 2011) were poor people who were fascinated by his 
policies on ǲcheap medical care and debt reliefǳ. According to McCargo (2005, p.5), 
Thaksin promised to run Thailand with his business principles by thinking and 
acting in fast, decisive, and effective ways (in other words it was a CEO or Chief 
Executive Officer style). His fast and innovative policy attracted people who were 
disappointed with the legalistic style of Chuan Leekpai, the former prime minister. 
 
When Thaksin became Prime Minister, during "the good old days" of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and Sondhi Limthongkul, their alliance was proved by the promotion of Sondhiǯs colleagues to major positions. For instance, Pansak Viyaratn was promoted 
as the chief of Thaksinǯs policy adviser team, Kanok Abhiradee a former head of 
Sondhiǯs companies became the President of Thai Airways International. Chai-anan 
Samudvanija, furthermore, received prominent positions at the Thai Airways 
International and the Krung Thai Bank, while Somkid Jatusripitak the co-founder of 
Manager served as the Commerce Minister and, at one time, had been the potential 
successor of Thaksin. In addition, Viroj Nualkhair had a major role as the president 
of state-owned Krung Thai Bank which later provided an immense financial 
assistance to Sondhi Limthongkul. Consequently, Sondhiǯs debt (Ǯthe good old days’, 
2005), owed to Krung Thai Bank, was reduced from Bt 1.8 billion (US$ 53,500,000) 
to just Bt 200 million (US$ 5,900,000). This (The Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi, 2005) 
provided an opportunity for Sondhi to re-emerge his media empire. He set up Thai 
Day Dot Com Company to run the Manager Website, English language newspaper, 
and television and radio programs. 
 
More importantly, Sondhi was given a chance to have a TV political show, ǲMuang 
Thai Raiwan or Thailand Dailyǳ on the state-owned Channel 11. The Government 
Public Relations Department or PRD at that time decided to broadcast eight 
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different sub-channels under the Channel 11 license, which permitted private 
companies to operate. They were able to air advertisements similar to the free TV 
channels. The PRD (ǮChannel 11 to hold off on six more sub-channels’, 2004)  made a 
contract with two companies one of which was Thai Day Dot Com of Sondhi 
Limthongkul.  He invested in two channels, 11/1 and 11/2, which were new satellite 
TV channels that had split from Channel 11. Sondhi also had permission to run 97.5 
FM radio. (These media were turned into a tool against Thaksin Shinawatra later.) 
 
In response, Sondhi applied his media to support Thaksinǯs government. The 
relationship between Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra (ǮOld views haunt 
govt critic’, 2005) could be seen from a quotation from a chapter of Sondhiǯs book 
which says that: ǲPM Thaksin is no saint, please do not be mistaken, but he is the 
best prime minister our country has ever hadǳ. The Manager Media group 
(Rojanaphruk, 2005)  acted as ǲa cheerleader for the Thaksin government, especially 
a back-page column written by a few senior editors, mostly Khamnoon Sithisamarn, 
under the pen name Siang Sao Longǳ. Thaksin himself once said Sondhi and he were 
former friends. However, later, when Sondhi started ousting Thaksin he denied that 
he personally knew the premier.  Sondhi (Yoon, 2005) said:  Itǯs a misunderstanding to say that I was a close friend of Thaksin. We were 
only acquaintances. We never went anywhere together. We never even 
travelled by the same car going places together. The premier used to invite 
me to Baan Phitsanulok (a governmental guest house) for lunch to seek my 
views on state affairs. We were never, contrary to what some people believe, 
and very closely associated. We are only erstwhile friends.ǳ 
To confirm this point, Sondhi clarified through his mobile live show at Thammasat 
University that they only had a meeting at Sondhiǯs house in 2000. Thaksin, on that 
day, told Sondhi that he was already wealthy; therefore the intention to be corrupt 
was not in his mind. Thaksin, according to Sondhi, insisted that he had a good 
determination to serve this country. Thaksin expected Sondhiǯs assistance to 
become the prime minister and Sondhi himself (ǮMuang Thai Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005)   
agreed, absolutely, to support him.  
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 ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ and the beginning of the news war 
 
An early source of friction between Sondhi and Thaksin came when MR 
Pridiyathorn Devakula, the Bank of Thailand governor, attempted to dismiss Viroj 
Nualkhair from the presidency of Krung Thai Bank due to the reclassification of 
loans. The story (Krung Thai bank: Dept heads blamed for dud loans, 2004) began 
when KTB permitted controversial loans for more than Bt 40 billion (US$ 
1,188,000,000) to 14 corporate borrowers. Viroj intended, in particular, to forgive 
the other debts of Sondhi.  As a result, Pridiyathorn signalled Viroj to withdraw from 
remaining in the Krung Thai Bank presidency for a second term. The reason was 
given that the central bank (Ǯktb presidency’, 2004) received only one report from 
KTB, while there were other projects from reclassified loans remaining. This 
evidently showed the lack of Virojǯs capability to occupy the position. To protect his 
colleague, Sondhi applied his media to defend Viroj from the accusations. The 
conflict started when Thaksin Shinawatra could not protect Viroj from losing his 
position; perhaps Thaksin avoided intervention in the conflict between Pridiyathorn 
and Viroj.  
 
To make thing worse, Sondhiǯs TV program ǲMuang Thai Rai Wanǳ or ǲThailand 
Dailyǳ was limited broadcasting time from every day to only every Friday. Title of 
the program (Matichon: 2008, p.82) was changed to ǲMuang Thai Rai Subda" or 
"Thailand Weeklyǳ. Moreover, his 11 news 1 TV channel was shut down because the 
Mass Communications Organization of Thailand (MCOT) asked the United 
Broadcasting Corporation Plc (UBC) to stop broadcasting the channel. Tongthong 
Chandrangsu, the director of MCOT (Amnatcharoenrit and Intarakomalyasut, 2004) 
gave the reason that ǲUBC failed to inform MCOT regarding the introduction of new 
programming, an omission that had put the pay TV company in violation of its 
contractǳ. Therefore, he changed the channel name from ǲ11 news 1ǳ into ǲASTVǳ 
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(Asia Satellite Television).  All of this led Sondhi to a huge loss of income which 
ultimately, became the breakup point between Sondhi and Thaksin.  
The famous ǲMuang Thai Rai Subdaǳ political talk show started broadcasting on 
Friday 9 July 2003 and gained widely popularity. Khamnoon Sidhisamarn (2006, 
p.35), a senator, columnist, and Sondhiǯs colleague, explained that, as the host of the 
show, Sondhi had a unique sense of journalism. From Khamnoonǯs view, Sondhi 
(2006, p.54) criticized and analyzed news with his accumulated knowledge and 
experience by using simple language with a sense of humour. However, since 2004 
Sondhi began to criticize Thaksin hard on several controversial issues through his ǲMuang Thai rai supdaǳ TV show and the Manager Newspaper.  
 
Issues which  Sondhi focused on mainly involved major controversial incidents such 
as several mega corrupt projects of Thaksinǯs government and the appointment of a 
caretaker of Somdet Pra Sangkarat or the Buddhist Supreme Patriarch in July 
2004.Thaksin and his subordinates claimed that the former His Holiness Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat was not in good enough health to perform his duties. As a result, an acting 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat was appointed, with which Sondhi completely disagreed.  
Apart from Buddhist matters, Sondhi (Khamnoon 2006, p.55) also indicated 
Thaksinǯs objective to expand his political power over the Central Islamic 
Committee of Thailand. He believed that Thaksin had attempted to employ his 
henchman in the position of the secretary of the Central Islamic Committee of 
Thailand. In his view, some Muslims requested to remove the Chularatchamontri or 
the chief of the Muslims from his position. Sondhi also claimed that Thaksin had an 
idea to establish the Thai Muslim Party as a new political party. In Sondhiǯs view, 
this could lead to an extensive rift among Muslims in Thailand. According to Sondhiǯs view, Thaksin might plan to replace the existing spiritual leaders of 
Buddhists and Muslims with his appointees. 
 
Another disgraceful practice of Thaksin and his subordinates was the dismissal of 
the Auditor-General Khunying Jaruwan Mentaka. The reason given by Sondhi was 
that Jaruwan had an obligation to inspect the governmentǯs corruptions. Thus, to 
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cover their guilt, she had to be removed from her position. Nonetheless, the 
significance of Khunying Jaruwan Mentaka case was not only relevant to the 
corruption of Thaksin, but also related to the Royal Supremacy of King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej, the present King of Thailand. Sondhi pointed out that there were some 
major positions in this country which only the King had authorization to appoint 
and discharge. Regarding this, the position of Khunying Jaruwan Mentaka as the 
Auditor-General (Khamnoon 2006, p.55) was considered as being under the Kingǯs 
prerogative. Sondhi accused Thaksin of having an intention to abandon the Royal 
Supremacy of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The intensification of Sondhi Limthongkul 
in criticizing Thaksin Shinawatra was increased and expanded into other parties. On 
6 September 2005, after critiquing Thaksinǯs practices for a period of time, Sondhi, 
with some technocrats and politicians, held a panel discussion about the prerogative 
of the King at Thammasat University, which he read the controversial article ǲthe 
lost sheepǳ to the public for the first time. Apparently, the monarchy rhetoric was 
raised to attack Thaksin Shinawatra at that time. 
 ǲThe lost sheepǳ story (Khamnoon 2006, p. 56) was originally posted on the 
Manager Website web board which appeared ninth in the rank of all opinions. 
Interestingly, Sondhi claimed that this anonymous author used the pseudonym ǲ555ǳ and chose to post this story on September 5, 2005. It seemed too coincidental 
that all numbers were associated with King Bhumibol, for example, number 5 is his 
birthdate, while he is the 9th King of Thailand. Sondhi brought this story to the 
public. The article, in essence, was a story of a sheep father and his oldest son. Even 
though it was not obviously pointed out to be the King and Thaksin, this story could 
be implying that the father is the current king, King Bhumibol, while the oldest son, 
or the lost sheep could refer to Thaksin Shinawatra.  
 
The writer told of a father who always provided love and good wishes to his 
children. He taught them to live a life with no greed according to his principles. 
However, there was a stubborn and arrogant oldest child who pretended to be 
decent by wearing "sheep's skin". He attempted to contest the accomplishment of 
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his father by following the revered fatherǯs successful path. Ultimately, he 
established himself to be the head of the other children. He turned some of them 
into greedy sheep by showering them with money. Since the oldest son had been 
supported from the others, he became a tyrant resenting criticism and opposing the fatherǯs teachings. To make matters worse, he determined to control the power of 
the father by forcing him to be under the rules of the house which were, in fact, his 
rules. Ultimately, the oldest son had become the lost sheep because of his greed for 
power. In the conclusion, the writer reminded the other children that they were all 
the children of the father. The author might have wanted to tell the children that 
they should not follow the demand of the oldest son or Thaksin, but the King. 
 
As aforementioned, the most severe accusation toward Thaksin Shinawatra was the 
abandonment of the Kingǯs royal supremacy. Accordingly, Sondhi chose to read this 
story, through the show and at a conference, to state his belief to the public, since 
this story could evidently be portraying Thaksinǯs actions at that time. According to 
the lost sheep story, the writer seemed to believe that Thaksin was determined to 
challenge the Kingǯs position of leader of the country. In order to achieve this he 
tempted the other children, who were his associates and voters, to support him with 
money, power, and populist policies. 
 
In the views of Sondhi and Thaksinǯs antagonists, the populism of Thaksin had a 
very destructive outcome for Thailand. Sondhi gave examples of the government 
persuading grassroots supporters to borrow village funds; however the grassroots 
spent the money on luxury goods such as expensive mobile phones, motorcycles, 
and cars which were sold by Thaksin's companies and his colleagues. Most of the 
borrowers did not spend the loan on worthwhile things, as a result there was a 
significant increase in household debts and consumerism among the poor. Sondhi 
believed that the principles of populism of Thaksin Shinawatra were absolutely 
opposite to the "sufficiency economy" philosophy of King Bhumibol. From this, 
Sondhi deemed that Thaksin, who had gained much popularity from the grassroots, 
might think that he could be the most powerful figure in this country.  Kasian (2006, 
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34), interestingly, described the image of Thaksin, in the eyes of the middle class 
and some elites during that time, thus: Thaksinǯs image as a selfless honest patriot was utterly shattered, they came 
to see him in a new light as just a greedy little cheat who, as rich as he is, still 
wants to take the lionǯs share of the spoils by abusing his privileged status, 
leaving only crumbs for non-cronies Ǯlike usǯ. The Prime Ministerǯs typically 
brash, intolerant and outright rude retorts to any unfavorable comments 
alienated them further. The tax-free sale of his familyǯs public holdings to the 
Singapore governmentǯs investment arm for a huge profit, along with control 
of vital national assets such as mobile phone, satellite, TV station and civil 
aviation concessions and licenses, was simply the last straw.ǳ   
Things came to an end on Friday 9 September 2005, when Sondhi (Khamnoon, 
2006, p. 59) read the lost sheep story again on the ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ program. 
This, later, caused wide condemnation of Thaksin from his opponents. Six days later, ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ faced sudden cancellation by Channel 9. Rewat 
Chamchalerm the chairman of MCOT which operated Channel 9 (ǮCh 9 drops Sondhi 
for royal references’, 2005) gave the reason that Sondhi was ǲimproperly citing His 
Majesty the King and the monarchy on several occasionsǳ. In reply, Sondhi stated 
that MCOT and some media outlets in Thailand were acting as ǲthe tools of the 
governmentǳ without considering their commitment to serving the public. In 
Khamnoonǯs view (2006, p.61), this prejudiced cancellation subsequently became 
the start of Sondhi Limthongkul provoking the movement to protect the Kingǯs royal 
prerogative. 
 
At last, Sondhi decided to continue the show by taking his "Muang Thai Raisupda" or 
"Thailand Weekly" on the road on Friday 23 September, 2005. He (Libel action: 
Thaksin takes aim at Sondhi, 2005) held the live programs at Thammasat Universityǯs auditorium hall which attracted audiences of thousands ǲwith hard-
hitting attacks on Thaksin and his governmentǳ. When the numbers in the audiences 
increased, Sondhi (Khamnoon, 2006, p.108) moved to Lumpini Park which drew 
more people to attend. When they moved to Lumpini Park, on November 11, the 
format of the program became a combination of live show, political discussion and 
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demonstration. Interestingly, it had been developed into a mass movement by one 
thousand participants afterwards.  
 
 
ǲIn the first phase at Thammasat Universityǳ  
 
This section provides the analysis of frames of Sindhi Limthongkul when he began 
his first movement phase. He started the mobile political live show ǲMuang Thai 
Raisupda Sanjorn" or "Mobile Thailand Weeklyǳ at Thammasat University on Friday 
23 September 2005. The show was performed every Friday until the fifth episode 
and was moved to Lumpini Park afterwards. During the first phase, he constructed 
seven mobilizing frames which were rooted on the four metaframes. In this section 
each metaframe will be examined its four functions and finished by the engaged 
metaframes being applied.   
 
1. The corruption mobilizing frame 
 
This mobilizing frame was the beginning frame which Sondhi Limthongkul 
constructed to attack Thaksin and the government. It had been framed since he 
broadcasted his political show on Channel 9 and sustained through his first 
movement phase at Thammasat. This frame was one of the major mobilizing frames 
which were powerful in terms of attacking rivals and attracting audiences. The 
reason Sondhi focused on this frame was the sudden cancellation of his political 
show ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ. After the decision to continue the show through 
rallies at Thammasat, this frame produced messages to attack Thaksin and his 
colleagues and portray them as evil politicians.  
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The problem definition function 
 
The first important function of a frame is problem definition. The social movement 
actors would specify the problem and the culprit so as to point out to the 
participants the urgency and seriousness of the problem that needed to be worked 
out. By this, Sondhi Limthongkul defined the problem of this mobilizing frame as ǲthe mega corruptions of Thaksin Shinawatra and associatesǳ. The culprits of the 
problem were ǲThaksin Shinawatra and his associatesǳ. To strengthen his accusation, 
Sondhi raised many examples of Thaksinǯs corruption through the show of which I 
select the two major cases to present here. These two cases were significant in 
prompting the detestation of the anti-Thaksin people toward him, and encouraged 
the audiences to take part in the movement.   
 
The first example to support the accusation was focused on the mega corruption of 
Suvarnabhumi airport construction. It was a complicated issue with many parties 
involved. The airport (Osathanont 2007) was plagued by many corruption 
accusations all through its planning and construction such as the case of the 
limousine concession, the baggage trolleys, the commercial development project, 
the duty-free shops, and the cooling system. Thaksin, according to Thanong 
Khanthong (as cited in ǮCracks, leaks, corruption: Thailand’s new international airport 
off to a rocky start’ 2007), a senior editor of The Nation newspaper, "wanted the new 
airport to become a hallmark of his government's success," thus: ǲhe rushed the 
airport through despite warnings that it wasn't ready for businessǳ. After the 
opening of the airport, there was a report from Somchai Sawasdeepon the airport's 
general manager that more than 100 cracks were detected in taxiways. Regarding to 
Karen Percyǯs report (Percy 2007), Thaksin and his associates were alleged that 
they favored for many building contracts. As a result, there were several problems 
of broken toilets, leaking pipes, and cracked tiles.  
 
On the show, Sondhi explained about the background and the epic story of the 
mega-corruption of Suvarnabhumi airport to the public. In Sondhiǯs view, the severe 
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corruptions seemed far more critical in the era of the former Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, particularly Suriya Jungrungreangkit, the former transport minister, 
was accused frequently on the show about his corruption. For Sondhi, the 
corruption case of Suvarnabhumi airport was framed as the most outrageous 
corruption case in Thai history. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) 
said: 
In terms of the Suvarnabhumi airport construction, it can be recognized as 
the mega-corruption in Thai history. Suvarnabhumi airport is in the top ten 
of the world best and biggest airport rankings; on the other hand it is labelled 
as the most shameful airport.   
Sondhi explained on the show about the corruption, that to get the jobs the 
architects must offer bribes to Thaksinǯs associates. According to Sondhi, this was 
the corrupt corporate culture in which bribes and dishonest contracts became the 
norm. Thus, the under table money, around 30 percent of the budget, must be paid 
to the head of the projects, such as politicians and state officials. As a result, the 
quality of the construction was reduced since the budgets were given as bribes. 
Once, Tortrakul Yomnak (as cited in Percy 2007) from the Architects' Association of 
Thailand revealed, about the quality of Suvarnabhumi airport, that ǲeven though we 
spent a lot of money on the building of a supposedly the first class, five star airport 
we have now got three star airportǳ. 
 
The next example of Thaksin Shinawatraǯs corruption was the state-owned 
enterprise privatization schemes. The plan of privatization in Thailand (Thailand’ 
troubled of EGAT, 2007) started in 1961, and in September 1998 the government 
mandated the ǲMaster plan for State Enterprise Sector Reformǳ to gain economic 
buoyancy resulting from the Asian financial crisis in 1990s. Thus, around 40 of SOEs 
had been privatized fully or partially by the government. Thaksin Shinawatra aimed 
to increase economic efficiency by privatizing the key state-owned enterprises. He (ǮThaksin Pushes Ahead with Privatization of State Firms despite Slump in Markets’, 
2001) claimed that the listed state enterprises could raise 700 billion baht of the 
stock market's capitalization which would attract the foreign investors. Sondhi 
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viewed this plan as unproductive by gaving examples of failed privatized companies 
to his audience. For instance, MCOT (MCOT Public Company Limited) which was the 
earliest privatized company operating in the television and radio businesses. Sondhiǯs condemnation was that there were no noteworthy changes after the 
privatization. The administrative board members (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 
2005) were still the same group who worked with the same old style but earning 
higher salaries.  However, the privatization of the PTT (PTT Public Company 
Limited), which conducted energy and petrochemical business, was often criticized 
hard as another awful example.  Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) 
said:      
After the PTT privatization, they appointed their colleagues to occupy 
administrative positions at the Department of energy. This organization has 
authority to administrate the PTT directly, thus the oil price in this country is 
set by these people. They are also the shareholders of PTT. Every time the oil 
price is increased, they gain a huge profit, as shareholders. The sad thing is 
people get no benefits from the PTT privatization. Besides, we have to spend 
more money to buy the overpriced oil which is in contrast to what they 
promised us before the privatization. We are getting poorer because of this 
scheme. 
For Sondhi, this privatization plan was beneficial to only a handful of people, 
especially some politicians and their associates, while the general public suffered 
from the on-going increased oil price. The result of this scheme was absolutely 
different from the promise given by Thaksin that the privatization would provide a 
chance for Thai people to get cheap oil, in fact people had to pay a higher price for 
oil. Besides, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) believed that the 
government proposed Singaporean candidates to be the shareholders of those 
privatized state-owned enterprises. Moreover, some politicians in the government 
deposited their money into Singaporean banks to avoid inspection of the sources of 
the money. In turn, the government allowed Singapore to conduct various 
businesses in Thailand, especially in the banking sector. As a result, almost all the 
financial system of Thailand has been under the control of Singapore owing to the 
betrayal of the nation by Thaksin Shinawatra and his cronies. 
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The causal attribution function 
 
In this function, Sondhi Limthongkul stated the cause of the frame that Thaksin and 
associates had done the corruptions for their personal benefit. Here, Sondhi alleged 
the government collaborated with Singapore to trade on Thailandǯs assets. In the 
view of Sondhi, Singapore overpowered the financial system of Thailand, he (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) said: 
Most of the foreign investors in Thailand are now from Singapore. They are 
supported by this government. The reason is some politicians in this 
government are the clients of Singapore banks. Those banks are regulated 
under Singapore banking law to prohibit disclosing the name of the clients. It 
is the purpose of this government to do advantageous things for 
Singapore....We may not realize that, at the present time, our financial system 
is under the control of Singapore, a small country with three million 
population. Worse, we have mischievous politicians who act as traitors. They 
rely on these foreign investors to trade our country through the state-owned 
enterprise privatization scheme. 
It can be seen that during his live show at Thammasat University, Sondhi 
concentrated on attacking the state-owned enterprise privatization scheme which, 
with regards to his claim, were conducted under ambiguity. This was a crucial 
example for Sondhi to represent Thaksin and his associates in ways of corruption. 
According to Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005), this government 
determined to privatize some major state-owned enterprises which would result in 
them getting a large sum of money. Thus, every energy section, such as PTT and 
EGAT, (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) would be considered to be 
privatized first. Another cause of this corruption mobilizing frame (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) was revealed thus: 
The state-owned privatization scheme has been done to increase GDP rates. 
This results in added value of the share market which leads to increased 
price of stocks. We have to know that most of shareholders are what we call Ǯnomineesǯ from abroad, particularly from Singapore. That country is a very 
famous destination for Thai politicians to deposit money so as to shelter their 
names and bank accounts from corruption investigations. This is the major 
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reason for this government to enthusiastically placate the Singapore 
government.  
The reason of privatization was interestingly connected with Singapore which could 
explain the situation of Thai financial and where Thai politicians ǲkeepǳ their secret 
money.    
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
In terms of moral evaluation, a greedy mind was stated by Sondhi as the motivation 
behind the corruption of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues. Furthermore, they 
were branded as plunderers who allowed Singaporean investors to take control of 
Thai privatized state-owned enterprises. From an episode of his political talk show 
at Thammasat University, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) gave a 
definition of a new type of crooked politicians in Thaksinǯs government thus:  
I think this government is very poor. If they are rich enough, they must stop 
being corrupt. It is interesting that these politicians graduate from overseas 
universities, thus they are supposed to apply their knowledge to develop this 
country. On the other hand, they disguise themselves under brand name 
clothes, drinking expensive wine, and silently robbing us by getting 10 
percent of commission fees from every governmental project.  
In relation to the corruptions of Thaksin Shinawatra, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) pointed out his usage of political authority as prime minister to 
benefit his personal interests: 
Mr. Thaksin, you cannot deny that you have become wealthy by 
politicization. After which, you have been voted to be the ruler of this 
country. Thus, you must abandon your businesses including any personal 
benefits. Conversely, your son has had business contracts with your 
government. You are in the position of the prime minister; you have to cut off 
yourself from all personal benefits. It appears that you are unable to do so. 
You canǯt verify to the public that your position is not advantageous to your 
businesses. Besides, you have an absolute authority to issue any laws that are 
useful to your businesses and to eliminate your business competitors as well. 
Hence, when you are criticized by the public on the involvement of your 
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political power in your personal interests, you canǯt entirely defend these 
accusations.  
Sondhi pointed out how Thaksin helped his family in its involvement in corruption. 
It was interesting at that time that Thaksin had the image of a family man which was ǲnewǳ and unusual in Thailand. Generally, Thai male politicians were widely known 
for their ǲunfaithful husbandǳ practices. Thaksin, in contrast, portrayed himself 
through media as a caring father and husband. When Sondhi branded him a greedy 
politician who had done anything necessary to support his familyǯs corruption, it 
was a surprise to many. 
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
This process is about suggesting the solution to the problem and predicting its 
possible effects. In this function, the solution provided by Sondhi Limthongkul, at 
this time, was not performing the protest, instead he remained in his role as a 
journalist. However, the solution for solving the corruption of Thaksin was not 
asserted, he just suggested a solution to the staff of EGAT  who were opposed to the 
pending privatization, since EGAT was the next target of this government. A 
majority of the EGAT workers had unwaveringly withstood the privatization. Thus, 
they became key supporters of Sondhi Limthongkul and, afterwards, became a 
major faction that participated in the movement of Yellow Shirts. Sondhi (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) encouraged the resistance of the EGAT workers on 
the privatization scheme.  He offered them, and the public, to hold a referendum and 
thus heartened the workers of EGAT to fight the wicked plan. Another solution was 
putting pressure on the EGAT administrators to stop the plan.  
 
The metaframes 
 
According to this corruption mobilizing frame, we can see that it was related to the 
nation, modernization, and democracy metaframes.  In terms of the nation 
metaframe, Sondhi repeatedly described the performance of Thaksin and his 
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colleagues as the plunderers who sold the nation by corruption. The state-owned 
enterprise privatization scheme and Suvarnabhumi airport construction were 
raised as examples of the accusation.  
 
Furthermore, the accusations of Sondhi about the privatization scheme and the 
connection with Singapore were constructed under the modernization metaframe. Thaksinǯs ideas to develop the Thai economy by privatization and foreign trading, in 
Sondhiǯs view, seemed too modern and unsuitable for Thailand. Interestingly, it was 
framed as the negative side of modernization.  
 
In terms of the next metaframe, Thaksin government had not allowed the public to 
participate in the previous privatization process. The Thai people, consequently, 
were not able to examine the process or the performances of these organizations 
because they were not transparent.  Therefore, to protect the other state-owned 
enterprises, a referendum must be conducted before this government starts any 
action. The democracy metaframe was applied this time when Sondhi proposed a 
solution to hold a referendum before the privatization of EGAT, which was the 
democratic solution. Interestingly, Thaksin was portrayed as an undemocratic 
prime minister who was never concerned about public opinion toward his projects.  
 
The corruption mobilizing frame was a significant frame that proved powerful to 
motivate people to have faith in Sondhiǯs movements. It was an early frame being 
produced by Sondhi, which was useful for general people and his audience who 
were not really concerned on the monarchy and religion matters. This frame could 
draw attention for those people who felt their national assets, paid for by their 
taxes, would be traded and used by crooked politicians. Besides, this corruption 
mobilizing frame is universally acknowledged, particularly among middle classes, 
which other countries were able to understand.  
 
From messages he framed in this corruption mobilizing frame, it is indicated that 
Sondhi framed Thaksin as traitor who privatized the state-owned enterprises to 
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benefit Singapore, also he and his associates benefitted from corruption on 
Suvarnabhumi airport construction.  
 
 
2. The monarchy mobilizing frame 
 
Similar to the corruption mobilizing frame, Sondhi Limthongkul started employing 
this monarchy frame since he hosted the TV show at Channel 9. At that time, 
Thaksin and his colleagues were alleged to have violated King Bhumibolǯs royal 
supremacy. The issue became serious when Thaksin and his subordinates 
appointmented some major officials which triggered disaapointment, for some,  
especially the positions that engaged with King Bhumibol. During the show at 
Thammasat University, Sondhi connected some contentious issues of Thaksin with 
the violation to the Kingǯs royal supremacy. Those issues were distributed to public 
via his media and became one of the serious allegations that attracted people who to 
protect the monarchy from Thaksin and associates. As a result, the monarchy 
mobilizing frame became the most powerful frame that used to appeal the followers 
and the general public which ultimately contributed a remarkable success in 
recruiting a high number of participants. 
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem in this monarchy mobilizing frame was constructed as the disloyalty of 
Thaksin Shinawatra to the monarchy institution, in particular King Bhumibhol 
Adulyadej. Sondhi indicated the culprits of this frame as Thaksin Shinwatra and his 
subordinates. He emphasized on the three main issues to point out the abuses of 
Thaksin Shinawatra toward King Bhumibol.  
 
The first example presented by Sondhi was the news that Thaksin Shinawatra 
performed the Buddhist rite as the head of an event in Wat Phra Kaew Temple (the 
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Temple of the Emerald Buddha), the nationǯs holiest place. Sondhi (Waning fortunes 
for populist PM?, 2005) affirmed his allegation by showing a photo of Thaksin 
dressed in a casual outfit sitting on the Kingǯs reserved seat praying for peace in the 
deep south of Thailand. Sondhi said (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005): 
I havenǯt accused the premier without evidence. I bring news from the 
Bangkokbiz newspaper published on 11 April 2005. Moreover, I have 
received a letter from Professor Rapee Sagarik showing his concern toward 
this news. From his letter, he said when he saw this news on television: he 
could not believe his eyes. Thaksin was conceitedly performing as the head of 
the Buddhist rite at Wat Phra Kaew. He has been voted, by many Thai people, 
to be the prime minister, thus he should act modestly and thoughtfully… 
However, I (Sondhi) said to Professor Rapee that Thaksin might not realize 
this. He might be deceived by his subordinates who do not have accurate 
knowledge about royal traditions. Because of this, I would say to everyone 
that I forgive him for his irresponsible action. However, after I revealed this 
incident the premier defended it saying that he just wanted to do ǲa normal 
merit in a templeǳ. I think he misses the point. There are thousands of 
temples in Thailand for doing merit; on the other hand he determines to hold 
the event at Wat Phra Kaew a reserved place for the monarchs. 
The second example of Thaksin in abandoning the Kingǯs power was the 
appointment of the caretaker of Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Supreme Patriarch of Thai 
Buddhism. With regard to the substantial relations between the King and the former 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, I consider individualizing this 
issue as another prominent mobilizing frame. Thus the details of the issue will be 
examined in the next frame. I, however, will provide a brief explanation here. 
Throughout the show, Sondhi had indicated that Thaksin was unfaithful to the King 
by appointing Somdet Phra Buddhacharya as the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat in 
place of Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara. Thaksinǯs subordinate, the Deputy Prime 
Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm gave the reason that Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
Nyanasamvara was seriously ill and was unable to perform his duties. Sondhi 
viewed this appointment as being done in an inappropriate manner by Thaksin and 
his colleague who did it without a formal royal permission from King Bhumibol.  
 
98 
 
 
 
The next example of Thaksin's disloyalty was the discharge of Khunying Jaruvan 
Maintaka, the Auditor-general of the kingdom of Thailand, from the position and 
then immediately offering the position to Visuth Montreewat.  Sondhi believed that 
Khunying Jaruvan was removed from the position because of her investigation of 
Thaksin governmentǯs corruption.  According to Sondhi, Khunying Jaruvan had a full 
obligation to scrutinize every state organization, which she discovered the 
corruption of Nevin Chidchob, a close colleague of Thaksin.  Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) described that:  
This government loathes Khunying Jaruwan Menthaka for the reason that 
she has not complied with their commands. According to her duties, she is 
responsible for monitoring the transparency of all governmental 
departments. For instance, the Para rubber tree project in which some local 
state officials sell low quality trees to farmers in the northeast region of 
Thailand. In order to inspect this corruption, she sends her officials to 
thoroughly count the numbers of Para rubber trees which causes difficulties 
for those corrupt local state officials. Moreover, she continues to inspect the 
other governmental projects and finally discovers the corruption of 
Suvarnabhumi airport.  
As a result, they plan to eliminate Khunying Jaruvan. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) deemed that this case indicated the disloyalty of Thaksin and his 
subordinates, in particular Thongthong Chantarangsu who was accountable for this. 
According to Sondhi, there are some major positions in this country which are 
appointed and discharged by the King included the position of Khunying Jaruvan 
Menthaka. Besides, Jaruwan herself claimed that she had not received the royal 
permission from the King to resign, thus she would ignore the discharge and hold on 
to this position.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The causal attribution function 
 
At this time, the cause of Thaksin Shinawatra's disloyalty had not been specified 
directly. Issue which engaged with the defamation of monarchy was highly 
controversial in Thailand. This might lead to legal trouble for Sondhi if he made 
allegations against Thaksin without proof of evidence. What he implemented was to 
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make gestures and support them with information. Issues that Sondhi concentrated 
on were the discharge of Jaruwan Menthaka, the ombudsman, and the appointment 
of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Thongtong Chantarangsu, a Thaksin subordinate, 
was blamed by Sondhi that he concealed the information of the appointments from 
the public. Thongtong, in response, refuted and claimed that as a servant of King 
Bhumibol he could not reveal the details about the discharge of Jaruwan Menthaka 
and the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. This enraged Sondhi. He (ǮReng kae Sangkarat sorn’, 2005) defended his claims in the first episode of the live 
show thus:  
I insist that my claims are absolutely true. Dr. Thongtong also claims that the 
discussions and suggestions between the government and His Majesty the 
King cannot revealed to public. No one could comment on this. This is the 
barrier that has been built up to block us from knowing the truth. We are 
confused by the hidden information. I ask him, as a journalist, about the case 
of Jaruwan Menthaka. Thatǯs because the government had offered a new 
candidate to replace Khunying Jaruwan, while it has been a while that His 
Majesty the King has not approved this candidate yet. When I asked 
Thongtong about this, he claimed that it isnǯt appropriate to talk about it.  
From the above speech Sondhi attempted to signal that Thaksin and his subordinates 
abused King Bhumibol’s royal supremacy by citing the royal etiquettes to cover the 
truth from the public.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
As well, branding function was not evidently done in the first movement phase. 
Sondhi Limthongkul avoided openly labelling Thaksin as being unfaithful to the 
King. A number of libel lawsuits by Thaksin against him might hinder his making 
allegations against Thaksin directly. Instead, he (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 
2005) laid the blame on the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm a Thaksin 
subordinate as an unfaithful person on the second show: 
It appears that the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm is responsible 
for organizing the merit event at Wat Pra Kaew. I never blame the premier 
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because the one who must be blamed is Mr.Vissanu. Heǯs supposed to give 
the premier good advice. According to the royal customs, if we were in the 
past, their heads would be cut off because of their actions. 
 
In contrast, Sondhi Limthongkul (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) framed 
himself as one who was wholeheartedly loyal to the King. His willpower to fight for 
the King was stated when he defended Thongtong Chantarangsuǯs comment thus: 
Mr. Thongtong speaks as if he knows everything, but he canǯt answer my 
questions. Besides, he had a meeting with the principal private secretary of 
His Majesty the King. He asked the secretary whether I have been appointed 
by His Majesty the King to investigate the appointment case, which was 
denied by the principal private secretary.  This is unfair for me, a common 
person, who has no opportunity to meet up with the principal private 
secretary. Am I doing the wrong thing being loyal to the King? It seems like I 
walk on a street and see a photo of His Majesty the King dropped on the 
ground. Then I spot someone determines to step on the photo; I stop him, 
grab the photo, and warn him that this is a photo of a revered person. He canǯt destroy it. I think I do no wrong for doing this, but it appears that the 
one who is loyal to the monarchy becomes the one who is in the wrong. 
From his above statement, he was a common loyalty one attempted to protect King 
Bhumibol from any disgrace which brought about by Thaksin and his colleagues.  
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
In this function, it is noticeable that Sondhi provided two types of remedy which he 
gave, firstly, to Thaksin Shinnawatra and, secondly, to his audience. Sondhi (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) suggested Thaksin to act on the following four 
issues:         
Today, a friend of mine came to see me. He suggested that I have a talk with 
Mr. Thaksin. I told him I have nothing to say to him. If I have to see him, I 
would suggest to him to solve these issues: 1) he should stop his family and 
colleagues from being corrupt, 2) if he is really loyalty to the monarchy, he 
should not perform anything that violates the Kingǯs royal supremacy, 3) he 
must find a solution for the case of Khunying Jaruvan Maintaka the Auditor-
general, and 4) he should not confuse Thai people about the position of His 
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Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat. If he is able to amend these issues, Thai 
people and I would have no doubts about his loyalty. 
Besides, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) also encouraged his 
audience to show the loyalty to the King:  
There is the only thing we can do to show our loyalty to His Majesty the King. 
On the coming Thursday and Friday we should express our love and loyalty 
by hanging yellow flags at home or in your cars. In case you do not have flags, 
you can use anything yellow to show that we are on the same side. I think 
yellow represents pureness. It is the colour of dharma and the King.  In 
addition we can use the sticker ǲWe will fight for the kingǳ. To express our 
frustration and grief weǯll show it through the yellow colour and do it 
unendingly. 
This symbolic solution was interesting since it was the beginning of them in wearing 
yellow shirts which later was called the Yellow Shirts by the press and public.   
 
The metaframes 
 
The framing of the monarchy mobilizing frame was rooted from the king metaframe, 
the most significant nationalist symbol. In terms of Sondhiǯs framing, he pointed to 
the three main cases engaged with the infringement of the Kingǯs royal prerogative 
such as the performance of Thaksin as the head of the Buddhist rite at Wat Phra 
Kaew, the discharge of Jaruwan Menthaka, and the appointment of acting Somdet 
Pra Sangkarat. Even though he did not directly allege that Thaksin was disloyal to 
the King, those issues could lead people to doubt on the practices of Thaksin and his 
colleagues. 
 
Throughout the show the Kingǯs concerns towards the well-being of his people, his 
royal development projects, and his philosophy of a sufficiency economy had been 
raised to remind the devotion of King Bhumibol to the Thais. Sondhi, together with 
Sarocha, his co-host, wore t-shirts with the slogan ǲWe will fight for the Kingǳ and 
paid homage to the King by singing the royal anthem at the end of the show. To 
create a bond with his audience, Sondhi started an activity expressing love and 
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loyalty to the King by inviting the audience to wear yellow shirts, decorate their cars 
or houses with yellow flags and ǲWeǯll fight for the kingǳ stickers. Later, this activity 
was developed in terms of patterns and the increase number of crowds.  
 
In the first phase of the movement, Sondhiǯs messages on the monarchy were 
constructed to point out the faults of Thaksin and his subordinates. He had not 
accused them of disloyalty to King Bhumibol, but implied this to the audience by 
framing. Furthermore, the monarchy, particularly King Bhumibol, was framed as an 
extremely respectable figure who was bullied by Thaksin and his colleagues. Also, 
Sondhi portrayed himself as a loyal journalist who attempted to protect the King, 
but was intimidated by those ǲdisloyal peopleǳ. This seemed to increase the royalists 
sympathy toward Sondhiǯs movement.   
 
 
3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame 
 
As aforementioned, the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat or 
Supreme Patriarch by Thaksin Shinawatra and his subordinates was raised as a 
significant issue by Sondhi Limthongkul. This frame intended to mobilize secular 
Buddhists as well as monks. Sondhi showed much evidence to support his blaming 
that this appointment was made through intrigue. Furthermore he insisted that 
Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, the 19th Somdet Pra Sangkarat of Thailand, was in good 
enough health to perform his duties. Therefore, the attempt by Thaksin to replace 
him with Somdej Buddhacharya (generally known as Somdej Kiaw), the abbot of 
Wat Saket, would cause a schism in the Thai Buddhist realm.  
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem of this mobilizing frame was the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat or Somdej Buddhacharya to replace the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
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Nyanasamvara. The key culprits were Thaksin Shinawatra and, to some extent, the 
Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm, who were responsible for this 
appointment. Sondhi (ǮReng kae Sangkarat sorn’, 2005) said, on the last episode 
before his show was cancelled from Channel 9, that:   
I believe in the declaration of the prime minister that he is entirely loyalty to 
His Majesty the King. However, sometimes the premier and his subordinates 
have performed some irresponsible acts which lead to doubts about their 
loyalty. The appointment started on January 13, 2005 which Somdej 
Buddhacharya from Wat Saket was appointed as the caretaker of Somdet Pra 
Nyanasamvara for 6 months.  After this, the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu 
Krue-ngarm claimed that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara had a serious illness 
and was unable to perform his duties as Somdet Pra Sangkarat. The point is 
the medical team of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara had never announced that 
His Holiness could not perform his duties. This is the reason that Luang Ta 
Maha Bua intervenes the government about this appointment. 
Sondhi repeated this issue many times in his show. He opposed the claim of the 
government that His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was unable to accomplish 
his duties because of his illness. Sondhi said, in the fourth episode at Thammasat, 
that His Holiness was 92 years old, thus it was impossible for him to walk briskly, 
but he could perform his Buddhist rites every day. Moreover, on His Holinessǯs 
birthday he allowed people to have an audience in which he was healthy enough to 
bless them.  
 
The next accusation was the violation of the royal supremacy. Sondhi made this 
frame to have more powerful in persuasion by engaging it with the three prominent 
figures: King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, and Luang Ta Maha 
Bua. In terms of King Bhumibol, Sondhi framed the appointment of acting Somdet 
Pra Sangkarat as relevant to the abandonment of the Kingǯs royal supremacy. 
According to the preceding Thai ecclesiastic law, the position of Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat was nominated by the Supreme Sangha Council and formally appointed 
by the King. But in this case, Thaksin and Vissanu had not offered the nominee for 
the appointment to the King for his consideration.  
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Also, Luang Ta Maha Bua an influential forest monk who had a close relationship 
with Sondhi Limthongkul resisted this appointment. The sermon of Luang Ta Maha 
Bua (ǮLuangta Maha Bua’, 2005) criticized Thaksin and his government as "wicked, 
corrupt, power-hungry, and greedy". The severe accusations of Luang Ta, from his 
famous sermon, indicated that Thaksin had an intention to be the president of 
Thailand. The opposition of Sondhi and Luang Ta Maha Bua was responded to, by 
Thaksin, with libel suits. However, Thaksin decided to sue only the Manager 
Newspaper and Sondhi Limthongkul for publishing the robustly-worded sermon by 
Luang Ta Maha Bua. To avoid criticism from the well-regarded monkǯs followers, 
Thaksin (ǮDefamation Lawsuits’, 2005) excluded Luang Ta Maha Bua from the suit. 
 
The causal attribution function 
 
In the last episode of ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ aired on channel 9, Sondhi (ǮSondhi 
chur nayok chongrakpakdee’, 2005) made this observation: 
We've talked about this issue before. But I urge the premier to show his 
loyalty by amending all the wrong practices. I do not want to see him being 
misunderstood by the whole of society. Since family members of the premierǯs wife have been the followers of Somdet Kiaw from Wat Saket, it 
might be perceived that the premier has his own Somdet Pra Sangkarat, but 
because His Majesty the King has His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, 
this is completely immoral and misbehaving.  
Sondhi signalled that Thaksin had an intention to appoint his own Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat which in Sondhiǯs framing, this position, in Buddhism, is the King of the 
monks. In Thailand the political and Buddhist realms are connected and influence 
each other, therefore Sondhi might deem that Thaksin Shinawatra attempted to 
expand his political power over the Sangha Council Committee through his appointed 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Thus, the abandonment of the Kingǯs royal supremacy was 
constructed in this frame. To strengthen the accusation, a sermon of Luang Ta Maha 
Bua was published in Sondhiǯs newspaper with Luang Taǯs view that Thaksin had 
made an obvious effort to ǲcontrol the Buddhist clergy and usurp royal authorityǳ.  
The monk (Luangta Maha Bua, 2011) stated that ǲI feel Thailand is now under a 
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dark influence. Bad people are in power and good people are being dominated. Not 
only ordinary people but also monks are now in trouble". 
 
The movement of Luang Ta to oppose this replacement had some background. A 
news article written by a monk claimed that Luangta Maha Bua, the famous forest 
monk of Thammayut sect, accused Somdet Buddhacharya (Somdet Kiaw) who was 
nominated by Thaksin as the tyrant who ǲmasterminded the power game behind the 
policy of the Ecclesiastical Councilǳ.  Mettanando Bhikku (2005), who wrote this 
article, pointed out that Somdet Kiaw had a close affiliation with the Mahanikaya 
Sect, which was widely known as the sect of Dhammakaiya temple. Somdet Kiaw 
was alleged by Luangta Maha Bua to be ǲnot only not qualified for the position of 
Supreme Patriarch - as he has ambitiously abused his power in paving his way to the 
highest post in the feudalistic hierarchy of Thai monks - but is also not qualified to 
wear the yellow robeǳ. By this, we will clearly see the conflicts between Luangta 
Maha Bua and Somdet Kiaw which motivated Luangta Maha Bua to entirely support 
the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul to stop this appointment.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
Sondhi was not obviously branded Thaksin Shinnawatra, but implying it to the 
audience. Through a show at Thammasat, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 
2005) asked Thaksin Shinawatra about his problematic disloyalty, which was raised 
thus: Iǯd lke to ask the premier one question. On the birthday of His Holiness, 
Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, which was widely known by the public, the 
premier did not go to consecrate him. I donǯt know what kind of business was 
very important and caused him to be so busy he did not have time to have an 
audience with His Holiness. From my observation, it has been two years in 
which the premier has not met His Holiness; while the major figures in this 
country would have an audience to bless His Holiness every year. 
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From this meesage, it could be implied that Thaksin was not loyal to Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat because he had not paid courtesy to Somdet Pra Sangkarat on his 
birthday.  
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
In this function, Sondhi offered the solution to the prime minister to restore the 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat position to Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara. He (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) said on his political show that: 
 
Once, you said that His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was critical ill, 
but so far he is healthy. To stop the misunderstanding among Thai people 
about whom the real one is, would you return him to be the one and only 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat? 
 
In relation to the infringement of King Bhumobolǯs authority, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai 
Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) suggested the government to offer the appointment to 
the King for his consideration thus: 
The present His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was the 
former custodian of His Majesty the King when he ordained as Bhuddhist 
monk. It is clearly seen that they have had a close and lengthy relationship. 
By courtesy of royal tradition, this government should report the illness of 
His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara to the King and wait for his 
consideration before taking any actions. 
The tradition, claimed by Sondhi, was explained on the show that before 1992, the 
commission of the appointment of Somdet Pra Sangkarat belonged to the King. After 
the new laws, the Sangha council and the government have authority over the 
appointment. The King has the duty to acknowledge and provide his signature on 
approval (Ibid).  
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The metaframes 
 
The metaframes being applied in this the Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame 
were the religion and the king metaframe. The religion metaframe in this frame was 
applied when Sondhi attacked Thaksin and his subordinates on the appointment of 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat and the movement of Luang Ta Maha Bua.  He insisted that 
Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was in good enough health to perform his tasks by 
displaying recent video clips of His Holiness conducting his duties. This 
appointment, in Sondhiǯs framing, would cause turmoil in the Thai Buddhist 
dominion.  
 
In terms of the king metaframe, Sondhi focused on framing the close relationship 
between King Bumibhol and Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, who was the former 
mentor of King Bhumibol. In Sondhiǯs claims, the government must inform the King 
about the appointing situation and await for the King deliberation before appointing 
Somdet Kiaw. Therefore, the actions of Thaksin and Vissanu Krue-ngarm were 
framed by Sondhi, and some people, as a serious abandonment of the Kingǯs 
prerogative. Besides, he implied that Thaksin himself was not loyalty to Somdet Pra 
Nyanasamvara by skipping the courtesy call on Somdet Pra Sangkaratǯs birthday. 
 
From this mobilizing frame, Sondhi framed some functions such as the causal 
attribution and moral evaluation vaguely to avoid legal charges from Thaksin. Also, 
he had no clear evidences of Thaksinǯs disloyalty. Nonetheless, another interesting 
thing from his framing is he began to connect Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara and King 
Bhumibol by their lengthy relationships from the past. This was done together with 
the monarchy mobilizing frame.  
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4. The media control mobilizing frame 
 
In this first phase of the movement, this mobilizing frame was focused on two 
aspects of media censorship. The first issue was framed around the restriction by 
the Thaksin government of the media in general, while another was the curb on Sondhiǯs media network included his political show ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ.   
Kavi Chongkittavorn (Southeast Asian Media Struggle to be Free, 2002), a senior 
journalist, portrayed the situation of the Thai media during the ruling of Thaksinǯs 
government thus: Thailandǯs Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who came to power in 2001 
with an overwhelming majority, has restricted freedom of expression in 
Thailand as never before. During the first year of his reign, his modus 
operandi has ranged from the removal or reshuffling of talk-show hosts to 
the suspension of television and radio programs unfriendly to government. 
Through the prime ministerǯs control of huge advertisement budgets from 
state-run institutions and enterprises, as well as his personal network of 
companies and affiliates, only media that support the government have been 
awarded large chunks of advertising and incentives. This situation enables 
the government to spin news and to confuse and control the Thai media. The 
absence of critical political coverage, something unusual for the Thai media, 
demonstrates the extent of the present governmentǯs control. It is leading to 
so-called ǲmedia apartheid,ǳ under which only pro-Thaksin media outlets 
will prosper. These actions contravene the countryǯs 1997 constitution, 
which guarantees freedom of expression in government and public media 
and prevents the government from interfering with all forms of media. 
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem of this mobilizing frame was the media control of the Thaksin 
government, whereas the culprits of this problem were indicated as Thaksin 
Shinnawatra and his colleagues.To strengthen his accusation, on his political live 
show Sondhi explained the critical situation of press freedom. According to Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005), Thailand was becoming ǲa society of 
darknessǳ in which good people were threatened through laws and orders by the 
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state. People had had their ears and eyes closed from news and information due to 
the the inability of state media to inform society of the truth.  He (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) said: 
So far our mass media are prohibited from doing their work. There are only 
the ASTV satellite television network and some newspapers such as Manager, 
Matichon, Bangkokbiznews, and Thai Post that complete their duty by 
revealing the truth to society, whereas the other media outlets focus on 
producing ridiculous news. 
Another example of Thaksin's media monopolizing was the takeover of famous 
newspapers in 2005. This process had been done through Paiboon 
Damrongchaitham, GMM Grammy's owner, who had a close connection with 
Thaksin Shinawatra. GMM Media, a subsidiary of GMM Grammy, demanded (ǮMedia 
giant retreats from bid to take over publisher’, 2005) to buy Matichon Plc the 
publisher of Matichon, Prachachart, and Khao Sod newspapers, and the Post 
Publishing Plc which was the publisher of the Bangkok Post and Post Today dailies. 
If this plan succeeded, GMM would become the largest publishing house with five 
daily newspapers. This was condemned by the Thai Journalists Association, the Thai 
Broadcast Journalists Association and the Economic Reporters Association as an 
attempt to concentrate media ownership which would ǲbode ill for the public's right 
to knowǳ. In fact, Thaksin and his family became a shareholder of Thailand's only 
independent television station or iTV in 2002. Also, this action of Thaksin (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) was criticized by Sondhi as an effort to monopolize 
the media which was a serious malpractice in terms of journalism ethics.  
 
As a major antagonist of Thakisn, the freedom of Sondhi Limthongkul to disseminate 
his news was curbed. Legal actions were used to attack Sondhi, other journalists, 
and activists who had opposite views. Sondhi Limthongkul and Sarocha Porn-
udomsak his co-host of the "Muang Thai Rai Sapda" (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 
ͺ’, 2005) were filed with two libel suits which demanded compensation of Bt 1,000 
million for Thaksin Shinawatra. Sondhi was sued from his critics on the 
appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Interestingly, Luangta Maha Bua 
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was sued together with Sondhi because of his sermon. The monk compared Thaksin 
to Thewathat or Devadatta who had committed a great sin against the Buddha. This 
sermon (Luangta Maha Bua 2005) was published on the Manager Daily on 27 
September 2005 and distributed via Luang Ta Maha Buaǯs community radio 
stations. Consequently Thaksin decided to sue both Sondhi and Luangta Maha Bua. 
However, he sued only the Manager Daily and Sondhi Limthongkul and excluded 
Luangta Maha Bua.  
 
Another means of blocking (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) claimed by 
Sondhi was that Thaksin and his subordinates sent their men to intervene in his live 
show. There was a group of hundred young men held a rally at his office and 
attacked him with offensive speech. Sondhi (ǮMob naksuksa mai sab sangkad 
pratuang Sondhi’, 2005) revealed that each man was paid Bt 300 (US$ 9) per day by 
the order of ǲa guy with thick lips,ǳ which was the designation of Nevin Chidchob, a 
scandalous politician who supported Thaksin at that time.  
 
The causal attribution function 
 
The cause of the media control was constructed by Sondhi Limthongkul as an effort 
by Thaksin to block criticism and investigation from the press. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai 
Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) explained that:  
Regarding the honest warning from Luangta Maha Bua and I, The premier 
fights back by attacking me through his state television program. He 
announces that whoever acts as his opponent will be considered as an enemy 
of his interests. Consequently, I would say that I am willing to disagree with 
him and oppose his personal interests. I insist to protect our national assets 
beyond everything. 
According to Sondhi, it seemed that Thaksin viewed Sondhi and his other opponents 
as enemies, thus the purpose of the measures to control the media was to stop them.             
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Through the show, Sondhi explained to his audience about the libel suits which 
Thaksin, and his team of lawyers, used to stop him from denouncing Thaksin. He (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) said, in the third episode: 
This week Iǯd like to begin the show by talking about the libel suits from the 
premier. He announced his rights to take a legal action against me. 
Accordingly, I will explain this story. Firstly, Mr. Thongthong Chandrangsu, 
Mr. Rewat Chamchalerm, and Mr. Mingkwan Sangsuwan announced that the 
reason to cancel my show from Channel 9 was that I unnecessarily mention 
His Majesty the King throughout the show. Thus, Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra is supposed to sue me with the lese majeste charge. On the other 
hand, he files me with a libel suit saying that I defame him. It does not involve 
the lese majeste charge, as they claim. The reason for this is Thaksinǯs legal 
team determined to stop me criticizing the premier. However, according to 
the constitution laws, I have the right, as a journalist, to criticize him.                                                                                               
Sondhi pointed out that some ethical media, including his Manager media, had done 
their duty by criticizing Thaksin and his government. As a result, Thaksin was 
distressed and vented his anger on him by cancelling his show followed by blocking 
his media networks. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005)                               
warned Thaksin that: ǲHis situation at moment is very critical. The more the prime 
minister attempts to block the media, the more his end is approaching, any minute 
nowǳ.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
Sondhi framed Thaksin, on his media control, as a dictatorial prime minister and a 
greedy capitalist. To illustrate his accusation, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 
ͺ’, 2005) told his audience that:  
Shortly after he returned from travelling abroad, the premier claimed that he 
knew nothing about the cancellation of ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ. He said it 
was done by the MCOT committee board. I acknowledge the decision of the 
board, but somehow this is really unfair to me. They should rather tell me 
straightforwardly that ǲMr. Sondhi, the premier cannot tolerate your 
criticism of his performancesǳ.  If they did so, I would stop criticizing him. 
Conversely, they claim that I defame the monarchy; therefore they must 
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cancel my TV show. When I fight back to protect my pride and honour, they 
sue me for Bt 1000 million compensation. 
Moreover, Thaksin, according to Sondhi, viewed that the Thai mass media are 
operated under the concept of capitalism. Thus, the buying and selling of media 
outlets were in accordance with the principles of capitalism. Sondhi (ǮPerd chak 
muang thai rai supda san jorn’, 2005) responded to the premierǯs view thus:  
I agree with the premier that media outlets are now facing a hard time. 
However, I must explain the true objective of this take over plan which may, 
or may not, involve the premier. According to capitalism, if the Bangkok Post, 
the Nation, and Matichon are bought and merged, the number of audiences 
would be increased immensely. As a consequence, the choices of the readers 
and sponsors would be limited, since these newspapers are controlled by one 
monopolizing owner. In terms of journalism ethics and norms, these 
newspapers must produce contents in conformity with the policies of the 
advertisers and owner. Hence, the news contents would be directly regulated 
by those capitalists. For me, the idea of capitalism might work well in some 
countries like the U.S., since American people understand their rights well. 
On the other hand, Thailand has many different circumstances from the U.S. 
We have inequalities in classes and economy. Capitalism is the merciless 
ideal for an unequal and impaired society as it destroys the poor while 
embraces the rich. 
 It is interesting that Sondhi attacked the capitalism of Thaksin. The greedy mind of a 
capitalist was framed in this mobilizing frame.  
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
The solution to this frame was inviting the audience to distribute ǲthe truthǳ to the 
public by creating networks of knowledge. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 
2005) encouraged his audience as below:                                
We ought to create a network. When they close our eyes we must find a way 
by suggesting to our friends to watch ǲMuangThai Raisupdaǳ and introducing 
them to read these reliable newspapers: the Manager Daily, the Bangkokbiz, 
Matichon, the Thaipost, Kom Chad Luek, and Kaosod. Other means to 
disseminate the truth can be done through community radio stations, 
distributing DVDs, CDs,ǲMuang Thai Raisupda showǳ books, buying ASTV 
satellite dishes, and buying ǲWe will fight for the kingǳ t- shirts. This is the 
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way to create the freedom of the press which might be powerful enough to 
attract some popular news media to report our news to society. Protesting is 
not our goal. We only demand the freedom of the press.  
At this stage, this could be the only solution for Sondhi to provide the knowledge 
and information from his show through these various networks. He might not have 
had a plan to lead the movement at that time. The important thing for him was 
continuing his business, attacking Thaksin, and protecting himself from legal 
actions. Nonetheless, this solution could help him to call for freedom of expression, 
and he could sell a huge number of his products simultaneously.  
The metaframes 
 
This mobilizing frame was directly built on the democracy metaframe since Thaksin 
controlled the press freedom. During Thaksinǯs era Thailand had the 1997 
constitution, which provided for the freedom of press, Thaksin seemed to have his 
own agenda on retaining his political power and family business. This led to widely 
criticism from the media; on the one hand he had ǲlittle tolerance of the criticism 
aired in a free pressǳ.  Chris Baker (as cited in Cumming-Bruce, 2005)  viewed the 
media situation thus: "There is absolutely nothing but the government view on 
electronic media. The talk shows are all ministers and officials. There is no 
discussion. It's really bleak". While Sopon Ongkara (2005)  a senior editor at the 
Nation said that it was a year of living dangerously in Thailand. This was the dirty 
war of Thaksin against the press and critics. Taken together, the actions of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his associates to control the media, including Sondhiǯs show, were 
framed as an action against the constitution and democracy. 
 
From the discouse of Sondhi, he portrayed Thaksin with a dictatorial leader image, 
while Thaksin came from elections, in conformity with a democratic regime. 
Nonetheless, Sondhi seldom praised the democracy claimed by Thaksin. As well, he 
began to criticize the capitalism which was used in the United States of America 
which he said increased greed and inequality. Anti-American and anti-Western 
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democracy was constructed and related to Thaksin Shinawatra, the greedy 
capitalist.  
 
 
5. The populism mobilizing frame 
 
Populism was a major political platform used by Thaksin Shinawatra to receive the 
popular vote from rural people. Since Thaksin became the Prime Minister, he 
(Hewison 2010, p. 120) had been personified as ǲa populist savior of the poorǳ. 
Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party created policies, combined with a U.S. style 
political campaign and use of a corporate marketing strategy as an electoral 
platform, to appeal voters, such as soft loans for local communities, a 30 baht 
universal healthcare program, and a farmer debt moratorium. In 2005 Thaksin 
(Pasuk and Baker 2010, p.66) was attacked hard by the press and public over his 
failure to take measures on the violence in the southern provinces of Thailand, the governmentǯs corruptions, the government support for his family businesses, and 
the privatization of state enterprises.  In response he announced more populist 
policies during his second election campaign such as ǲan extension of the village 
funds, more sports facilities in urban areas, cheaper phone calls, more cheap 
housing, lower taxes, more investment in the universal health scheme, a nationwide 
scheme of irrigation, and a deadline for the end to povertyǳ.  
 
Anek Laothamatas (cited in Pasuk and Baker 2010, p.62),  a political scientist, gave 
his view on Thaksinǯ policies thus ǮǮwe must deal quickly with Thaksin-style 
populism before another economic crisis arises and destroys the nation completelyǯǯ. While Ammar Siamwalla(cited in Chanikarn 2013), a TDRI honorary 
researcher, thought that ǲthough the populist policies pushed the country's 
democracy forward, they cast a shadow over Thai politics because voters only cared 
about what they would be given in return for votesǳ.  
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From this Thaksin Shinawatra and his populism was criticized hard by the middle 
classes, some scholars and media outlets, particularly Sondhi Limthongkul. He saw 
this policy as the cause of household debt and corruption. Sondhi, furthermore, 
pointed out that this policy was contradictory to the "sufficiency economy" 
philosophy of King Bhumibol. A pillar of the Kingǯs philosophy (Philosophy of 
Sufficiency Economy, no date) is moderation, which means ǲsufficiency at a level of 
not doing something too little or too much at the expense of oneself or others, for 
example, producing and consuming at a moderate levelǳ. 
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem of this populism mobilizing frame was defined as the populist policy 
that caused the huge debts and consumerism of the poor. The culprit was Thaksin 
Shinawatra. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) explained the impacts 
of Thaksinǯs populism on Thailand thus: 
These populist projects, such as the agrarian debt relief scheme, village 
funds, and loans at low interest rates for small businesses scheme, lead to the 
rocketing of public debt. Recently, TDRI announced the cost of living 
expenses of Thai people of which 17.7 percentages are the cost of 
transportation and mobile phone bills. It shows the uneconomical 
expenditures of Thais. We will see that young students, poor farmers, and 
even factory workers own mobile phones. Horribly, the need to have modern 
and expensive mobile phones leads to the prostitution of some students. An 
interesting point is while most Thai people are falling into huge debt, this 
year AIS, a telecom operator of Shin Corporation, earned the highest profit 
among Thai companies. Moreover, our Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is 
ranked in 14th place on the list of the richest men in the world. Interestingly, 
Thai people are in trouble with household debt, because this rich prime 
minister persuades us to fall into debt then create measures to reduce the 
debts later. I am curious how the premier became such a super-rich guy. We 
should look to him as our role model and follow his example to become as 
rich as him.  
The unnecessary spending of the poor was blamed on Thaksin's populism, while the 
unusual wealth of Thaksin and his mobile phone company was questioned. 
Furthermore, Sondhi described the many aspects of the damaging results of 
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Thaksinǯs populism. He (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) used the example 
of the village funds project, which caused the public debt, thus:  
In terms of the village fund debts, about 98 percent of the loans from the 
village funds have been repaid by debtors. They did not reveal the truth that 
70 percent of the money lent has been spent on luxury goods such as 
motorcycles and mobile phones. As a result, the borrowers have no money to 
pay off the debt. Thus, it is necessary for them to borrow money from 
moneylenders with high interest rates of 10-20 percent. This means that the 
borrowers must pay interest to both the moneylenders and the village funds. 
It is clear that this village fund is absolutely unsuccessful in reducing the 
problem of the poor borrowing money from loan sharks. On the other hand, 
it seems the number of borrowers has increased. Worse, if the government 
determined to demolish the moneylender networks, it would result in the 
crash of the village funds. Thaksinǯs populism (Pisit: 2011) was named ǲThaksinomicsǳ with the primary goal 
of circulating money to the rural people who hardly received any financial support 
from central government. Thus, the poor ultimately became the major voters for 
Thaksin Shinawatra. On the show, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) 
stated to his audience that the budget source for populism was from taxes, paid by 
the middle classes, and the national budgets. 
Last week there was news about a new household debt policy which will be 
declared to public as another strategy of this government. From my 
observation, the premier typically announces a new extravagant policy when 
his popularity has dropped. It sounds good for Thais to have a new populist 
policy, but the point is these budgets come from our taxes. I donǯt mind to see 
them dump their personal money on the populist policies to boost their 
popularity. But it turns out to be that they spend on our taxes and national 
budget to increase their popularity among their voters. 
The anger and dissatisfaction of the middle class toward Thaksin, and the behavior 
of the poor that was created, was what prompted them to eagerly join Sondhiǯs 
movement afterwards. 
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The causal attribution function 
 
Sondhi defined the cause of the populism frame as an effort by Thaksin Shinawatra 
to receive popularity from voters by populism and to distract attention away from his 
scandalous corruptions. Accordingly, Thaksin seemed to disregard the effects of his 
populism. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) explain that: 
The premier constantly announces new projects to divert peopleǯs attention 
from his malpractices such as corruptions, the appointment of the acting 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and the abandonment of the Kingǯs royal prerogative. 
This government always uses the tactic of throwing money to shut up the 
mouths of their critics. Another tactic is promoting senseless chauvinism 
which leads to severe turmoil in this country. The last one is creating dreamy 
mega-projects to fool people. 
This policy finally becomes a two-sided coin for the government. The premier 
does not deliberate over this policy. He just wants to provide the funds to 
stimulate consumerism among the public. He forgets the fact that these funds 
are spent on buying things not building up businesses as itǯs supposed to be. 
This project finally comes to an end. On the surface it has good image but, in 
reality, people borrow money from the loan sharks to repay the village funds. 
People become a football which is kicked back and forth between the 
moneylenders and governmental village funds. This type of economy is called 
Eua-Arthorn economy (generosity economy) because money is poured on 
everything. When the government's votes are low, they throw money at their 
voters to increase their popularity. When they have difficulties from news 
about corruption, they create fanciful mega projects to distract the publicǯs 
attention. I would say that this exactly describes a self-destructive economy. 
The above statement could specify every populist cause used by Thaksin to appeal 
for votes. During Thaksin government, there were several Eua-Arthorn projects 
which Thaksin had created to provide funds, houses, and taxi cars for the poor. In Sondhiǯs view, Thaksin and his TRT spent money on these projects to buy voting. 
Thus, money became the solution for to solve problems. 
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The moral evaluation function 
 
In terms of the moral function, Sondhi framed Thaksin as greedy, selfish, and a liar. 
Thaksin, according to Sondhi, was one who would do anything to gain popularity 
from voters, even if his populism might lead the nation into difficulties (ǮMuang Thai 
Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005): 
This government is broke. They do not have any money left. They fool people 
with trillion baht mega projects to portray a dependable image. Thaksin 
always says money is just paper, therefore he can use his magic, making as 
much as he wants. This is the only government in Thai political history which 
demolishes our monetary saving system. They steal childrenǯs savings from 
the Government Saving Bank, while the bank itself is transformed from a 
national saving source into a money source for the premier to spend on 
increasing his vote ratings through his populism.                       
Another greedy side of Thaksin was revealed by Sondhi(ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn ͺ’, 2005) thus: 
Nowadays the premier owns many businesses which reward him with a 
fortune, such as money lending business and mobile phone company. His 
businesses tempt people to fall into debt by promoting the use of mobile 
phones and money borrowing. On the other hand, he convinces people to 
reduce debts by borrowing money from his populist funds. The premier is 
much wealthier now. He should stop being greedy. Once he told me that he 
was done with making more money, because he had plenty of it. He even 
promised that he would not be involved with any corruption.                          
Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) also claimed Thaksin Shinnawatra 
thought of his voters as foolish poor people. He claimed on the second episode of his 
show that: ǲThe government rarely promotes good education for them so as to fool 
the grassroots easily. Furthermore, some people who borrow money from the 
village funds never realize that they have to pay back the lent money. They believe 
that this government gives them free moneyǳ. 
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The treatment recommendation function 
In this frame, to solve the overspending of Thaksin, Sondhi proposed the sufficiency 
economy philosophy of King Bhumibol as a solution. He viewed populism as a 
defective idea resulting in growing consumerism among Thais. For him, the King's 
concept was the finest way for Thais to cope with economic crisis and consumerism, 
while Thaksin's economic policy focused on increasing the GDP rates and 
disregarding the declining morality.  Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 
2005) criticized that: 
The prosperity of our society is not based on the GDP rates. We may get an 
increase of GDP at a rate of 12 percent, but we still have a critical problem of 
teen pregnancy. I know that we cannot resist the need for modernization, but 
we can define our meaning of modernization. Similar to the thoughts of His 
Majesty the King, we must build our nation to have a sufficient ability to 
stand on our own legs. I think the premier wants Thailand to be a wealthy 
nation; on the other hand our norms and moralities will be progressively 
destroyed. If we develop and modernize our country by following this path, 
we should rather live scantily in a moral society in way we are supposed to. 
From this mobilizing frame, we will see that Sondhi opposed the populist policies. 
He thought of these policies as a means of corruption and only benefitting Thaksin 
and his associates by obtaining popularity. The worse thing about Thaksinǯs 
populism from Sondhiǯs viewpoint was the growth of consumerism among the poor. 
Furthermore, the collapse of national budget security would be the end result, since 
it was transformed into a budget source for populism.  
 
The metaframes 
 
This mobilizing frame was promoted in accordance with the modernization, nation, 
and monarchy metaframes. In terms of the modernization metaframe, Sondhi 
attacked the economic policies and businesses of Thaksin and his colleagues. 
Thaksin's notions, in the view of Sondhi, were based on capitalism which led to the 
increase of consumerism. Sondhi, thus, strongly opposed to the modernizing ways of 
Thaksin Shinawatra.  
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In contrast to the populism, Sondhi proposed that Thais solve their economic 
problems by following the philosophy of "sufficiency economy" of King Bhumibol. 
Thus, the monarchy metaframe was constructed to devalue the populism of Thaksin 
and, simultaneously, honour the Kingǯs finer concept.  During this early movement, 
he did not focus much on the principles of the sufficiency economy, but we could see 
some traces from a part of his talk show. He raised some worthy advice on 
development by King Bhumibol to instruct Thaksin and his audience which was, in 
essence: Thailand should build on her own strengths, in terms of economy, until she 
is capable of relying on herself. According to Sondhiǯs framing, the need to borrow 
money from the international monetary funds to create mega projects and populist 
policies was not in conformity with the Kingǯs sustainable development concept. 
In relation to the nation metaframe, Sondhi stressed that populism was a defective 
policy that led to the destruction of the finance, morality, and economy of Thailand. 
Moreover, Thaksin seemed not care to find sustainable ways to develop Thailand. 
What he had done, according to Sondhi, primarily focused on gaining popularity 
from voters. Nonetheless, the opposition for Thaksin Shinawatra, to this social 
welfare, was the middle class who felt they were unfairly treated by Thaksin. The 
middle class pay taxes, while the rich avoided them. Hewison (2010, p.126) 
summarized the populism of Thaksin as follows: 
...it was said that middle-class taxes kept corrupt politicians in power 
through policies that appealed to poor voters, while allowing Thaksin and his 
cronies to get wealthier. Worse, these politicians stayed in power by buying 
the votes of the ignorant and poor masses. Worse still, these corrupt 
politicians then continued to support the lazy poor, making them lazier still. 
Some of the more radical activists called for a tax revolt against the TRT 
government. While social welfare has continued, there is a deep suspicion 
among the middle class. 
From all of this, we can clearly see that Thaksinǯs populism, according to Sondhi, 
caused severe problems to the security of Thailandǯs economy and morality which 
could be classified under the nation metaframe.  
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This mobilizing frame was produced to frame the greedy side of Thaksin as wicked 
politician. It was also framed to emphasize on King Bhumibolǯs wisdom in creating 
the finer economic policy. Sondhi clearly show his negative thoughts toward 
capitalism from the West. Furthermore, to gain more support from his middle class 
audience he began to frame the inapporiate money spending of the poor given by 
Thaksin and the government, the money that paid by the working hard middle class. 
As a result of this framing, the discontentments among the middle class were 
amplified and drew more audience to join the live show.  
 
 
6. The Thaksin's police state regime mobilizing frame 
 
Throughout the premiership, there had been severe criticism about the ǲThaksin 
regimeǳ. It was regarded from some people as ǲthe police stateǳ regime that 
concentrated on controlling, investigating, and eliminating antagonists. From 
Chitlaoarpornǯs work (Chitlaoarporn, no date), he explained that the independent 
polity of the 1997 constitution allowed Thaksin to act as an autocratic prime 
minister, while government organizations were turned into tools to serve his 
regime. He also summarized the characteristics of Thaksinǯs police state regime 
saying that Thaksin was ǲusing the law to further the aims of the TRT, destroying 
the political examination system; using methods of political repression, using 
populist policies to increase support; changing the bureaucratic structure; using 
independent polity to intimidate opponentsǳ. Besides, ǲthese subtle deviations from 
democratic government make it difficult to scrutinize how the government of 
Thaksin has behavedǳ.  
 
Sondhi Limthongkul started criticizing the police state regime of Thaksin through 
his show. He condemned the policy of Thaksin in sending the police to the 
southernmost provinces. Also he claimed that he had been intimidated by Thaksinǯs 
police to stop his ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ political talk show, while his audiences 
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were prevented from participating in the live show. This act was done under the 
cocept of police state regime.  
 
The problem definition function  
 
During the show at Thammasat University, Sondhi Limthongkul identified the 
problem of this frame as the police state regime of Thaksin Shinawatra. The culprit 
of this frame was Thaksin Shinawatra, a former police officer who became Prime 
Minister. Sondhi gave examples of the unrest in the southernmost part of Thailand 
to portray how Thaksinǯs administration used nepotism by sending his police 
colleagues to solve the turmoil. Sondhi (ǮPerd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn’, 
2005) said,  
This prime minister is a former policeman, thus he has numerous police 
colleagues. When he becomes the premier, it implies the rise of the police 
force in his era. Regarding the unrest in the southern provinces, Police 
Lieutenant General Thawatchai Julsokhon, the Commissioner of Provincial 
Police Region 9, is in charge of the southern provinces area. This policeman 
reports to his superior that the separatists in the south are just crappy 
hooligans, for that reason this area should be under the management of the 
police force. In accordance with this report, military force is withdrawn and 
ultimately replaced by the police. 
The defects of the police system and morality were raised through the show. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) referred to the lack of response by the 
police in solving his cases, moreover the upset feelings of common people towards 
Thai police was framed to create the discontented sentiment: 
So far many people are enthusiastic to report to the police the malpractices 
of this government, such as the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. 
The response from the police to this case upset the people since they just 
kept prolonging the case. I would say that the Thai police are good at 
surviving every situation. They perform their duty in accordance to the 
leader's wishes. In this case, I am sure that they will sweep this case under 
the carpet. I bet that when we have a new prime minister these police will 
solve the case quickly. If this government decide to take legal action against 
me, those police would come to investigate me immediately.ǳ  
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Furthermore, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) also provided more 
details about the libel charges brought by Thaksin and his subordinates, which were 
presented in a police style, thus: 
His subordinates declared that while I held the show at channel 9, I defamed 
the king which resulted in the cancellation of the show. The Prime Minister 
himself denied his involvement, but he sued me with a defamation charge 
from the show broadcasted on 9 September 2005. Moreover, he sued me as 
an agent of the government not the prime minister.  I would say that this is 
the real style of police. 
To further emphasize how Thaksin and his police subordinates troubled him, in the 
second episode of his show Sondhi welcomed his audience and announced that 
someone had sent a group of men to protest against him at his office. Moreover, 
some senators (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005), who were in his audience, 
were harmed after the show ended.                   
             
The causal attribution function 
 
Sondhi stated the cause of this mobilizing frame as attempts by Thaksin to stop 
everyone criticizing him and acting as his opponents. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) thought Thaksin sought to halt him from revealing the truth or 
information to public because the premier could not tolerate critics. He said:   
The Prime Minister keeps saying that he wants to transform Thailand into a 
"knowledge society". How can we become such society when he controls the 
freedom of media?  He must provide liberty to the media by freeing the 
dissemination of news and information. He said we must have diversity in 
society. He must acknowledge the difference of opinions; conversely he 
cannot consent to this... 
In terms of the struggle for the righteousness, it is hard to see brave ones 
standing firm and fighting against the state, because the ruler would apply 
state apparatus to eliminate them. For me, I used to be scared, and then I 
decided to fight back. Accordingly, I challenge this government to take legal 
action against me. I believe that at the end of the battle the noble will always 
be the winner. Mr. Prime Minister, I am really concerned about you. I always 
warn you that your true self is revealing to the public. Most media have not 
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found out your faults yet, it is only me who knows you very well. This is the 
underlying reason that explains his loathing towards me. 
The fear of the truth would be revealed to the public was framed as the reason for 
Thaksin to take legal and illegal actions, to attack Sondhi and other opposition 
media.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
In this function Sondhi applied dharma from Buddhism to explain the actions of 
Thaksin Shinawatra and those police subordinates who bullied him. He called 
Thaksin a dictator. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) said: 
I feel empathy for those policemen to act according to the command of their 
superiors. So far we are at the beginning of the battle; we must endure a 
great deal of hardships. It looks as if the unrighteous faction would win over 
us; however in the end the righteous people will completely win every battle. 
Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) told his colleagues and audience to 
tolerate the evil measures of Thaksin since in the end they, as the dharma and moral 
faction, would gain victory.  
For Mr. Prime Minister, anyone who has diverse thoughts from him would be 
considered as an opponent to his benefits. If so, I am willing to be his obstacle 
to oppose him and protect our nationǯs assets perpetually. I would like to 
inform any dictators, including those junky people who are using evil 
methods to destroy me, I will conquer them by peace and tranquility. They 
can do anything to me, because I never fear them …In every battle, I never cross the lines. I never want to become an influential 
politician. What I need is to stand at this point where everyone can see me 
any time. I insist upon my standpoint to reveal the truth to public at all times. 
This labeling was done in two ways. Sondhi framed Thaksin as a dictator who 
bullied him with state power, he framed himself as the victim. Besides, he started to 
label his movement as the moral forces which were defending the country from the 
evil forces, Thaksin and his associates.  
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The treatment recommendation function 
 
For this function, Sondhi did not offer a definite solution. Instead, he (ǮMuang Thai 
Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) used a sermon from Luangta Maha Bua and His Holiness 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat to warn Thaksin that: 
Luang Ta Maha Bua always says to let things go. One day the Prime Minister 
will be punished by his bad karma, which nobody escapes. I quote a message 
from His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat to warn the premier that life is 
really short, but it is very important. In this life we have many paths to 
choose. We can do good or bad, thus we must carefully decide on our paths. 
The solution implied to stop doing bad and turned to do good which might mean 
stop harassing him. 
 
The metaframes 
 
This Thaksin police state regime mobilizing frame had been promoted along with 
the nation and democracy metaframes.  It could be seen that Sondhi accused 
Thaksin of being an autocratic leader ruling the country with his police state regime. 
This police style was explained by Rowley (2006) that Thaksin applied his attitudes 
of business tycoon to Thai politics which were aggressive, obsessive, and ruthless as 
in the ǲnew management ideologyǳ.  In addition his notions of administrative power 
were centralized, authoritarian, and primarily antagonistic to democratic 
governance. Hence, the military and defense forces were included in his political 
administration through the war on drugs scheme and the crackdown in the south.   
 
From this, we will see that the Thaksin regime or, Thaksin police state regime, was 
contradictory to the foundation of democratic ideology. He violated freedom of 
expression and brutally abused human rights.  However, it was interesting that 
Thaksin himself seemed to believe that he was a democratic premier who allowed 
opposition factions to express their views. For him, Thailand was his company, 
while its citizens were his employees. Other factors were the inability of Thaksin to 
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distinguish his business interests from the interests of the whole nation; his 
populism was also branded as the cause of the collapse of Thai economy.  
 
7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame 
 
This mobilizing frame was presented on every episode of the Muang Thai Raisupda 
political talk show to reflect the serious problem of the violence in the south of 
Thailand, particularly in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and parts of western Songkhla 
province. Since 2004, these southern border provinces of Thailand (Pathan and 
Tweedie, 2013) have suffered violent incidents of bomb attacks and assassinations 
which have left nearly 10,000 injured and 5,600 dead. These incidents of unrest 
have a long history of being against a highly centralized state, and are seen as an 
indigenous ethno-nationalist conflict which began in the early part of the 20th 
century.  
 
According to the UNICEF situational analysis (Suwannarat, 2004, p. 11), the violence 
originated from the differences of religions, culture, and the discrimination from the 
majority Buddhist population against the southern Muslim population. In the 
history of the independent Malay Muslim kingdom of Pattani, these three provinces 
of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat were part of this kingdom. It was defeated and 
turned into provinces in 1786 by Prince Surasi, the brother of King Chulalongkorn 
or Rama VI. The aboriginal Malay sultans (Suwannarat, 2004, p. 12) were replaced 
by Bangkok-appointed bureaucrats. The local people were required to pay taxes, 
while Thai law was enforced including the study of Thai language in primary 
education. The Muslims (Violence in southern Thailand, 2003) did not acknowledge 
the Buddhist bureaucrats resulting in the rebellion and resistance across the region. 
From 1950s to 1960s, more than 60 armed grouped operated in the southernmost 
area. The aggressions (Suwannarat, 2004, p. 13) had continued but were lessened 
by the 66/2523 policy of General Prem Tinsulanonda in the 1980s.  
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However, the violence flared again when Thaksin Shinawatra became the prime 
minister in 2004. He countered the violence with armed forces and declared an 
emergency decree to increase the power of the forces in the area. He cracked down 
hard on suspected insurgents which made the situation worse. During his term, 
more than 2,500 drug suspects were murdered as were Muslims at the historic Krue 
Sae mosque and other places. The human rights situation, according to Vanida 
Tantiwittayapitak, worsened after Thaksin came to power (cited in Bhumiprabhas 
and Tangwisutijit, no date). His opponents, such as activists and community leaders, 
were killed and the Muslim lawyer, Somchai Neelaphaijit, disappeared in 2004. 
Vanida, a famous human rights worker, said that in the old days, the opponents of 
the government would be labeled as communists and eliminated, but in Thaksinǯs 
era, they (cited in Roberts 2004) turned into  ǲdrug dealersǳ and ǲterroristsǳ. Former 
Senator Jon Ungphakorn (2004) said that: ǲThe extreme right-wing patriotic 
movement is, I believe, being supported by the government itself because it deflects 
issues from the prime minister and the army. It is extremely dangerous for the 
entire countryǳ.  Certainly, the worse situations in the south became an issue being 
framed by Sondhi, although his proposed solution may have been no better. This 
mobilizing frame was set up to undermine the image of Thaksin as the premier.  
 
The problem definition function 
 
In the first phase Sondhi Limthonkul framed the problem as the negligence of 
Thaksin Shinawatra to create peace in this region which led to the increased number 
of the unrest incidents. Therefore, the agent or the culprit of this frame was Thaksin 
Shinawatra. In the third episode of his show, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 
ͻ’, 2005) described the losses thus: 
Since January 2004, before the two marines were killed, we see that each 
week around twenty four people were killed. The whole picture of dead 
people from January 2004 to September 2005 reflected the uncommonly 
high number of incidents of violence. It could be assumed that the terrorists 
or the separatists are striking back against the measures of the government. 
Some may argue this is a typical fight by the terrorists against the serious 
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measures of the government. What I am going to point out is since January 
2004 this government, under the ruling of Thaksin Shinawatra, has not 
succeeded in improving the unrest. The most concerning point is the premier 
announces himself to be the only one who is responsible for this problem. 
But he does not specify a deadline, the duration of time, or any particular 
measures to accomplish the stopping of the unrest. Generally, when someone 
offers himself to do something, he must state the exact deadline including 
what he would do if he fails to achieve the goal. 
The numbers of dead people in each year was raised through the show to stress on 
the losses of innocent people. He determined to portrayed the image of unreliable 
premier included the failed strategy to reduce the violence in the south. 
Furthermore, the unprofessional plans of Thaksin were pointed out to devalue 
Thaksin, the former police and businessman who turned to be the prime minister. 
The causal attribution function 
 
In reality there are various factors relevant to the unrest incidents in the 
southernmost provinces of Thailand. However, Sondhi framed the causes as the 
nepotism of Thaksin in supporting his police colleagues to accomplish the incident and 
the mistaken foreign policy of Thaksin with neighboring countries such as Malaysia 
and Singapore. Moreover, he made the accusation that Thaksin was terrified of those 
separatists; since he hardly ever went to inspect the situations in the southern 
provinces. Sondhi (ǮPerd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn’, 2005) provided the 
background to the unrest, which involved many factors including the unsuccessful 
measures of Thaksin Shinawatra to relieve the problems, he said: 
If we look back to the past, we would see the balance of power between the 
major groups in the south of Thailand. When the police started to manage 
this region, they did not share the interests of the other groups. Therefore, 
those groups decided to take back their power and interests by hiring some 
other groups to start the turmoil. The aim of those groups is to become peace 
makers by stopping the chaos. Unfortunately, this prime minister only 
believes in the information reported by his police subordinates which led 
him to dismiss many senior deputies. As a result, there is no permanent chief 
responsible for dealing with the insurgence. Some of agents report the 
ongoing situation to Nevin Chidchob (Thaksinǯs major colleague).  
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Nevin himself is from the northeastern region. He does not have enough 
potency or background knowledge about the southern provinces. He 
becomes a politician who is in authority for this unrest problem. By nature of 
the people from the south, in particular Muslims, they do not like Esarn 
people (people from the northeastern part) because of their different 
lifestyles. Therefore, the violence has been developing and increasing which 
leads to the intervention of international factions, especially Malaysia. 
The above statement indicated that Thaksin, a former policeman, supported his 
police colleagues to manage the unrest, with no concern about the interest of the 
nation. As a result, the efficiency of the governmental agencies in the south was 
ruined by Thaksinǯs nepotism led to the situation worsening.  
 
Sondhi framed the benefits between Thaksin with the Singapore government caused 
the conflicts among Thailand and Malaysia, the neighbouring country. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) criticized Thaksin governmentǯs foreign 
policy that: 
So far we can justify that Malaysia is totally involved with this problem. In 
terms of the violence in the south, we cannot only focus on the three 
southern provinces. We must consider the geo-political situation of Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. Malaysia is a Muslim country with a combination of 
Chinese and Indians; basically they have had some conflicts with Singapore.  
Conversely, Thailand chooses to have a close relationship with Singapore 
instead. We allow the Singapore army to rent out the air force airports in 
Udornthani and Karnchanaburi provinces for fifteen years. Besides, Thaksin 
allows them to practice gun shooting in Khon Kaen. All these areas are 
restricted, even Thai people cannot trespass, but Singapore is allowed to 
occupy our air sovereignty. How come the prime minister announced that he 
would not let Thailand lose an inch of terrain to other countries? We are too 
close to Singapore both in terms of economy and supremacy. Singapore 
almost controls Thai economy. If I were the prime minister of Malaysia, I 
would consider utilizing the three southern provinces of Thailand as a buffer 
for Malaysia. 
An example, from Sondhi, about Thaksin's attitude to the insurgence of the three 
border provinces was drawn when the premier did not go to the funerals of brutally 
killed militants. He thought Thaksin might be worrying about his safety. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͸’, 2005) said: 
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Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced, at the state office, that he 
never feared the insurgents, that this land would not be separated by the 
liberal movement. He would go to the south to Ǯcleanǯ every violent incident. 
However, on Thursday 22nd, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn went to 
participate in a militantǯs funeral in Naratiwat province, while the prime 
minister accompanied the deputy prime minister of China in Chiangmai. 
Moreover, on Monday 26th Queen Sirikhit, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, 
and Princess Chulabhorn Walailak had a sojourn at the Thaksin Palace in 
Naratiwat, the premiere, again, did not go there. He chose to stay in Bangkok. 
Nonetheless, before he gets mad at me and allows his subordinates to take 
revenge, he must consider himself first. In Bangkok he seriously criticizes the 
separatists, but he does not go to the south to eliminate them. Actually, he 
could go there safely, with his official aircraft and 4,000 guard soldiers, to 
prove that he has a real determination to solve the violence in the southern 
provinces. 
Sondhi did not straightforwardly say that Thaksin feared those separatists; however 
this function effectively portrayed Thaksin as a fainthearted premier. Furthermore, 
Sondhi honored what he believed were the important roles of monarchy to work out 
the poverty and violence in the southernmost provinces.   
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
From the Asia foundation report (Burke 2013), people from the south have been 
treated unfairly by the government. Even though they have received development 
projects and budgets from the government in the last few decades, ǲthe rewards 
have been spread unevenly and inequalities have increased. Many people in the area 
feel that they are effectively second-class citizensǳ. Similarly, Sondhi (ǮPerd chak 
muang thai rai supda san jorn’, 2005) framed Thaksin as the essentialist. He said: 
I have been warning the premier since we aired the show on Channel 9. Do 
you remember? I said this country has various ethnic groups, whether he 
likes all of them or not. Even though he does not like some, they must be 
treated fairly as Thais. On the other hand, the premier considers everything 
based on his attitudes. If he does not like a group of people, they would be 
abandoned. 
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Thaksin, according to Sondhi, was a prime minister who was born in Chiangmai, a 
province in the north of Thailand. On the other hand, people from the south support 
the Democratic Party, the opposite party to Thaksinǯs Thai Rak Thai Party. Due to 
different political views, this implied that Thaksin discriminated against people 
from the south due to regions and voting records. 
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
Sondhi Limthongkul offered the solution for the violence that Thaksin should 
reconsider the foreign policy with neighboring countries, especially Malaysia. He 
suggested Thaksin should have a formal meeting with the Malaysian prime minister 
to find a solution and consensual agreement to make peace in the southernmost 
area of Thailand. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005) said: 
The three southern provinces are significant to Thailand politically and 
economically. Even though we have differences in terms of religion, lifestyle, 
and culture, we are all Thais. We must make people in the south agreeably 
united with all Thais.  Economically, the territory of these three provinces, 
according to the law of sea conventions, expands over half of the gulf of 
Thailand which includes the petroleum resources under the sea.  
Accordingly, these natural resources are the main reason for Malaysia to 
remain involved in the problem. As I mentioned, we must solve problem 
carefully, with wisdom and intelligence. 
Sondhi pointed out that Malaysia might determine to separate the southernmost 
area of Thailand so as to take over the petroleum sources. According to Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͻ’, 2005), Malaysia involved with the unrest 
incidents in Thailand. He said: 
We must use both carrot and stick. We must provide people in the south with 
justice. It is true that we lost two naval marines; on the other hand they have 
lost thousands of their families and friends too. Are we brave enough to 
acknowledge our fault in the past? Do you remember the teacher of the 
Malaysian prime minister? He has many famous students such as kings from 
Middle East. He gave honorable opinions about the Takbai incident, which 
are acknowledged by many Muslims in the south.  He pointed out that even 
though this government is the key culprit of Takbai incident, Muslim-Thais 
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should forgive them and forget about the hardship and grief of the past. I 
think this is promising for the establishment of peace in this area. But 
unfortunately, nobody pays attention to continuing this peace making 
progress. 
Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͹’, 2005) also provided another solution by 
offering peace talks with the Malaysia prime minister.  
We should define the true problem and discuss it with the Malaysia prime 
minister by asking him about the real dilemma. I think we might say that we 
will not allow Singapore to rent out our airports and consider the Malaysian 
prime ministerǯs response. We should try to do this. Moreover, the unrest in 
the south should not be examined by the terrorism definition. Political 
science perspectives must be applied into the operation as well. We must 
consider the inter-relationships between Thailand and Singapore, Singapore 
and Malaysia, and Malaysia and Thailand. If Malaysia enthusiastically 
cooperates with us, those insurgents would not be able to be exiled in 
Malaysia. 
Interestingly, Sondhi connected Singapore and Malaysia with this mobilizing frame. 
He suggested Thaksin to stop providing advantages to Singapore and improved 
relationships with Malaysia instead.  
The metaframe 
 
It is interesting that Sondhi Limthongkul framed this mobilizing frame with a 
different perspective. Altogether he applied the nation metaframe with this framing 
to spotlight the apparent destruction of Thaksin Shinawatra in administration. He 
believed that Thaksin considered only his personal interests with Singapore, 
overlooking the security and sovereignty of the nation. This contrasted with the 
Malaysian prime minister who had acted in his countryǯs best interests. For Sondhi, 
Thaksin was a real plunderer who traded the national assets to Singapore. Another 
blame was the division of the nation which caused by Thaksin. From his voting 
policy, it led to both division of the far south from the nation, and the division of 
people in Thaksin's thinking. 
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Another metaframe used was the king frame. In some parts of the frame he 
compared the monarchyǯs work to relieve the incidents of unrest with that of 
Thaksin. Apparently, the monarchy had no fear of going to the southern provinces, 
while Thaksin sheltered himself in Bangkok. The different images of the two sides 
were constructed into Sondhiǯs frame to honor the monarchy and disgrace Thaksin. 
The problems of this frame portrayed Thaksin as an irresponsible leader who never 
cared for peopleǯs lives. Also, it was constructed to create dissatisfied feeling among 
the military toward Thaksin, a former police officer. From this, Sondhi hoped for 
Thaksin to resign, if he could not fulfill the promise to relieve the unrest.  
 
 
ǲIn the second phase at Lumpini Parkǳ 
 
From the sixth episode of ǲMuang Thai Raisupda Sanjornǳ or ǲMobile Thailand 
Weeklyǳ, the show was relocated from Thammasat University to Lumpini Park. The 
reason was announced in the fifth show that the auditorium hall at Thammasat was 
reserved for other activities. Accordingly, they could not host the show the next 
week. Nevertheless, this may not be the only reason for Sondhi Limthongkul to 
move the show to Lumpini Park, a larger place. It is likely that Sondhi gained some 
confidence that he could continue his live shows or movements at the larger 
Lumpini Park. 
 
Examining more closely his frames in the first phase, we can see traces of situations 
or events occuring at that time, which had impacts on his framing and movements. A 
reason (Khamnoon 2006, p. 113) that Sondhi decided to move the show to Lumpini 
was due to the numbers in the audience having greatly increased, nonetheless 
Khamnoon (2006, p. 99) revealed that since the first episode of the mobile live 
show, a group of famous people had attempted to persuade Sondhi to start a mass 
movement by associating his audience with theirs. Sondhi declined their offer by 
stating his standpoint as being a journalist. Nonetheless, people who convinced 
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Sondhi to start the movement had good connections with Thai elites such as 
Prasong Soonsiri a former head of the Thai National Security Council, Ekkayuth 
Anchanbutr a political activist and businessman, and Prapan Koonmee an 
experienced political activist. Most of them were Thaksinǯs rivals. During the first 
phase at Thammasat, this group carried out a protest at Sanamluang located near 
Thammasat, but only a handful of people joined them.  According to Khamnoon 
(2006, p. 204), once they attempted to invite Sondhiǯs audience to join which failed. 
Khamnoon gave an interesting opinion of Sondhi that he refused to start the 
movement, but was willing to support and announce the movement of this group. 
Sondhi and Khamnoon agreed that they needed ǲfriendsǳ and experienced activists 
to lead the protest. They knew that Sondhi and his ASTV staff had no skills to 
undertake mass movements.  
 
This alliance could have boosted the confidence of Sondhi Limthongkul that he could 
sustain the movement at Lumpini. He realized he was supported by a powerful 
group of famous and wealth people. Furthermore, some of them had good 
connection with the palace and elites. Conducting the movement with the support in 
terms of money and power seemed possible.  Another key factor was the increased 
number of his audience. Sondhi pointed out on the show that his audience in many 
provinces had expanded. He could sell more products which might give him 
confidence financially.  What he and his supporters needed was suited for starting a 
mass movement. It is possible that the second phase of the movement had to wait 
for an audience that was large enough to perform large and effective movements in 
the future. This needs for commitment could be seen developing in the first phase,  
as his audiences were enthusiastic to follow activies such as wearing yellow shirts 
and lighting candles. This was a promising sign that these audiences could become 
loyal potential participants for the coming protest. Besides, during this waiting he 
might have gained additional support from those powerful supporters, since 
Khamnoon (Khamnoon 2006, p. 203) revealed that Sondhi had had several meetings 
with them during the first phase. It is likely that they prepared the future 
mobilization through the meeetings.  
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To prepare for the effective movements, the pattern of the show had been 
noticeably transformed, with the creation of symbolic activities to create a 
connection between Sondhi and his audience. Just sitting and talking about news 
was not enough attractive; the host of the show must have acting skills to entertain 
the audience similar to most television shows. Khamnoon Sidhisamarn (2006, p. 
87), a senator, columnist, and Sondhiǯs thinker, explained that this time the show 
was designed to be the combinations of political debate in the hall, an outdoor show, 
and a broadcast television program (2006, p. 108). However, the alteration of the 
show's pattern and content had been developed to give this a degree of 
encouragement. The seven mobilizing frames which had been constructed since 
Thammasat were retained and applied into the show at Lumpini, but some were 
highlighted and raised in significance to appeal the potential participants. 
Throughout the duration of the show at Lumpini Park, the monarchy and corruption 
mobilizing frames, as well as the king, nation, and democracy metaframes were 
amplified and linked to almost all the issues. In particular the monarchy and king 
metaframes were emphasized throughout the show.  
 
1. The corruption mobilizing frame 
 
This frame was retained in the second phase which this time focused on the 
privatization of state owned enterprises. The reason was that part of his audiences 
was state owned enterprise staff, particularly from EGAT. Interestingly, some of 
EGATT staff became the security guards for the show. Sondhi also criticized other 
negative sides of privatization such as the expensive oil price, the lack of potency in 
administration, and the corruption of Thaksinǯs colleagues in privatizing state 
owned enterprises. During that time, Thaksinǯs family and his close colleagues were 
condemned harshly for their alleged corruption. His issues were chosen to attract 
state owned enterprise staff and general people who suffered from the continual 
increase of oil prices. On the other hand, Thaksin and his associates were said to 
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gained huge benefits from corruption. Hence, the corruption mobilizing frame 
became one of the major frames that drew attention from the public. Some key 
issues remained and were developed with new empirical evidence to support his 
claims. Sondhi claimed that he was given evidence such as video clips, news, and 
official documents from some state officials and state-owned enterprise officials 
who had suffered from the crookedness of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
 
At that time an important movement of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences was 
occurred and engaged with this corruption mobilizing frame. Sondhi announced on 
the 11th episode to call for transparency by appointing himself as ǲYam Fao Pandinǳ 
(the guardian of the country). The Yam Fao Pandin group was set up on the 13th 
episode (23rd December 2005) and recruit the members to protect Thailand from 
corruption and media control. It was the initial movement of Sondhi and the 
audience which would be developed as the Yellow Shirts afterwards.  
 
The problem definition function 
 
Sondhi identified the problem, at this stage, as the betrayal of the nation by Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his associates. The culprit, nonetheless, was considered in the main 
to be Thaksin Shinawatra. Examples in this frame were the same as those he 
presented at Thammasat which were supported by official documents to prove the 
reliability of the accusations. Nonetheless, the privatization of state owned 
enterprises was emphasized as the major misconduct of Thaksin in his treachery of 
the national interests. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) said:  
While Suvarnabhumi Airport construction is represented as the largest scale 
of corruption we have had this country, the EGAT privatization scheme of 
this government is the biggest national betrayal. After the privatization of 
EGAT, a significant number of stakes were sold to foreign investors, in a 
similar way to those of PTT. Itǯs interesting that the government promised to 
the public, before the privatization, that 70 percent of shares would be 
owned by the government. Conversely, it appeared last week that only 51 
percent of shares were held by the government. Where have the rest gone? 
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Another example showing the corruption of Thaksinǯs family was a plan to buy a 
squadron of jet fighters from Russia. The plan belonged to Interior Minister Kongsak 
Wantana, whose wife was a close friend of Pojaman Shinawatra, Thaksinǯs wife at 
the time. Sondhi claimed that from this purchase Kongsak would earn a 10 percent 
commission fee, or Bt3.5 billion (US$ 104 million), even though the Royal Thai Air 
Force committee rejected this Russian-made jet fighter squadron because it (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͷ’, 2005) had too large a body for the standard of the RTAF 
 
A key corruption which Sondhi attempted to magnify involved a sister of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, Monthatip Kowitcharoenkul. The accusation by Sondhi was that she 
ordered a Royal Thai Air Force C-130 aircraft to transport her friends from Bangkok 
to her house-warming party in Chiang Mai. A copy of official document was shown 
on the show. He called this incident ǲTung Yai Digitalǳ to frame the similarity to the 
event that caused the uprising of the student movement in 1973 (This historic 
uprising happened when a group of military personnel used an official aircraft to 
transport movie stars to hunt animals in Tung Yai Naresuan national reserve park). 
Sondhi compared the 1973 incident with Thaksinǯs sister's case by stating that this 
country was under the control of a powerful clan similar to the junta in the 1970s. 
With a huge amount of money and political power, members of the Shinawatra 
family could do everything. When their faults were discovered by public, they 
responded by keeping silent, on the one hand, according to Sondhi, they attacked 
their antagonists hard with legal actions and filthy intimidations, as they had done 
to him at that time.  
 
The causal attribution function 
 
In regard to the cause of the problem, Sondhi identified the cause of the corruption 
as the need of the Shinawatra family to be corrupt for their own benefit. The sell of 
Thaksin to Singapore government was revealed which caused resentment in the 
opposite factions. The tax-free sale happened in January 2006 (ǮThailand’s Thaksin 
Freeze Ou’t, 2007) when Thaksin sold his familyǯs public holdings, in Advanced Info 
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Service Plc (AIS), to the Singaporeǯs Temasek Holdings for nearly 74 billion Baht, 
which involved the disposal of a national asset to a foreign country. However, this 
issue was not much focused on at that time since it only happened a few weeks 
before Sondhi started his ǲGoo chart movementǳ (saving the nation) on 4-5 
February 2006. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͻ’, 2006) explained about 
this sale on the show, briefly, thus: 
Mr. Thaksin determined to sell Shin Corp several months ago since he 
realized his potential downfall. He was afraid that in the near future his 
assets might be seized by a court order. To pave the way for his breaking 
away, he decided to sell it. There have been lots of rumours that he offered 
his company to various countries, only Singapore bought it under their 
agreements. I would say that this prime minister is a plunderer who allows 
Singapore to occupy Thailandǯs assets. According to the royal speech given by 
His majesty the King on his birthday, the premier got mad when the King 
suggested to him to adopt the philosophy of sufficiency economy into his 
policies. But on January 28, 2006, he was obviously jolly and even sang a 
song in an interview, the reason was that he could sell his Shin Corp to 
Singapore during New Year season. He went to Singapore with his children to 
sign the documents of the sale and held a press conference. The worst thing 
is he hasnǯt paid taxes for this sale at all. The director-general of the Revenue 
Department, who is his man, had recently declared that this case was an 
exception. Hence, there was no need for Thaksin to pay tax for this almost 
$1.9 billion stake sale. 
Another example was the loophole from the 1997 constitution which allowed 
Thaksin and his colleagues to be corrupt. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 
2005) said, 
 
This latest 1997 constitution was drafted to be the best constitution that 
Thailand ever had. It would be even better if we had a moral leader as well. 
Unfortunately, weǯve had a crooked leader who takes advantage of the loop 
holes of this constitution to be corrupt. It has been proved over the last 4-5 
years that we must be more careful about any laws that are issued. We can't 
trust politicians and we cannot believe that the rich will never be corrupt. 
These corrupt politicians apply this constitution to claim that they are 
elected by people, but they buy the votes. They also spend the national 
budget and our taxes on million or trillion baht projects to get voted again. 
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It seemed Sondhi viewed thie 1997 constitution as the tool that provided Thaksin 
the opportunity for corruption. Furthermore, the claim of Thaksin that he was 
elected by people to be the democratic prime minister, according to Sondhiǯs view, 
was used to legitimize his malpractices.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
In this frame, Sondhi labelled Thaksin as a liar, plunderer, and the problem of the 
nation, whereas Sondhi and his participants framed themselves as the moral faction 
who attempted to protect the national interests. Sondhi's thoughts (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) about Thaksin and this government were that: ǲThis 
government never keeps their promises. Those words are them lying through their 
teeth. Hence, we must not believe all their storiesǳ. The corrupt family was 
frequently framed when Sondhi hosted the show at Lumpini which referred to 
Luang Ta Maha Bua and Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun’s words about the 
corruption situation. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͷ’, 2005) said, 
Do you remember about what was said by Luang Ta Maha Bua? He used to 
say that Thailand has been eaten and dilapidated by corruption. Besides, 
another former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun expressed his regretful 
sentiment towards the corruption of this government saying that it has 
systemically expanded into every faction. As I said, it is the mega corruption, 
especially by this mega corrupt clan. 
We can see that Sondhi mentioned the related views of the respectful persons to 
stress on his moral movement.  
To describe the shallow thoughts of Thaksin in reducing poverty, Sondhi compared 
King Bhumibolǯs philosophy with Thaksin's procedures. He attacked the ǲmobile 
Cabinet meetingsǳ, of Thaksin and his colleagues, which took place in some rural 
areas. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͺ’, 2005) criticized this on the 14th 
episode of the show thus: 
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This prime minister is the problem for this country, since he disapproves of 
the ideal of sufficiency. At the Art Samat district, he employs the plan to 
eliminate poverty, which is in contrast to His Majesty the Kingǯs ideas. 
Thaksin goes there and interviews local people about their incomes. His 
solution to the poor is to suggest to them to get more income. On the other 
hand, the philosophy of His Majesty the King to solve the poverty starts by 
considering our extra expenses for each month. We must reduce the 
excessive expenses until it reaches the balance point between income and 
expenditure. We donǯt need to get more money to pay for those excessive 
expenses, which is the premierǯs solution. His Majesty the King never 
encourages us to increase the growth of GDP rates.  
The Kingǯs principles had been framed by Sondhi to imply the ignorance of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, while Sondhi framed himself and his audience as the good people who 
were protecting Thailand from greedy politicians.  
The treatment recommendation function 
 
The recommended solution to this mobilizing frame was applying the sufficiency 
economy philosophy of King Bhumibol as the Thai economic policy. Sondhi applied the Kingǯs birthday speech and Pramoteǯs article in his fraiming. He honoured the Kingǯs 
philosophy as the finest means to eradicate the corruption that occurred under the 
governing of Thaksin Shinawatra.  He said on the 12th episode of the show (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷ͸’, 2005) that: 
As I said before, we are spending immense budgets on improper things. 
According to the principle of sufficiency economy, our expenses should be 
consistent with our earnings, we should not overspend. His Majesty the King 
also stated that if everyone has faith in this principle, we should follow it. 
This philosophy is really functional for Thailand. His Majesty the King 
realizes the difficulties our country faces in the future, since our 
neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and China focus on 
capitalism. They are competing in the search for new energy resources. At 
the moment, we buy power from Myanmar, while China in turn buys energy 
from us. Ultimately, we will end up with exasperating competition. To follow 
the principles of capitalism, we must work hard so as to gain more materials, 
but happiness. We donǯt feel satisfied in life anymore. The sufficiency 
economy philosophy of His Majesty the King is the only way to give us the 
true meaning of happiness. 
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In Thailand the Kingǯs speeches, on his birthday, have been followed by Thai people 
and adopted as honourable messages. His messages sometimes referred to major 
issues in Thailand at that time which described by McCargo (2005, p. 501) that: ǲthe 
King acted as a didactic commentator on national issues, helping to set the national 
agenda, especially through his annual birthday speechesǳ.  Sondhi also implemented 
the King speech into his frames since the messages seemed useful to his agendas. 
 
Another solution was the formation of the ǲYam Fao Pandinǳ army. This was the 
beginning of Sondhiǯs movement in this early time. He encouraged his audience to 
be active in the army of ǲYam Fao Pandinǳ. He (Khamnoon, 2006: 104) announced 
on the 13th episode that: 
I would like to invite everyone to participate in the ǲYam Fao Pandinǳ army. 
We have the four main obligations to accomplish: (1) to demand the 
transparency in public and government administration, (2) to protect the 
freedom of the media, (3) to support the political reform, and (4) to endoese 
the power of the middle classes. 
This concept was applied as an obligation of the group and became part of the 
Yellow Shirtsǯs objectives. However, the last obligation was fascinating since Sondhi 
demanded to increase the role of the middle class in Thailand. Most of his audiences 
appear to be middle class; possibly he wanted to challenge Thaksin and his 
colleagues who were elites and their voters who comprised the majority rural poor. 
Thus, to do battle with them the suffering and grievances of the middle class must 
be raised to stimulate the disappointments of Sondhiǯs audiences. The conflicts 
between classes were applied in this mobilizing frame. 
The metaframes 
 
Sondhi constructed the corruption mobilizing frame based on the nation, king, 
modernization and democracy metaframes. The nation metaframe was employed to 
create the sentiment of patriotism among his audience to protect Thailand from 
corruption. In the second movement period Sondhi labeled Thaksin and his family 
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as a corrupt clan. He framed many corrupt issues of this family which he claimed 
would lead to the eventual destruction of the nation. This nation metaframe was 
effective to arouse the sense of love toward Thailand.  At that time, the major 
audience was staff of state owned enterprises which had had conflicts with the 
government on the privatization scheme. Consequently, this metaframe was useful 
for Sondhi to attract them to resist privatization to protect both of personal and 
national benefits. In terms of the general audience, Sondhi framed them as the 
middle class which was being intimidated by Thaksin and the poor or Thaksinǯs 
voters. The framing of the middle class dissatisfaction was just begun; hence it was 
not precisely seen as the key motivation for them to participate in the later 
movement.  However, the formation of the ǲYam Fao Pandin armyǳ was 
underpinned by the nation metaframe. Sondhi set up the four obligations which 
directed the audience to protectthe nation from Thaksinǯs corruption. This worked 
successfully in attracting and recruiting a larger audience, who saw this form of 
protection of the nation as inherent to their sense of Thai identity.  
The next important frame was the king metaframe. In this second movement period 
Sondhi connected King Bhumibol to his framing which had been done in this 
corruption mobilizing frame. To attack Thaksin, an example from Art Samart district 
was presented to the audience. According to Thaksin's plan, this event (Pasuk and 
Baker: 2008, p. 67) was held to allow local people and officials to offer petitions to 
Thaksin. The tour was held at Art Samat district in Roi-et province in January 2006 
and was set up as a ǲreality showǳ to eradicate poverty. It was broadcasted live on 
television. On this live show, Thaksin did many homely activities such as ǲdressing 
in a pakoma (common manǯs lower cloth); being transported on a village tractor (i-
taen); riding a motorbike down a dusty village street; and accepting flowers from 
toothless old ladiesǳ. Sondhi criticized Thaksin's solution as a wasteful activity 
created to gain more popularity from the grassroots, because the plan to eradicate 
the poverty was not effective and sustainable. Consequently, the finer philosophy of 
King Bhumibol was proposed in order to undervalue Thaksin.  
 
143 
 
 
 
2.  The monarchy mobilizing frame 
 
This mobilizing frame had been raised as one of the most important frames during 
this second phase. Sondhi realized well about the love and loyalty of the Thais 
toward King Bhumibol, accordingly he emphasized on framing the honors and 
benefactions of the King. As previous mentioned, Sondhi started framing this 
monarchy mobilizing frame since he had the show on Channel 9. Shortly before the 
cancellation, he joined in a seminar at Thammasat to distribute the concept of the Kingǯs royal prerogative to the public. The ǲlost sheepǳ story was read in the 
seminar led to the escalation of the doubtful loyalty of Thaksin and his colleagues.  
During the show, Sondhi performed activities to show the respect to King Bhumibol. 
Nonetheless the major event that motivated him to focus on this framing was King 
Bhumibolǯs birthday.  
 
On 4th December 2006 the King gave a royal speech on his birthday which advised 
Thais, and perhaps Thaksin, to live in moderation. After this, Pramote Nakornthab, a 
prominent political science professor, and Manager Columnist, wrote an article to 
stress on the King's speech. The King, according to Pramoteǯs article, seemed 
concern on the defects of Thai democracy, the denial of Thaksin Shinawatra of 
public criticism, the corruptions, the misguided economic policy or populism, and 
the inattention of this government to his sufficiency economy principle. Counted by 
Pramote, the King stressed and repeated on his philosophy twenty three times 
during his speech. Pramote (2005) concluded that the King encouraged Thai society 
to follow his principle, not only Thaksin and the government; all Thai people must 
adopt this philosophy to protect the country from all calamities.  
 
It is interesting that Sondhi activated his actual movement due to this special event. 
He attempted to imply that the King referred to Thaksinǯs misconducts through his 
speech. This was used as a sign for Sondhi to trigger the movements which might be 
claimed that it was done in accordance to the Kingǯs speech. In consequence, Sondhi 
144 
 
 
 
intensed the anger of the audiences and royalists through this monarchy mobilizing 
frame. The significance activity during this time was the intention of Sondhi 
Limthongkul to return this country to King Bhumibol and support the the extra-
constitutional royal powers of the King through the ǲRajprachasamasai principleǳ .  
 
The problem definition function 
 
This time, the problem of this monarchy frame was constructed as the plan of 
Thaksin and his colleagues to abandon the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol. Sondhi 
provided evidence to support his claims, as he had done in the previous episodes. To 
support the allegation, an action of Thaksinǯs subordinate in Chiang Mai province 
was mentioned. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͽ’, 2005) said: 
I would like to show you a t-shirt that is made by Thaksinǯs supporter in 
Chiang Mai. He is MP Pakorn Buranapakorn from Chiang Mai. This t-shirt has 
a slogan ǲWe love Thaksinǳ, he makes wristbands too. When I heard about 
this I really felt downhearted. I want to believe that this action does not 
involve with the premier. It seems like MP Pakorn determines to convince 
the public to believe that Chaing Mai people completely support the premier. 
This example seemed to deepen the anger among the royalists, since 2005 and 2006 
were the years that Thai people had a celebration of King Bhumibolǯs life events. The 
King turned 82 in 2005, while in 2006 there were the sixtieth anniversary 
celebrations of the Kingǯs accession to the Throne. In that period of time, Thai 
people wore yellow T-shirts and silicon wristbands printed with the slogan ǲWe 
love the Kingǳ.  The significance of the yellow color was that it is associated with 
Monday, in Thai tradition, which is the day the King was born on. However, it could 
be said that Sondhi and his audiences were the earliest group that wore the yellow 
shirts to honour the monarch. After his television program was cancelled from 
Channel 9, he continued the show and wore a white and yellow t-shirt with the 
slogans ǲWe will fight for the Kingǳ and ǲWe love the Kingǳ. He persuaded the 
audience to show loyalty to the King by using yellow flags and stickers, and wearing 
yellow t-shirts. The numbers of people wearing yellow shirts and wristbands with 
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the slogan was greatly increased and spread to the public. Hence, the action of MP 
Pakorn to support Thaksin with the similar t-shirts and wristbands was, inevitably, 
considered by some people, including Sondhi, as a sign of disloyalty by comparing 
Thaksin to King Bhumibol.   
 
In the 8th episode, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) reminded 
people of the actions of Thaksin when he performed the Buddhist rite in Wat Phra 
Kaew. This time, he supported his claim with more reliable evidence of photos and 
official documents. He explained to the audience that: 
Regarding Thaksinǯs performance in the hall of Wat Phra Kaew, people who 
are loyal to His Majesty the King are going to charge the prime minister with 
the lese majesty law. This place has been reserved as a place for members of 
the Chakri Dynasty; in particular the position where Thaksin sat, as the head 
of the event, was reserved as the sitting position for the King. Evidently, he 
was not conscious of what the appropriate manners were. His subordinates 
eventually had a press conference to defend the action saying that they had 
held this event legally. They insisted that on April 8th they had sent a letter to 
the Office of His Majesty the King's Principal Private Secretary asking for 
permission from the King. From my information, before this event was 
staged, there were many meetings of committees. The conclusion from the 
meetings was that the head of this event was His Majesty the King, whereas 
the premier was just a participant. On the other hand, Mr. Vissanue had not 
offered a formal invitation letter to His Majesty the King. Instead, it was the 
premier who became the head of the event. 
The next serious accusation was framed in episode eight. Sondhi claimed that 
Thaksin plotted a plan to isolate the King from Thai people. This plan was called ǲthe 
tyrannical strategy of Thaksin Shinawatraǳ. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 
;’, 2005) described this plan as follows: 
At this time, in response, they determine to shut my mouth by legal actions. A 
policeman accused me with committing lese majeste, and the two Thai Rak 
Thai MPs went to the Central Investigation Bureau to accuse me of 
committing lese majeste and rebellion against me. According to the charge, Iǯve become ǲthe riotǳ. As a riot I will reveal, to everyone, ǲthe tyrannical 
strategyǳ, the evil plan to separate the King from the people. Please 
concentrate on this; this could be the last time for me to publicly talk about 
this topic. We must be careful and deliberately consider this strategy. We 
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should not let them conduct this plan. The people of the King must realize 
that there are some movements at the moment, from some factions, 
committing the malpractices to abandon the royal prerogative. While 
someone who is disloyalty attempting to act as an equal to the King.  
This plan seemed stired up the furious of his audience and the royalists. Sondhi 
might deduce this plan when Thaksinǯs subordinates denied revealing the 
information about the appointment of the acting Somdet Phra Sangkarat to him.  
This new blame surprised the public that this prime minister had the evil plan to 
harm their esteemed monarch. 
The causal attribution function 
This time, Sondhi Limthongkul identified the cause of this mobilizing frame as an 
effort of this government, in particular Thaksin Shinawatra, to violate the royal 
prerogative of the King. According to Sondhi, if this tyrannical strategy was 
accomplished, the King would have been limited in his royal power. In episode eight, 
Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) explained that: 
Mr. Thongthong said this government has had interactions with His Majesty 
the King regularly. By referring to the royal tradition from British, he claims 
that subjects which are discussed between the King and the government 
must not be revealed to the public. In other words, reference to the King, by 
the general public, shows inappropriate manners. I totally disagree with this 
idea. His Majesty the King is different from the Western Kings. He has 
undertaken several valuable developments for this country for, at least, the 
last 60 years. Any attempts to isolate the King from his people are absolutely 
immoral. The aforementioned claim by Mr. Thongthong would be acceptable 
if we were governed by the ethical government. On the other hand it would 
be appalling if we were ruled by the immoral government. The King would be 
restricted in his rights and be unable to freely help his suffering people from 
troublesome.This would be happened as a result from the ǲtyrannical 
strategyǳ of this government to isolate the King from his people. 
Sondhi connected this plan to Thongthongǯs interview. He concluded that the 
government planned to report the King's news to the public, which would lead to 
the separation of the King from the people. According to Sondhi, this was the plan of 
Thaksin and colleagues to abuse the Kingǯs royal supremacy.  
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The moral evaluation function 
 
Sondhi framed Thaksin as the unfaithful prime minister who attempted to act as an 
equal to the King. The accusation was described in episode eight when Sondhi 
guided the audience to give an oath to protect King Bhumibol from Thaksin. In part 
of the vow, he labelled Thaksin Shinawatra as immoral leader. Consequently, people 
were longing to protect the treasured King, since King Bhumibol had untiringly 
devoted himself to develop and lead this country for 60 years. On the other hand 
Thaksin Shinawatra was an egotistical and conceited leader who was the 
representative of the greedy capitalist groups.  
 
Thaksin, according to Sondhiǯs branding, undertook several malpractices to violate 
the Kingǯs royal supremacy. Thaksin and his capitalist colleagues had attempted to 
issue a new law to demolish the Thai traditional democracy (this will be explained 
later). Besides, they (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) plotted an evil plan to 
isolate the King from his people to control the power of the King. This time Sondhi 
straightforwardly branded Thaksin as disloyalty. He might have confidence to fight 
back with supports from the powerful political activists and the royalists.   
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
The solution of this monarchy mobilizing frame has been a breakthrough for 
contemporary Thai political movements. It became the instant answer for many 
political movement leaders as ǲthe finest solutionǳ to solve the dead end nature of 
political conflicts in Thailand.  Sondhi proposed the concept of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ 
as the solution to stop the government of Thaksin Shinawatra from committing 
corruption and violating the King’s royal supremacy. Sondhi referred this concept to 
Mom Rajawongse (M.R.) Kukrit Pramoj, a former prime minister and prominent 
royalist.  Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) put that: 
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Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj, our great philosopher, offered a concept of 
conformity between the King and the people which was called the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle. Regarding this concept, any actions with a 
predisposition to isolate the King from the people are absolutely 
inappropriate. 
This concept was proposed in the 8th episode which was the beginning step of 
Sondhi Limthongkul to start the movement. This activity might be his plan to test 
the extent of the audienceǯs love toward King Bhumibol before the protest started. 
Moreover, his standpoint and agenda of the movement was announced this time. 
According to Khamnoon, this movement had two stages. The first one was leading 
the audience to give an oath to restore King Bhumibol his royal prerogative. After 
this, they planned to collect signatures to offer to the Head of the Privy Council, 
General Prem Tinsulanonda.  
 
Sondhi lead the audience to give the vow in front of the photo of King Bhumibol. He 
declared to do the battle to restore the King his royal prerogative. The oath (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) was announced by Sondhi that: 
His Majesty the King, I am Sondhi Limthongkul. I am here to give a vow, with 
all my might, to fight serenely to return His Majesty the King the Royal 
Prerogative which in conformity with the principles of the constitution. 
Accordingly, His Majesty the King would have an absolute royal authority to 
provide us a new leader to reform the politics and establish new political 
organizations through the amended constitution. As a result we would have 
the stability of the democratic government with the King as Head of State. 
This could stop wicked people conducting corruption and bring people peace 
and contentment. 
I am here today to give my vow and collaborate with every faction to return 
Thailand to His Majesty the King in order to establish the solidarity in this 
country. His Majesty the King would have the royal supremacy to rule this 
country together with the people in conformity with the Rajprachasamasai 
principle, a Thai traditional rule of law which is a form of democracy with the 
King as Head of State. 
The notion of Rajprachasamasai principle, raised by Sondhi, had been created by the 
elite in the early era of the Thai kingdom as part of the Thai kingship concept. In a 
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writing of Phya Anuman Rajathon (1951, p. 2), he asserted the meaning of the 
traditional Thai kingship that in the earlier periods the Thais had experienced 
several hardships such as poverty, natural disasters, and wars. So as to survive, they 
must have a leader who can protect their lives and provide them serenity and unity.  
Accordingly, the King was elected to be their leader to protect them from sufferings 
and enemies. This Thai kingship concept had been appeared in part of the Kingǯs 
name that was ǲAnekchonnikorn samosorn sommutǳ or ǲelected by the peopleǳ. From 
the definition of Phya Anuman Rajathon, Thai kings were elected by the people to 
rule the country, which was the democratic mean to elect the leader. However, in 
reality Thai monarchs had to struggle hard with the members of their royal family 
and powerful officials to become the King. In the real lives of some Thai monarchs, 
the concept of ǲAnekchonnikorn samosorn sommutǳ seemed diverse from the 
explanation of Phya Anuman Rajathon.  
 
This concept was brought back in 11 December 1971 by Mom Rajawongse Kukrit 
Pramoj. Sondhi Limthongkul (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) told the 
audience that Kukrit transformed the principle of ǲAnekchonnikorn samosorn 
sommutǳ into ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ. It was the combination of Raja+pracha+som+asai 
to describe the role of the monarchs in Thai politics. Nonetheless, the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ concept was transformed again in 1973 by a political-science 
professor Chai-anant Samudavanija to offer the solution after the uprising of the 
students in October 1973. He asserted the alternative definition of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ as ǲthe joint-ruling between the monarchy and the people 
through the House of Representativesǳ. Chai-anant (Supalak, 2008) pinpointed it as 
the essential concept for Thai people that had no faith in political institutions and 
dishonest politicians.  
 
Sondhi Limthongkul brought up this concept as the solution to stop Thaksin from 
abandoning King Bhumibolǯs royal prerogative. Sondhiǯs movement and his concept 
were supported by some famous aristocrats and royalists such as Professor 
Pramote Nakornthap and Chai-anant Samudavanija, his Manager Columnists and 
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respected advisors. During the campaign of Sondhi on the monarchy issue, Pramote 
also wrote an article to explain the meaning of the royal prerogative in the Manager 
Newspaper. He cited the case of Jaruwan Menthaka to portray the misconduct of Thaksinǯs government in violating King Bhumibolǯs royal prerogative. In the article, 
Pramote (Pramote 2006) provided the background of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ concept, 
which actually was named by King Bhumibol in 1958.  Also, the King gave the 
characterization of the concept that ǲthe King and the people are interdependentǳ. 
In terms of the royal prerogative, Pramote provided the definition of Mom 
Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj that: 
I would like to propose the middle path of the Rajprachasamasai principle 
which allows the King to rule this country in association with the people. 
According to this concept, the King and the people would have more 
administrative power than in a democratic regime. The reason is the King 
and the people have sincere good wishes and regard towards each other. If 
this country were ruled by love and care of the King and the people, Thailand 
would become the land of peace, serenity, and civilization as everyone wish. 
More backdrops was given in the article, in that the concept of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ 
had been established since ancient times, for instance, in the Sukhothai period it 
was called Pho Khun or patriarchal king (father rules, children ruled). In the 
Ayudhya Kingdom it was Devaraja which was the combination of Buddhism and 
Bramahnism, and it was named ǲAnekchonnikorn samosorn sommutǳ in the 
Rattankosin period. An interesting point about the power of the King was that in 
past times Thai people relied on the support and protection of the King. When the 
absolute monarchy was overthrown by the military and civil bureaucrats in the 
1932 revolution, a constitutional monarchy was established. Pramote believed that 
the supremacy of the King, to protect the people and relieve their difficulties, has 
been curbed since that time.  
 
He referred to the British monarchy saying that the extra-constitutional power of 
the British Monarch was accepted as part of the royal prerogative. This power could 
be used by the monarch in times of crisis. Pramote condemned the present day Thai 
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politics that Thailand has not been able to establish the firm democracy since the 
political leaders never have faith in the monarchy and the people. Hence, the 
constitution has been created to limit the rights of the King and the people to 
participate in the political arena. This, according to Pramoteǯs writing, could be seen 
from a phrase in the constitution that ǲthe King is above politics and under the 
constitutionǳ. 
 
In terms of the character of the royal prerogative, Pramote explained the first 
criterion that appeared in the constitution that: ǲThe King can do no wrongǳ. He 
identified that any action made by the King was always legitimate with no 
wrongdoing at any point. To illustrate this meaning, he gave an example of Thai 
royal custom of when the King ordered a royal command. Traditionally, there must 
have a person, who could be either the Prime Minister or another state official acted 
as the signatory responded to the royal command. When the royal command 
process was completed, nothing could be changed. For the next criterion, Pramote 
explained that "The Royal Prerogative remains a significant source of constitutional 
law which is largely immune from scrutiny by the courts". He pointed out that when 
the royal command was ordered and completed, the court had no right to oppose 
the enacted royal command. In other words, any confutation toward the royal 
command of the King, which led to the deterioration of the royal prerogative, should 
not be done. For that reason, if one insisted to bring up the royal command, to re-
consider the legitimacy in the court, it could be considered as an intention to violate 
the royal prerogative. The writing of Pramote (Pramote 2005) determined to 
explain the action of Thaksin and his colleagues in the dismissal of Khunying 
Jaruwan Menthaka from the Auditor-general post. It was indicated the act of 
Thaksin, concerning this matter, as inappropriate and absolutely violating the royal 
prerogative of King Bhumibol.  
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The metaframes 
 
This monarchy mobilizing frame was based on the king and democracy metaframe. 
Even though this mobilizing frame emphasized on the King and the royal 
prerogative, it was also involved with the democracy. Sondhi announced in the show 
that he would do everything to protect King Bhumibol and return to him the royal 
supremacy. By this, the King should play a major role during the critical political 
situation. Sondhi and his colleagues believed that the authority of the King had been 
abandoned by both the constitution and politicians, which had been done through a 
democratic regime. To solve the crisis resulting from the defective administration of 
Thaksin Shinawatra, Sondhi proposed the concept of Rajprachasamasai which was 
considered by him, and some scholars, as the traditional form of Thai democracy. 
From this concept, the King and the people would rule the country together, with 
love and compassion, by being dependent on each other.  
 
Nevertheless, Pramote declared that a democratic regime, with the King as Head of 
the State, had the same objective with the Rajprachasamasai principle in terms of 
participatory democracy. The King and the people would have both authority and 
participation in accordance with the concept of a democratic regime (Pramote 
2006). Thus, it could be explained that Sondhi proposed his concept of democracy, 
based on traditional Thai Kingship, to remain which would secure the King's and the 
monarchy's power in Thailand. On the other hand, the Western style of democracy, 
which was used by Thaksin Shinawatra, was rejected by Sondhi and his group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame 
 
This mobilizing frame was produced to support the monarchy frame and creating 
the image of moral movement of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences. The event 
which occurred and had an impact on this frame was the fully support from Luang 
Ta Maha Bua. Thus, Sondhi engaged the monk into this frame included King 
Bhumibol to create his moral movement image. However, this frame had a lessened 
significance in this second phase since Sondhi turned to focus on the other 
mobilizing frames, which were more powerful in terms of mobilization. Issues 
involved with this mobilizing frame had not been significantly changed, but 
emphasized on the close relationships between King Bhumibol and Somdet Phra 
Nyanasamvara.  
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem of this mobilizing frame was the appointment of acting Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat to replace Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara which was identical to the framing 
in the first phase. The main culprit was, again, indicated to be Thaksin Shinawatra 
as the key agent, but this time Sondhi also stridently attacked the Deputy Prime 
Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm, who was in charge of this appointment.  
Sondhi insisted that Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara had good health to accomplish his 
duties as Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Several evidences, such as official documents, 
photos, and video clips, were used to support his arguments. In this frame, Vissanu 
was accused of being deceitful in the appointment process by misinforming the 
public, including hiding the truth from Queen Sirikhit. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) put that: 
This is a very serious case, but this government disregards this action. Why is 
this so critical to us? I must say that to enact the royal decree, Mr.Vissanu had 
a royal meeting with Her Majesty Queen Sirikhit so as to assert, to her, that 
His Majesty King Bhumibol has agreed to the appointment of Somdej Kiaw to 
act in place of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. I would say that this is 
154 
 
 
 
his determination to abandon the prerogative of the King. At the moment, the 
disciples of Luang Ta Maha Bua are bringing a charge against Vissanu Krue-
ngarm of committing lese majeste. 
It seemed that Vissanu, as alleged by Sondhi, determined to deceive Queen Sirikhit 
that King Bhumibol approved of this appointment. Thus, Vissanu was guilty of 
committing lese majeste by deceiving both the King and Queen. The movement of 
Luang Ta Maha Bua and Sondhi were consonant which was presented through the frame. 
 
The casual attribution function 
 
While hosting the show at Lumpini Park, Sondhi Limthongkul had not, obviously, 
mentioned the fundamental reasons behind this appointment. When he was at 
Thammasat, he made implications about the intention of Thaksin to act in ways 
comparable to King Bhumibol by appointing his own Somdet Pra Sangkarat. 
According to Sondhi, Thaksin might need to expand his political power into the Thai 
Buddhist realm for the personal interests of himself and his associates.  
The hidden agenda of Thaksin was revealed in Khamnoon's book. He and Sondhi 
assumed that the purpose of Thaksin in promoting Somdet Kiaw was that this monk 
had a close relationship with Pojamanǯs family. Furthermore, Khamnoon (2006, p. 
82) claimed that Thaksin desired to gain more votes by assisting Somdet Kiaw, since 
the monk was involved with Phra Dhammakaya Temple.  Khamnoon (2006, p. 82) 
portrayed that the Thai Rak Thai Party of Thaksin Shinawatra was supported by 
Phra Dhammakaya Temple, led by the abbot Phra Dhammachayo. In 1997, this 
temple faced difficulties due to the reduction of both followers and donations. 
Political power was needed for them to survive their impaired situation. As a result, 
the network between Thaksin Shinawatra ǲthe King of political marketingǳ and Phra 
Dhammachayo ǲthe King of religious marketingǳ was created to achieve their mutual 
interests. It must be noted that Phra Dhammakaya Temple had a huge number of 
devoted followers all over Thailand. Hence, wholesale voting from them, for Thaksinǯs party, was not far from Thaksin's expectations.  
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Nonetheless, during that time the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was 
the primary figure in eliminating ǲthe abnormal practicesǳ from the Thai Buddhist 
dominion. The teachings and practices of Phra Dhammachayo and his Phra 
Dhammakaya Temple were investigated and judged as committing corruption and 
not being in accordance with the Buddhaǯs principles. In Khamnoonǯs view (2006, p. 
82), to accomplish the plan of Thaksin and Phra Dhammachayo, a new Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat, that is Somdet Kiaw, must be appointed to be the King of Thai Buddhist 
realm.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
The label of the liar was given to the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm, 
while that of the sinner was given to Thaksin, according to the sermon of Luang Ta 
Maha Bua. An example was presented by Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͽ’, 
2005) thus: 
Mr. Vissanu authorizes this appointment by referring to the illness of Somdet 
Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, without the approval from His Holinessǯs 
medical team. He claims that the Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand has a 
resolution to appoint an acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. On the other hand, 
Somdet Polklang from Chana Songkram Temple argues that on that day he 
was there with Vissanu. It is he who suggests to Mr. Vissanu to carefully 
study the law and regulations before having a meeting with the council, 
which means that this appointment is not approved by the council. 
Conversely, Mr. Vissanu announces to the public that the Sangha Supreme 
Council has agreed to this appointment and that it is also approved by 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Unfortunately, Mr. Vissanu doesn't 
know that Iǯve got a document of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. From 
this document, we will see that His Holiness signs his signature and then 
crosses it out which indicates his disagreement to the appointment. This is 
evidence which demonstrates that what Mr. Vissanu has done is completely 
committing falsification. 
The long and congenial relationship between King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was described through the show. To reinforce his claim, 
Sondhi explained that when the King ordained as Buddhist monk his mentor, during 
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his monk-hood, was Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Interestingly, Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) stressed on the bond between the King 
and Somdet Nyanasamvara in this frame thus: 
Apparently, both His Majesty the King and Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
Nyanasamvara were born to rule this country as Kings. The secular kingdom 
has been ruled under the throne of His Majesty King Bhumibol, while Somdet 
Pra Nyanasamvara is determined to rule the Buddhist kingdom as His 
Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat. 
The intention of Sondhi to emphasize on the King and Somdet Pra Nyanasamvaraǯs 
connections could be understood as his attempt to intensify the fault of Thaksin and 
Vissanu. This message was selected and highlighted to persuade his participants to 
protect both Buddhism and the King, the two primary institutions. They were 
convinced to have faith on the duty and rightfulness, as a moral force, to protect the 
revered figures. 
 
According to the support of Luang Ta Maha Bua, Sondhi authorized his legitimacy to 
conduct the ǲmoral movementǳ. Sondhi announced that Luang Ta Maha Bua framed 
his actions as dharma actions in hosting the show, and providing information to the 
public. Thus, as a moral person, he (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) never 
feared the intimidations of Thaksin and his associates. He had been protected by 
tens of thousands of blessed forest monks under the leadership of the esteemed 
Luang Ta Maha Bua.  
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
When hosting the show at Lumpini Park, Sondhi did not propose another solution 
for this frame. He had said, since the show was held at Thammasat University, that 
Thaksin should stop appointing the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat to prove his loyalty 
toward King Bhumibol. 
 
157 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, on the 9th episode of the show (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn Ϳ’, 
2005) an invitation letter from Luang Ta Maha Bua to Sondhi Limthongkul and 
Thaksin Shinawatra was recited. The monk invited them to go to Wat Pa Ban Tard in 
Udon Thani province to make reconciliation. Even though this proposal of Luang Ta 
Maha Bua was not asserted as a precise solution for this Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
mobilizing frame, Sondhi accepted the invitation. The subject of the letter was 
described on the show thus: Iǯve just received a letter from Luang Ta Maha Bua invites us to see him for 
building peace. In the letter, it was written:  Dear Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra. I am aware of the situation between your Excellency and Mr. 
Sondhi Limthongkul which might cause severe hatred and discord in our 
society. The security and amity of Thailand, a country of Buddhism, could be 
affected by this. The undesired destructions should be avoided. I would like 
to invite your Excellency to have a meeting at Wat Pa Ban Tard, Udonthani 
province to establish peace and serenity in this country. 
For me (Sondhi Limthongkul), Iǯm willing to accept the invitation, but the 
premier may not have time to come. If I could meet him there, I would ask 
him the same old questions. I really want to know his answers to the 
questions Iǯve asked him before. 
This could imply that the solution of this frame was to ask for the solution from 
Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister. Only the former premier could work out this 
problem. 
 
The metaframes 
 
The religion and king metaframes were involved with this mobilizing frame. Even 
though Sondhi posited the importance of every religion in Thailand, Buddhism was 
principally focused on to mobilize his Buddhist followers. Sondhi engaged with 
famous monks and framed himself as a moral force supported by those forest 
monks. He realized that the religion frame was effective to draw the attention from 
Bhuddists. Besides, a major reason that many monks and lay people were activate in 
this movement came from a verdict of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara. Khamnoon 
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explained that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara had the duty in eliminating ǲthe abnormal 
practicesǳ from the Thai Buddhist dominion. It appeared that Somdet Pra 
Nyanasamvara did not approve of the teachings and practices of the Dhammakaya 
Temple, which were seen as not conforming to the teachings of Buddha. Most of Sondhiǯs supporters agreed with the verdict of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara. When 
Sondhi pointed out the connections of Thaksin, Somdet Kiaw, and Dhammachayo 
from the Dhammakaya Temple, his supporters were eagerly to join the movement to 
get rid of these ǲabnormal practicesǳ. Also, King Bhumibol was touched upon 
through the king metaframe. The relationship between the King and Somdet Pra 
Nyanasamvara was tied in to solidify the blame as Sondhi had done in the first 
phase. 
 
 
4. The media control mobilizing frame 
 
In this second phase, Sondhi had encoutered a worse situation of media censorship. 
He was allegedly attacked many times by groups of young men who he claimed were 
ordered to attack him by Thaksinǯs subordinates. It happened when he performed 
the live show at Lumpini Park. At that time, the show would occasionally be 
interrupted.  Sometimes, a group of men would be sent to disturb the audience by 
throwing firecrackers into them, attacking them with offensive speech, and 
threatening Sondhi Limthongkulǯs security. Furthermore, the show and his media 
networks had been blocked by both legal and illegal means. It was removed from the 
broadcasting schedules of the local cable TV networks. Some policemen also 
charged him with legal accusations to bar him from conducting the movement, while 
Thaksin and his lawyer team continued the legal action.  However, there was a 
significant event on the 10th episode. Sondhi suddenly hosted the show from Wat Pa 
Ban Tard, Udon Thani. He told his audience that he was hunted by some people; 
fortunately he escaped and was under the protection of Luang Ta Maha Bua. Sondhi 
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declared his battle with Thaksin Shinawatra on the show. Accordingly, this mobilizing 
frame was constructed to show the greivances of Sondhi Limthongkul caused by Thaksin.  
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem in this mobilizing frame was constructed as the intention of Thaksin to 
silence the media. Thus, the culprit was Thaksin’s cabinet. According to Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005), Thaksin viewed him and some media 
outlets as opponents. Sondhi said: 
This government decides to silence the media that criticize their mega 
projects. The government does not want people to hear my voice. In fact, the 
owners of some media outlets also support this government. When the 
government dissatisfies, they typically use state-owned television to attack 
the opposite factions and convince people to support those mega projects. 
In terms of his media, Sondhi pointed to the rights as a journalist which in 
accordance with the 1997 constitution. He (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͶ’, 
2005) attacked Thaksinǯs subordinate who curbed his freedom of speech thus: 
How could Mr. Phumtham Wechayachai (the Deputy Transport Minister) 
block us from our basic rights? According to the 1997 constitution, in 
sections 39 and 40, as Thai people we have freedom to receive news and 
information. Besides, as a journalist, I have the right to express my opinions 
and make speeches as well. You accuse that I am destroying democracy; on 
the other hand, it is you who abolishes democracy by stopping us from 
exercising our basic rights.  
Sondhi saidThaksin had made a mistake by cancelling his ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ 
show from Channel 9. According to Sondhi, most of his audiences were normal laid 
back Bangkokians who were ignorant about political situations. Generally, they 
would watch their favorite TV shows and go to bed around 11 p.m. every day. 
Occasionally, they might complain about minor issues, resulting from some policies 
of the government, with their colleagues. When this program was cancelled, they 
were irritated. Hence, they started wondering about the reason of the cancellation. 
They wanted to know what Sondhi had done that led to the termination of their 
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favorite show. When Sondhi had the mobile live show, the government continued to 
intimidate him. For that reason, these frustrated people wanted to know the truth 
and ultimately became his regular audience, which was the reason for the upsurge 
in numbers. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 9, 2005)   stated that the more 
the government threatened him, the more the people came to support the live show. 
 
The causal attribution function 
 
Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) explained the cause of media 
control on the sixth episode saying that Thaksin and the government were afraid of 
the information revealed by Sondhi. He said:  
As I said, our society is covered by darkness. Those devils harm us by 
camouflaging themselves in the dark. The only thing to dispel them is by 
lighting candles. I am the first one who lights the candle of my knowledge. 
This will be followed by thousands of people. This is a reason for them to 
severely intimidate me. My tactic works well, so they are afraid of it. 
According to the Nation newspaper, they (ǮTeam to tackle Sondhi threa’t, 2005) 
reported that the Thai Rak Thai Party had arranged ǲa special team to try and stall 
Sondhi Limthongkulǯs plans to bring down the governmentǳ. The government was 
anxious that Sondhi might prompt the audience to file a petition to the King for a 
new interim constitution, which might lead to the overthrow of the government. 
Thus media control became the measure to stop Sondhi for the further movements.  
 
The moral evaluation function 
 
Likewise the first phase, he framed this government as devils attempting to hide 
their malpractices such as corruption, the abandonment of royal prerogative, and 
the failure of their administrative policy. Accordingly, he also framed himself and 
his audience as the ethical ones helping this society by lighting candles of knowledge 
to drive away those devils. Thus, the candle of dharma metaphor had been 
emphasized again through this mobilizing frame. According to Sondhi, Thai media, 
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which should act as a mirror to reflect the truth and lead society on the right paths, 
did not accomplish their duty. On the other hand Sondhi identified himself as a 
decent journalist who dared to fight this malevolent government.  
 
In the 11th episode (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͷ’, 2005), he told the audience 
that he had been transformed into a journalist purposed to protect the primary 
institutions of nation, religion, and king. He was not anymore the old Sondhi who 
had done both good and bad. During the show, he asked the audience to forgive him 
for his past mistakes. He would devote himself to perform his journalism roles, and 
refuted to have any position in a government as a reward. In episode twelfth, he (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷ͸’, 2005) re-stated his position as a journalist, who 
was a representative of the people, fighting for what was right. Sondhi stressed that 
he was just a patriotic Thai who love this country, similar to his audiences.  
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
When the show was hosted at Thammasat, the solution of the media control frame 
was recommended as expanding the networks of information. The metaphor of ǲTian 
Hang Thamǳ or lighting the candle of dharma was raised as one of the movement's 
symbols. Similarly, this solution also applied into the frame during this second 
movement period. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) said:  
In this darkened society, I have to be brave and speak the truth as a 
journalist. This is the mean to light up our society. If all of you can relate to 
this, please cooperate by igniting your candles to distribute the truth to your 
colleagues. This is the only way to scare and drive out those devils. They have 
intimidated me by several means because they are scared by our candle 
lights. Our strategy is really effective, since they are facing difficulties. If we 
keep doing this, in the end we will have a transparent society. 
Another solution, furthermore, was the decision of Sondhi to sue Thaksin and his 
subordinates. This idea came up when the Public Relations Department stopped 
relaying satellite feeds from ASTV 1; accordingly the local cable TV network had to 
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stop broadcasting the show. However, this could not bar the audiences from other 
provinces. Those local residents in major cities (ǮModern media subverts Sondhi ban’, 
2005) such as Phuket, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, and Hat Yai declined to surrender. 
They gathered people to watch the show via open air projectors. Besides, according 
to Sondhiǯs accusation, some policemen and politicians had made efforts to stop him 
by charging him and his co-host, with various allegations, in many provinces. With 
the support of Luangta Maha Bua, Sondhi decided to sue them back. He also invited 
the audience in Bangkok and other provinces to protect their rights and freedom. 
Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn Ϳ’, 2005) said: 
According to the constitution, we have the right to receive news and 
information through any form of media such as television, radio, newspapers, 
and websites. When this government blocks the media, we can sue them 
through the Administrative Court. The first defendant is the government, 
while the second one is the cable TV operator. If everyone loves me and the 
freedom of expression, we must not compromise with them.  
This solution was offered to the audience by encouraging them to follow his show 
and sue the government for blocking the show. This solution was framed as 
beneficial for the people to fight for their freedom; as well Sondhi could disseminate 
his show and other products without control.    
The metaframes 
This media control mobilizing frame was shaped from the democracy metaframe 
since the Thaksin government curbed the freedom of speech and expression of 
Sondhi Limthongkul, the audience, and other media outlets. This practice of the 
government was completely against democratic regime. According to Suwat 
Apaipak, the lawyer of Sondhi Limthongkul, he (Escobar, 2005) said: "this is the first 
time that a prime minister has sued a newspaperman in the history of democracy in 
Thailand." Obviously, the 1997 Thai constitution gave more freedom of speech than 
its predecessors, but Thaksin also filed other media, such as the Bangkok Post, 
Matichon and Prachachat Turakij, with lawsuits for defamation. The Bangkok post 
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defined this incident as ǲan unprecedented threat against their constitutional right 
to free expression".  
 
While the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) was concerned about press 
freedom in Thailand under this government. Executive director of SEAPA Roby 
Alampay gave his insight saying that ǲPrime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra should 
take the blame for this dismaying portrayal of Thailand as a country where the press 
is suddenly under a dark cloud".  The Asia Times Online described Sondhi taking his 
show on the road as ǲan expanded exercise in participative democracyǳ. It is 
interesting that Thaksin had often announced to the public that he came from 
election and was voted in by the people. In a nutshell, he was the democratic prime 
minister. From Sondhiǯs framing, Thaksin was a dictator who demanded to control 
critics from the media. This was not a true democratic means as he claimed.  
 
 
5. The populism mobilizing frame   
 
At Lumpini Park, this mobilizing frame had not been focused on as much as the 
corruption and monarchy frames.  However, it was raised to attack Thaksin when 
King Bhumibol gave a speech on his birthday. As I mentioned in the previous frames, 
the Kingǯs speech was analyzed that the King seemed to disagree with Thaksin 
projects including his populism. The philosophy of sufficiency economy was 
suggested by the King as the way to solve the economic crisis. The important point 
of this frame is the solution function, as Sondhi asserted the Kingǯs philosophy and 
attacked Thaksinǯs populism.     
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem of this frame was the use of populism as the vote winning policy of 
Thaksin and his party. The main culprit of this frame was Thaksin Shinawatra. 
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Populism was hardly referred to by Sondhi during this second phase. He only 
pointed out the problem of populism on the day he led his audience as the solo 
leader of ǲMuang Thai Raisupdaǳ movement, on February 5, 2006. He (ǮMuang Thai 
wan goo chat’, 2006) said to his followers that: 
While weǯre getting poorer, theyǯre becoming richer. This is the era of 
Thaksinomics. He buys the grassroots with money. When they have money, 
he sells them his mobile phone products. The grassroots are supposed to 
spend the village funds on their own businesses; on the other hand they 
spend it on excessive stuff. Thaksin and his colleagues claim to eliminate the 
poverty by giving money to the poor. He hasnǯt solved the problem following 
His Majesty the Kingǯs concept.  His populism is the policy created to increase 
his votes. He fools the people into voting for him with this populism. 
This message was repeated the one in the first phase. However, he condemned on 
the grassrootsǯs spending which caused the dissatisfaction from his middle class 
audience. 
The causal attribution function 
 
From the twelfth episode, the cause of this frame was Thaksin and his associates 
create populism to gain votes from the poor. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 
ͷ͸’, 2005) criticized Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai party thus: 
I don't think his policy is the new one. It has been done before by the other 
leaders. Thaksin just copies those ideas to make himself wealthier, while we 
are getting poorer. We are the middle class who are used to support his 
prosperity. He is only good at promoting populism and buying his votes with 
our taxes. This strategy has been used in America, England, France, and so 
forth. Hence, we are fooled by him to believe that this government is 
contributing new things to this country. In my view, they are just the 
government that only thinks about gaining huge interests. 
The cause of the problem was focused on vote buying. At that time, the next election 
was nearly approach, thus Thaksin began to produce new populist projects to 
attract his voters. Accordingly, Sondhi criticized this strategy through this frame and 
in some frame. 
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The moral evaluation function 
 
In terms of moral judgment, Sondhi framed Thaksin and his government as greedy 
ones who only concentrated on their interests. The populist policy, which had 
several disparities to the philosophy of sufficiency economy of King Bhumibol, was 
drawn to the attention of the public. At this time Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn ͷ͸’, 2005) connected the Kingǯs ideas with this mobilizing frame thus: 
Our society has gone mad now; our leader is leading us to become economic 
slaves. He does not help us to stand on our own feet. Certainly, this doesnǯt 
cause him trouble, because this government gets 10-20 percent of 
commission fees from their mega projects. Thus, they are able to support 
their children to study abroad, while we have to work hard to pay debts. 
What the premier has done is in complete contrast to the philosophy of 
sufficiency economy of His Majesty the King. 
 
The treatment recommendation function 
 
Similar to some previous frames, the ideals of King Bhumibol were tied into this 
frame. Sondhi raised the sufficiency economy philosophy as the finest treatment for 
curing the defective economy and morality. On a show he criticized Thaksinǯs 
populist projects that needed huge budgets, while the Thai economy at that time 
was going slumped. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷ͸’, 2005) said: 
The premier expects huge foreign investment in the subways and mega 
projects. He proudly announces that he can invite the foreign investors to 
give Thailand a chance to have the first project ever. He also states that his 
government is willing to spend a huge national budget for those projects 
since they will never hold-up the advancement of the country. Besides, He 
also said that he does not feel tired of being criticized.From the premierǯs 
words; we need to understand his mental illness. His Majesty the King just 
gave us a royal speech advising us to live on the moderate needs, following 
the philosophy of sufficiency economy. On the other hand the premier insists 
to continue his projects.  
It seems we have different viewpoints in terms of developments. For 
Thaksin, development is about high rise buildings, the lottery project, 
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entertainment complexes, casinos, and his failed OTOP project. On the one 
hand, my definition of development is to concentrate on developing mind 
and soul. For me, the indication of the true development could be perceived 
from the honesty of politicians, the solidarity of the country, the contentment 
of the family, good education, the freedom of the press, and the participation 
of people in administration. It is apparent that the premier and I have 
completely opposite notions of development. 
The above statement was refered to the Kingǯs philosophy. The development 
definitions which mentioned by Sondhi were framed to point put the greedy mind of 
Thaksin. Alternatively, his development was drawn from King Bhumibolǯs 
philosophy which was applied to attack Thaksin and make himself an image non-
greedy journalist.  
The metaframes 
 
Obviously, the nation, king, and modernization metaframes were involved with this 
mobilizing frame. Regarding the nation metaframe, the populism was the 
destructive policy which ruined the stability of the economy including the morality 
of the Thai people. This populism, according to Sondhi, was the political platform 
used by Thaksin to gain votes from the grassroots, while the middle class paid their 
taxes to spend on this policy. Sondhi viewed Thaksin as the greedy leader which 
could do everything to gain votes, while with his voters spent money, given by 
Thaksin, with no troubles. They, thus, were people who might destroy Thai 
economy; consequently conflicts between the classes had been created. 
 
The king and modernization metaframes were engaged when Sondhi opposed Thaksinǯs modernization which was founded on capitalism. He labelled this 
populism as the defective policy which encouraged the growth of consumerism 
among people and led to the increase of household debt. Accordingly the best 
remedy was the Kingǯs sufficiency economy idea.  
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6. The Thaksin's police state mobilizing frame 
 
This frame was promoted together with the media control mobilizing frame because 
the dictatorship of Thaksin to control the media and administrate the country with 
police style. However, this frame determined to attack the police which was 
prominently promoted to take major positions. This frame was not paid attention to 
focus, but there was an event, the assassination, which was happended   with Sondhi 
Limthongkul before he hosted the 10th episode. It became the turning point for 
Sondhi to fight Thaksin and the colleagues. During the second period, Sondhi had 
been harassed by some policemen and sometimes by groups of men, which was 
supported by Thaksinǯs policemen.  
 
The problem definition function 
 
The problem in this frame was the intimidation of the people by the immoral police. 
The culprits were Thaksin Shinawatra and his police subordinates. According to 
Sondhi, Thaksin gave the police power to threaten Sondhi, some of his famous 
audience, and the opposition media outlets. The dangerous situation got worse 
when Sondhi and Sarocha had to escape and hold the show at Wat Pa Ban Tard 
Temple under the protection of Luangta Maha Bua. It happened on episode 10 when 
Sondhi suddenly broadcasted the show from Udonthani province. The mastermind 
of this plan was implied to a woman which could be Pojamarn Shinawatra, Thaksinǯs 
wife.  He (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͶ’, 2005) told the audience that:  
A woman demands those police to get rid of me. You can guess who she is. 
Today, several police and a group of young men are hanging around this area. 
They attempt to stop me from hosting the show. So far the most important 
thing is the security of our lives. I think those young men plan to interrupt us 
by many evil means whichI donǯt know whether those police would protect 
us or not. They may let those men intimidate us. Actually, those police are 
paid their salaries from our taxes. Theyǯre supposed to maintain justice by 
protecting us; conversely they donǯt accomplish their police fundamental 
duty. Thus, they are not the real police, just men wearing police uniforms to 
assist the immoral politicians. 
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Sondhi (Policeman sues media tycoon for lese majeste, 2005) revealed a wicked plan 
of someone, in the police, who attempted to please Thaksin by demanding legal 
action be taken against him. This policeman was Colonel Samniang Loujiangkham, 
the deputy commander of the Yasothon provincial police. He stated his accusations 
saying that Sondhi ǲhad gone too far in his fierce criticism of Thaksin's governmentǳ 
and also "had made an inappropriate comparison between His Majesty the King and 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra". Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 
2005) raised one of the Kingǯs speeches to warn those police. He said everyone had 
a specific responsibility which one should try to accomplish, but those police had 
disregarded the obligation to protect the people and maintain justice, as policemen. 
They had become the subordinates of the corrupt politicians, carrying out their evil 
commands.  
 
The causal attributions function 
 
For the cause of this frame, Sondhi claimed that Thaksin and a woman, which might 
be Thaksin’s wife, determined to stop him from critiquing them. To do this, they 
instructed the police in many provinces to charge Sondhi with legal actions and to 
exert police power against him. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͶ’, 2005) 
explained the reason for this: 
The worst action is from a police friend of the premier. He commands the 
police in every province to accuse me of defamation. My dear fellows, this 
procedure has been done to get rid of me, the leader of the peopleǯs 
movement. They think that if they can eliminate me, the people movement 
will be stopped. Besides, Thaksin doesnǯt want to come to see Luangta Maha 
Bua at Wat Pa Ban Tad Temple. Accordingly, he demands his subordinates to 
arrest me a day before the meeting day. 
The moral evaluation function 
 
In this frame, Sondhi labelled those police as the politician’s police. He (‘Muang Thai 
wan goo chat’, 2006) attacked them thus: 
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You must know how immoral these police are. On the way here, our 
participants are blocked and investigated by the evil tactics of those police. 
Are they evil? When our colleagues held a demonstration in Khon Kaen 
province, those police forced them to stop speaking by turning off the 
microphone and spoke in a bad manner to the leader of the protest.  Ladies 
and gentlemen, these are the malpractices of the police in the era of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. This is the era of police state which is far worse than in the past. 
The police can do anything. They take part in many organizations which 
results in having authority to intimidate us, the innocent people.  
The greed of the Thai police (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) was 
constructed that: 
I would say here that Iǯm not ambitious to have any political position. My goal 
is to be a guardian, protecting and retaining social justice in this country. We donǯt need nepotism, which allows the police to do anything to intimidate 
people who have opposing views. Thai police can do anything to gain power 
and money. Sondhiǯs view toward police was unfavorable. In the later movement, the police 
become one of major opponents of the Yellow Shirts and other anti-Thaksin 
movements. He was successfully framed bad image of the police in Thaksinǯs era.   
The treatment recommendation function 
 
At this time, Sondhi, himself, had not proposed the solution for this frame. He just 
told the audience that his team of lawyers would fight back at those police with legal 
actions. However, he also said that one day they would certainly receive a 
punishment as a result of doing bad karma.  
 
The metaframes 
 
The democracy metaframe was combined into this mobilizing frame. The police 
force, under the rule of Thaksin Shinawatra, was accused of being the force that 
served Thaksin and his colleagues, while the common people were intimidated by 
them. Obviously, the dictatorial aspect of the police state was contradictory to the 
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principles of a democratic regime, especially when blocking Sondhi, and other 
media, from doing their duty as the press. Besides, they were attacked by legal and 
illegal measures to stop them from criticizing the government. This completely 
abused the freedom of expression that a democratic regime would allow. 
 
7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame 
 
In the second movement period this mobilizing frame had been retained, but was 
lessened the importance. Some issues that being used as examples to attack Thaksin 
Shinawatra were changed to engage with the monarchy. At Thammasat University, 
this frame had been involved with the inability of Thaksin to relieve the unrest 
incidents. In the second phase Sondhi connected this frame with the monarchy. He 
compared the role of the monarchy with that Thaksin Shinawatra in solving the 
unrest incidents, especially Queen Sirikhit who was more concerned about reducing 
the difficulties of local people in the southernmost area.  
 
During the movement at Lumpini Park, there were some events in the severe unrest 
in the south, including a report from the Washington Post about the CIA black-site 
prisons in Thailand, the new national election, and news of the monarchy going to 
the south to support the local people during the violence.  This was applied into the 
framing of Sondhi to construct the irresponsible image of Thaksin and honour the 
sacrifice of the monarchy.  
 
It is noticeable that this frame had been retained and presented to the public during 
the show at Lumpini Park. However, the importance of this mobilizing frame was 
decreased, which could be seen by the fewer number of mentions during the show 
at Lumpini Park. Alternatively, this frame was associated with the efforts of the 
monarchy, in comparison with the deficiency of Thaksin Shinawatra, to resolve the 
unrest. Sondhi seemed to emphasize the outshining roles of the monarchy, 
particularly the Queen, the monarchy's network, and of General Prem Tinsulanonda. 
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They teamed up to relieve the southern problem in accordance with the Kingǯs 
purpose. 
 
The problem definition function 
 
Sondhi stated the problem of this frame as the nepotism and negligences of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. The culprit of this frame is Thaksin Shinawatra.  Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai 
Rai Supda Sunjorn ;’, 2005) gave the background, of the south before the Thaksin 
era, to the audience:  
This southern region, before 2004, was a moderately peaceful land, though it 
was not completely contented and serene. There were many diverse groups, 
which avoided disturbing each other. Around 20-30 years ago, this land was 
under the management of the military who knew every single detail of those 
groups. One day, there was an egotistical one (Thaksin) who came up with 
the idea that the Thai police are able to complete everything in this country. 
Consequently, he cancelled the sequential projects which had been done 
under the command of military, and, in order to support his police 
colleagues, he replaced the military with them.  Those police finally 
promoted other dreadful subordinates, from which stemmed the increase of 
troubles among local people.  
Furthermore, the premier convinces people to trust him by proposing 
several approaches to relieve the violence. Sometimes he announces that he 
will take immediate action to get rid of the problem. Sometimes he promises 
to solve the problem and guarantee the outcome by challenging people to 
stop electing him if he could not achieve the goals of these schemes. 
However, the deadline and his responsibility for the failure of the approaches 
have never been confirmed to the public. It means that he does not want to 
have full responsibility for this issue. 
The message gave the brief details of the three southern provinces in the past. 
Sondhi encouraged the audiences to believe that under the management of the 
military the situations was generally reaceful. After that, he pointed to what he 
believed to be the mistake of Thaksin, replacing the military with the police. That 
police force, according to Sondhi, was incompetent, corrupt, and untrustworthy, and 
they were Thaksinǯs subordinates.  In Sondhiǯs framing, Thaksin and his police 
increased the troubles to this land. 
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In terms of Thaksinǯs plan, Sondhi focused on placing the responsibility on the 
premier in case the scheme failed. Interestingly, Sondhi demanded the resignation 
of the premier. If Thaksin resigned from the post, this would be a great news for 
Sondhi. He might stop conducting the movement and return to his normal life. In Sondhiǯs mind, he might not be certain about the power and resources to perform 
the mobilization.  
The causal attribution function 
 
In this function, the cause was specified that Thaksin was scared of being 
assassinated by the separatists. Besides, Sondhi thought Thaksin was paying more 
attention to running the vote winning campaigns in his voter bases, while the last 
accusation was that Thaksinǯs foreign policy was pro-American. Sondhi (ǮMuang 
Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) asserted an example to support his claim thus: 
The premier must admit that he is a trouble maker who creates the crisis in 
the southern region. I have evidence, which is a timeline of his previous 
speeches and actions.  
In 2001-2002, he viewed the insurgence in the southern region as a common 
crime; as a result, he dissolved the Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Center and promoted his police colleagues to resolve the 
situation.  
In 2003, he called those separatists common thieves.  
In 2003, he was an accomplice to the unrest incidents, because he was not 
trying to stop the kidnapping and killing incidents. 
In 2003, he permitted the U.S. to arrest Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin) in 
Thailand.   
In 2003, he sent the Thai military to participate in the Iraq war. 
In 2004, he ignored the investigation of the case of Somchai Neelapaijit (a 
Thai Muslim-lawyer and human rights activist) who was kidnapped and 
killed. In addition, when he was asked by journalists about the progress of 
this case, he got frustrated. 
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In 2004-2005, he was foul-mouthed and intimidated some Muslim 
international organizations, and recently he suggested the secretary of the 
Muslim World League to step away and go back to re-read the Quran. 
In 2004, he announced that he would go to the south and spent 3 months 
there, but he only stayed there for a short period of time, with thousands of 
guards... 
...A few days ago the unrest increased significantly, but the premier has not 
gone there. He chose to promote his vote winning campaigns. To make 
matters worse, when he went to the south, he announced to the local people 
that he would not provide budgets to people who did not vote for his party.  
Once, on the 8th episode of the show Sondhi presented news from the Washington 
post about the locations of U.S. "black-site prisons" in some countries. The 
Washington Post (Priest, 2005) reported one of the CIA black-site prisons was in 
Thailand. It was reported that 30 major terrorism suspects ǲhave been held under 
the highest level of secrecy at black-sites financed by the CIAǳ. In mid-2002, ǲthe CIA 
had worked out secret black-site deals with two countries, including Thailand and 
one Eastern European nationǳ. This incident occurred when Thaksin was the prime 
minister. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͽ’, 2005) considered it as an 
underlying cause affecting the upsurge of insurgent incidents in the south. He said: 
In 2004, the Asia Times Online, which is a reliable news source of prominent 
agencies such as CIA, FBI, MI5, and MI6, reported news about the black-site 
prisons in some locations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand. Once, I 
talked about Udonthani airport and the buying up of land in Udonthani to 
build the VOA radio station. If they really want to build a small radio station, 
they do not have to buy such a huge amount of land. Asia Times Online 
reported the news that it was a possibility that one of the black-site prisons 
may be located here. Nonetheless, I wonder why a wealthy country likes the 
U.S. chooses Thailand as a place to operate terrorist investigations. Why do 
they not take these terrorists back to the U.S. or Pakistan?  
We, Thailand, should not be involved with this operation. We have enough 
troubles in the south caused by our Prime Ministerǯs bad mouth. We do not 
want to be attacked by those terrorists, as the U.S.ǯs supporting country. I am 
much concerned about this...Our Prime Minister is opening up our country to 
international terrorism. The violence in the south will develop from domestic 
to international level. Because of this, he must responsible for any severe 
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unrest incidents which may be undertaken by these international terrorist 
organizations in the three southern provinces. 
Thaksin, according to Sondhi, did not apply diplomatic means to handle Muslims 
and the terrorists. Thaksinǯs foul mouth had been criticized from opposition groups 
as potentially damaging, which could cause conflicts between Thailand and 
international organizations. Sondhi also highlighted this point. Furthermore, in this 
mobilizing frame Sondhi attack the relationships between the U.S. and Thaksin. He 
disagreed when Thaksin sent the Thai military to Iraq to support the American 
army. He reckoned Thailand might be marked as the enemy of the international 
terrorists. Thaksin, again, was branded as a trouble maker.  
The anti-America sentiment was encouraged as America was portrayed as the ally of 
Thaksin; consequently the nation nationalist symbol was applied to frame the 
messages of Sondhi Limthongkul. During his early movement, the U.S. was the only 
Western country that was being framed as a greedy country seeking advantages 
from Thailand linked to the framing of the corruption of Thaksin and his colleagues. 
When the Yellow Shirts were formed, the leaders including Sondhi set up many 
issues which involved with other Western countries. This is the origin of the 
xenophobic sentiment toward the U.S. and some Western countries in Thailand.   
The moral evaluation function 
 
In this second period, the southern provinces were framed as abandoned by 
Thaksin. The reason came from the coming election that these provinces were not Thaksinǯs voting base. Thaksin made his election campaign trips to all areas except 
the southern provinces. Accordingly, Sondhi framed Thaksin as a greedy prime 
minister who divided Thailand.  
 
For Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͽ’, 2005), Thaksin was not ruling this 
country as the Prime Minister of Thailand, but as the leader of the Thai Rak Thai 
party who only cared about his votes. Sondhi said: 
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As an executive of the AIS Company, the premier is good at promoting 
campaigns. Thus, those marketing tactics are adapted into his political 
strategies. For instance, his voters would be rewarded with good promotions, 
such as borrowing money or allocated budgets, if they vote for his party. 
Accordingly, people have no choice; they have to vote for his partyǯs 
candidates. It is clearly seen that he is really drunk with power. 
In this framing function, it was Sondhi who began to portray the discrimination of 
Thaksin. The reason is, in the early movement, his audience were Bangkokians and 
some middle class from major cities, particularly people from the south. On the one 
hand, the majority of Thaksinǯs voters were the poor from the north and 
northeastern region. Accordingly, Sondhi convinced his audience to believe that 
people from the south were not Thaksinǯs voters and alleged that they would not get 
an equal share of the budget.  This emotive strategy was used to create anger 
toward Thaksin in his audience, since part of them were people from the southern 
provinces.  
Another accusation was constructed by comparing the intention to relieve the 
unrest incidents between Thaksin and Queen Sirikhit. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai 
Supda Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) said: 
I would like to ask why the premier spent his time at Uthaithani, Singhburi, 
and Pichit province to run his vote winning campaigns, while Her Majesty the 
Queen went to the south and spent a month there to assist her people. Does 
he really care for the plentiful deaths of the local people and the military? 
Does he really see the devotion of the Queen to resolve the insurgency? By 
this, he must acknowledge that he is the real cause of the violence in the 
three southern provinces. 
Simialr to some previous frames, Sondhi applied the monarchy into this framing. 
This branding was produced to highlight Thaksin as irereponsible and cowardly as 
premier. Conversely, Queen Sirikhit, an elderly lady, showed her concern and love to 
her people by visiting them in the area of unrest.  Later, Queen Sirikhit became a 
significant figure for the Yellow Shirts. We would see Sondhiǯs frames which 
involved with the Queen in his future movement. 
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The treatment recommendation function 
 
The solution of this frame was proposed for Thaksin Shinawatra. He suggested 
Thaksin to resolve the incidents in accordance with the principles of King Bhumibol, 
Queen Sirikhit, and General Prem Tinsulanonda. Sondhi (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn ͼ’, 2005) recommended that:   
In 2004, Her Majesty Queen Sirikhit sojourned to Narathiwat and spent 
around two months there. For 2 years, she gave around 8 speeches and 
writings to the public. In her speeches, she explained to the public that most 
Thais are nice and kind, but the trouble makers are a new kind of Muslim she 
has never seen before. She implored Thai people to harmonize and be 
tolerant towards the brutal acts of those agitators. Moreover, she sent a letter 
to show her sorrow and support to the family of a cruelly killed teacher... His 
Majesty the King suggests us to solve the problem with the principles of 
understanding, accessibility, and development, and Her Majesty the Queen 
advices us to understand and empathize with the southern people. 
Conversely, our prime minister rudely scolds the separatists. He has daily 
conflicts with Malaysia and the OIC secretary. He does not care to go to the 
insurgent areas, but goes on vote winning campaigns in other provinces 
instead. He is such a sharp-tongued person. Some say that he is not brave 
enough to go the south, because he fears assassination by those separatists.  
The principles of King Bhumibol to understanding, accessibility, and development 
have been adopted at least in a name by the governments to solve the problems in 
Thai society for many years including in the southern provinces since 1980s. In this 
frame, Sondhi not only focused on King Bhumibol, Queen Sirikhit was another figure 
engaged in Sondhiǯs framing. In his framing, her ways of solution were based on 
generosity and reasonableness. She did not discriminate between Thais and 
Muslims. This was compared with Thaksin who was fainthearted.   
Also, the work of General Prem Tinsulanonda the head of Privy Council on solving 
the southern provinces problem was praised by Sondhi Limthongkul through his 
early movement. He (ǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn ͷͺ’, 2006) said: 
Recently, General Prem Tinsulanonda went to the south because he cannot 
sit idly by while the severe violence there is continuing. In fact, he went there 
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to make peace in the area, by the royal command of His Majesty the King. Gen 
Prem warned the army and the police force to serve the monarchy. They 
should collaborate to resolve the unrest as the army of His Majesty the King 
not as the army of any politician. 
General Prem Tinsulanonda employed aspects of the strategy of the King to work 
out the problem. He was the premier for almost decade in 1980s, the era that the 
unrest was reduced. Sondhi highlighted that at that time Prem had warned the army 
to serve only the monarchy on the show. He framed this with this mobilizing frame. 
Sign of conflicts between Prem and Thaksin might clearly start from this time, 
leading to the overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra in the next year. Consequently, 
Prem was considered as the head of the movement by Thaksinǯs faction. 
The metaframes 
 
The king metaframe became vital to this mobilizing frame followed by the nation 
metaframe. It was refered to in the past works of the monarchy in the southern 
provinces. Sondhi did not honour only King Bhumibol, Queen Sirikhit and General 
Prem Tinsulanonda were also included since in his framing they have had significant 
roles in alleviating problems in the southern provinces.  
 
The king metaframe was applied to gain supported by honoring the royal family and 
Prem Tinsulanonda and also to decrease the trustworthiness of Thaksin. This framing 
ultimately gave Sondhi supports from some royal family members and the network 
monarchy when he began the formal movement. During his early movement, it could be 
seen that the royalists and some elites were part of his audience. This metaframe was 
used to attract them. Besides, Thaksinǯs failed strategies, exaggerated by Sondhi 
Limthongkul, seemed to not just reflect the failure of his policy but in Sondhiǯs 
framing, highlighted the monarchyǯs work in the south. The distrust of local people, 
the views of the palace and the network of the monarchy and its attitudes toward Thaksinǯs approaches was constructed, while the questionable loyalty of Thaksin to 
the monarchy was frequently pointed out by Sondhi on the show.  
 
178 
 
 
 
As for the nation metaframe, Sondhi framed it with populism and the relationship of 
Thaksin with the U.S. The security and solidarity of Thailand was raised, especially 
when Thaksin showed his support for the U.S. by sending military to Iraq. The CIA's 
black-site prison in Thailand which was revealed by the Washington Post was also 
framed to blame on Thaksin. Sondhi alleged that Thaksin had opened up the country 
to the invasion by international terrorism. Moreover, the unrest incidents in the 
south would be made worse because of the premierǯs apathetic foreign policy.  
 
Another serious accusation had been made through the show when Thaksin 
conducted his vote winning campaigns. Sondhi said the royal family members went 
to the south, Thaksin, on the other hand, was visiting his voting strongholds. In Sondhiǯs framing, Thaksin determined to discriminate by campaigning only for his 
voters, while ignoring people in the insurgence in the south. Thaksin announced 
that he would primarily provide budgets to his voters' provinces. Thus, Sondhi 
accused actions of Thaksin, as being the riot that attempted to divide the country, 
which was against the laws from the 1997 Constitution.  
 
The Conclusion 
 
As aforesaid, in the previous sections, Sondhi Limthongkul is forced to beginthe 
movement by the unexpected cancellation of his political show ǲMuang Thai rai 
Supdaǳ from Channel 9. The given reason, from the chairman of MCOT, is that 
Sondhi ǲimproperly cited His Majesty the King, and the monarchy, on several 
occasionsǳ. It is interesting that as Sondhi alleged that Thaksin Shinawatra and 
associates had a lack of loyalty to King Bhumibol, he is also accused of disloyalty and 
this allegation leads to the termination of his political show. The tough 
denunciations with which Sondhi bombards the governing of the former premier, 
Thaksin Shinawatra and his government seems to be the reason behind this. 
Inescapably, a huge loss in terms of income and pride, as an experienced journalist, 
befalls Sondhi. Accordingly, he decides to take his live show to Thammasat 
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University on September 23rd 2005. When the numbers in the audience increases, 
Sondhi relocates the show to Lumpini Park where the mass movement of ǲMuang 
Thai rai Supdaǳ takes place and develops progressively.  
 
Throughout the initial movement of Sondhi Limthongkul as a sole leader and 
journalist, he concentrates on attacking Thaksin and associates about several issues, 
but some key issues are repeatedly mentioned.  Accordingly, I determine to group 
the key messages produced by Sondhi into seven mobilizing frames, while the 
metaframes are examined together. From here, the main ideas of each frame, which 
were constructed at Thammasat and Lumpini, will be summarized below.  
 
From the beginning of the movement at Thammasat University, Sondhi creates 
seven mobilizing frames aimed at attacking the misconducts of Thaksin and his 
government. They are principally focused on the controversial topics of corruption 
and the violations to the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol, while the other 
problems are concentrated subsequently.  
 
Sondhi begins constructing the corruption mobilizing frame as the first frame to 
identify the greed and practices of betrayal of the nation of Thaksin Shinawatra and 
his government. Evidently, the problem and culprits is pinpointed at the mega 
corruptions and the betrayal of the nation by Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. 
Sondhi stresses on some crucial examples such as the corruption of Suvarnabhumi 
airport construction, the state-owned enterprise privatization schemes, and the 
corruption of Thaksinǯs family. These cases represent the complicated norms of Thai 
corruption, while the privatization is used to explain the betrayal of Thaksin by 
allowing Singapore to control the Thai economy through the privatizations. The 
relationship between Singapore and Thaksin which benefits his personal interests 
was mentioned. This frame has highlighted the self-interest and materialistic nature 
of Thaksin to ǲtradeǳ Thailand for his own benefit. Besides, his family is framed as a 
corrupt family that needs to rule Thailand.  Sondhi suggests the solutions of holding 
a referendum for the EGAT privatization and applying the sufficiency economy 
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philosophy of King Bhumibol to relieve the Thai economy. The latter solution is 
interesting since it is engaged with the Kingǯs economic concept, which contrasts, 
extremely, with the capitalism of Thaksin. Thus, the modernization, nation, and king 
metaframes are applied into this mobilizing frame. Sondhi seems oppose to the 
modern developmental concept of Thaksin which could lead the country to the 
ruination of morality. Consequently, the Kingǯs philosophy is praised in this frame to 
undervalue Thaksinǯs capitalism.  
 
The second mobilizing frame, the monarchy mobilizing frame, is one of the most 
significant frames. It is constructed and framed simultaneously with the corruption 
frame. The monarchy issue becomes a reason for Channel 9 to cancel Sondhiǯs ǲMuang Thai rai Supdaǳ show. In response, Sondhi employs the monarchy to 
produce a powerful frame to strike back. This works very well in creating an 
immense sentiment of loathing towards Thaksin. Throughout this framing, Sondhi 
identifies subtle issues to allege the malpractices of Thaksin and his associates in 
abusing the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol. To contrast with the unfaithful 
image of Thaksin, the generosity and devotion of the monarchy to Thailand are 
highlighted.  
 
The problem is framed as the disloyalty of Thaksin Shinawatra and this government 
to the monarchy, particularly King Bhumibhol, while the culprits are pointed out as 
Thaksin Shinwatra and his subordinates. Interestingly, Sondhi does not specify 
clearly that Thaksin commits the violations of the Kingǯs power; he primarily attacks 
the subordinates of Thaksin instead. Thus, Thaksin is implied as one who seemed to 
act as an equal to the King. The examples are: the inappropriate action of Thaksin 
Shinawatra of being the head of the Buddhist rite event in Wat Phra Kaew Temple, 
the appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharya as the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
in place of Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara, and the discharge of Jaruwan Menthaka, the 
ombudsman. Sondhi supports his allegations with a series of official letters and 
photos. Nonetheless, this frame becomes the most forceful frame in terms of 
persuasion, since Sondhi constructs Thaksin as one who attempts to challenge King 
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Bhumibol, in terms of love from the people, as the prominent figure in Thailand. 
Apparently, this allegation makes Thai people seriously furious with Thaksin.  
 
The treatment, to solve the problem, suggested by Sondhi, is changed from time to 
time. When he hosts the show at Thammasat, Sondhi just suggests to his audience to 
show their loyalty to the King by using yellow things such as flags, t-shirts, wristbands, 
and stickers. However, in the last phase of the movement the next fascinating 
solution proposed by Sondhi is to return the King’s royal prerogative in accordance 
with the principles of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ. Throughout the live show, Sondhi threw 
suspicion on the actions of Thongtong Chantarangsu to stop Sondhi and the press to 
involve with matters relating to the King. Sondhi comes to the conclusion that 
Thaksin and his associates have an evil plan to isolate King Bhumibol from the 
people. This was called the ǲtyrannical strategy to separate the King from his 
peopleǳ. Accordingly, he offered the concept of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ as the solution 
to stop the government of Thaksin Shinawatra from doing corruption and violating 
the Kingǯs royal supremacy. The ǲRajprachasamasaiǳconcept, from the definition of 
Pramote Nakornthap (Nakornthap, 2006), allows the King to rule this country in 
association with the people, where the King and the people are interdependent.  
Sondhi leads the audience to give a vow to return, to the King, his royal power in 
ruling Thailand. 
 
The king and democracy metaframes are employed to construct these messages 
when Sondhi announces to return the power to King Bhumibol and offers the 
alternative democracy, ǲRajprachasamasaiǳconcept. This concept is different from 
the Western-style democracy, since the prime minister must be appointed by the 
King. If this approach were accepted by King Bhumibol, Thaksin would be deposed 
and a new leader would be provided by the King. Sondhi and some associates insist 
that ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle contribute the participatory democracy with the 
King as Head of the State. The King and the people would share both authority and 
participation in accordance with the concept of a democratic regime (Nakornthap, 
2006). 
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The next mobilizing frame is constructed around the appointment of acting Somdet 
Pra Sangkarat. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame attracts the massive 
numbers of Buddhists and forest monks to support Sondhiǯs movement. The 
problem is the nomination of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Somdej 
Buddhacharya to replace the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, while the 
culprits are Thaksin Shinawatra and the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm.  
 
Similar to the monarchy mobilizing frame, Sondhi does not accuse Thaksin directly. 
He implies that Thaksin Shinawatra attempts to expand his political power over the 
Sangha Council Committee through his appointed Somdet Pra Sangkarat. In terms of 
moral framing, Sondhi has not identified clearly that Thaksin is disloyal to the King 
and Somdet Pra Sangkarat, while the solution is to return the position of Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat to Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. This mobilizing frame is 
engaged with the religion and king metaframes, since Sondhi constructs this frame 
around the appointment of Somdet Pra Sangkarat and links it with the violation of 
King Bhumibolǯs royal prerogative.  
 
Sondhi implies that Thaksin might want to have his Somdet Pra Sangkarat whilst the 
King has Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Apparently, this frame is connected 
to the conflicts of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, Luangta Maha Bua, and 
Phra Dhammachayo the abbot of Phra Dhammakaya Temple. By this, we will see 
that famous monks are included into this frame, while he also frames the close 
connection between King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. 
Accordingly, followers of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, Luangta Maha Bua 
and Thai people who are loyal to the King are eager to join the movement to protect 
King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara from the intimidations of 
Thaksin and his associates. The moral force to protect the two ǲKingsǳ is constructed 
to persuade moral Buddhists to participate. 
 
During the governing of Thaksin Shinawatra, the media restriction becomes an issue 
that falls into the category of abuse of peopleǯs rights. The freedom of expression is 
183 
 
 
 
controlled by Thaksinǯs measures since Sondhi is a major opponent who applies the 
media networks to attack the former premier and his companions. Thus, the 
blockage of media freedom is framed as the media control mobilizing frame. He 
primarily focuses on the termination of his show from Channel 9 and the lawful and 
unlawful operations that Thaksin employs to stop him from hosting the live show.  
 
During that time, he is harassed by groups of police and young men. Also the 
freedoms of the other media outlets that have opposite views to Thaksin are curbed.  
In this frame, the problem is the media control of the Thaksin government, whereas 
the culprits are Thaksin Shinnawatra and his colleagues. They are framed as the 
dictatorial and greedy capitalists intend to block criticism and investigation from the 
press. Accordingly, the treatment proposed by Sondhi is to ask the audience to 
distribute ǲthe truthǳ to the public by creating networks of knowledge. He invites the 
audience to buy his products and support the other ethical media, as well as his 
Manager media. Accordingly, lighting the society with the dharma candles, or 
knowledge, later becomes one of the major symbolic activities of Sondhi 
Limthongkul and the Yellow Shirts. Thus, the democracy metaframe is engaged to 
illustrate the dictatorial image of Thaksin on the media control. 
 
The populist policies of Thaksin are also constructed as the populism mobilizing 
frame to create a discontented feeling in the middle class to this policy. In Sondhiǯs 
framing, Thaksin spends the middle classes's taxes on these policies which are only 
beneficial to the grassroots and the government. Thus, this frame attracts the 
middle class, particularly Bangkokians. The problem, constructed at Thammasat, is 
that the populist policy causes the huge debts and consumerism of the poor, while at 
Lumpini Park it is framed as  populism as a vote winning policy of Thaksin and his 
party. However, the causes are not dissimilar, since Thaksin is condemned over his 
corruptions and abandonment of the Kingǯs power; according to Sondhi, he 
promotes his new populist projects to receive popularity from voters and to distract 
public attention from his scandalous corruptions. Thus, they are labeled by Sondhi as 
greedy, selfish, and false, and Thaksin is also framed as the problem of the nation. The 
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populism, according to Sondhi, was the political platform of Thaksin's government 
to gain votes from the grassroots, while the middle class are abused by having to 
pay more taxes to support the projects. Sondhi suggested the sufficiency economy 
philosophy of King Bhumibol as a solution to relieve the economic problems caused 
by the populism.  The nation, modernization, and king metaframes are involved with 
this mobilizing frame. In Sondhiǯs view, populism is based on the capitalism, a 
modern concept which promotes consumerism and household debts. Worse, 
Thaksin also encourages the poor to borrow village funds that some of the 
borrowers spend on needless things. Many mega projects of Thaksin, furthermore, 
are funded by the national budget and taxes paid by the middle class. Accordingly, 
this would lead, eventually, to the collapse of the Thai economy since Thaksin 
determined to borrow money from international financial organizations to carry out 
the policies. All of this causes Thailand to fall into a huge debt rut. For Sondhi, The 
sufficiency economy concept of King Bhumibol is the finest solution to solve the 
debt problem and the decline in the morality of the people. Thus, the king 
metaframe is applied to contrast to the greedy image of the materialistic 
government of Thaksin.  
 
The sixth frame is the Thaksin’s police state mobilizing frame which criticized 
the dictatorship of ǲThaksin regimeǳ. In Sondhiǯs movement, he frames the problem 
of this frame as the dictatorial police state regime of Thaksin Shinawatra which 
focuses on the rise of Thaksinǯs police colleagues. Examples are raised to highlight 
the ineffective and autocratic nature of the police force in Thaksin's era. The 
violence in the southernmost provinces is given as an example to show the nepotism 
of Thaksin in promoting his police colleagues, which ultimately brings calamities to 
the local people. Another example is framed around Sondhiǯs security. He had been 
legally and illegally harassed by the police. He told his audience that someone 
orders the police to intervene in his live show. Consequently, the cause of this frame 
is the fear of Thaksin that the truth be revealed by Sondhi, thus he stops everyone from 
criticizing him. Thaksin is framed as the dictator, while his police are the politicians’ 
police. In this mobilizing frame, Sondhi had not proposed a solution. The democracy 
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metaframe is engaged to support the accusation that Thaksin and his police 
intimidate the common and innocent people. It absolutely violates the principles of 
democratic regime. 
 
The last frame is the violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame.  
In the beginning, Sondhi creates the problem as being the negligence of Thaksin to 
relieve the unrest; however in the second phase he constructs the problem as the 
nepotism and negligence of Thaksin that cause the violence. The causes of the 
ineffectiveness are framed as the nepotism of promoting the police and Thaksin 
focussing on his vote winning campaigns in his voters' provinces. Accordingly, Thaksin 
is framed as the greedy politician. The treatment of this frame is created as applying 
the principles of the King to relieve the problem, moreover Sondhi also suggests to 
Thaksin to follow the footsteps of the palace and General Prem Tinsulanonda in 
calming the situation. Accordingly, the king metaframe is connected to this 
mobilizing frame. The monarchy and the head of Privy council, General Prem 
Tinsulanonda, become the only ruling group that devote themselves to the southern 
conflicts. The nation metaframe is applied to emphasize the destruction of the south 
by the ineffective ruling of Thaksin Shinawatra. Also, Thaksin is framed as one who 
divided the country from his policy.  
 
In sum, the movements of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences is separated into 
two phases. Sondhi constructs seven mobilizing frames and four metaframes which 
have been employed in every phase. The concentrated mobilizing frames in the first 
movement session are the corruption, monarchy, and Somdet Pra Sangkarat which 
similar to the second session. The monarchy becomes the most important frame 
among these three frames.  The most important metaframes in the first movement 
period are focused on the king, religion, and the nation. However, the democracy 
metaframe is highlighted in the second phase of movement when Sondhi offers the 
principle of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ to solve the crisis cause by Thaksin and associates. 
This concept is a type of democracy which Sondhi and some royalist propose to 
challenge democracy of Thaksin.  
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In the first phase Sondhi, as a journalist, frames issues and events to attack Thaksin 
and associates, on the one hand his framing is changed later since he begins the role 
as the movement leader. He demands to protect the country, the monarchy, and 
religion by ousting Thaksin. Accordingly, frames are transformed into persuading 
the audiences to participate in the movement to eradicate Thaksin and his 
associates. This is evidently happened in the second phase of the movement at 
Lumpini. 
 
These seven mobilizing frames are, later, adopted into the mobilization of the 
People Alliance for Democracy, or the Yellow Shirts, since the leaders, and their 
followers, are similar factions with shared movement purposes. Sondhi becomes the 
key leader of the Yellow Shirts which most of the mobilizing frames are derived by 
him. It is interesting that the pattern of mobilization, including his frames, have been 
adopted and imitated by later political movements, including the Red Shirts, the key 
opponents of Sondhi Limthongkul.   
 
The seven mobilizing frames which rooted from Thai nationalism resulted in the 
construction of group identity. Although the precise identity cannot be seen in the 
early movement, Sondhi originates the initial identity of his movement. Thus, they 
are a group of Thais which loyal to the king, nation, and religion. They are willing to 
sacrifice themselves to protect the key symbols of Thailand. Apparently, the major 
enemy of them, in their minds, of the nation is the disloyalty and greedy group of 
Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates.  
 
In the next chapter, the mobilizing frames of the Red Shirts or the United Front for 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) will be examined and compared, in terms of 
the framing process, with the frames of Sondhi Limthongkul.  
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Chapter 4 
Framing and the identity of the anti-coup groups 
 
In this chapter the anti-coup groups and their frames will be examined following the 
same method of Sondhiǯs frames. Certainly, Thai nationalism plays the crucial role in 
the framing process of the anti-coup factions. Traditional Thai nationalism, as 
mentioned previously, mainly consisted of nation, religion and king elements. After 
the so-called 1932 democratic revolution of the Peopleǯs party, democracy was 
asserted as the fourth nationalist element. Throughout the promotion of 
nationalism, by the rulers, it is interesting that the king metaframe is sometimes 
supplemented with the democracy, while the democracy is occasionally substituted 
by the modernization metaframe. Up to the present time, these nationalist symbols 
have been employed to perform the social movements in Thailand including the 
movement of Sondhi Limthongkul in his early periods. The initial political 
movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the Yellow Shirts, is 
examined in the previous chapter. However, it needs to be stressed that throughout 
the framing process of the anti-Thaksin movement, the king and the religion are 
respectively emphasized as the most powerful metaframes to appeal to the potential 
constituencies.  Accordingly, in this chapter it is my purpose to examine the frames 
of the anti-coup groups whose construction are build on nationalism which the 
democracy/modernization metaframe was heavily promoted as the most significant 
metaframe.  
The beginning of the anti-coup protest activates when the elected Prime Minister, 
Thaksin Shinawatra, is ousted by the 19 September 2006 coup. Thaksin's 
supporters believe that the coup group robs them of their democracy and also of 
their democratic prime minister. The coup makers and amat, or the old power 
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group, and the Yellow Shirts are turned to be their key enemies. The messages of the 
anti-coup groups are purposely created to attack the coup makers and counter 
frames of the Yellow Shirts, simultaneously the anti-coup groups apply their frames 
to appeal to the supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra. The unique metaframe, 
mobilizing frames, and the identity of the anti-coup groups are emerged as a result.  
In the beginning parts of this chapter, I provide the backdrop of Thaksin Shinawatra, 
the mastermind of the Red Shirts, to describe his life before becoming the popular 
prime minister of the grassroot. Additionally, the downfall of his political career will 
be explained to give more understanding about the causes of his loss. After this, 
brief details about the occurrences of the 2006 coup and the protests of the anti-
coup groups will be described. In the last, and biggest, part, the study of the 
mobilizing frames and metaframes are examined in two separate phases of the 
movements which the framing tactics and the developments of frames will be 
provided here.  
 
Thaksin Shinawatra, the mastermind of the Red Shirts  
Thaksin Shinawatra (Thak 2007), the 19th prime minister of Thailand, was born into 
a Sino-Thai family in 1949. His father was a progressive man who was confident to 
explore new technologies and ideas. Apart from the family silk trade, he showed 
Hollywood movies in his movie houses and had a BMW automobiles and European 
motorcycles dealership in Sankamphaeng, Chiang Mai province. Thaksinǯs father, 
eventually, turned to be a politician and took a seat in parliament. By this, it was no 
surprise that he had an utmost influence on Thaksinǯs life.                                                                                                                     
When Thaksin entered the police cadet academy, he was given the nickname ǲMeoǳ 
by friends as he was from Chiang Mai, a northern province. His fair skin endeared 
him to the Hmong hill tribesmen. Thak (2007, p. 54-55) described Thaksinǯs ǲcountry boyǳ image thus: 
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Although his autobiography claims that he was proud to be a country boy, he 
was taking a liberty with this label. His attempts to show a rag-to-riches 
story, a country boy making good, is disingenuous. Thaksin did this to 
distinguish himself from other political rivals during the 2001 election. He 
explained that because he was a country boy, he understood the needs of 
fellow provincial folk. In fact, Thaksin's family was well-to-do, so he never 
experienced the hard life of a villager or farmer. He was a rather privileged 
member of the elite from Thailand's second largest city.  
It was interesting that Thaksin applied his country boy childhood to create the 
image of a down-to-earth politician, perhaps he wanted to have the look of an 
ordinary and approachable premier for his middle class and grassroots voters. 
Thaksin (McCargo 2011, p. 296) received a doctoral degree in Criminal Justice in the 
United States and was married to Pojaman Damaphong who was ǲan extremely 
astute financial and personnel manager who effectively ran his business and 
political back offices for decadesǳ. Pojaman, in the eyes of her rivals, was seen as Thaksinǯs brain. She (Pojaman Shinawatra, an influential woman, 2013) knew well 
how to do business and negotiate with high ranking officials and state. As well, 
Sondhi Limthongkul (Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10, 2005) claimed that she was 
behind the assassination attempt on him.  Thakasin, according to Thak (2007), had a ǲpolice mentalityǳ which ǲshades his policies toward dissidents and enemies of the 
stateǳ. Thus police manoeuvres had been used to solve national problems, when he 
became the premier. 
 
After complete the degree, Thaksin returned to Thailand and occupied a position as 
the deputy director of the Police Intelligence Center. The turning point of his career 
(Thak 2007) occurred when he realized that being an ideal police officer was ǲunproductiveǳ for him. Since he had a good understanding of the police 
bureaucracy, he established a computer company with his wife and bought IBM 
computers to be rented, with government allowances, by his squad and the other 
police units. His rental business was fruitful to enable him to resign from police 
work to assist his wife in Shin Computers.  Thaksin, according to Thak (2007), was 
one who had no concerns about the conflict of interest laws, and his wealth had 
derived from government concessions. 
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Thaksin started his political career by being an apprentice of Prida Patthanathabut, 
a friend of his father, in the office of the Prime Minister. Thaksinǯs duties, as 
described by Kasian Tejapira (2006, p. 25), were ǲcollecting money from some big 
army figures, borrowing from certain ministers and distributing the money to MPs 
and ministers whose hand or vote the government neededǳ. It seemed his 
apprenctice life provided him connections and knowledge in the monetary system 
of national politics. This was fruitful for him afterwards.  
 
In the early part of the 1990s, Thaksin Shinawatra became a foreign minister of the 
Palang Tham party, or the moral force of Chamlong Srimuang, in the government of 
Chuan Leekpai. However, he (McCargo and Ukrist 2005) was appointed to be the 
head of the Palang Tham party in 1995. In that year, he took part in the government 
of the Barharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh which was viewed by 
Chamlong Srimuang, who was seen by the public as ǲMr. Cleanǳ, as an association of ǲmoney politicsǳ. Remarkably, Palang Thamǯs 11 years of political credit, which had 
been constructed by Chamlong, was destroyed by Thaksin. The party's popularity 
declined and it was defeated in the 1997 election, ultimately Thaksin decided to 
leave Palang Tham to form his own party (McCargo 2011; McCargo and Ukrist 
2005). 
 
Thaksin founded the Thai Rak Thai party in 1998, which was supported by 
numerous famous academics, businessmen, and activists. He (Kazmin 2007) offered 
himself to eradicate ǲmoney politicsǳ and replace it with a new deal for the 
neglected poor people. The establishment of the party (McCargo and Pathmanand, 
2005) coped well with the liberal reforms of the 1997 constitution including the 
dissatisfaction of people with corruption, ǲmoney-based electoral politics,ǳ and ǲlow 
quality politiciansǳ. TRT was the first political party in Thailand that was elected on 
the merits of its political platform, while the old style Thai politicians (Anek, 2007, 
88) would create the bond between them and their supporters with money and 
cronyism. At that time, Thaksin Shinawatra desired to gain votes from the people 
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who had suffered from the economic policy of the Democrat government. To do so, 
an electoral platform was produced to show the differences between his party and 
the Democrats which stressed on relieving the countryǯs financial problems. Even 
though the most outstanding policies of the Thai Rak Thai were targeted at the poor, 
the rich also were included.  These two aspects of the voting campaign were 
explained by Ockey (2003) thus: 
Two aspects of that policy, both responses to the Asian financial crisis, are 
noteworthy. First, the Thai Rak Thai party proposed to set up a Thai Asset 
Management Corporation to take over bad debts. Since many leading 
entrepreneurs were deeply in debt, this policy had widespread appeal. While 
the policies to assist the rural poor received more publicity, the 
establishment of the Thai Asset Management Corporation to assist the rich 
was actually more costly. Secondly, the Thai Rak Thai party promised 
preferential treatment for domestic entrepreneurs. This second promise 
allowed the party to seek support from entrepreneurs who would otherwise 
have been in competition with each other, and might have chosen to support 
competing parties. Thus, Thai Rak Thai was able to consolidate the support of 
many financiers who had previously supported other parties. This second 
policy also provided the cement that held the entire policy platform together: 
nationalism. The IMF and its policies became the enemy, and promotion of 
Thai interests in business and in the countryside became the rallying cry.  
Evidently, the disposition of nationalism to oppose the IMF's restrictive package 
during the Thai economic crisis was applied into his voting campaign. He (McCargo 
2011) proposed an alternative way to release the economic problems of the low 
income groups whilst insisting upon retaining the potential of Thailand in global 
competition. He also promised to lead Thailand to become a developed country 
according to the concept of a developmental state. In essence, he would restore to 
Thailand its national pride and economy. In McCargo and Ukristǯs view (2005), 
Thaksin created the ǲnationalistic advocacy of a mix of local expertise and high 
technologyǳ.   
Thaksin combined the modernization and the nation metaframes into his economic 
policy and vote winning campaign. He realized that the time had come when people 
were longing for someone to help them secure their fragile finances. After his 
triumph, the debt forgiveness program for farmers was initiated to relieve their 
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hardship.  Moreover, Thaksinǯs government started to pump billions of dollars into 
the rural areas, to stimulate consumption, through village funds. It is said that this 
measure had ǲa knock-on effect for the whole economy, fuelling a boom in 
household spendingǳ (Szep 2011).  Accordingly, from 2001 to 2004 he received 
immense popularity from both the business faction and the rural poor.  
 
The decline of Thaksin Shinawatra 
In 2001, during his first term of premiership, Thaksin Shinawatra (McCargo 2005) 
was accused of assets concealment by the Constitutional Court; he denied all the 
charges. He was finally acquitted of this distressing situation, since people regarded 
him as the most popular and suitable prime minister at that time. In his second term 
in 2005, a series of condemnations gradually came from academics, the press, and 
NGOs. His populist policies, the corruptions, the state-owned enterprise 
privatizations, the failed measures to relieve the violence in the south, the media 
control, and his rejection of critics became his crucial mistakes. When he was 
criticized about his human rights abuses, Thaksin (Phongpaichit and Baker 2005) 
once said ǲdemocracy is just a tool, not our goalǳ. All of this led to the deterioration 
of his popularity among Bangkokians, the middle class, businessmen, and the elite.  
 
It is interesting that in his first term of premiership he focused on helping the rich 
by having the government buys up all the debt of companies in trouble, but later he 
was deserted by some of them.  Thus, in the second term he started to promote 
policies aimed at supporting the rural poor to retain his popularity. Numerous of the 
so-called populism policies had been announced to attract people in the 
countryside. Also, Thaksin (Pasuk and Baker 2008) changed the slogan of TRT to ǮǮthe heart of TRT is the peopleǯǯ to attract the poor.  Thaksin (2008) promised 
several projects, funded by spending the entire 100 billion baht central fund, for the 
poor such as getting rid of poverty within three years, giving free laptops for 
students, free cows for farmers, cheap school fees, training programs for the poor, 
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cheap phone calls, cheaper housing and so forth. The policies (Wehrfritz 2008), 
which aimed to receive votes from the poor, had been called ǲThaksinomicsǳ or Thaksinǯs economics. It is noticeable that in his second term the modernization 
metaframe of Thaksin shifted its focus from the business groups and some middle 
class to the grassroots. Besides, the democracy metaframe had been applied to 
frame Thaksin as the one and only democratic prime minister who provided the 
grassroots with several benefits. He might be the only ruler who offered a better 
quality of life to them. Thaksinǯs image, furthermore, was manipulated as a down-to-
earth premier by doing activities with the common people.  This time, the ideas of 
modernization and democracy were used to gain popularity from the grassroots, the 
largest voting group of Thaksin. 
 
In 2005, Thaksin's government was stirred up when the media mogul Sondhi 
Limthongkul started to criticize Thaksin and his government on the famous political 
television show ǲMuang Thai Rai Subdaǳ. (The details and information about the 
battle between Thaksin and Sondhi were already explained in the previous chapter).  
Ultimately, on 9 February 2006, the Peopleǯs Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow 
Shirts was formed under the leaderships of the media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul, 
the former leader of the Palang Tham Party and Bangkok governor Major General 
Chamlong Srimuang, well known activist Phiphob Thongchai, university lecturer 
and the leader of the Assembly of the Poor Somkiat Pongpaiboon, and Somsak 
Kosaisuuk the leader of State enterprise labour union. The PAD's, or the Yellow 
Shirts', main goal was to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra and his regime under the 
theme of ǲGoo Chartǳ or redeeming the country.   
 
The 19 September 2006 coup 
 
The resistances opposing Thaksin continued for months. Thaksin (Pongsudhirak 
2008) responded by dissolving parliament in February 2006 and holding an election 
which was boycotted by the Democrat party and the other opposition parties. 
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Nonetheless, one day after Thaksin announced his triumph, he had a meeting with 
King Bhumibol. After the meeting (Montesano 2009), he announced to the public 
that he would not become the prime minister. The Kingǯs intervention (Funston 
2009) became apparent when he told the newly elected judges that ǲthe one-party 
election was not democraticǳ and called for the judiciary to find a solution to the ǲmessǳ. Thaksin (2009) struck back by claiming that he was threatened by a ǲcharismatic individual outside the constitutionǳ which referred ǲeither to the royal 
institution or someone closely associated with itǳ. Ultimately, Thaksin was toppled 
by the army in 19 September 2006.  
 
This coup was interesting in that, while perfoming the operation, the soldiers and 
tanks displayed yellow ribbons, the color of King Bhumibol and the Yellow Shirts. 
From this, this coup was seen by many as being endorsed by King Bhumibol. Some 
academics viewed this coup (Charoensin-o-larn 2009) as the battle between ǲthe 
network monarchyǳ and the network of Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was seen as a 
great threat to the royal power of King Bhumibol. Thus (ǮThere Wasnǯt Any 
Choiceǯ, 2006): 
A group of military commanders, elites and blue-bloods close to King 
Bhumibol, led by coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratklin and former 
prime minister and retired General Prem Tinsulanonda, who heads the Privy 
Council, knew Thaksin would win the next election, so a coup became the 
only option for getting rid of him.  
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin the leader of the coup referred to his group as the 
Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDR). He 
(Charoensin-o-larn 2009) announced his intention, regarding the coup: )ǯd like to say two things about the military coup. First, I received calls for the 
coup from many people. Second, soldiers are obliged to protect national 
security, safeguard the nation and uphold loyalty to the monarchy. The 
military cannot tolerate any leaders who lack or have limited loyalty to the 
King. 
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It was interesting that Gen. Sonthi (We did it for the people: Sonthi 2006) said, in an 
interview with a foreign correspondent, that: ǲThere had been a lot of vote buying 
during the previous election. Most of the people were not satisfied with this 
situation. They had called on the military to do something about it. We did it for the 
people of Thailandǳ. While he (Wiseman and Chitrada 2006) refuted the 
involvement of King Bhumibol with the coup: "I am the one who decided to stage the 
coup," he said. "No one supported me".  
After the coup, a list of names of royalists, to become the interim prime minister, 
had been proposed. Finally, Privy councilor General Surayud Chulanont was 
approved by King Bhumibol to receive the premier post. The monarch gave a royal 
speech (Thailandǯs King Endorses the Coup 2006), on his birthday in December 2006, 
about the military-appointed government saying that: 
Some of you may have come out of your retirement in order to salvage the country… Do your job in the best way you can even though you may face 
some criticisms… Old people who have experience can use their experience 
to help other people…People who have no experience can make the country 
go bankrupt. 
 
The formation of the anti-coup groups 
The 19 September coup was described by Chairat Charoensin-o-larn (Charoensin-o-
larn 2009) as ǲnot really a coup dǯétat but rather a coup de grâce. This is because the 
coup was launched without bloodshed, and it effectively ended a lengthy period of 
political turmoilǳ. Not everyone eagerly acknowledged it. Only one day after the 
coup, eighty people, led by activist Sombat Boon-ngam-anong, began the initial anti-
coup protest under the name of ǲthe September 19 Network Against the Coupǳ 
(Sombat Boon-ngam-anong aka ǲbor gor lai judǳ was a long-time NGO activist who 
initially activated the anti-junta protest). A statement (Bhumiprabhas and 
Rojanaphruk 2006) was declared condemning the actions of the CDR (Council for 
Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy) saying that "Abolishing the 
Constitution, harassing the media and putting an end to independent agencies are 
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regarded as acts of abolishing parliamentary democracy. This act will lead to the 
same outcome as of previous coups".  
 
During that time, members of the Thai Rak Thai and their allies kept silent while the 
civilian groups started the protests. ǲThe Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship,ǳ one 
of the active groups set up a speakerǯs corner at Sanam Luang and held a meeting 
every Saturday. The demonstrators of this group were portrayed as common, 
middle class people with no political backgrounds, thus their speeches to oppose the 
coup makers were barely supported by difficult political theories. They (No Red 
Shirts in Bangkok 2011) claimed that sometimes they were insulted by some skillful 
activists from ǲthe September 19 Network Against the Coup groupǳ led by Sombat 
Boon-ngam-anong. These two major groups performed their demonstrations with 
diverse objectives. The movements of ǲthe September 19 Network Against the Coup 
groupǳ were focused on attacking the coup. On the other hand, members of ǲthe 
Saturday Voice Against Dictatorshipǳ were Thaksinǯs supporters and their messages 
sometimes referred to the virtues of Thaksin. Nonetheless, in the early movement 
they had an agreement to avoid talking about Thaksin, because they could not guess 
the other groupsǯ views toward the exiled premier. Moreover, most media outlets 
included some people seemed greatly opposed to Thaksin Shinawatra, so, by openly 
supporting Thaksin they might be accused of being paid to make the protests.  
 
In their third meeting ǲthe Saturday Voice Against Dictatorshipǳ started to show 
their support toward Thaksin Shinawatra and TRT by attacking the coup makers 
about the overthrowing of Thaksin and his government. To avoid being accused of 
disloyalty to the King, the protest groups (2011) wore yellow shirts and headbands 
written ǲLove the King, dislike Premǳ and ǲCDR, get out!ǳ  It was obvious that they 
separated King Bhumibol from the coup makers. General Prem Tinsulanonda was 
believed to be the mastermind of the 19 September 2006 coup and was attacked 
hard by these groups. Throughout the early movement, these anti-coup groups had 
not been supported by the TRT politicians. They (2011) sold their own 
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merchandize: VCDs, and the weekly newspaper ǲthe Serichonǳ to finance 
themselves. As well, the live demonstrations were disseminated via websites and 
community radio stations with simple technology. Later, some members of the Thai 
Rak Thai party began their movement as the PTV group which finally collaborated 
with the other protest groups. Various factions were combined to form a strong 
political movement group, known as the Red Shirts. It could be seen from a part of 
the Red Shirtsǯ declaration (Who Are We? Red Shirts n.d.) that: 
The Red Shirts roots are in the various groups who protested against the 
military coup in 2006, such as the Federation for Democracy back in 1992, 
the Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship, 19th September Group, PTV Group 
and Ex-Thai Rak Thai members. These groups protested against the military 
coup of 19 September 2006 and have gradually grown from small gatherings 
to large protests. The red colour was first adopted in 2007 as a symbol 
against the 2007 constitution which was drafted by the 2006 coup makers. 
In terms of framing, the anti-coup groups applied the democracy metaframe from 
the beginning of the protests. The coup makers were blamed as the dictators who 
took away the peopleǯs democratic government led to the destruction of the country 
economically and politically. It was noticeable that the nation metaframe became 
the second most important frame for them. The king and the religion metaframes 
were concentrated on to a lesser degree. In this chapter, I will explore the frames 
employed by the anti-coup groups. The number of frames and the four functions of 
each mobilizing frame will be shown in the sections below. In this study, I chose the 
Thai E-News Website as the source to study the frames of the anti-coup groups since 
this website contained a variety of information about the protest groups. To see the 
whole picture of the framing, I will separate the periods of movement into two 
phases. The first phase begins from the first day of the protest in September 2006 to 
February 2007 when the PTV group was established, and the second phase will be 
from that point until the Red Shirts were formally established in early June 2007. 
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ǲThe first phase of the anti-coup groups movementǳ 
 
In the initial movement period, the anti-coup groups were a coalition of activists, 
scholars, students, and ordinary people. Their primary messages were focused on 
opposing the coup, the coup makers, and condemning the loss of democracy. As they 
were from different backgrounds, the mobilizing frames in the first phase had been 
diversely constructed into two main directions.  Some factions concentrated on 
calling for democracy, whereas some supported the return of Thaksin Shinawatra 
and his party.  Covered in this chapter are the seven mobilizing frames which 
consisted of the anti-coup, the anti-amat, the unproductive Surayud government, the peopleǯs democracy, the media control, the Buddhism, and the Thaksin mobilizing 
frames. In addition, the metaframes will be explored in the last part of each 
mobilizing frames. 
 
1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame 
The anti-coup mobilizing frame was originated when the 19 September 2006 coup 
was staged. As aforementioned, the anti-coup protests had taken place one day after 
the toppling of the Thaksin government. The protestors were factions of ordinary 
people, students, and activists from Bangkok. Apart from those groups, Thaksinǯs 
supporters also participated to support the reinstatement of Thaksin Shinawatra. 
However, calling for the return of Thaksin became a minor priority in this early 
stage. The anti-coup groups started the protest in the Royal plaza, Thammasat 
University, and some major places in Bangkok to signify their democratic 
movements. The reason was those domains, particularly the Royal plaza and 
Thammasat University, had been major arenas for democratic movements in the 
history of Thai political movements.  
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The problem definition function 
In this mobilizing frame, the anti-coup groups framed the problem as the severe 
damage to Thailand in terms of democracy, economy, and the prestige of King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej resulting from the 2006 coup. The culprits were the CNS, the old 
power group or amat, and its network. This time, the protestors determined to attack 
the whole coup group. The accusations were primarily attacking the destruction of Thailandǯs democratic regime, therefore, denial of the military government and their 
laws had been constructed.  The collapses of the Thai economy and the damage to 
the Kingǯs honor were respectively created to accuse the coup group. A work of 
Phichit Likhitkitchasombun (2007), a lecturer from Thammasat Universtiy, 
highlighted the undemocratic nature of the coup. It was posted on the Thai E-news 
website and said that: 
The discourse of ǲthe malevolent Thaksin regimeǳ has been used as a reason 
to do the coup. In truth, the abolition of the ǲThaksin regimeǳ is in addition to 
the ǲdemocratic regime.ǳ We can see that the old power group tears up the 
1997constitution to establish their dictatorial regime. Besides, some right-
wing scholars also regard this coup as a last resort and solution to eliminate 
the tyrannical Thaksin regime. For them, this coup becomes the most 
proficient political reform to clean up Thai politics. They never viewed this 
coup as an undemocratic means which abolishes Thai democracy. 
To strengthen the reliabilitiy of the blame, the website often referred to the opinions 
of scholars, especially Phichit Likhitkitchasombun and some lecturers from 
Thammasat University who seemed to oppose the coup. Those opinions sometimes 
were published in other sources which were re-posted on Thai E-news. They used 
the views of scholars to support their frames similar to the movements of Sondhi 
Limthongkul and the Yellow Shirts.  
Another damage caused by this coup was the recession of the Thai economy. It was 
blamed on the appointed premier General Surayud Chulanont and General Sonthi 
Boonyaratklin the head of the coup makers. At this time, the two figures, according 
to the anti-coup groups, were disapproved of by democratic countries because of 
their tyranny. A view, from the Pantip web board ȋǮRatthapraharn art tam hai 
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konkrung shuad rotfaifaǯ 2007), was chosen to be published on Thai E-news website. 
It was about the refusal, of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, to lend 
Thailand the money to develop the transportation system because of the 19 
September coup. Furthermore, this news also claimed that some countries decided 
to suspend their investments because of the uncertain situation in Thailand. In a 
sense, the downfall of Thailandǯs economy absolutely resulted from the 19 
September coup.    
The last accusation was pointed towards the act of the coup group in violating King Bhumibolǯs esteem and royal power. This was because, initially, the coup group ȋǮThailand: No Elections for a Yearǯ 2006) had been named ǲthe Council for 
Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM)ǳ.  They were 
criticized for involving the monarchy with the coup which led to doubts about the Kingǯs role in the coup. A few days later, the name was changed into ǲthe Council for 
Democratic Reformǳ (CDR). It is interesting that the anti-coup groups engaged the 
King with this frame, which was similar to Sondhiǯs framing strategy. Opponents 
were accused of disloyalty. 
A view from a former senator ȋǮPrachachon sudton yun nangsue kormorchor yud 
arng taharn prarachaǯ 2006) was published to demand General Sonthi 
Boonyaratklin to stop involving the 19 September coup with the King. His 
accusation was that General Sonthi had performed many undemocratic actions such 
as accomplishing the coup and demolishing the 1997 constitution. General Sonthi, 
furthermore, continually announced that he was the soldier of the King, according to 
the accusation, led to the publicǯs perception that his dictatorial moves were 
endorsed by the King.  
Additionally, a group of people declared a statement indicating the malpractices of 
the coup group. This group ȋǮNaklongtoon sudton triam fongsarnpokkrong au 
padetkan aukpaiǯ 2007) asserted that the elimination of the 1997 constitution, 
promulgated by King Bhumibol, and the appointment of the military government 
were acts which completely violated the Kingǯs royal prerogative.   
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The causal attribution function 
In this function, the cause of the problem was given that the coup and the junta 
government was unacknowledged by democratic countries, particularly by the ASEAN 
countries. An article on Thai E-News referred to the ASEAN meeting in the 
Philippines which General Surayud attended and was treated as a ǲfool.ǳ  In the 
article the author ȋǮSurayud tuatalok nai asean langrang kotbat aseanǯ 2007) claimed 
that: 
This meeting had an agreement to deny any coup which was conducted in 
any of the ASEAN members since the standpoint of ASEAN is to promote 
solidarity. Thus, this announcement seems like Surayud was slapped by the 
ASEAN community. It is clearly seen that Thailand and Myanmar are directly 
impacted by this agreement. Besides, every country has a consensus to deny 
a coup by dictators. 
In the anti-coup mediaǯs view, the junta government was not accepted by the other 
countries, while another cause of the decline of the Thai economy was asserted that 
his government had applied a mistaken financial policy which resulted in the 
hesitation of the other countries to invest in Thailand. Besides, some countries 
(ǮSamapan prachatippatai pramern 4 deunǯ 2007) might stop investing altogether 
and move to another country since they did not trust in the potency of this 
government. In addition, the internal damages of farmers from flooding were 
pointed out to illustrate the carelessness of the government.  
The moral evaluation function 
Obviously, in this mobilizing frame the coup makers were called tyrants, rioters, 
robbers, fake heroic knights, crooked dictators, and accused of disloyalty to the King. 
In an article from the Serichon Newspaper (The Serichon 2007), it was explained 
that: 
The coup makers attempt to give many honorable reasons to rob this 
country. It is amusing to see that they fool themselves and the whole world 
as if everyone is senseless. Undoubtedly, this coup will never be approved by 
democratic countries. The good governance concept in administration is 
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referred to by these dictators to authorize the coup and ruling. Are they 
confident that they are truly moral? 
In addition, the coup groupǯs corruption was criticized on the Thai E-News website ȋǮKormorchoe kinmuangǯ 2006) thus: ǲAfter several efforts to terminate the 
antagonists, CNS acts like the heroic knights who defeat the villains. They cover 
their immoralities under noble masks; on the other hand they are the worst and 
greediest rulers everǳ.   
The next accusation was directed at the infringement of King Bhumibolǯs royal 
power. The former, early, name of the coup group and some actions of Gen Sonthi 
which involved the King were framed. The anti-coup groups gave the reason that the 
coup makers led the public to understand that the King had authorized this 
undemocratic coup, which could be seen from an article ȋǮThattae 
ratthapraharnthaiǯ 2006) thus: 
When the coup had been staged, yellow and blue were used to represent the 
colors of the coupǯs army. Furthermore, the last part of the coup groupǯs 
name had the phrase ǲthe King as head of the stateǳ which brings up the 
assumption, for the international community, that the monarchy supports 
this coup. 
It has been widely known in Thailand that yellow is the color of King Bhumibol, 
while blue represents the color of Queen Sirikhit. Accordingly, the coup makers, in 
the anti-coup groupsǯ point of view, purposed to relate the monarchy with the 19 
September coup which completely defamed the monarchy.  
An anti-coup group, ǲklum prachachon phoo rak prachathipatai" or "the people who 
love democracy,ǳ labeled themselves as a loyal group. From their declaration ȋǮTalang kao klum poo rak prachathippataiǯ 2006), they protested against the coup 
to call for democracy and ǲprotecting and restoring the honor and virtuousness of 
King Bhumibol Adulyadejǳ. 
This framing tactic to label their rivals as immoral, while framing themselves as 
moral, were applied to legitimize their movement and protect the group from 
charges. This also appeared in the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul. 
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The treatment recommendation function 
In the beginning of the anti-coup groupǯs movement, they called for democracy. 
Thus, the solution in this frame was demanding the restoration of democracy. To 
achieve their resolution, they persuaded people to participate in the protest every 
weekend. When the number of participants increased, the goals of the movement 
were added to with the demand for a new national election, restoration of the 
discarded 1997 constitution, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. An article in the 
Serichon newspaper (The Serichon 2006) was written to invite the readers to join 
the movement thus: 
Our primary goals are bringing back our 1997 constitution and our 
democratic leader. We, the people, must not be terrified by those tyrants who 
claim the approval of His Majesty the King. Our strategy in fighting with this 
tyrannical regime is called Ǯlighting the torch to catch the thievesǯ. Thus, we 
must discover the real culprits behind the coup. Please help us by inviting a 
massive number of people to participate in this movement, and do not forget 
that we have an appointment to catch the thieves every Saturday. 
This ǲlighting the torch to catch the thievesǳ tactic imitated the strategy of Sondhi 
Limthongkul in providing public news and information about the coup. The truth 
and the thieves would be visible through their torches or information.  Literally, 
they wished to reveal the mastermind of this coup which they implied to be General 
Prem Tinsulanonda.  
Also, ǲthe people who love democracy groupǳpleaded with people to join the 
movemen. The leader of the group ȋǮTalang kao klum poo rak prachathippataiǯ 2006) 
announced that: ǲI would like to invite all Thais come out to call for our basic human rights…to get rid of  the immoral group from Thailand…we must bring back our 
democratic regime…This is the battle between democratic factions and tyrantsǳ.  
Regular demonstrations were the means for the anti-coup groups to distribute 
messages to their followers in Bangkok, while the websites and community radio 
programs were used to live broadcast the protests. Evidently, the grassroots 
protesters were able to receive the framing messages and the movements via these 
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communications. In this early time the anti-coup groups needed to increase the 
number of participants from outside Bangkok, including rural grassroots and some 
people from overseas.  
The metaframes 
In this anti-coup mobilizing frame, the democracy, nation, and king metaframes 
were relevant. The democracy metaframe was the most substantial frame, whereas 
nation and king were emphasized as the next most significant.  
The democracy metaframe was applied when the anti-coup groups attacked the 
coup makers as robbers who had stolen Thailandǯs democracy. They were named 
tyrants to underline the dictatorship of the coup group, while the 19 September 
coup was framed as an undemocratic means to occupy Thailand. As a result, the 
democratic regime was demolished. The anti-coup groups offered the restoration of 
democracy to Thailand as the solution. From their framing,  Thaksin was the 
democratic prime minister who was justified to be the Thai leader. Unfortunately he 
was robbed of his premiership by the dictatorial coup makers. 
Also, the nation metaframe was applied to frame the destructive outcomes of the 
coup and the actions of coup makers. According to the anti-coup groups, the coup 
makers proclaimed themselves as heroic knights who redeemed thecountry from 
Thaksin and his regime. However, they were labelled as fake knights and crooked 
tyrants who staged a coup for their own benefit, consequently Thailand met 
disaaproved from democratic countries. Foreign investors also suspended their 
investments because of this situation. This brought devastation to the Thai 
economy, thus the nation metaframe was applied to accentuate the damage the coup 
caused to the nation.  
However, the king metaframe was employed when the anti-coup groups accused the 
coup makers of being the ones who defamed King Bhumibol and ruined his honor, 
since the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra was approved by the King. 
Thus overthrowing this government and eliminating the constitution, which was 
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signed by the King, was definitely illegitimate and infringed the royal power of King 
Bhumibol. The anti-coup groups also focused on the former name of the coup group 
which was ǲthe Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy 
(CDRM)ǳ. The coup group was blamed that they engaged the King with the coup. In 
the anti-coup groupsǯ framing, the coup group's purpose, behind the original name, 
was to take advantage of King Bhumibol.  
 
2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame 
This mobilizing frame was created when the 2006 coup was staged. The anti-coup 
groups undoubtedly realized the head of the coup makers was General Prem 
Tinsulanonda the head of Privy Council, who had agitated before the coup was 
enacted. He gave speeches to the army to be loyal to King Bhumibol. Even Thaksin 
Shinawatra mentioned that he was threatened by ǲa charismatic figureǳ who was 
not identified but assumed to be either King Bhumibol or Prem Tinsulanonda. When 
the Thaksin government was overthrown, some of the anti-coup groups which 
supported the former premier activated this frame.   
The amat (aristocrats) or the old power group has been identified as one of the 
major opponents of the Red Shirts. They framed the conflicts between them into 
political discourses, thus faults and calamities, which the amat had done to them, 
were constructed as influential mobilizing frames.  Nevertheless, the background of 
the amat was clearly explained by Duncan McCargo as ǲthe network monarchyǳ in 
1980s era (McCargo 2005).  He said, 
The main features of Thailandǯs network monarchy from 1980 to 2001 were 
as follows: the monarch was the ultimate arbiter of political decisions in 
times of crisis; the monarchy was the primary source of national legitimacy; 
the King acted as a didactic commentator on national issues, helping to set 
the national agenda, especially through his annual birthday speeches; the 
monarch intervened actively in political developments, largely by working 
through proxies such as privy councillors and trusted military figures; and 
the lead proxy, former army commander and prime minister 
PremTinsulanond, helped determine the nature of coalition governments, 
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and monitored the process of the military and other promotions. At heart, 
network governance of this kind relied on placing the right people (mainly, 
the right men) in the right jobs. Allocation of key posts was the primary role 
of the lead proxy, Prem.  
McCargo described the network of Prem as ǲthe network monarchy,ǳ while in the 
eye of Thai people Prem (Nanuam 2009) has his close subordinates widely known 
as ǲLuk Paǳ or ǲPapaǯs childrenǳ network.  
This framing of the anti-coup groups was remarkable since they created a new 
discourse to call Premǯs network as ǲamat,ǳ while Prem's regime was named ǲamatayathipataiǳ. Anek Laothamatas (1988) provided the explanation about the 
original characterization of ǲamatayathipataiǳ thus: 
Between 1932, the year the absolute monarchy was overthrown, and 1973, 
when the country's longest-ruling military regime was toppled, Thailand 
was, in a sense, a bureaucratic polity. During most of this long period, the 
country was under the rule either of military governments or of elected 
governments that relied heavily on the support of the armed forces. Most of 
the premiers and cabinet ministers of both types of government were active 
or retired military and civilian bureaucrats. Unlike the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes of Latin America, however, the Thai bureaucratic 
polity operated among docile, politically inert social groups or classes, 
leaving decision-making authority in the hands of small elite of bureaucrats. 
Autonomous, organized political activities of non-bureaucratic groups - 
students, workers, peasants, businessmen - were minimal and affected the 
policy of the state mainly in an informal and particularistic manner.  
From the framing of the anti-coup groups, Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues 
were the opponents of Prem in terms of power and benefits. Accordingly, Thaksin 
was attacked by ǲa charismatic figureǳ and his network.  When the anti-coup groups 
activated the protests, Prem and his conservative power group, or amat, were 
framed as tyrants who forcefully abused the rights of people or grassroots. The anti-
coup factions named the regime of Prem as ǲamatayaPREMathipatai" which was a 
combination of amat+Prem+thipathai (aristocrat+Prem+regime). This cleverly tied 
up General Prem with the amat group and the 19 September coup. 
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The problem definition function 
In this mobilizing frame, the problem was the power and benefits monopolization of 
the amat which destroyed Thai democracy. The culprit of this problem was indicated 
to be the old power group, or amat, and its networks. From the anti-coup groupsǯ 
framing, the members of the amat were the Privy Council committees, Premier 
Surayud Chulanont, some militants, bureaucrats, technocrats, businessmen, 
journalists, and some right-wing scholars. According to the anti-coup groups, Prem 
demanded his networks to fulfil his desires in obtaining power and wealth. As a 
result, Thai democracy had been demolished by Prem and his network.  The anti-
coup groups also alleged Prem as one who took advantages of being in the inner 
circle of King Bhumibol to gain fortunes. An example from the writing of Pichit 
(2007) was used to support the frame. Pichit gave an explanation of the excuses 
used by the amat to stage the coup thus: ǲThaksin's regimeǳ discourse is created by some right-wing political 
scientists. Their conservative standpoints are bended to oppose democracy, 
capitalism, and globalization. Consequently, Thaksin, his colleagues, and the 
Thaksin regime are criticized, blamed, and attacked strongly, by the old 
power group, for demolishing the Thai democratic regime. Thaksin and his 
regime have been blamed as the culprits. On the other hand, this 
conservative group is the real agent who has been destroying Thai 
democracy for a long time. 
It is interesting that the work of Pichit was often cited by some of the anti-coup 
groups, particularly Thaksinǯs supporters, to construct the battles between the 
tyrannical amat and democratic Thaksin factions. Additionally, an article from Thai 
E-News ȋǮTaharn namdee chae saprang patiwat puepaktongǯ 2006) described the 
connection between Prem and his network. It said: 
The coup makers staged the coup for their personal benefits. Obviously, 
there were many factions intermingled in this coup. In the list of names, 
Prachai Leophairatana was the leader of Thai petrochemical Industry (TPI), 
while The Democrat Party and Sanoh Tientong were from political factions. 
The representative of the business groups was Sondhi Limthongkul along 
with the Kasikorn Bank and Bangkok Bank groups. In terms of the amat, the 
key members were Prem Tinsulanonda, Surayud Chulanont, and Prasong 
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Soonsiri. It was noticeable that all of them determined to oust Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra from his position. Obviously, Surayud Chulanont was the 
planner who acted under the instruction of Prem Tinasulanonda. Funds for 
the coup were raised from these people.  
There had been some preparations 7 to 8 months before conducting the 
coup, while some plans, such as the movements of the PAD and a petition to 
appoint Abhisit Vejjajiva to be Prime Minister, had been activated.  
Nonetheless, these plans failed. The 19 September coup, accordingly, became 
the last and absolute resort for them to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
From the previous statements, the anti-coup groups illustrated how this amat group 
committed the coup in terms of plot, collaborators, and budgets. General Prem 
Tinasulanonda was suspected as the head of the coup group, whereas his 
subordinates assisted him in demolishing the government of Thaksin Shinawatra. 
 
Another disputed accusation toward Prem Tinsulanonda and his network was about 
their disloyal practices which violated the Kingǯs power. The anti-coup groups did 
not pinpoint, directly, how Prem and his amat network dishonored King Bhumibolǯs 
royal supremacy. Instead, an article written in 1987 by Mom Rajawongse Kukrit 
Pramoj the former prime minister was re-published on the Thai E-News website. In 
this article Kukrit criticized Prem when he held the premiership in 1980s. Prem, 
according to Kukritǯs accusation, disclosed King Bhumibolǯs private conversation, 
without permission, about ǲThai style democracyǳ to the public.  In Kukritǯs article ȋǮColum soi suanplooǯ 2006) which was originally published in 1987, he wrote: 
I have heard news that His Majesty the King had an informal dialogue with 
some Chiang Mai journalists about difficulties in adopting the Western-style 
democracy into Thailand. From that news, it was claimed that His Majesty the 
King suggested a solution by transforming Western democracy into ǲThai 
style democracy. 
...I do not understand why Prime Minister Prem Tinasulanonda seems excited 
about the thoughts of His Majesty the Kingǯs on Thai style democracy. 
Furthermore, Prem demands his subordinates and mass media to 
disseminate the Kingǯs words to the public. He stresses that the whole of 
society must be aware of this. It makes me curious about his declaration of 
being extreme loyal to the King…)n my view, distributing the Kingǯs personal 
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dialogue to the public is completely inappropriate. In doing so, the whole 
conversation of His Majesty the King must be distributed, not just a sentence 
which is what Prem has done. Only His Majesty the King thoroughly 
comprehends the accurate meaning of his ǲThai style democracy.ǳ So, how 
can Mr. Prem precisely read the Kingǯs mind?  
I assume that he may need to sustain his own style of Thai democracy by 
applying His Majesty the Kingǯs words to hold on to his premiership. He does 
not want to be suspected on any issues. Nobody can criticize him when he 
occupies the prime minister position.  As the premier, he is not responsible 
for paying any of his costs of living, and being respected by people. According 
to his needs, Premier Prem eagerly adopts the Kingǯs thoughts about Thai 
style democracy to verify his practices as being in conformity with His 
Majesty the Kingǯs view.  
Everyone in this country must keep in mind that the status of His Majesty the 
King, in this country, is above everything. He must not be used by anyone…The government of Premier Prem Tinasulanonda must stop taking 
advantage of His Majesty the Kingǯs words to support their actions and 
protect them from any guilt over things they have done. 
The anti-coup groups made use of the respectful and honored image of Kukrit to 
imply the Ǯhidden intentionǯ of Prem.  Kukrit had a good image among most Thais 
since he was a junior member of the royal family and former premier.  In this re-
posted article he wrote about ǲThai style democracyǳ which was framed as the 
autocratic regime being used by someThai rulers including Prem.  
During this early movement, the anti-coup groups did not concentrate on the 
concept of ǲThai style democracyǳ, although they began to connect Prem with this 
dictatorial concept. ǲAmatayathipataiǳ usually referred to the regime of Prem at that 
time. From this article, the anti-coup groups framed Prem and ǲThai style 
democracyǳ to highlight Premǯs dictatorship and his malpractices toward King 
Bhumibol. Factually this type of democracy (Thak 2007) was initially mentioned by 
Marshall Sarit Thanarat, a former authoritarian premier, to legitimize his dictatorial 
regime. The anti-coup groups emphasized the resemblance of Premǯs regime to Saritǯs, while the anti-coup groupsǯ democracy was framed as the real democratic 
regime. 
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The causal attribution function  
In this mobilizing frame the head of Privy Council, General Prem Tinasulanonda, was 
blamed as the key person who masterminded the coup to overthrow Thaksin 
Shinawatra's government. The anti-coup groups explained the reasons behind the 
coup that the amat determined to take over the ruling power, while another reason 
involved the popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra among the grassroots. It was claimed 
by some scholars, and the anti-coup groups, that Thaksin became a great threat for 
the monarchy and the amat since he was voted for by a massive number of voters from 
rural areas. Thus, getting rid of Thaksin and his associates became the remedy for 
these elites. However, Premǯs movements to oppose Thaksin had begun months 
before the 19 September coup. At that time, General Prem Tinsulanonda ȋǮMilitary 
Coup in Bangkokǯ  2006) had dressed in military uniform to give a speech warning 
the army to be loyal to King Bhumibol rather than to the government of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. In some foreign news media, Prem and his network (ǮThere Wasnǯt Any 
Choiceǯ 2006) were alleged to be: …a group of military commanders, elites and blue-bloods close to King 
Bhumibol, led by coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratklin and former 
prime minister and retired General PremTinsulanonda, who heads the Privy 
Council. For months, the royalists have seen Thaksin as a threat to the power 
that King Bhumibol, and those surrounding him, have acquired during six 
decades on the throne.  Pichitǯs article was used by the anti-coup group again to explain the reason of amat 
to perform the 2006 coup. It (Likhitkijsomboon 2007) was clarified thus: 
The real goal of the conservative group and the right-wing intellectuals is to 
demolish the democracy regime. They camouflage their true objective by 
portraying Thaksin and his colleagues as tyrants, plunderers, and unfaithful 
to the King. Also, chauvinism is applied to arouse people to attack Thaksin 
and his associates. Thaksin's regime is used to mobilize people to overthrow 
that regime; on the other hand the old power group determines to destroy 
democracy and the constitution. Accordingly, a dictatorial regime is re-
established by this conservative group. 
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This frame was constructed to convince the readers to think that the ǲThaksin 
regimeǳ was just a constructed discourse by the amat to portray an evil image of 
Thaksin and his policy. It was applied as an excuse to legitimize the coup and to 
establish the amat regime or ǲamatayathipataiǳ which was rule by Prem. Another 
article (Serichon 2006) which was written by an anti-coup author was used to 
support this blame. It said: 
The coup makers claim themselves to be a group of moral people performing 
a moral mission in exterminating the corrupt government of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. They demolish the ǲThaksin regimeǳ in order to take up in all 
major governmental positions. In doing so, they unite with scholars, 
technocrats, politicians, bureaucrats, and business groups to establish an ǲamat regimeǳ.  Furthermore, the amatǯs goal is to suppress the people so 
they are ǲsecond class citizensǳ. Worse, their opposition factions would be 
alienated and prevented from participating in any political activities.  
The framing strategy of the anti-coup groups thus began framing the divide as a 
class conflict.The old power group or amat was framed as the upper class 
determined to suppress the people, or grassroots, and make them their inferiors. 
The anti-coup groups began to illustrate the amat as enemies of the people or 
grassroots. They challenged each other by promoting their different typs of 
democracy.  
The moral evaluation function 
In this function, the anti-coup groups focused on the oppressive attitudes of the old 
power group towards the common people. The old power group was portrayed as 
the suppressive conservative group which pretended to be moral. Also, they were 
called the democracy destroyers and a disloyal group. Again, the work of Pichit 
(2007) was re-posted on the Thai E-News that: 
This old power group is a group of people that shares the same thoughts in 
opposing westerners. They attack Western democracy, saying it is a 
deceptive and vicious regime because they believe in elitism and a privilege 
system. Thus, this country must be ruled by ǲthe moral leaders.ǳ Apparently, 
in their minds the moral leaders are the wealthy, well-educated, and noble 
people. 
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It is interesting that the views of Pichit towards the coup makers had been used to 
construct some movement discourse of the anti-coup groups, particularly when they 
attacked amat.  In this moral branding function they framed amat as an elite group 
that aimed to demolish the democratic regime, because this Western style of 
democracy allowed anyone to be elected as the leaders. On the one hand, amat, as 
framed by the anti-coup groups, believed that only the elite were eligible to rule the 
country. The old power group was gradually framed as the superior class with an 
oppressive attitude in intimidating the inferior class. They saw themselves as the 
cream of the crop who deserved to be the rulers. Another example (ǮTalangkarn 
kabuan thap prachaconnǯ 2006) of moral branding was constructed on the abuse of peopleǯs rights that:  
This country belongs to all Thais, not just one privileged group. Those amat 
and their tyrannical network have never changed their true oppressive 
nature. They overpower people with their tyrannical 
ǲamatayaPREMathipataiǳ regime to prohibit the liberty, human rights, and 
voices of people. Worse, the right of people to elect their leaders has been 
taken away by amat. 
Even though the old power group, or amat, was the target of attack, General Prem 
was the main culprit. He had been framed as the major enemy of the the anti-coup 
groups and the Red Shirts for almost a decade. They ('Sarupkao robsapda jak 
soonkao chaoban bangsaiǯ 2006) also published a news story to portray Premǯs 
practices of disloyalty to the King. It was small news about a local radio program 
which routinely broadcasted the Kingǯs speeches. After the coup, the Kingǯs speeches 
were replaced by Premǯs. The author claimed that the change was demanded by the 
CNS. Doubts about the inappropriate action of Prem and CNS were competently 
constructed to convince people to believe that Prem and his network purposed to be 
comparable with the King.  
The treatment recommendation function 
During this early movement, Thailand was under the rule of the martial law. There 
was a small number of protesters, thus the anti-coup groups could not apply a hard-
hitting strategy at this time. Nevertheless, a solution of this frame was constructed 
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as getting rid of the amat group and General Prem Tinsulanonda by means of protest. 
Accordingly the anti-coup groups invited people to participate in their peaceful 
protests every weekend at the Royal plaza, Thammasat University, and the centre of 
Bangkok. An announcement of a protest group, ǲthe Peopleǯs armyǳ (ǮTalangkarn 
kabuan thap prachaconnǯ 2006), said that one of their goals was to terminate the old 
power group or amat. They declared that: 
A virtuous power of patriotic people will never be defeated by any tyrant or 
amat. Consequently, the ǲamatayaPREMathipatai regimeǳ will be crushed 
swiftly by our patriotic peopleǯs movement. We must believe in democracy. 
Do believe that our absolute victory will come shortly. Those liars will 
experience the agonizing finale soon. 
The anti-old power groups also attempted to oust General Prem Tinsulanonda from 
the position of head of the Privy Council. The leader of the White Doves group ȋǮGannam kloom pirabkaoǯ 2006) announced that Prem must resign from the 
position since he defamed King Bhumibolǯs honor by conducting the coup.  
The metaframes 
Evidently, this mobilizing frame was primarily constructed using the democracy and 
king metaframes. The amat, or old power group, was alleged to be the key group 
that conducted the 19 September coup, for that reason they were framed as the 
democracy destroyers. The amat, in the framing of the anti-coup groups, was the 
major enemy of the people. The nature of this superior group was illustrated as 
oppressive; therefore the common people were suppressed as their inferiors.  
The anti-coup groups focused on attacking General Prem Tinsulanonda. They 
accused Prem of being the head of the coup group. The anti-coup groups claimed 
that the amat made up the accusations against the Thaksin regime as an excuse to 
get rid of Thaksin and his associates through staging the coup. By this, they could 
establish their ǲamatayaPREMathipataiǳ which was the regime of Prem 
Tinsulanonda. This regime, according to the anti-coup groups, was the dictatorial 
regime established to seize Thailand.  At this early stage, the anti-coup groups had 
not intensely attacked Prem and his network.  
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The king metaframe was applied to allege amat of defamation of King Bhumibolǯs 
honor. Moreover, they were accused of applying the Kingǯs power to the benefits of 
their associates.  In the anti-coup groups view, amat took advantage from being 
close to King Bhumibol which was a seriously inappropriate practice. Accordingly, 
the anti-coup groups demanded Prem to resign from the president of the Privy 
Council position.  
 
3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing 
frame 
This frame was constructed when General Surayud Chulanont, a prominent member 
of the Privy Council, was appointed and approved by King Bhumibol as the interim 
prime minister. It triggered dissatisfaction among the protest groups because it was 
undemocratic. Besides, Surayud had a close relationship with General Prem, thus in 
the anti –coup groupsǯ view he was amat. The policy results of the amat government 
were attacked to contrast them with Thaksinǯs. After the honeymoon period of the 
bloodless coup, critics of the junta government appeared. The anti-coup groups 
focused on condemning faults such as corruption, denunciation of the international 
society, the lack results of the military government, the unrest situations in 
Thailand, and the vague economic philosophy. The anti-coup groups pinpointed the 
ineffective and corrupt image of the Surayud government to contrast with the 
productive and innovative Thaksin Shinawatra government.  
The problem definition function 
In this mobilizing frame, the problem was the damage, to Thailand, caused by the 
government of Surayud Chulanont. The culprits in this frame were General Surayud 
Chulanont and his government. Obviously, corruption had been highlighted as a 
severe allegation to disgrace the clean image of the amat government. In the anti-
coup groupsǯ view, Surayud Chulanont, the leader of the government, had had a 
good reputation as an unsullied and respectable Privy Council member. It is 
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interesting that, after taking the premier position, Surayud, his family, and 
colleagues were alleged on their unusually fortunes. The anti-coup groups criticized 
that the amount of assets and liabilities of the ministers and their partners had risen 
after they were ministers. It is not surprising that Surayud and his wife, Colonel 
Khunying Chitrawadee, were attacked on their increased assets. In an anti-coup 
groupsǯ news ȋǮRaikarn ped kong koosomrot kong nayokǯ 2006), it was written that: 
The total assets of Surayud and his wife are 65,566,363.11 Thai baht. The 
people have differing views about this. Some criticize, some feel envy, and 
some say the premier keeps preaching to people to be economical according 
to the sufficiency economy philosophy, but he is the one who canǯt do it.  
Throughout the premiership, General Surayud Chulanont was accused of unlawfully 
owning forest reserve land in Yaithiang Mountain of Nakhon Ratchasima province. 
This issue had been escalated on the Thai E-New website.  
The next example was the rejection of the interim government by the international 
society and Thai people. The anti-coup groups claimed that the Surayud government 
was illegal and undemocratic and was not acknowledged by democratic countries.  
Furthermore, Surayud and his colleagues did not have enough knowledge and 
experience to govern Thailand; as a result the economy was severely declined.  
News from the anti-coup group reported that Surayud was disregarded by China 
government, since he was the ǲrobberǳ prime minister. On the one hand Thaksin 
was wholeheartedly welcomed as a genuine and authorized leader. The anti-coup 
groups also claimed that Surayud Chulanont was loathed by people from Chiang Mai 
province ȋǮKon Chiang mai chingchang Surayudǯ 2006), since he robbed the premier 
position from Thaksin Shinawatra. Apparently Chiang Mai is the hometown and 
voting base of Thaksin and his party.  
Another example, in this early period, was the lack of results of the interim 
government. The recession of economy and the unrest in the southernmost 
provinces were constructed as the major flaws of the Surayud government. In the 
framing of the anti-coup groups, Thaksinǯs accomplishments were obviously greater 
than the junta governmentǯs. Thus, the junta's lack of skills in administration and 
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economics was highlighted. An article ȋǮJa tooptamlai kwam churmun kong 
pratedthaiǯ 2006), written by the anti-coup groups, criticized Surayud for delaying 
some projects created by the Thaksin government. It was framed as frustrating the 
hopes of voters of Thaksin who received benefits from the projects. 
In addition, the juntaǯs ineffective and vague economic idea was criticized from 
some anti-coup scholars and journalists as part of the Thai economyǯs recession. 
They believed in capitalism of Thaksin. Oppositely the self-sufficiency economy 
philosophy of King Bhumibol was claimed as the economic policy of the amay 
government. The concept was condemned by the anti-coup groups due to the 
imprecise application of the philosophy. In their view, the philosophy was redefined 
by the amat which was not given the certain and practical approaches. To devalue 
the concept, they compared the efficiency of the capitalism used by Thaksin with the 
self-sufficiency economy philosophy of the junta. An article from the Serichon 
newspaper (The Serichon 2007) criticized the economic concept of the junta thus: 
Many economists regard the ǲThaksin regimeǳ as using the same notion of 
capital globalization which has been adopted by many countries. The 
efficiency of capitalism has been proved by its winning over several 
challenging ideologies such as communism and even the thrilling concept of a 
self-sufficiency economy…Certainly conflicts of diverse economic ideals lead 
to the 19 September coup, conflicts of which Thaksin Shinawatra is only a 
part. The war between the ideas of capital globalization and anti-
globalization has been continuing in Thailand for a period of time. The long 
history of capitalism in Europe has proved itself, by its advantages and 
proficiency, to be the finest idea of economic development.  We must admit 
that we cannot turn back to live like a submissive farmer as we used to do in 
the agricultural society. 
This author viewed the concept of King Bhumibol as an old-fashioned idea. For him, 
this concept became a hindrance for modern economic development, while the finer 
capitalism, or ǲThaksinomicsǳ, concept used by Thaksin has been approved by many 
modern countries.  
Another anti-coup writer ȋǮTapom mai aou sedtakitporpiang version surayudǯ 2007) 
condemned on the self-sufficiency economy philosophy that Surayud convinced 
people to follow. The author thought Surayud was unable to apply the correct and 
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genuine concept of King Bhumibol into his ruling. Because of this, Surayud and his 
government made public misunderstandings about the Kingǯs philosophy which 
resulted in the disgrace of King Bhumibol.  
Furthermore, during the premiership of Surayud, there were several severe unrests 
that occurred in the southernmost provinces as well as blasts in Bangkok. The anti-
coup groups claimed that bad news of the unrest situations in the south were 
extensively distributed online. In their view, the situations had shifted into the 
warfare, on the other hand the junta neglected to solve the crisis. Futhermore, the 
junta attempted to control the news to maintain their popularity among the 
Bangkokians. In the anti-coup groups' opinion, the junta ȋǮKlasae kao paktai tuam 
internetǯ 2006) was at risk of losing the southern areas to the separatists. In 
addition, the many bombs in Bangkok were seen, by the anti-coup groups ȋǮRai 
ngarn karn raberd tee krungthepǯ 2007), as the plot to put the blame on Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his colleagues.  
The causal attribution function 
The causes of the destruction were mainly framed on the incompetence of the 
government of Surayud Chulanont. An analysing article from Newsweek 
International, by George Wehrfritz (2008), was re-posted on the Thai E-News 
website. In the article the causes were considered: 
The return to normalcy promised by the junta leaders has failed to 
materialize, and policy blunders, persistent coup rumors and a recent spate 
of unsolved bombings have heightened uncertainty. The problem may be that 
the generals are simply inept and their Western-trained technocrats past 
their prime. But a close look at the economic agenda of Surayud Chulanont, 
Thailand's interim prime minister, suggests something else is at work. Since 
his appointment last October, the former general has introduced measures to 
halt the Westernization of Thai society, downsize the role foreigners play in 
the economy and maximize "happiness," not growth, as he put it. Surayud's 
blueprint draws inspiration from the country's highest authority: 79-year-
old King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world's longest-reigning monarch. His 
Highness has long advocated "sufficiency" in Thai life, meaning humility, 
simplicity and living within one's means. Others have a different name for it: 
"Buddhist economics." 
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…..Sufficiency proponents include conservative generals uncomfortable with 
one-person, one-vote democracy; nationalists eager to reduce the role of 
foreign businesses in Thai markets; and the Bangkok elite, which is unhappy 
with the way Thaksin mobilized poor farmers into a sturdy electoral base. By 
linking new policies to the monarch, who under Thai law is inviolate, these 
powerful groups have managed to ward off virtually all debate. "Sufficiency is 
multi-layered: it's a philosophy, a way of life, a potential policy platform and 
context for the [Sept. 19] coup" says political scientist Thitinan 
Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies 
at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University. "But the government's effort to 
convert it from concept to policy has been very problematic." 
The English article was used to legitimize the accusation of the anti-coup groups on 
the amat government. They intended to show that the policy of the amat 
government was critiqued by the foreign correspondents. From this statement, it is 
obvious that the inexpert government and the economic idea were the main root of 
the Thai economyǯs recession.The junta's measures, supposedly inspired by King Bhumibolǯs philosophy, to stop Westernization were questionable.  
The moral evaluation function 
At this time, the anti-coup groups framed Surayud Chulanont as the robber prime 
minister.  He robbed the position from Thaksin Shinawatra, thus Surayud 
government was the illegal government. Corruption was also blamed on Surayud 
and his associates. The anti-coup groups did not label them with a specific name, but 
cynically mocked the Surayud government on their so-called economical lifestyle.  
The anti-coup groups' accusations about the corrupt projects of the military 
government ȋǮRattaban tuen arng chai 2500 lanbaht piang pue tung ronnarong hai 
kon chon lerk len huaiǯ 2006) were reported in an article on the Thai E-News website 
thus:  ǲThis illegal government poured a huge budget of 2,500 million Thai baht to 
campaign people to stop playing the illegal lottery. It is the 5 year project that 
indicates the intention of this government to profit from the budget.ǳ 
Also, Surayudǯs underperformance to end the turmoil in the south and Bangkok was 
caused by his inability to protect Thai people from threats. It was noticed in an 
article ȋǮSurayud sarapab tor lok muslim wa prathed thai rangkae chao thai muslimǯ 
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2006) that Surayud put on an act as a nonviolent and peace-loving person, similar to 
Prem Tinsulanonda, to remain in his premiership without end. Furthermore, 
Surayud told Al Jazeera news that the unrest in the southernmost provinces was 
rooted in the officials and the poor level of education. Accordingly, the anti-coup 
groups attacked Surayud over his casting blame toward the officials in the critical 
areas. Surayud admitted during the interview that Muslims in the south were 
unfairly treated by the officials, according to the anti-coup groupsǯ framing, Surayud 
triggered revenge from international Muslim terrorists.  This accusation was 
repeated the tactics that Sondhi Limthongkul had used to attack Thaksin Shinawatra 
about the southern turmoil.  
The treatment recommendation function 
The solution in this frame was offered as the restoration of democracy and the 
demand for Surayud to quit his position. The chairman of Confederation for 
Democracy, Weng Tojirakan, and Sant Hatirat, the chairman of Foundation for 
Democracy Heroes, demanded Surayud to step down from his position, since he 
violated the Forestry Act of 1941 and Reserved Forest Act of 1964 by having a 
private house in a forest reserve. His flawless image was questioned by Weng ȋǮCall 
for Surayud to quit over forest retreatǯ 2006) thus: "If he thinks that running the 
country needs high ethics and morality, then he must quit because what he did was 
unlawfulǳ. They also called for the termination of the Special Operation Centre, 
established by the Council for National Security, because of the waste of the huge 
budget. 
The metaframes  
This mobilizing frame was constructed under the democracy, nation, and 
modernization metaframes. In terms of the democracy metaframe, this government 
was seen as the product of the coup makers, thus Surayud Chulanont was the robber 
who robbed the ruling power from Thaksin Shinawatra. In terms of the nation 
metaframe, he was framed as an unproductive and corrupt premier. He caused 
Thailand damage by being a dictatorial premier, since democratic countries rejected 
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him. Besides, his lack of economic skills led to the decline of the Thai economy. His 
inattentiveness was blamed for the inability to resolve the unrest in the south and 
the bomb blasts in Bangkok. The anti-coup groups pinpointed it as the destruction 
of the Thai economy and security of the southern people. 
Furthermore, the modernization metaframe was applied to portray the conservative 
image of Surayud and the government. The anti-coup groups condemned the old-
fashioned notion of the sufficiency economy of the government as outdated when 
compared with the capitalism of Thaksin Shinawatra. This led to the ineffective 
administration of the government.  
 
4. The people’s democracy mobilizing frame 
The frame was created to mobilize the protesters after the 2006 coup was staged. 
The democracy of the people concept was primarily framed to pursuade Thaksinǯs 
supporters and the general people more generally respectively. The discarding of 
the 1997 constitution was seen as the loss of peopleǯs or grassrootsǯ rights. 
Additionally Thaksin Shinawatra, which perceived as the premier of the grassroots, 
was toppled. All of this brought about the movement of the people to call for 
democracy. It is interesting that when the anti-coup groups started to protest they 
called themselves ǲthe peopleǳ and sometimes ǲthe grassroots.ǳ The amat, or the old 
power group, were constructed as their crucial enemies. The class conflicts were 
created.  
In the beginning of the protest there were many groups of protestors that came up 
to oppose the coup, typically they set up agendas and activities based on their 
objectives. Some demanded the restoration of democracy and the 1997 peopleǯs 
constitution, some intended to overthrow the coup makers and the amat group, and 
some preferred the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. By this, the 19 September coup 
was the cause of the loss of the peopleǯs democracy; consequently the anti-coup 
groups demanded the coup groups to restore ǲthe peopleǯs democracy.ǳ However, 
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the anti-coup groups gave descriptions of their peopleǯs democracy which involved 
the following themes: the 1997 peopleǯs constitution, the elected government of 
Thaksin Shinawatra, the national elections, and the rights of people to protest.   
The problem definition function 
The problem in this mobilizing frame was the loss of the peopleǯs democracy by the 
19 September coup. The culprits of this frame were pinpointed as the coup makers, 
the junta, the old power group and its network, such as the Yellow Shirts, some right-
wing scholars and the media that supported the coup. 
It is misleading to say that movements of the anti-coup groups at this time 
determined to support the return of Thaksin Shinawatra since there were some 
factions that predominantly demanded the restoration of a democratic regime, 
accordingly, they had diverse goals. The primary framing issues in this frame were 
engaged with the removal of the 1997 peopleǯs constitution and the elected 
government of Thaksin. When the protest began, the country was under the control 
of the martial law, thus the freedom of expression was restricted.  
The movement group ȋǮTalang kao klum poo rak prachathippataiǯ 2006) insisted 
upon the restoration of the 1997 people's constitution drafted by the elected 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly. They explained that during the drafting process 
the members of the CDA were elected from each and every group of Thai people. 
Thus, the 1997 peopleǯs constitution could not be replaced by the autocratic 2007 
constitution of the junta. The values of the 1997 charter were described in an article 
as follow: 
The previous 1997 constitution was particularly drafted to prevent future 
coups, in addition it was approved that sovereign power belonged to the Thai 
people. According to Section 63, it was written that ǲNo person shall exercise 
the rights and liberties, prescribed in the Constitution, to overthrow the 
democratic regime of government, with the King as Head of the State, under 
this Constitution or to acquire the power to rule the country by any means 
which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution.ǳ…By 
this, the attempts of the CNS to legalize their sovereignty by common law 
cannot be accepted; since the constitutional law has far greater precedence 
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than common law developed by judges. Thus, every law and order issued by 
the CNS has no legal effect because of the contradiction to the cast-off 1997 
constitution. 
It was clearly seen that the anti-coup groups applied this news to deny the juntaǯs 
constitution and the junta government. They pointed out to the democratic of the 
1997 constituion which was written to defend the future coups. In terms of the 
constitution, the junta announced the formulation of a new constitution and 
arrangement of a new election, but the anti-coup groupsǯ mistrust toward the draft 
was highlighted.  For them, the possibility of obtaining a genuinely democratic 
constitution was evidently slim, since it was created by the dictators.  
The most contentious issue of the juntaǯs constitution was the method of selecting 
the premier. It caused a broad argument when the drafting process was set to start. 
The anti-coup groups, such as activists, scholars, members of Thai Rak Thai party, 
and Thaksinǯs voters, started to oppose the non-elected premier idea which would 
further the regression of Thai democracy.  A Thai Rak Thai legal professional, 
Pongthep Thepkanchana ȋǮElected prime ministers best, top political parties sayǯ 
2007), insisted that ǲthe head of a government must be an elected member of 
Parliamentǳ. In his view Thai democracy would move backwards as a result of a new 
charter which permitted the prime minister to be either elected or appointed. In 
terms of the election, an article was written saying that the coup makers decided to 
cut some budgets for the next year's election (2007) because they could not confirm 
the definite date of the national election. The anti-coup groups ȋǮSanyan jak 
padetkarn maimee karnluektung nai pee neeǯ 2007) believed that the coup group 
determined to extend their time in power.  
Even though the movements of the anti-coup groups calling for the return of 
Thaksin Shinawatra had not been seriously undertaken at this time, there were 
some voices from his voters, showing their support toward Thaksin, reported on 
their media. The call for Thaksinǯs reappearance was escalated when he gave 
interviews to international media outlets. Thaksin ȋǮSiangriak ha prachatippatai jak 
thaksin dung kun rueiǯ2007) expressed his need to return to Thailand which, 
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according to the anti-coup groupsǯ news, would be warmly welcomed by a massive 
number of people. In an interview, Thaksin said the coup makers ousted him from 
the position, worse; they overthrew the popular government which was voted for 
and supported by the Thais.  
In an article from The Times (as cited in ǮThailand: Thaksinǯs Giant Shadowǯ 2007), it 
was translated and re-posted by the anti-coup groups which was described that: 
Thaksin presided over a deeply divided nation. Even as the citified middle 
class rallied for months to dislodge him from office, rural masses clung to a 
leader whose populist policies were seen as evidence of his devotion to the 
poor. If general elections were held today, Thaksin might very well win, 
courtesy of a silent majority rising up from their paddies and mountain 
villages. Just ask rice farmer Mukda Phardthaisong, who lives in Nakhon 
Ratchasima, part of the countryǯs impoverished northeast. ǲIf Thaksin were 
to run again, I would want him to be our leader because he gave more 
attention to grassroots people than to the middle class or government 
officers,ǳ she says. ǲPoor people are not important for the new governmentǳ. 
This article was translated to show the love and loyalty of the grassroot towards 
Thaksin, also the disregard of the junta government to them was mentioned. The 
amat government was portrayed as the elite who never paid attention to the people. 
Class conflict was engaged in this frame. 
The causal attribution function 
At this stage, the anti-coup groups had not identified the definite reason for the coup 
makers to demolish the peopleǯs democracy, perhaps it was too early in the 
movement. Because of this, accusations were generally levelled at the 2007 draft 
charter and the undemocratic drafting process. An article cast suspicion on the 
reliability of the 2007 Constitutional Drafting Assembly.  
The members of the 2007 Constitutional Drafting Assembly were notified by 
someone to elect Prasong Soonsuri to be the chairman. It happened after a 
meeting of General Prem Tinasulanonda, Prasong Soonsuri, and some key 
CNS members. Apparently, this voting result, already anticipated by public, 
means that the CNS empowers the Constitutional Drafting Assembly. Thus, 
we cannot expect a democratic constitution from them. 
224 
 
 
 
The anti-coup groups ȋǮSanyan jak padetkarn maimee karnluektung nai pee neeǯ 
2007) alleged that the intention of the amat, in empowering the CDA, was to remain 
in power. Another intention was the suspension of the national election. It was seen 
by the anti-coup groups that the coup makers were concerned about Thaksinǯs 
popularity among his voters.  
The tyrantsǯ tactic, as analyzed by a political observer, is that they plan to 
dissolve the Thai Rak Thai party. Besides, the national election will never be 
held as long as the TRT still have popularity. Thaksin is still unwaveringly 
favored by the rural people, certainly he will be re-elected in the next 
election. 
This reason indicated the fear of loss of the coup makers, accordingly the dictators 
would take any actions to prevent Thaksin and the people to get close to democracy.  
The moral evaluation function 
In this mobilizing frame, the agonies of the people, caused by the elite, the old power 
group, and some middle class in Bangkok, were constructed to portray the evil side 
of those three groups. Thus, the old power group was framed as the dictatorial 
group which determined to suppress the grassroots. Undoubtedly, the 19 September 
coup was viewed, by the anti-coup groups, as a tool of the elite and middle class to 
obtain power; apparently the people, Thaksin Shinawatra, and the democratic 
regime became great burdens. Consequently, all means that lead to democracy must 
be eliminated. An example showing exactly this was the abandonment of the 
common peopleǯs rights to participate in the drafting process of the 2007 charter. A 
view of a political science professor Michael Nelson ȋǮSoodtai ja mee tae 
konkungthep kloomleklek kian rattathammanoonǯ 2007) was reported on the Thai E-
News website: 
Despite the long and cumbersome process of selecting the drafters, their 
composition is very predictable, that is, Bangkok-based high-level 
bureaucrats and academics… As a consequence, you will have a tiny group of 
elite Bangkokians writing a constitution, and then ask the rural majority to 
approve it in a referendum… It is not about a very limited black/white 
question, but about a document so complex and difficult that only such elite 
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people were deemed to be in a position to write it… Although there will be 
public hearings and a lot of PR about the process and the product, one might 
wonder on what sort of understanding ordinary voters will base their 
decision. 
In the above statement, Nelson explained how the Bangkokian elites controlled the 
Thai polity through the 2007 draft charter, which illustrated the conflict between 
the classes. In this mobilizing frame, we see that the anti-coup groups applied 
writings from scholars to strengthen their accusation. Again, the view of Thai 
scholar Phichit Likhitkitchasombun (The Serichon 2007) was posted on Thai E-
News to describe the troubles of the grassroots caused by the coup group, thus: 
The 1997 constitution helps the middle and lower classes realize their 
democratic awareness. When the 19 September coup occurs, they are 
powerfully impacted. For the grassroots, their rights, freedoms, and 
sovereignty are completely stolen. Also, the benefits, which they received 
from the populist policies of Thaksin Shinawatra, are demolished. Thatǯs why 
they entirely resist this coup. Those dictators have made a major mistake by 
overrating their power. So far the middle and lower class are fully awake to 
recognize the real agents who intervened in the establishment of Thailandǯs 
democracy. Thais are forced, heartlessly, to choose between ǲthe Thai style 
democracyǳ which is the authoritarian regime of the amat and ǲthe peopleǯs 
democracyǳ created by the people.  
It is interesting that Phichit started to differentiate democracy types. He brought 
back the notion of Thai style democracy, by which the totalitarian regime of Field 
Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the former dictatorial premier, was known. Pichit attempted 
to point out the similarity between the Sarit regime and Premǯs. Furthermore, his 
message noticeably began to frame the conflicts between the grassroots and the old 
power group. It was adopted by the anti-coup groups to construct messages in this 
mobilizing frame.  In addition, the anti-coup groups framed the amat as a 
conservative dictatorial group which enjoyed insulting the people or the grassroots. 
From the anti-coup groupsǯ view, the peopleǯs movements ȋǮPrachathipatai maimee 
wan klod jak modlook padetkarnǯ 2006) this time were far greater than was 
estimated by the old power group. It was interesting that the class conflict inspired 
by those scholars was brought up by the anti-coup group leaders to create the 
movement messages afterwards.  
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The treatment recommendation function  
The solution for this frame was to demand the restoration of democracy and the 
1997 peopleǯs constitution. In addition, a mass gathering to make peaceful protests 
every weekend in Bangkok was proposed as another means. The protests were 
characterized as the ǲpeopleǯs movementǳ. The anti-coup groups ȋǮPrachathipatai 
maimee wan klod jak modlook padetkarnǯ 2006) denied an accusation that they were 
hired, by Thaksin, to protest. They insisted that they were a group of people that 
demanded the restoration of democracy and liberty.  
As mentioned before, Thailand, at that time, was under the regulation of the martial 
law; media and political activities were curbed because of this. During that time a 
group of university teachers (The Serichon 2006) made a statement against the 
control of freedom of expression that: 
As a commemoration of the constitutional day, we would like to declare our 
standpoints on the peopleǯs liberty that: 
We insist the government respects the liberty of citizens to express opinions 
by speeches, writing, printing, publicizing, and any other means. 
We insist the government respects the liberty of citizens to conduct anti-coup 
demonstrations. 
We insist the government respects the liberty of citizens to peacefully 
assemble without arms. 
This statement was posted on the website of the anti-coup groups to support their 
movements. Later, opinions of this group of scholars was referred to by the anti-
coup groups and the Red Shirts to convince the public that they were on the same 
side.  
An article on the Prachathai web board ȋǮPlai meena prawattisat tong jarukǯ 2007)  
encouraged people to protest in March 2007. The author said this would be the 
perfect time for the people to get rid of the dictatorial regime and to restore a 
democratic regime. He also invited people to do the demonstration to protect the 
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nation, deman for the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, and 
express their frustration towards the measures the coup makers took against 
Thaksin. According to this author, in the end streams of people from the north, 
south, central, and east would effortlessly sweep the coup makers, who destroyed 
the nation, out of Thailand. 
The metaframes 
The metaframe being applied in this mobilizing frame was democracy. The anti-
coup groups activated their movements under the name ǲthe peopleǯs movementǳ to 
call for ǲthe peopleǯs democracyǳ. They demanded the restoration of democracy and 
of the ǲ1997 peopleǯs constitutionǳ. To restore the peopleǯs democracy, the anti-
coup groups started demanding the re-establishment of the 1997 constitution, a 
new national election, the right to do political activities, and the return of Thaksin 
Shinawatra. They attacked the 2007 draft charter ȋǮPrachachon prom lookhue hak 
rattatammanoonmai mai tong mk jak karn luektungǯ 2006) as being undemocratic 
and would lead to the uprising of people to against it, thus: 
An uprising of the people would happen if the premier did not come from an 
election. Many voices criticized this new constitution on its similarities to the 
1991 tyrannical constitution of the National Peacekeeping Council…(ow 
many times have we struggled for democracy? How many lives have been 
lost? Why do they still draft this dictatorial constitution to serve their power-
hungry minds? The 1997 constitution was the best constitution ever, because 
it was drafted by people from every group, not by a group selected by 
tyrants, elites, and the amat.  
Obviously, democracy was the main metaframe being employed in this framing and 
movements.  
 
Also, the inequality between the elite and the grassroots was framed. The anti-coup 
groups determined to increase the intensity of the argument by framing the class 
conflict between the amat and the grassroots. The people, according to their 
framing, were insulted by the amat as an unintelligent and shortsighted class which 
must be ruled by the more enlightened and intelligent group. The people had been 
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taken advantage of, by the oppressive old power group, for long periods of time. 
Because of this, the 19 September coup was definitely the tool for the old power 
group to remove all benefits and rights of the people given by their democratic 
government. To restore their rights and benefits, the anti-coup groups or the people 
would start the movement to call for democracy from the old power group or amat.  
 
 
5. The media control mobilizing frame 
The frame was triggered when the junta began to control the distribution of Thaksinǯs interviews in Thailand. Furthermore, some websites and community radio 
stations of the anti-coup groups were banned. Accordingly, the anti-coup groups 
started to attack the acts of the junta on censorship and the opposition media who 
allegedly had so-called unethical journalistic practices. This frame was constructed 
similarly to Sondhi Limthongkul, because the anti-coup groups realized the power of 
media, which were used in the movement of the Yellow Shirts. When Thaksin gave 
interviews to foreign media and intended to broadcast it, the junta barred it, 
including on the community radio stations that supported Thaksin.  
The problem definition function 
In this frame, the anti-coup groups constructed problem to concentrate on the unfair 
and favoritism measures of the coup group on media censorship. The anti-coup 
groups thought their media, which published news about the coup and the 
mobilizations, was restricted by the junta, while news of Thaksin Shinawatra from 
international and local media was banned. On the other hand, the media of Sondhi 
Limthongkul and some other media outlets, which were seen as supporting the 
coup, were given business opportunities and freedom. An article in the Serichon 
newspaper (The Serichon 2007) written: 
At this time, we are living in a one-sided communication society. Media 
outlets cannot publish viewpoints opposite to the government. If they do so, 
they would become the trouble makers that intervene in the building of 
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peace and harmony. The CNS also manipulates the mass media to produce 
peaceful and harmonious news about Thailand to claim that there are no 
conflicts of beliefs and ideas amidst Thai people.  
In addition, the media of the anti-coup groups such as websites, radio programs, and 
some print media were curbed ȋǮSathannee witthayoo took book kuenwanǯ 2006). It 
was reported that the radio equipment of a community radio station was removed 
by the order of the military government. The radio station claimed that they 
presented the pure voices of the grassroots to protect the nation; however they 
were treated unfairly by the government. Also, a radio program hosted by a veteran 
Thai Rak Thai politician, Veera Musikapong, was stopped two months after the coup 
was staged. Furthermore, when the anti-coup protests began, they ȋǮWeera 
Musikkapong remton jad raikarn janneeǯ 2006) claimed that their websites were 
fiercely attacked by hackers.  
When Thaksin gave an interview to CNN in Singapore, it was, undoubtedly, barred 
from being broadcast in Thailand.  This brought fury and frustration among his 
supporters.  The anti-coup groups reported condemnations from other countries on 
the media restriction. The opinion of CNN correspondent Dan Rivers on the 
censorship (as cited in ǮPabpoj thai toktum soodkeed nakkao CNN chae torǯ 2007) was 
re-published on Thai E-News website: CNNǯs signal into Thailand is being blocked whenever our exclusive 
interview with deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is broadcast… 
The military junta had promised to lift martial law by the end of 2006 – but 
now weǯre in 2007, and martial law remains in place, CNN is being censored, 
local TV stations are self-censoring their output and there is a growing 
climate of anger, trepidation and fear…especially in the CNN office, where 
anonymous, threatening calls keep coming! 
This CNN correspondent often reported news that was in conformity with media of 
the anti-coup groups. Accordingly, this article was used to support the frame.  
Regarding the unfairness of the junta, the anti-coup groups claimed that Sondhi 
Limthongkul and his allies were given more freedom. It is clearly seen that during 
the movement of the Yellow Shirts in 2006, the Manager Media of Sondhi 
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Limthongkul was used as a crucial tool to attack Thaksin Shinawatra. Furthermore, 
other media outlets such as the Nation groups, Matichon, Bangkokbiz, and Post 
Today were seen as allies of Sondhi Limthongkul supporting the junta. Thus the 
injustice practice of the junta was comdemned by the protest groups.  
The causal attribution function 
In the early period of the movement, Thailand was under the control of martial law 
by which mass media was firmly restricted. At this time, the martial law and bias of 
the junta were alleged as the reasons to censor the movement's media. An article 
from the Serichon newspaper (The Serichon 2007) published that: 
Thailand has had two coups. The first coup was done by General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin to seize power from the elected government, while the second 
one was accomplished by Sondhi Limthongkul to occupy the media domains. 
In the past, Sondhi applied his media to overthrow the government of 
Thaksin Shinawatra. So far he has been given a chance to host his political 
television program on a state television station. He also appoints himself as ǲYam Faopandinǳ (the guardian of the nationȌ…because of this, Thailand has 
been distorted by such wicked thoughts of him which sometimes causes us 
dreadful fatigue in the morning.  
It seemed that Sondh Limthongkul, the former leader of the Yellow Shirts, was 
attacked most by the anti-coup groups when he was given a chance to host his 
television show on Channel 11, because he was seen as the juntaǯs spokesman. 
The moral evaluation function 
At this time, the accusations of media restriction in this frame were constructed 
around two issues. The first one was constructed when the coup makers banned the 
media which reported Thaksinǯs interviews, while the second was framed around 
the discrimination in favor of the opposing media outlets, particularly Sondhi 
Limthongkul and his media allies.  
The anti-coup groupsǯ media posted news of Dan Rivers, the CNN international 
correspondent, interviewed Thaksin from Singapore. The juntar banned this 
interview broadcast. Accordingly, the acts of the coup makers caused critics from 
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Dan Rivers thus (as cited in ǮPabpoj thai toktum soodkeed nakkao CNN chae torǯ 
2007): 
We interviewed Thaksin in Singapore, where he also met a senior politician. 
Our interview threw his visit to Singapore into the limelight – now the 
military regime in Thailand is furious with the Singaporeans – theyǯve 
cancelled an official visit of the Singaporean foreign minister and cancelled a 
civil service exchange program, because they dared to have a meeting with 
the deposed prime minister of Thailand…oh and because they didnǯt prevent 
CNN from interviewing him there too. The Singaporean Ambassador has also 
been summoned to government house here for a reprimand. )tǯs not quite 
war, but itǯs certainly a jolly angry spat. )tǯs ironic that the undemocratic, 
authoritarian junta here in Thailand is trying to take the moral high ground 
with Singapore – itself not exactly a paragon of freedom. 
The sour relationship between Singapore and the junta was raised through this 
news control.  It seemed the protest groups intended to show the public that the 
conflicts between Thailand and Singapore, were created by the amat government, 
the interview of Thaksin was just a small matter. 
From the news report of the anti-coup groups ȋǮNgarmna suetangchat prjab 
padetkarn censor CNNǯ 2007), the CNS attempted to stop broadcasting news about 
Thaksin and his political colleagues. Martial law, furthermore, was applied to give 
the authority to the army to censor the media and bar any protests. On the one hand, 
Sondhi Limthongkul received permission from the junta to host his political show on 
Channel 11.  
Consequently, he was framed by the anti-coup groups ȋǮPoojadkarn jak sue klaipan 
klaipen wattanatham hang kan kleadchangǯ 2006) as the master of news spinning 
who divided society by his media. An anti-coup author claimed that Sondhi found 
every chance to portray Thaksin as an evil person, using impolite words. Sondhi, he 
claimed, would not hesitate to twist the truth about Thaksin. Anyone who was Thaksinǯs friend would be labeled as a bad person. The opposition media such as the 
Nation, Matichon (this newspaper seemed support the Yellow at that time, but 
turned to support the Red later), and so forth were framed as unethical media for 
reporting bad news about Thaksin and the protests. Two famous news anchors from 
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the Nation group (ǮKanok lae theera team nation art done saeǯ 2007) were criticized 
about their practices thus: 
The news program hosted by Mr. Theera and Kanok might be banned from 
airing since the popular rating is plunging.  This is because of their unfair and 
unethical attitudes. They are famous for their imbalance and lack of ethics 
which causes disharmony in Thai society. 
To fight back, journalists who supported Thaksin started to disseminate positive 
news of Thaksin and attack the junta, the amat, and the opposed media. Taveevoot ȋǮThammai nak kao mai thamnatee truadsobǯ 2007) wrote thusly:  
Last night I had a dinner with my journalist colleagues from the Nation, 
Manager, and Post Today. The discussed topic was why they admired the 
coup group so much. The insiders reveal that, since the coup has been done, 
these journalists are bought already, while some of them are threatened. 
They also dislike Thaksin so much that they aren't concerned about 
journalism ethics when reporting news about Thaksin. Another reason for 
them to support the coup group is that they hope that the coup group would 
reform Thai politics by getting rid of Thaksin and replacing him with the 
Democrat politicians. They obviously support this party, like most 
Bangkokians. 
He portrayed the opposition media as fainthearted, biased, and greedy, since they 
did not attempt to criticize the junta. Some journalists, according to his accusation, 
also supported the Democrat party to become the next government. This strategy 
imitated Sondhiǯs by employing experienced journalists to attack rivals through 
framing, which was followed by the establishment of Thaksinǯs media.   
The treatment recommendation function 
The remedy of this mobilizing frame, for the anti-coup groups, was calling for the 
freedom of expression. The anti-coup groups re-distributed the views of media 
professionals on censorship as the solution. For instance, news of a group of 
scholars held a symposium was posted on the Thai E-news. This conference was 
organized by the Campaign for Popular Media Reform (CPMR). The chairperson of 
the group, Ubonrat Siriyuwasak (Rojanaphruk 2006), was well known for her 
scholarly work. In the symposium she talked about the media control situation thus: 
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"The people's media has been shut down for the moment…They must return basic 
rights as soon as possible…The heart of democracy is rights and liberty."  
In synchronization, the anti-coup group media ȋǮPerd jodmai samakom poosuekao 
tangprated yapidsueǯ 2007) posted an open letter from the Foreign Correspondents' 
Club of Thailand that was sent to General Surayud Chulanont. The letter explained 
that the media censorship in Thailand had become "media threatening". They asked 
Surayud to free the press and insisted that the interview of Thaksin by CNN should 
not be barred from airing in Thailand.  It seemed the condemnations from the 
professional media organizations had been used to support the movement of the 
anti-coup groups. Besides, they ȋǮSathannee witthayoo took book kuenwanǯ 2006) 
pressured the junta by writing petitions to inform the international journalist 
organizations about the current media censorship situation. This became a tactic 
that used by the anti-coup groups when they intended to reveal the evil side of the 
junta to the world. 
The metaframes 
In this mobilizing frame the media censorship was framed with the democracy 
metaframe. The restrictions of the media to publish news were seen as media 
threatening practices. Certainly, the junta was framed as violating the principles of 
democracy. The situation became worse when Thaksinǯs interview by CNN was 
banned from broadcasting in Thailand which brought about condemnation from the 
international journalist organizations. From this, the anti-coup groupsǯ tactic was to 
report the critiques from the international media agencies. They were seeking the 
support from international media organizations by writing the letters to inform 
them of the situation.  
The drawback of the press censorship, for the coup makers, was framed involving 
the nation metaframe. Even though the anti-coup groups had not clearly specified 
the worst results to the nation, their view was that the practices of the junta caused 
condemnation from democratic countries. This could lead to a bad image for 
Thailand in the eyes of the international community.  
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6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame 
From the beginning of the anti-coup movement, this was the least important 
mobilizing frame. Nonetheless, it was constructed to attack the junta when the 
unrest in the southern porvinces flared. Some Buddhists in the south asked for help 
from the government. The anti-coup factions seized the chance to raise religious 
issues to legitimize the junta actions; this was similar to the Yellow Shirtsǯ 
movement tactic of engaging morality with framing. 
The problem definition function 
The anti-coup groups constructed the problem as the inattentiveness of the junta to 
protect Buddhism. There was news of some Buddhists, from the southernmost 
provinces, that were threatened and harmed by the RKK group of separatists from 
Pattanee. A threatening announcement from the RKK ȋǮBaiplew komkoo thai poot 
wonǯ 2006) was published thus: 
The Thai Buddhists in these areas are not permitted to search for resources 
or hunt animals in the land of Fadoni Muslims. The Thai Buddhist employees 
must pay 500 Baht fee to the Muslims at the mosques every month. For one 
who pays money, he must hang green clothes in front of the house so as not 
to be injured by the RKK army. Every Friday, the Thai Buddhists must stop 
working and drinking alcohol, according to the teaching of the prophet 
Muhammad. 
Thus the anti –coup groups pointed out the losses of the Thai Buddhists resulted 
from the Muslim separatists.  
The next issue was framed around the process of constitutional drafting which the 
Buddhism and the King issues were brought up. The example was from the Thai E-
News website. They ȋǮSanyan antarai wa rattatammanoonmaiǯ 2007) published a 
letter from the Rector of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University (MCU), a 
famous Buddhist university. The open letter was sent to Premier Surayud Chulanont 
to declare the rectorǯs concern toward the interim 2007 constitution. According to 
the rector, this constitution did not contain section 9 which said that ǲThe King is a 
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Buddhist and Upholder of religions.ǳ He also worried about articles involved with 
possible changes to the Sangha administration which would cause the Buddhist 
realm confusion and calamities.  
The causal attribution function 
The anti-coup groups had not directly given the cause of the problem for this frame, 
but there was some news ȋǮPaktai yang por meewang kamnan jaising hang 
krongpeenung prom suǯ 2006) that criticized the unrest in the south saying that the 
junta did not pay attention to resolve the problem since they spent time talking 
nonsense on TV. This might indicate that the junta focused on holding onto power 
and neglected to solve the serious problems. 
The moral evaluation function 
Obviously, the junta was framed as power hungry and stupid. An interview of 
General Surayud, about the southern problems, was criticized hard. In the interview 
with Aljazeera news Surayud admitted that the cause of the problem came from the 
unjust practices of local officials. Because of this, the anti-coup media ȋǮSurayud 
sarapab tor lok muslim wa prathed thai rangkae chao thai muslimǯ 2006) labeled 
Surayud as stupid, since it might cause anger among the Muslim terrorists around 
the world and lead them to escalate the violent situations in Thailand. 
The treatment recommendation function 
The anti-coup groups did not offer a solution in the first phase of the movement. 
They just published some short news about the Buddhist movement; nonetheless 
this movement would be emphasized more strongly in the second phase.  
The metaframes 
The religion metaframe was involved in this mobilizing frame. The anti-coup groups 
determined to construct the inattention of the junta to Buddhism and the hardship 
of the Thai Buddhists in the southernmost area that were threatened by the RKK 
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group. In this very early movement, the anti-coup groups had not directly 
constructed the conflict frame between the RKK Muslims and the Thai Buddhists in 
the south. Later, in the second phase, this frame was radically transformed to 
escalate the negligence of the coup makers to protect Thai Buddhists on some major 
issues. 
 
7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame 
This mobilizing frame occured when the junta controlled news of Thaksin and 
banned him from returning to Thailand. This frame was promoted together with the peopleǯs democracy mobilizing frame. This was because some of the anti-coup 
groups supported the return of Thaksin; accordingly they produced messages to call 
for his return. Nevertheless, Thaksinǯs politicians stayed silent and undertook no 
political activities. On the one hand some voices of Thaksinǯs followers were aired to 
express their admiration toward Thaksin and his party. The banning measures from 
the CNS to censor news about Thaksin, including preventing him from returning to 
Thailand, stirred up anger among Thaksinǯs voters. Because of this, this frame was 
constructed to propagate news about the movements of Thaksin and his followers 
in order to sustain the popularity of Thaksin and attack the measures the CNS 
employed to deal with Thaksin. Benefits given by Thaksin were framed to remind 
the voters of his bigheartedness to the grassroots. However, during the first 
movement this mobilizing frame was not emphasized, because the protest groups 
had not yet formed formed a movement organization. 
The problem definition function 
The anti-coup groups framed the problem as the unjust practices the dictators had 
used to intimidate Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues. The examples were the 
censorship of news about Thaksin, the allegations toward Thaksin and his family, 
the removal of Thaksinǯs Thai passport, and the banning of Thaksin from returning 
to Thailand. Apparently, the culprits in this frame were the CNS.  The anti-coup 
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groups ( ǮNgao tamuen tee tod yao kong thaksinǯ 2007) posted an article from Time 
magazine which described the actions of the CNS thus: 
The generals are trying to inoculate themselves against the Thaksin effect. 
Last Septemberǯs military takeover was initially greeted with little public 
disapproval—even among Thai supporters of democracy—yet the junta has 
repeatedly warned the local press not to report on Thaksin, lest the coverage 
inflame public sentiment. A recent CNN interview with the former PM was 
blocked from Thai airwaves. Nor are foreign governments exempt. When 
Thaksin met last month with Singaporeǯs deputy Prime Minister, Thailand 
angrily canceled a set of diplomatic meetings between the two countries. A 
few days later, CNS leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin intimated that 
Singapore might be eavesdropping on Thailandǯs leaders through its 
ownership of Shin Corp., which runs a Thai mobile-phone operator. 
(Formerly controlled by Thaksinǯs family, Shin was sold last year to Temasek 
Holdings, the investment arm of the Singaporean government, for $1.9 
billion.) 
The measures of CNS to withdraw Thaksinǯs passport and prevent him from 
returning to Thailand were viewed, by an anti-coup writer, as evil acts to bully the 
powerless former prime minister. The anti-coup groups ȋǮChatwua sanlangkad hen 
eka binpad kor tokjaiǯ 2007) also condemned the defensive measures of the CNS to 
bar Thaksin from going back to Thailand. At that time, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin ȋǮPrachachon penlan prom um thaksin kao thaiǯ 2007) announced a few conditions 
when Thaksin expressed that he might return to Thailand. The first condition was 
Thaksin would be charged immediately when he arrived in Thailand, the next was 
the prohibition of massive numbers of people to welcome him at the airport, and the 
last one was the ban of every form of mass movement. Regarding this, General 
Sonthi ȋǮSonthi, Thaksin take war of words to foreign mediaǯ 2007) told a Japanese 
newspaper that: ǲ"We will not stop him if he wishes to return, but I don't think he 
will be able to return, because of the ongoing corruption investigation against him."  
The CNS also launched a program to oppose Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. 
The spearhead of the campaign was the Council for National Security (CNS) 
assistant secretary-general Saprang Kalayanamitra. The CNS wanted to ǲimprove 
the political system so as to ensure that the rogue Thaksin regime could not regain 
power.ǳ Saprang (ǮTraitorǯ used to describe Thaksinǯ 2007) attempted to convince 
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local officers and politicians, particularly in the north-eastern provinces, that "Civil 
servants should know they are dispensing duties on His Majesty's behalf, so they are 
not supposed to allow themselves to become henchmen for rogue politicians." He 
also stressed that the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues would lead to 
the collapse of the three pillars of society - the nation, religion, and the monarchy.  
The casual attribution function 
The reason for the CNS to intimidate Thaksin was framed as the fear of the CNS 
toward the enduring popularity of Thaksin. We must admit that after taking power 
the coup makersǯ popularity among Thais generally dropped.  An analysis from Time 
magazine ȋǮNgao tamuen tee tod yao kong thaksinǯ 2007), which was re-published on 
the anti-coup groupsǯ website, explained that: 
Thaksin makes the CNS very nervous,ǳ says Ukrist Pathmanand, associate 
director of the Institute of Asian Studies at Bangkokǯs Chulalongkorn 
University, who has co-written a book about the ousted leader. ǲI donǯt 
believe he will stay out of politics. I could see him returning when people 
begin to think that the leaders who followed him have failed. He could be 
seen as the best alternative to the CNS.ǳ Indeed, the CNS, which says it 
overthrew Thaksin to restore national unity and prevent a violent showdown 
between his supporters and detractors, is looking less than bulletproof. 
Sonthi and CNS-appointed interim PM Surayud Chulanont have promised 
fresh elections by yearǯs end. But just four months after the coup, local polls 
show that the Thai public is wearying of military rule. 
Views of scholar who had a positive image were used in this frame to support the 
messages. They described the coup maker as dictators who attempted to intimidate 
Thaksin and his voters, while the popularity of the junta among Thais was 
significantly reduced.  Thaksinǯs supporters also revealed information that Thaksin desired to return to 
Thailand to bring about national reconciliation (Ibid). Another article ȋǮChatwua 
sanlangkad hen eka binpad kor tokjaiǯ 2007) taunted the anxious reactions of the 
CNS toward Thaksinǯs activities, such as playing golf in Bali, shopping, and visiting 
friends in China. The author said that the CNS was distressed because Thaksin might 
be behind the movement's plan.   
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The moral evaluation function 
The anti-coup groups portrayed those generals as the dictators who intimidated 
Thaksin by using unproven charges to get rid of him. News from the anti-coup groupsǯ 
website ȋǮFarang rem mong game ok teekao nao polthai ha let sairai thaksinǯ 2007) 
said that:  
The Thai generals could not completely remove Thaksin. They can only 
charge him with unproven accusations. On the other hand, Thaksin can 
definitely retain his popularity. The true color of the coup makers is revealed 
by the change from the democratic military to dictatorial military. 
To strengthen the accusation, the anti-coup groups ȋǮWela yakun fai tee dai puenpai 
mak teesud chanaǯ 2007) insisted that: ǲThe old power group teamed up with the 
other networks to attack Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party. They constructed 
those nationalist sentiments to eliminate Thaksin. They are afraid that Thaksin 
might return and be welcomed by massive numbers of people.ǳ 
Furthermore, they disseminated Thaksinǯs denial of the accusations. Thaksin used 
an interview with NHK to defend himself against the charges, which was posted on 
the Thai E-News website ȋǮSiangriak ha prachatippatai jak thaksin dung kun rueiǯ 
2007):  
An investigation has been launched in Thailand by the National Counter 
Corruption Commission and the Assets Examination Committee into alleged 
corruption during the Thaksin administration and the suspected 
accumulation of wealth by the Thaksin family. Asked about such allegations, 
Thaksin said: "I believe in my innocence. It's a one-sided allegation without 
reasons...If [the case] is brought to court--maybe by international standards--
I can prove my innocence easily. 
Thaksin also framed news about himself through the interview pieces from 
international and local media. He found chances to communicate his intentions and 
defend the juntaǯs allegation; simultaneously he could keep in touch with his Thai 
supporters through this framing. 
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The treatment recommendation function 
In this early movement period, the anti-coup groups offered the solution which was 
calling for the return of Thaksin, but it was not a major goal of the movement at this 
time.  
The metaframes 
The democracy metaframe was clearly applied into the messages of this mobilizing 
frame. The unjust charges and measures from the dictators to get rid of Thaksin 
Shinawatra were framed to exaggerate the maliciousness of the CNS. The censorship 
of news about Thaksin was condemned as a violation of a democratic regime. 
Besides, the popularity of Thaksin among his supporters was framed by the nation 
metaframe; these people needed the return of Thaksin to rule the country which 
would lead to the improvement of the economy and their quality of life.  
Nevertheless, later this frame would have gained increased persuasive power for 
the mobilizations when the supporters of Thaksin cooperated with other factions to 
oust the junta and demand the return of Thaksin. 
 
ǲThe second phase of the anti-coup groups movementǳ 
In the second period of the movement groups that became the core of the movement 
supported the come back of Thaksin Shinawatra, while the PTV station started the 
protest. This time Thaksinǯs supporters began to support the movement by joining 
the PTV. The news of the station was disseminated among the anti-coup groups and Thaksinǯs voters of which might stimulated their hope to bring Thaksin back to 
Thailand. As well, the other groups that called for democracy continued their 
movements, but did not fully collaborate with Thaksinǯs supportersǯ factions. In this 
second phase the groups that demanded the return of Thaksin will be the focus 
since they would turn to be the Red Shirts afterwards. The establishment of the PTV 
boosted the confidence to perform extensive mobilization, since the members of the 
television station were former TRT politicians. They had huge budgets, were skilled 
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persuades, had lots of voter support, and were backed by the wealth of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his colleagues.  
Thaksin had expressed his goal to return to Thailand which seemed possible when 
the popularity of the junta among some Thais declined. It was the right time for him 
and his supporters to perform movements. The movement of Thaksin was done 
together with the movement of the leaders of TRT. Those politicians visited their 
voting bases to remind the voters about the benefits given by Thaksin and TRT. 
They sought to inspire hope in the grassroots for the return of Thaksin; accordingly 
the strong movement of the voters was necessary to accomplish this. The anti-coup 
groups were confident in their power to sustain the movement in this second 
period. As a result, the faction that supported Thaksin collaborated with the PTV to 
attack the junta and call for the return of Thaksin and his party. 
In terms of the mobilizing frames, the anti-coup factions produced seven mobilizing 
frames which focused on some aspects of the various issues and frame functions. In 
the first pase of the framing, the anti-coup, anti-amat, peopleǯs democracy, and 
Thaksin mobilizing frame were primarily concentrated on. In this second phase the 
same numbers of mobilizing frames were remained, with the four previously 
mentioned frames still being powerfully persuasive. Nonetheless, the anti-coup 
groups changed their tactics by focusing on attacking individuals using only some 
functions.  
The timeline of the second phase ran from March to June 2007. It started when the 
anti-coup groups established the PTV television station and ended when the anti-
coup groups formed the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or 
the formal Red Shirts. During this period, we will see changes in the anti-coup groupsǯ framing process, in which all of the mobilizing frames were retained, but 
some functions were transformed. An important action was the Thai Rak Thai Party 
establishing the PTV station to be the mouthpiece for Thaksin and the party. When 
PTV was banned from airing programs, however, the producers who were TRT 
members started to form the protests. The PTV turned into a leading protest group 
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that was supported by experienced politicians and activists. Apparently, the 
movements of the anti-coup groups, at this time, were well planned and supported 
by huge budgets, and they had skillful leaders and speechmakers. This led to more 
concise and persuasive messages for mobilizing their followers in the second phase 
movement. 
 
1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame 
In the second phase of the movement, the anti-coup mobilizing frame was 
minimized in its significance, since the coup had been staged many months ago. 
Nonetheless the coup group still remained as the protest focus. The anti-coup 
groups called for the restoration of democracy and the return of Thaksin which they 
blamed on the coup and so resistance to the junta was significant in mobilization. 
They changed tactics to attack individuals. Rather than pointing out the 
undemocratic nature of every coup maker, in this second phase the leader of the 
CNS, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, became the main target of attack.  
The problem definition function 
In this second phase the coup had been staged over six months, thus the anti-coup 
groups framed the problem of this mobilizing frame as the evil attempts of the coup 
makers to remain in power. The accusations were supported by citing the interim 
constitution of the junta and the measures to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
colleagues. Also, the coup makers were accused of disloyal practices toward King 
Bhumibol. The malpractices of the coup group were examined by a Thammasat 
university law scholar Worachet Pakeerat. His view was applied into the framing of 
this mobilizing frame. In his speech ȋǮHok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated 
thaiǯ 2007) about the situation of the 19 September coup and the future of Thailand, 
he viewed the coup as an illegal act without foolproof reasons. As a result, some 
major and unfavorable impacts on the Thai legal system took place. He said: 
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When comparing this draft charter with the previous constitutions, this draft 
produces new laws. Besides, the knowledgeable and skillful drafters of this 
draft have gained abundant experience from the preceding coups. By this, the 
amnesty bill in this charter is drafted to allow the coup makers take no 
responsibilities for their actions. According to this, the coup makers find a 
legal way to accomplish their goals which is very far beyond their usual 
weapons and army forces. They also claim the morality to stage a coup and 
abandon the former constitution. This could cause a major confusion and 
conflict of authority between moralities and laws. 
The protest groups also posted Worachetǯs view toward the Constitutional Tribunal 
which had been set up by the juntaǯs interim constitution. The Tribunal was 
questioned on their authority to consider the fraudulent cases of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, the Thai Rak Thai Party, and the Democrat Party. The analysis of 
Worachet seemed perfect for the anti-coup groups to attack the bad and 
undemocratic practices of the coup makers in regard to Thaksin and his colleagues.  
After the courtǯs verdicts the anti-coup groups posted some foreign news which 
criticized the undemocratic results of the Constitutional Court. A statement from the 
EU president ȋǮEU okronglaew pranam tulapadetkarn yub pakkarnmuang mai pen 
thamǯ 2007), which evidently opposed the verdicts, was published on the Thai E-
News website. It said that the EU president was upset by the regression of Thai 
democracy when the CNS eliminated their antagonists through the Constitutional 
Court. An article from the Asia Sentinel ȋǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs Over in Thailandǯ 2007) 
was used to support the anti-coup groupsǯ accusation thus: 
While Thaksin can justly be blamed for interfering with independent 
constitutional bodies during his tenure, the rulers that replaced him have 
gone even further by overthrowing an elected government, manipulating the 
justice system, rewriting the constitution, sending soldiers to television 
stations and enforcing ex post facto laws. Now they've wiped Thaksin's party 
off the map and banned 111 of the Partyǯs executive members from running 
in an election for five years the harshest possible punishment. Although the 
blatantly political decision has profound ramifications for the Thai political 
landscape, it was simply the culmination of a series of rulings over the past 
year that skirted or completely ignored the law. 
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The above views from the foreign media were applied to construct the disapproval 
and condemnation, from other democratic countries, toward the CNS. These tactics 
had been applied to acquire credibility and acknowledgement about their blames 
from the public.  
The causal attribution function 
The practices and measures of the coup group were framed as their intention to 
remain in the power. This time, the anti-coup groups often supported their 
accusation using foreign news. An article from the Asia Sentinel (ǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs 
Over in Thailandǯ 2007) was published on the anti-coup media in which the author 
pinpointed the reason to ban Thaksin and his colleagues from political activities. It 
said that: 
The Constitutional Tribunal's decision to dissolve the party — finally 
revealed after the judges read the ruling for an excruciating nine hours — 
was just one part of the plan to remove Thaksin from the political scene. The 
rest of the job belongs to those drafting the new constitution, which aims to 
limit the powers of the executive and expand the role of non-elected senators 
and judges to ensure that a reincarnation of Thaksin doesn't rise from the ashes…  
The main goal of the coup-makers, of course, was to cut the legs off Thaksin 
and Thai Rak Thai, the party he founded in 1998 as a personal vehicle to 
carry him to the premiership. TRT stormed to power with a win in the 2001 
general election and became the only party in Thai history to complete a full 
term in office…The real winners, however, are the military, judiciary and 
royalist elites who saw Thaksin as a threat to their traditional power base. 
With Thaksin gone, they can safely fade into the background once again and 
pull the strings from behind the scenes. Thaksin had egged them out into the 
open, and he paid the price. 
In essence, the junta eliminated Thaksin and his associates through the 
Constitutional Tribunal since the popularity of Thaksin among his voters had not 
declined. Moreover, the junta was afraid of the recent movements of Thaksin and 
the TRT, which would cause the uprising of Thaksinǯs supporters to prevent the 
junta from staying in the power. It is interesting that the anti-coup groups spread 
news from sources that backed their views, which became known among them as 
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trustworthy sources afterwards. The reason is the Thai mainstream media were 
under the regulation of martial law and some, according to the anti-coup groupsǯ 
framing, backed the coup makers.  
The moral evaluation function 
In the accusations of the anti-coup groups, the coup group was framed as the 
tyrants who robbed Thailandǯs democracy. News from the anti-coup groupsǯ website ȋǮKoomue suksa mob tan padetkarnǯ 2007) portrayed the coup makersǯ actions thus: 
This theft group overthrew the peopleǯs democracy. They seized the ruling 
power by depicting themselves as honorable heroes who protected this 
country from dishonest people; on the contrary they desire to occupy 
Thailand. Worse, they affront the common people as foolish and short-
sighted, while they praise themselves as moral and prudent rulers who are 
leading Thailand with decent and highly regarded wisdoms. In fact, they 
absolutely cause huge dispute and hatred among Thais. 
From the above statement, the anti-coup groups portrayed the coup makers as an 
evil group determined to hold on to power endlessly. The people were suppressed, 
so as to be their unintelligent inferiors. This accusation had been constantly applied 
into the frames of the anti-coup groups in both the first and second phase of 
movements. Another label was the devils that hold the sacred books. The anti-coup 
groups thought of the coup group as malicious people pretending to be moral. This 
branding was alleged in an article on the Thai E-News website ȋǮThaksin teesakna 
surayud borihan prated mai pen laew panǯ 2007): 
The government might be able to deceive some people by saying this coup is 
legitimate. They claim that it has been done in accordance with the sacred 
book they hold. On the other hand, they are ǲthe devils that hold the sacred 
bookǳ. What they actually do is thieve the peopleǯs power, which is strongly 
condemned by all democratic countries. 
This labeling was constructed to portray the conflicting image of the coup makers, 
since they gave the reason for conducting coup as to save Thailand from the corrupt 
Thaksin government. On the other hand, their malpractices were far worse which 
being done under the mask of good people.  
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The treatment recommendation function  
In the second period of the movement, the anti-coup groups offered the solution as 
getting rid of the coup makers and restoring democracy. This time the PTV group, 
some of which were members of Thai Rak Thai, participated in the movements, thus 
certain objectives and strategies were established to effectively overthrow the coup 
makers, junta government, and amat. From the Pantip web board ȋǮKoomue suksa 
mob tan padetkarnǯ 2007), a view was re-posted on the Thai E-News,  
These dictators must not have a place in Thailand anymore. To become the 
rulers, they robbed the peopleǯs constitution. We must stop this malevolent 
group from destroying our country. All of them must be brought to a peopleǯs 
court for a hearing and judgment on their faults. Besides, we must reform our 
bureaucracy and army to function for us, the people. And lastly, we must 
restore freedom, liberty, and egalitarianism into Thailand. 
Moreover, an anti-coup writer ȋǮSanyan antarai tung thai tung chatǯ 2007) invited all 
Thai people, from all groups, to protect and secure the existence of the monarchy 
which had been threatened by the coup makers. However, the writer did not 
propose a specific strategy and means to protect the monarchy. 
The metaframes 
This mobilizing frame was framed involving the democracy metaframe. It was 
applied when the anti-coup groups labeled the coup makers as the dictatorial group 
that robbed democracy from the Thai people. However, this time the anti-coup 
groups also attacked the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal on Thaksinǯs cases. 
For them, the Tribunal was an illegitimate product of the junta interim constitution. 
Thus it was believed, by the anti-coup groups and some foreign media, that this was 
an undemocratic and immoral strategy to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
associates. The true goal of the coup group, according to the anti-coup groupsǯ 
framing, was to remain in power. To restore Thai democracy, the solution was 
offered that the coup makers must be expelled by the people. 
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2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame 
In the first phase of the movement, the old power group, or amat, led by General 
Prem Tinsulanonda, Chief of the Privy Council was constructed as the group which 
destroyed Thai democracy and the expansion of the economy. Also, this group had 
the main goal of establishing their authority in order to enrich their personal 
prosperities.  In this second phase, the frame started to run in chorus with the 
forming of the fiercer movements. This time, General Prem Tinsulanonda, as the 
head of the old power group, became the key target of the anti-coup groupsǯ attacks. 
This mobilizing frame was created and became convincing when Thaksin and the 
party were barred from politics. Furthermore, this frame was a significant frame in 
this second period since Thaksinǯs supporters planned to stimulate a movement to 
get rid of Prem and amat. They paved the way for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
The problem definition function 
The problem in this frame was shaped as the undemocratic demand of the old power 
group to seize power from the new power group of Thaksin Shinawatra. In the anti-
coup groupsǯ view, Thaksin was a new powerful group that had emerged to 
challenge the popularity and supremacy of the amat. Both groups contested with 
each other in terms of economic ideas and popularity. The culprits of the frame 
were the old power group, or amat, headed by General Prem Tinsulanonda. In Pichitǯs 
view ȋǮRabob prachatippatai kong puangprachamahachonǯ 2007), the 19 September 
coup was a tool used by the old power group to gain the ruling power. He said, 
The 19 September coup had arisen to overthrow the popular prime minister 
elected by a massive number of the middle and lower classes. This 
conservative group does not realize that Thailand is inseparably tied up with 
globalizing capitalism, more importantly the poor are more aware of their 
democratic rights, which is a result of the 1997 peopleǯs constitution. Thus, 
the old power group has made many mistakes because of their lack of 
knowledge and understanding of a modern economy. They hinder the 
progress of the Thai economy with their bureaucratic capitalism. They also 
deny any economic competition. Getting rid of modern capitalists (such as 
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Thaksin and his colleagues), in order to dominate Thailand, is the goal of this 
conservative group.  
For them, the lower class is their perpetual labor of production. Worse, the 
sufficiency economy concept of His Majesty the King is applied into the juntaǯs administrative policy, but they cannot explain the definition and 
usage of the idea clearly. Because of this, the concept is viewed by the 
business sector as an ineffective and conventional idea that rejects 
globalization.  Pichitǯs views were borrowed and adopted into this mobilizing frame, since the anti-
coup groups needed to portray the dictatorship of amat that suppressed the people. 
The conflicts between the old power group and the lower class were highlighted. In 
the opinion of the anti-coup groups, the grassroots had been taken advantage of by 
the old power group for ages, moreover Thaksinǯs government, which was elected 
by this lower class, was abolished. Thus, in the eyes of the grassroots the amat 
brought about their severe hardships. General Prem Tinsulanonda was specifically 
alleged to be the leader of the 19 September coup; consequently he became the 
stand out target for the anti-coup groups. It was said, in an article of the anti-coup groupsǯ media ȋǮPolsatuen jak koranee mob PTVǯ 2007), that: 
It is clearly proved that General Prem Tinsulanonda is the most significant 
figure of the coup makers. When the anti-coup protest began, the junta, the 
army, and the PAD attacked the protestors with legal and illegal actions in 
order to maintain the decent image of Prem. Unfortunately, his clean-handed 
and noble image is already shattered in the eyes of Thai people.  
A view of Pichit ȋǮRabob prachatippatai kong puangprachamahachonǯ 2007) was put 
that: 
To take down the crowd-pleasing government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the old 
power group cut back the budgets of Thai Rak Thaiǯs projects including 
cancelling some important populist projects. They also allege Thaksin and his 
companions with accusations about Suvarnabhumi to paint the image of a 
corrupt government. To make things worse, they plan to dissolve the Thai 
Rak Thai party and ban the people from participating in the movements. 
Nonetheless, the serious accusation of the anti-coup groups was framed about the 
attempts of Prem to engage King Bhumibol with the 19 September coup. This was 
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seen from in an article of the anti-coup groups ȋǮSanyan antarai tung thai tung chatǯ 
2007) that said:  
A few hours before the coup took place, General Prem desperately attempted 
to have an audience with His Majesty the King, but the King rejected his 
attempt. Actually, Prem realized the disapproval of His Majesty the King, 
since the King preferred to solve the nationǯs conflicts by democratic means. 
It was futile for Prem to change His Majesty the Kingǯs mind. Consequently, 
he completed his plan arbitrarily by coup. The chiefs of the army were 
ordered to have an urgent audience with His Majesty the King that night. 
Interestingly, the frame raised the disagreement between the coup group and King 
Bhumibol which led to the accusation of violation to the Kingǯs royal supremacy. In 
the anti-coup groupsǯ framing, Premǯs misconducts were immoral and inappropriate 
for being head of the Privy Council.    
The causal attribution function 
The reason for the old power group to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra was framed 
as being Thaksin and his associates were a great threat to the power of the old power 
group. In a sense, these two groups were enemies that challenged each other in 
terms of benefits, ideals, and popularity.This blame was supported by a written in 
English article of Pichit Likitkijsomboon (2007b). His work was used to describe the 
reasons of amat to overthrow Thaksin thus: 
Mr. Thaksinǯs huge popularity among the urban and rural lower class is 
perceived as a serious political threat to the royalists. The rural poor have 
always been regarded by the royalists as their most important political 
assets. For decades, the royalists have painstakingly built up their strong 
political base among the rural population which was effectively used to fight 
off the communist threat in the 1980s and to countervail elected politicians. 
Mr. Thaksinǯs trespassing on the royalistsǯ political base in the countryside is 
thus seen as an unforgivable crime to the royalists.  
 
Mr. Thaksinǯs globalization policy and ǲpro-poorǳ measures have also 
aroused anger and hatred among diversified groups of opposition which 
include some sections of the urban middle class, the right-wing, conservative 
intelligentsia and university lecturers, old business interest groups and 
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cartels, dinosaur politicians, most of Thailandǯs print media, and anti-trade 
NGOs. Some of these, such as old business families and cartels and the 
royalists themselves (known as ǲthe old richǳ), stand to lose under Mr. Thaksinǯs pro-trade, liberalization policy while some others are simply 
ideologically against capitalism and globalization either from the right, such 
as the ultra-nationalist groups and royalist conservative intelligentsia, or 
from the left, such as anti-trade NGOs, and former leftist activists and 
academics with their rejection of electoral politics. This assortment of anti-
globalization groups have found their saviour in the royalist power and 
rallied around the royalist institution and personality to overthrow the 
Thaksin government. The Thai anti-democratic, anti-globalization coalition 
has been formed. 
From the above statement, the challenge to gaining support from the lower classes 
was the reason for the old power group to get rid of their political opponents such 
as Thaksin and his acquaintances. His portrayal of ǲevilǳ of the amat was repeatedly 
employed in this second period. Besides, this analysis of Pichit seemed based on the 
concept of Duncan McCargo (2006) about the network monarchy. Pichit avoided 
saying the names of the royalists.  During this initial movement with uncertain 
purposes, leaders, budgets, and strategies the anti-coup groups were unable to 
specify their rivals. The lese majesty law and martial law also played a major role in 
controlling their framings.  
The moral evaluation function 
In this frame, the amat, or old power group, was called, by the anti-coup groups, the 
fake saints and antediluvian group. The ǲfake saintsǳ (Nak Boon Jai Bap) was applied 
when the amat and the coup makers staged the coup claiming ethical reasons. The 
framining was outline on the Thai E-News website ȋǮRabob prachatippatai kong 
puangprachamahachonǯ 2007), that: 
The conservative group strips off their saint masks to disclose their true ugly 
dictatorial faces. This 19 September coup brought up the conflicts between ǲthe conservative right-wingersǳ and ǲthe new capitalists, the lower class, 
and the democratic intellectualsǳ. It awakens us to the real culprits that 
obstruct the progress of our democracy. 
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From the above statement, amat were framed as dictators and enemies of the 
democratic regime, the capitalists, and the grassroots or the people.  The ideal of 
claiming themselves as being ǲmoral or good peopleǳ had been used since the 2006 
coup and continued into other political movements. It is mostly used by the 
movement of the middle class that support the monarchy and the Democrat party.  
When the Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai cases were being considered by the 
Constitutional Tribunal, the anti-coup groups viewed it as a one-sided intimidation 
that the amat operated to get rid of Thaksin. Pichitǯs analysis (2007b) about the old 
power groupǯs motive was re-posted on the website thus: 
Their immediate objective is to prevent Mr. Thaksin from returning to power 
by various ǲcorruption investigationsǳ and political persecution to destroy 
his credibility and popularity among the masses. On the economic front, they 
arouse economic nationalist sentiment to abolish and reverse the economic 
liberalization and reform measures implemented by Mr. Thaksin, to keep in 
place all the protection and privileges of the old business and royalist 
interests and domestic cartels.  
On the political front, they want to replace the highly democratic 1997 
Constitution by a new one which will create numerous small and weak 
political parties, a parliament of a fragmented House of Representatives 
dominated by a powerful, royalist Senate appointed from the bureaucracy, 
and hence, a coalition government and a weak, puppet prime minister while 
the core of the state power remains in the royalistsǯ tight grip.  
In short, their political and economic model is Thailand of the early 1980s in 
which the royalist power had complete control of all the political institutions 
through the military and bureaucracy covered up by a thin crust of 
parliamentary ǲdemocracyǳ. The motive of the royalists and its middle class-
intelligentsia supporters is backward-looking and reactionary. 
The image of an antediluvian group portrayed the amat as an old-fashioned faction 
purposed to rule Thailand by overthrowing political enemies and suppressing the 
rise of the lower class. The anti-coup groups, particularly Thaksinǯs supporters, 
considerable emphasized on this issue to create the frustration and anger of the 
grassroots. The precised rivals of the people must be created to motivate the 
grassroots participants, thus this moral framing was important at this stage. 
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Notwithstanding, General Prem Tinsulanonda was the primary target of attack. It 
was appeared in an article ȋǮKwam naijai kong kon hadyaiǯ 2007):  
He has been praised and respected by the southern people for thirty years; 
on the other hand he has done many evil things… In the late night of the coup 
day, he brought the coup group to have an audience with his Majesty the 
King, while the Kingǯs health was not in a good condition…So far the Thai 
people now realize who the mastermind of the 19 September coup is. I am 
not surprised why so many people determine to oust him from the chief of 
the Privy Council. Getting rid of him is as good as getting rid of the ugly ideals 
of aristocracy. 
Prem was accused of being disloyal by taking advantage of King Bhumibol. An 
allegation ȋǮSanyan antarai tung thai tung chatǯ 2007), referring to General Premǯs 
action when he was the premier in the 1980s, was that: 
On the 1st of April 1981, a group of young militants led by Major General 
Manoonkrit Roopkachorn staged a coup to overthrow the government of 
General Prem Tinsulanonda. To protect himself, Prem invited King Bhumibol 
and Queen Sirikhit to stay in Korat province. He announced this through a 
radio station to fool people in to understanding that he was fully supported 
by the monarchy. Evidently, the monarchy had been used by General Prem 
Tinsulanonda to overcome the coup. This was extremely inappropriate 
manners, but he seemed unconcerned about this as long as it could help him 
to escape the risky situation…Accordingly, this past event could be 
reminiscent of the 19 September coup.  
In the anti-coup groupsǯ view, the old power group led by General Prem 
Tinsulanonda took advantage of King Bhumibol to benefit their interests. However, 
when the anti-coup groups started forming the official group, they started accusing 
Prem with serious allegations about his personal life and sometimes called him with 
discourteous names. 
The treatment recommendation function 
The solution of this mobilizing frame was ousting the old power group and General 
Prem Tinsulanonda. The movement aimed at toppling General Prem by collecting 
signatures for a petition. The petition would be offered to King Bhumibol who had 
authority to appoint and dismiss the members of the Privy Council. In an open letter 
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from the Saturday Voice for Democracy group ȋǮKonwansao yun deeka tod premǯ 
2007), led by Wiphu Phalangphattanaphuntai, the reason was given thus: 
According to our campaign to collect 100,000 signatures for a petition to His 
Majesty the King, we have a goal to depose General Prem Tinsulanonda from 
his position as the head of the Privy Council.  General Prem has been involved 
in many political activities; moreover he is the head of the 19 September 
coup that overthrew the government of His Majesty the King. This 
misconduct of General Prem Tinsulanonda leads to the critical defamation of 
the King. 
However, the PTV group, which was led by some members of Thai Rak Tai, 
distanced themselves from the signature campaign, even though the campaigners ȋǮSonthi mulls response to campaignǯ 2007) claimed that Jatuporn Prompan, the 
leader of PTV, gave his signature but withdrew it. Later, when the anti-coup groups 
collaborated, the PTV changed their standpoint to fully support the ousting of 
General Prem Tinsulanonda from his position. 
The metaframes 
In this frame, the promoters applied the democracy and king metaframes into its 
framing. General Prem Tinsulanonda and the conservative group, according to their 
framing, overthrew the democratic government of Thaksin Shinawatra and 
destroyed Thai democracy. The class conflict between the old power group and the 
grassroots was framed to show the undemocratic practices of the amat. The anti-
coup groups framed the nature of the amat as being a mean and evil group that took 
advantage of the lower class by overpowering them.  
The king metaframe, became the second most significant frame in constructing the 
disloyal image of Prem Tinsulanonda and his subordinates. With regards to the 19 
September coup, they were portrayed as an unfaithful group that conducted the 
coup to demolish the government of the King. Besides, this old power group 
convinced the public to believe that the coup was approved by the King. On the 
other hand, the King, according to the anti-coup groupsǯ framing, disagreed with this 
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unconstitutional coup. The malpractices of the old power group were framed as a 
violation of the Kingǯs royal prerogative.  
 
3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing 
frame 
In this second phase, Surayud was not the major target for the anti-coup groups, 
since he had decided to leave the premiership after the next election. As a result, the 
target of the confrontation was shifted to Sonthi and Prem instead.  The anti-coup 
groups still constructed Surayud as an unproductive leader who was not 
acknowledged by other democratic countries. According to the anti-coup groups, 
Surayud and his government definitely caused damages to Thailand.  
The problem definition function 
The problem constructed in this frame focused on the ineffective and unpopular 
government of Surayud Chulanont. An article, written in English by Pichit 
Likitkijsomboon (2007b), described the dissatisfaction over the economic outcomes 
from Surayudǯs work thus: 
The military junta has suffered several scandals, including appointment of its 
generals to the top positions in various lucrative state enterprises, a 33% 
increase in the military budget which is the largest in modern Thai history, 
their spending of government and state enterprise budgets on their salaries 
and perks and the expansion of the secret military agency and its secret 
budget, and so on. On the other hand, the military-appointed government has 
never gained serious popularity and has also suffered from a series of 
economic policy mistakes by following anti-investment measures such as the 
30% reserve requirement for foreign fund inflow, the more stringent foreign 
business law, anti-foreign retail business law, and violation of foreign companiesǯ patent rights by issuing compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals. 
The governmentǯs little credibility was further weakened by security failures 
resulting from the worsening of the violence in the South and the New Year Eveǯs bombings. Consumer and investor confidence has plummeted to 
historical lows with sharp drops in consumption and investment spending, 
causing an abrupt slowdown in the Thai economy in 2007 with the expected 
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GDP growth of only 3.8%, the lowest since the 1997 financial crisis and the 
lowest in ASEAN and East Asia. 
The protest groups attempted to portray the financial damages caused by this amat 
government as a legitimate reason to oust them. The unproductive Surayud 
government was tied up with the coup and amat to show the inefficiency in their 
administration. 
The unrest in the southernmost provinces was another fault that was framed. 
According to the anti-coup groups, Surayud and his army paid small attention to 
relief the turmoil. An article of the protest groups was written that the army was 
unfortunately ruled by Surayud and Sonthi, and had lost lives in the southern 
violence. They were sent to the unrest areas to protect the peopleǯs security; 
however they were abandoned by their power hungry superiors. The author ȋǮWai 
alai dae robpisetǯ 2007) suggested General Surayud send his son to the south so as to 
experience a loss similar to his subordinates.  
The causal attribution function 
This time, the anti-coup groups gave a short reason for Surayudǯs lack of 
administrative results. They ȋǮWai alai dae robpisetǯ 2007) claimed that Surayud 
spent his time on retaining his power and neglected to work on the nationǯs problems. 
Also an accusation ȋǮThaksin teesakna surayud borihan prated mai penǯ 2007) was 
constructed, around the condemnation from other countries towards Surayud's 
dictatorial government, that the democratic countries insulted him and rejected 
cooperation with the tyrannical prime minister. Accordingly, he humiliated 
Thailand.   
The moral evaluation function 
When Surayud said to the public that his duty as premier was obstructed by the 
former powerful group, which indicated Thaksin and his colleagues, Thaksin 
responded by saying it was Surayudǯs fault. Surayud, according to Thaksin, did not 
know how to rule and progress this country, but Surayud laid the blamed on 
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Thaksin and the others. Moreover, Surayud, according to the anti-coup writer ȋǮThaksin teesakna surayud borihan prated mai penǯ 2007), was scared to admit that 
he was rejected by other countries. He enjoyed being prime minister, and had no 
concern for developing the country. Because of this, he became the unpopular and 
unwanted premier in the eyes of Thai people. 
The treatment recommendation function 
In terms of the remedy, the anti-coup groups did not offer the solution to oust 
Surayud directly. They included Surayud with Sonthi as the same target for 
opposition; accordingly ousting Sonthi and Surayud would be done simultaneously. 
Pichit (2007b) convinced the anti-coup groups to overthrow the dictators and the 
constitution. He analyzed the situation and was used in the movement frame of the 
anti-coup thus: 
Thailand is heading towards a cataclysm with several potential triggers. 
Despite Prime Minister Surayudǯs firm assurance that the new constitution 
will be promulgated in September and a new election held in December 
2007, few people take his words seriously. Mass protests against the coup 
may spread and result in clashes and violent suppression. The Constitutional Courtǯs ruling due at the end of May could also trigger mass unrest and 
violence if the court orders the dissolution of Mr. Thaksinǯs highly popular 
Thai-Rak-Thai Party on the charges of illegal conduct during the run up to the 
April 2006 election. The new constitution must pass a referendum due in July 
or August and this is another landmark of severe conflict and protests. The 
friction between the military junta, which wants to impose draconian 
measures against Mr. Thaksin and the anti-coup movements, and the 
Surayud government, which refuses to cooperate on the matter, may result in 
a second coup by either the military junta itself or the royalist supporters of 
the Surayud government. 
Nonetheless, Surayud himself announced that he and his government would finish 
their tasks, as the interim government, in October 2007 and start the process for 
the election in December. This might be the reason for the anti-coup groups to 
subdue their attack on Surayud Chulanont.  
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The metaframes 
The nation and modernization metaframes were employed in this mobilizing frame 
when the anti-coup groups accused Surayud of being an inefficient prime minister. 
He was constructed as the dictator who was dismissed by the international society. 
Accordingly, Thailand missed out on the chance to have business relations with 
other democratic countries which hindered the progress of Thai economy.  
Moreover, the coup, martial law, the violence in the south, and the unrest from the 
blasts in Bangkok led to the situation of insecurity impacting on foreign 
investments.  In a sense, Surayud, and his unproductive government, slowed down 
and damaged the development of the country in many ways.  
 
4. The people’s democracy mobilizing frame 
The second phase of the movement was significant in terms of recruiting 
participants and expanding budgets. This frame was strengthened by focusing on 
the losses of Thaksin and the TRT from the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
The verdicts were given that Thaksin Shinawatra and another 111 leading members 
of TRT were barred, for five years, from politics. TRT was found guilty of paying two 
small parties to run in elections to avoid rules on single candidate polls. Thus, TRTǯs 
crimes, according to the judges (Wong-Anan 2007), were ǲvery dangerous to 
democracyǳ which led to the dissolution of the party. As mentioned previously, the 
movements of the protest groups were combined with the two primary goals of 
opposing the 19 September coup and supporting Thaksin Shinawatra. During this 
time, the protest factions began to work in partnership. They collaborated in 
demonstrations and ultimately united as a formal mobilizing group. The movement 
of the anti-coup groups had been activated every so often since the Constitutional 
Tribunal started considering the allegations, of breaches of electoral laws, against 
Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai.  
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The anti-coup protesters, consequently, demanded the resignations of General 
Surayud Chulanont, Sonthi Boonyaratglin, and Prem Tinsulanonda. They rejected 
the interim charter of the junta and called for the bringing back of the 1997 peopleǯs 
constitution. The anti-coup groups constructed their mobilizing frames with more 
purposeful and forceful meanings to arouse the feelings of the demonstrators. 
Interestingly, this time the ǲpeopleǯs revolutionǳ discourse was used in the 
mobilizations. 
The problem definition function 
In this frame, the problem was framed as the democracy of the people that was 
taken by the immoral coup group with their undemocratic means. The examples in 
this problem were the attempts of the tyrants to convince, and sometimes force, 
people to vote for the undemocratic draft charter, while the charges on Thaksin and 
his party were framed as unfair and unreasonable accusations from the junta. In the 
anti-coup groupsǯ framing, their rights to have the peopleǯs constitution and an 
elected government were overthrown by the coup group; seemingly their liberties 
and preceding democracy had vanished.  
In a demonstration at Sanamluang a movement leader ȋǮRaingarn sod satanakarn 3-
6-07,  2007) attacked the junta saying that the tyrants plotted to steal sovereignty 
from the people, accuse Thaksin with unreasonable charges, dissolve the Thai Rak 
Thai party, and determine to remain in power.  While an article from the Thai E-
News website ȋǮPadetkan sang paemaidai dernna patiwatprated pen padetkarn 
temtuaǯ 2007) reported on the forceful measures the junta employed to coerce 
people to vote for the interim constitution. For instance, the village leaders and the 
local army were obliged to convince their villagers to approve the charter by any 
means, even with weaponry. In addition, the people were stopped, by the local 
officials, from participating in the movements. 
The anti-coup groups published an article, analysing the Constitutional Tribunal's 
verdicts, from the Asia Sentinel ȋǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs Over in Thailandǯ 2007) which 
said: 
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While Thaksin can justly be blamed for interfering with independent 
constitutional bodies during his tenure, the rulers that replaced him have 
gone even further by overthrowing an elected government, manipulating the 
justice system, rewriting the constitution, sending soldiers to television 
stations and enforcing ex post facto laws. Now they've wiped Thaksin's party 
off the map and banned 111 of the Partyǯs executive members from running 
in an election for five years the harshest possible punishment. Although the 
blatantly political decision has profound ramifications for the Thai political 
landscape, it was simply the culmination of a series of rulings over the past 
year that skirted or completely ignored the law. 
The culprits in this mobilizing frame ȋǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs Over in Thailandǯ 2007) 
were framed as the Bangkok elites, royalists, and military which could be seen from 
this: 
With Thai Rak Thai dissolved, the Bangkok elite succeeded in pushing 
Thaksin and his allies from power, more or less permanently. Neither 
Thaksin nor his partly leaders can participate in an election for five years, a 
lifetime in politics. Other Thai Rak Thai members can still form a new party, 
but it will likely be a relatively small player. The next government looks set to 
be governed by either the Democrat Party, which was absolved of all charges 
yesterday, or Banharn Silpa-Archa, leader of the slippery Chat Thai party, 
which always looks to join any government to collect the spoils of power. 
The elite and the middle class in Bangkok who were believed by the anti-coup 
groups to be the group that overtrew Thaksin were framed as enemies of the people 
or of Thaksinǯs voters. The Democrat party was attacked as the major rival of the 
Thai Rak Thai party. This framing pointed out the specific opponents of the anti-
coup groups and Thaksinǯs voters.  
The anti-coup groups publicized a judicial analysis ȋǮHok duan rattaprahan kao tor 
pai kong prated thaiǯ 2007), by Thammasat university law academic Worachet 
Pakeerat, of the 19 September coup and its impacts on the Thai legal system. It was 
explained: 
According to criminal law, a coup d'état is illegal, since it abolishes the 
conception of the Legal State. The Legal State can be established only in 
democratic countries which allow people to have freedom and liberty. 
Accordingly, it is a big fat lie when the coup makers promise people freedom 
and liberty. After the coup had been done, we have the Conventional 
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Constitution (CC) to draft the new charter. It is interesting that the CC 
members have gained much experience from the previous coups. Thus, the 
undemocratic flaws of this draft are concealed under the democratic surface. 
The coup group realizes that they cannot control the people by arms and 
force, as it used to be. Instead, they exercise their power through this law 
mechanism. The example is the Constitutional Tribunal, set up to have 
authority to dissolve a political party. 
In Worachetǯs view, the 19 September coup makers were different from their 
predecessors. They were skillful and knew how to control people through the 
legitimate 2007 constitution.  However, the most controversial clause in the draft, 
for the anti-coup groups, was the amnesty for the coup groups which enhanced the 
chances of there being future coup makers. Furthermore, General Sonthi 
Boonyaratklin also announced he would become a politician after the draft was 
passed by the referendum. According to the 2007 constitution, General Sonthi 
would not have any guilt associated with conducting the coup.  He could start his 
new career smoothly as an innocent politician. The next debated clause in the draft 
was pointed out by Worachet ȋǮHok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thaiǯ 
2007) thus: 
When I deliberately consider the 2007 draft constitution, )ǯve found a 
concerning point about the premier appointment. In this draft, it allows us to 
have appointed prime ministers. When I look back into our past, we have had 
a prime minister who hadnǯt come from an election. We couldnǯt criticize and 
scrutinize him throughout his eight years of premiership. Besides, in 1992 
when a coup was staged, we had an appointed prime minister which led to a 
major uprising of people to oust him. 
The other disputations with the draft were the rights of the Supreme Court to 
intervene in the executive and legislative power, and that the appointed senators 
could hold power over the elected government. All of this led to the conclusion that 
the interim constitution was undemocratic. Speaking of the juntaǯs 2007 draft 
constitution, Worachet (ǮHok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thaiǯ 2007) 
expressed the view that: 
The referendum becomes a strong selling point of the interim constitution; 
on the other hand the uncustomary and unconstitutional writing process is 
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barely acceptable. People are told that turning away this charter may lead the 
country to a crucial political crisis. Besides, one who denies the draft would 
be branded as a traitor who retards the reconciliation and development of 
the nation. In fact, it is stated in the draft that one has the right to either 
reject or approve the draft. From the name list of the drafters, we can predict 
how the actual constitution would be. They are not embodied from every 
group; certainly this constitution would be beneficial to only some groups. 
In Worachetǯs opinion, this draft charter was a problematic constitutional law. 
Hidden advantages would result for the coup group and their networks, while the 
common people would be abandoned.  
The analysis of Worachet was applied to this frame to explain the undemocratic 
organizations set up by the junta government. Consequently their achievements 
were untrustworthy and tyrannical. This finally became the reason for movement to 
solve this ǲproblemǳ and restore the peopleǯs democracy.   
The causal attribution function 
In the second movement phase, the cause was framed as the attempts of the junta to 
get rid of the power of Thaksin Shinawatra and the grassroots through the interim 
constitution. A work of Pichit Likitkijsomboon (2007b) was posted on the Thai E-
news to explain why the coup makers removed Thaksin and replaced the 1997 
constitution. 
They want to replace the highly democratic 1997 Constitution with a new 
one which will create a numerous small and weak political parties, a 
parliament of a fragmented House of Representatives dominated by a 
powerful, royalist Senate appointed from the bureaucracy, and hence, a 
coalition government and a weak, puppet prime minister while the core of 
the state power remains in the royalistsǯ tight grip. In short, their political 
and economic model is Thailand of the early 1980s in which the royalist 
power had complete control of all the political institutions through the 
military and bureaucracy covered up by a thin crust of parliamentary ǲdemocracyǳ. The motive of the royalists and its middle class-intelligentsia 
supporters is backward-looking and reactionary. 
When the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal toward Thaksin and his partyǯs 
cases came out, the anti-coup groups were deeply disappointed. They began framing 
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the protest messages to attack the Tribunal and oust the coup makers. A view from 
an Asia Sentinelǯs journalist ȋǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs Over in Thailandǯ 2007) was posted 
through the anti-coup media: 
The main goal of the coup-makers, of course, was to cut the legs off Thaksin 
and Thai Rak Thai, the party he founded in 1998 as a personal vehicle to 
carry him to the premiership. TRT stormed to power with a win in the 2001 
general election and became the only party in Thai history to complete a full 
term in office.  
The Constitutional Tribunal's decision to dissolve the party — finally 
revealed after the judges read the ruling for an excruciating nine hours — 
was just one part of the plan to remove Thaksin from the political scene. The 
rest of the job belongs to those drafting the new constitution, which aims to 
limit the powers of the executive and expand the role of non-elected senators 
and judges to ensure that a reincarnation of Thaksin doesn't rise from the 
ashes.  ….Although the powers that be were able to eliminate Thaksin, his legacy 
won't quickly be erased. Political parties will have to take the interests of 
poor upcountry voters much more seriously from now on. Moreover, his 
popularity is - or at least was - second only to the king’s. In five years, 
when the ban expires, Thaksin may just well be the most popular politician 
left standing in the country. 
The anti-coup factions employed this news to provide the reason for the junta to 
eliminate Thaksin and to prevent him from returning to Thai politics. Interestingly, 
this article pointed out the popularity of Thaksin and compared it with King 
Bhumibol. It seemed this article was used to claim that the elite plotted to prevent 
him from being elected by his voters. The popularity of King Bhumibol among his 
people might be challenged by Thaksin. 
The moral evaluation function 
The anti-coup groups labeled the CNS as thieves who robbed the peopleǯs democracy; 
therefore the interim constitution and the Constitutional Tribunal created by the coup 
makers were branded as the illegal and undemocratic inventions of the tyrants. In the 
anti-coup groupsǯ framing, the Constitutional Tribunal was ǲthe robber 
Constitutional Courtǳ appointed by the coup makers. The verdicts of the court were 
definitely untrustworthy, since it was created to steal the justice and democracy 
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from Thai people. An article of the anti-coup groups ȋǮKloom tortan padetkarn pue 
prachatippatai talangkarn pranam tulakarnjoneǯ 2007) was written that said:  
This group of thieves uses force and the army to overthrow the peopleǯs 
constitution. They also create the discourse that portrays themselves as the 
national heroes protecting Thailand. Definitely, this has been done to claim 
their authority and acknowledgement to occupy this country. They insult the 
grassroots, divide society, and brainwash all Thais. 
While the view of Pichit ȋǮMue pakpuak sai yaipai kwa lae puakkao klubma lenngarn 
raoǯ 2007) was applied to express that: 
The constitution of the CNS is illegitimate, because it is inherited from the old 
bureaucratic system under the lead power of the military. Politicians turn to 
be their puppets. This 2007 constitution gives the ruling power to the amat 
and elites. It allows people to vote and establish the government, but the real 
power belongs to the amat. 
In terms of the constitution, the CNS was attacked for the persuasive measures used 
to gain the constitutional votes. In a statement of an anti-coup group ȋǮTalangkarn 
kloomprachathai maiaou padetkarnǯ 2007), it was described that:  
The coup group propagandizes people to show their loyalty to His Majesty 
the King by voting for the 2007 draft charter. His Majesty the King never 
stated his viewpoint toward the draft, thus different standpoints toward the 
draft would not violate the royal supremacy of His Majesty the King. The 
tricking act of the CNS would result in the severe defamation to our revered 
King and impairs our democratic regime with the King as Head of State. 
The next view on the Thai democracy situation was given by Ukrit Mongkolnavin, a 
law professor and former veteran politician. He was curious about the direction of 
the country (ǲUkrit chamlae roojakmai nitithamǯ 2007):  
What types of political regime do we need? So far weǯre talking about 
different views. Weǯve been told that Thailand must be governed under a 
democratic regime, good governance, and the state of law. On the other hand, 
the CNS seem not understand the true meaning of democracy. It has been a 
year since the coup was conducted, but they cannot change peopleǯs 
thoughts. They taught people an undemocratic lesson by staging the coup. 
How can they expect democratic practices from the people? 
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They must thoroughly understand what democracy is.  The sovereignty must 
be possessed by the people. The people must come first, on the other hand 
some groups act as superiors. People have the right to choose what is right or 
wrong for their future. We shouldnǯt look down on them. They have far more 
knowledge than us in many things. 
From Ukritǯs statement, the powerful amat, or the old power group, overpowered 
Thai people in terms of rights and liberty. Besides, Thai people, or the grassroots, 
were seen as unintelligent and had to be ruled by the more intellectual amat.  
From the examples in this moral branding function, the framing hightlights the 
wicked and immoral image of the coup makers and amat. Their constitution and the 
Constituional Tribunal were branded as the tools of the dictators to remain in 
power, while the people lost their sovereignty they had from the 1997 constitution. 
This type of branding appeared in almost every frame of the anti-coup groups in this 
second phase of the movement. The period they planned to activate the strong 
mobilization.     
The treatment recommendation function 
In the second phase, the solution of this mobilizing frame was calling for the 
restoration of the 1997 peopleǯs constitution and the peopleǯs democracy, and ousting 
the tyrants. The intensity of the protest increased when the PTV station was banned 
from broadcasting in March, before the Constitutional Tribunal gave its verdicts on 
Thaksin and TRTǯs charges in May. All of this brought up substantial movements, 
calling for democracy, by the anti-coup groups and Thaksinǯs supporters.  
Some of the anti-coup groups collected signatures for a petition to dismiss General 
Prem and the CNS, some encouraged the general public to reject the juntaǯs interim 
constitution and restore the 1997 peopleǯs constitution. The anti-coup groups 
published the anti-coup scholarsǯ viewpoints and suggestions. An opinion of 
Worachet was posted on the Thai-E news suggested the junta to bring back the 1997 
constitution and amend some articles. In Worachetǯs view ȋǮHok duan rattaprahan 
kao tor pai kong prated thaiǯ 2007), every faction should be involved in the 
discussions and negotiations until they reached a consensus in order to bring peace 
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and harmony to Thai society. Whereas Pichit ȋǮMue pakpuak sai yaipai kwa lae 
puakkao klubma lenngarn raoǯ 2007), a scholar who supported the movement, 
advised the protestors to work on the mobilizing campaign with the three objectives 
of rejecting the juntaǯs draft charter, overthrowing the amat, and restoring the 1997 peopleǯs constitution. He said: ǲIt is the peopleǯs obligation to repudiate the 2007 
constitution and demand the more proper 1997 constitution. The peopleǯs voice is 
the most powerful force which must be heard.ǳ 
The metaframes 
The democracy, nation, and king metaframes were applied into this mobilizing 
frame. The democracy metaframe was the most important since the raised issues 
were involved with the restoration of the 1997 constitution and the verdicts of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. In the anti-coup groupsǯ views the CNS robbed the ruling 
power from the democratic government, thus any laws and organizations originated 
by these thieves were considered as the unlawful products of the dictators. Thus, 
the draft charter and the Constitutional Tribunal were condemned forcefully while 
the anti-coup groups invited people to turn down the 2007 draft constitution. The 
draft charter was criticized for the limited public participation in the drafting 
process, the controversial clauses on the selection of prime ministers, the amnesty 
for the coup makers, and the advantages written into the constitution that were 
beneficial to the elites. At the same time, the anti-coup groups demanded the 
restoration of the 1997 constitution which, for them, was the most democratic 
having been originated by all factions of Thais, truly the constitution of the people.  
When the cases of Thaksin and TRT were judged by the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
anti-coup groups were upset with the undemocratic verdicts that banned Thaksin 
and 111 leading members of TRT from political activities, followed by the 
dissolution of the TRT party. For the anti-coup groups, the tribunal was established 
to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra from Thai politics. It could be seen that the verdicts 
became a prompt stimulation for Thaksinǯs supporters to form the immense 
protests. It was interesting that the anti-coup groups framed their movements as 
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ǲthe peopleǯs revolutionǳ which was established to overthrow the amat regime and 
re-instate a democratic regime in Thailand.  
The peopleǯs movement was also framed with the nation metaframe, since the 
people are a part of the nation. They believed that they had the right to vote for their 
government, as well as the right to receive benefits similar to the other groups of 
people. The unequal and unfair practices that the coup makers did to the grassroots 
were framed to start the class conflict. The grassroots, or the people, in the anti-
coup groupsǯ framing, were insulted and bullied by the superior amat and the elites. 
The lower class had been taken advantage of for years.  Moreover their elected 
government of Thaksin and the 1997 peopleǯs constitution were taken by the coup 
makers. After this period, the class conflict was applied as an important issue in the 
mobilization of the anti-coup groups.  
The role of the king metaframe was played down in significance in this movement-
specific frame. The protest groups engaged King Bhumibol in the frame just once 
when they claimed that the junta government of General Surayud Chulanont tricked 
people into believing that the interim charter was supported by the King. They, 
according to the anti-coup groups, wanted the Thai people to express loyalty to the 
King by approving on the draft charter. Unquestionably, the junta ȋǮTalangkarn 
kloomprachathai maiaou padetkarnǯ 2007) was framed as an unfaithful government 
that defamed the honour of King Bhumibol. 
 
5. The media control mobilizing frame  
In the second phase of the movement, some of the anti-coup media had been 
censored, since it was the channel used to gather the protestors. Furthermore, the 
CNS intended to block Thaksin from communicating with his supporters and 
encouraging them to start an uprising. At that time, the members of the TRT 
activated the movements by visiting their voting bases and establishing the PTV. 
The ǲPeople Televisionǯs Stationǳ or PTV ȋǮThree more to quit TRTǯ 2007) was 
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formed by the three TRT members: Veera Musiga-pong the party executive, 
Jatuporn Promphan the deputy spokesman, and Natthawut Sai-kua. They resigned 
from the party to establish a media company to broadcast cable TV programs. Even 
though Chaturon Chaisang, the Thai Rak Thai Party's caretaker leader, denied the 
involvement of the party with PTV, it was seen that PTV was expected to be the TRT 
mouthpiece to challenge the CNS.  
However, before the launch, the Public Relations Department (PRD) warned that the 
PTV operation could be against the law. The director of PRD (Srivalo 2007) 
explained that: ǲPTV was in a similar situation to ASTV (a service of Thai Day Dot Com 
Company, part of Sondhi Limthongkul's Manager Group). The operator of 
ASTV has filed a criminal lawsuit against the PRD, alleging it abused its state 
powers when it questioned ASTV's legal statusǳ.  
This was the spark for TRT and Thaksinǯs supporters to originate the intensive 
movement calling for the freedom of expression.  
The problem definition function 
In this second phase, the anti-coup groups framed the problem as the undemocratic 
actions and double standards of the junta on media censorship. Examples were raised 
to highlight the practices of the junta toward the anti-coup groupsǯ media. The 
strengthening of media control was significantly increased when Thaksin 
Shinawatra started his movements by giving interviews to the international and 
local media on his plans and future in politics. The interviews were brought up and 
distributed through his supporting media, while, undoubtedly, these community 
radio stations and websites had been banned from airing the interviews. The media 
censorship scheme had been carried out by a collaboration between the Ministry of 
Information and Communications Technology (MICT), the Royal Thai Police, CAT 
Telecom Public Company Limited, and TOT Public Company Limited. It was 
reported that many radio stations and websites, such as FM 87.75 Taxi Community 
Radio, www.19sep.net, www.19sep.org, Saturday Voice (www.saturdaylive.org and 
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saturdayvoice.no-ip.info), Hi-Thaksin, and the online telecast of PTV television 
(www.ptvthai.com) were temporarily blocked.  
To highlight the concerns from international organizations, some foreign news that 
criticized the censorship by the CNS was re-posted on Thai E-News ȋǮSuetangchat 
teekao tualok lung jaonatee koddan pid satanee wittayoochumchonǯ 2007) thus: 
The Reporters Without Borders condemned the military governmentǯs 
closure, yesterday, of three community radio stations - Confidante, Taxi 
Driver Community Radio and Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship - just 
hours after they broadcast an interview with deposed prime minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra. The authorities have also charged them with violating 
national security. "The closure of the three radio stations and the warning to 
some 3,000 other local stations are utterly reprehensible,ǳ the press freedom 
organization said. ǲThe government does not do itself any favors with this 
kind of authoritarian intervention, which violates free speech. The three 
stations must be allowed to resume broadcasting at once.ǳ 
Simialr to the previous frames, the anti-coup groups employed critics from the 
foreign media to support their movement and put pressure on the junta. 
Nonetheless, the critical point, which led to a big protest, emerged when the satellite 
television channel PTV was banned from broadcasting.   
A former Thai Rak Thai Party member Jatuporn Promphan announced the launch of 
PTV or People's Television satellite TV on March 1, 2007. This satellite channel, 
according to Jatuporn ȋǮJatuporn insists to launch satellite TV on March 1ǯ 2007), 
would be for serving the people not for political purposes.  The objective of PTV was 
claimed as "a small candle shedding the light of truth". The programs ȋǮPTV to go on 
air Wednesdayǯ 2007) would be put on the internet and aired via satellite. 
Apparently, this was similar to ASTV in terms of the concept and strategy. Double 
standards of the junta were cited, by the PTV founders ȋǮTwo stations, same path, 
clashing agendaǯ 2007), since ASTV was allegedly acting against the law, but allowed 
by the junta to broadcast its program on Channel 11. Hence, the PTV should be 
treated on a par with ASTV.  
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When PTV failed to launch, Nattawut Saikua the PTV executive ȋǮPTV says ǮCAT 
attackǯ ruined debutǯ 2007) asserted that ǲthe PTV management has fully complied 
with the laws, yet the broadcast is being blocked without justification." Besides, ǲhe 
was disappointed that the authorities were treating supporters of the former ruling 
party as second-class citizensǳ. Also, General Saprang Kalanamitr, a junta leader and 
chairman of CAT Telecom, was alleged, by Jatuporn, to be the mastermind. 
"Although the inaugural broadcast was blocked by authorities, management will 
fight on and not back down even if they take our lives," Veera announced.  
The causal attribution function 
From the anti-coup groupsǯ framing, the cause of the juntaǯs media control was 
indicated to be the fear of truth. An articleǯs writer ȋǮBot wikrao satannakan 
kanmuangǯ 2007) reckoned those dictators were afraid that their immoral and 
tyrannical practices would be disclosed by the anti-coup media. It was written thus: 
A while ago, the tyrants feared the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
colleagues, also they do not want the people realize how evil they are. Thus, 
they control the media. But people are ultimately awakened when they 
experience many troubles from the juntaǯs ruling. The increase of living costs 
leads them to be illuminated to the awfulness of the coup. 
When Thaksin began to confront the CNS, he visited some countries and gave 
interviews to both Thai and foreign media. Certainly, his news was barred from 
being broadcast in Thailand.  Noppadon Pattama, the chief counsel of Thaksin, told 
the news organizations that Thaksin was ready to interview in person, by telephone, 
teleconference, and internet. Furthermore, many newspapers and television 
stations showed the intention to interview him. From the Nation newspaper ȋǮThaksin rumoured to have rented satelliteǯ 2007), news about Noppadon and 
Thaksin was published thus: 
Thaksin was bound for London in March where his news media appearances 
would be limited for the comfort of the government and the CNS. Thaksin's 
appearances will be sparing and refrain from criticising the government, he 
said. Noppadon said recent interviews had not been initiated by the former 
prime minister. In past weeks, Thaksin has appeared on CNN and interviews 
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with him have been published in the Asian Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, 
The Economist and Time. Noppadon said Thaksin would never criticise His 
Majesty the King, as claimed by the CNS. He is a loyal subject and one whose 
marriage was blessed by His Majesty. 
Nonetheless, the reaction to the PTV operation ȋǮThailandǯs military government 
censors satellite TV stationǯ 2007) was explained thus: 
Top military leaders had earlier indicated that they would not interfere with PTVǯs news broadcasts if the station abided by rules it has imposed on state-
controlled television stations, including a ban on broadcasting any news 
footage or interviews that feature Thaksin. The government has on several 
occasions blocked news spots that featured footage of Thaksin, including 
reports from international news broadcasters CNN and BBC. 
The cause of the media ban at this time was framed as the fear, of the CNS, of Thaksinǯs movements that complemented the growth of the anti-coup protests. As a 
result, any media which had a tendency to support Thaksin and the anti-coup 
movements were strictly controlled. The anti-coup groups and Thaksinǯs supporters 
convinced the public to believe that their movement had power to stir up the junta, 
as a result the junta attempted to control them. 
The moral evaluation function 
As the censorship by the military government continued, the anti-coup groups 
regarded it as a malevolent action. The CNS was framed as the evil dictator who was 
motivated to unethically attack the media of the opposing camp. Some news from the 
anti-coup groups ȋǮBueng luk pia tanon rajdamnernǯ 2007) showed that the 
government attempted to charge the media operators and demonstrators with lese 
majeste so as to prohibit them from using the media as a channel to conduct 
mobilizations. Another example, to support the allegations of undemocratic 
practices of the coup group, was the censorship of news about Thaksin. An article 
from Thai E-News ȋǮAfter Shock tee satuenjai kon thai tunglokǯ 2007) described that: 
Streams of people from everywhere phoned in to radio stations expressing 
their love for Thaksin Shinawatra. They also demanded the re-broadcast of Thaksinǯs interviews. As a consequence of broadcasting Thaksin's live 
interview, those two radio stations' broadcasts were stopped immediately 
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with no explanations. Rumour has it that they were scrutinized and ordered 
to stop broadcasting permanently by police and officials from the Public 
Relations Department (PRD). 
Some of the anti-coup groups which supported Thaksin attempted to show the love 
of Thaksinǯs voters towards the former premier, on the one hand the junta was the 
dictators that tried to bully them through several measures. In terms of the PTV, the 
major channel to disseminate mobilizing news from Thaksin and his supporters, it 
was seen as threat to the junta. The operator of PTV ȋǮDefiant PTV to go ahead with 
telecastǯ 2007) insisted that the television station was ǲtruly people's televisionǳ 
which ǲwould help steer Thailand to becoming a society that respected the rule of 
law.ǳ He said: 
In the past, the channels of communication that served the nation were 
limited, and we saw no hope for the future. If a station that helps people 
constructively exchange views exists, it will help the country maintain its 
democracy. PTV was not set up to become an enemy or a threat to anyone. I 
do not like threats either. PTV is offering a choice to the people so the people 
won't be forced to close their ears and eyes by having to watch only certain 
channels. It will truly be the people's channel, and we will ensure people's 
participation in owning the station by issuing stock. 
Jatuporn framed this movement as a mean to establish democracy in Thailand, 
furthermore PTV was the ǲpeople's channelǳ not a threat to the government. 
Interestingly, it was the station of the grassroots, while ASTV was supported by the 
middle class and the junta at that time. Nonetheless, the PTV station later was at the 
forefront of the attack to try to oust General Prem Tinsulanonda and the junta. 
The treatment recommendation function 
The solution to the media censorship was ousting the tyrannical coup makers which 
were similar to other mobilizing frames. When PTV was barred from operating, the 
TV producers announced they would hold live a program at the Royal plaza. They 
accused the government of having double standards by allowing ASTV to air on 
Channel 11. Natthawut Saikua the PTV executive ȋǮPTV rally Ǯwonǯt be stoppedǯ 2007) 
announced that during the demonstration he would reveal some information about 
the coup makers. The PTV station chairman, (ǮFull gear police fail again to end PTV 
protestǯ 2007) Veera Musigapong, planned to attack the ǲsuspicious role" of General 
Prem Tinsulanonda together with airing their grievances about being blocked from 
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broadcasting. Also, they produced the 100,000 VCDs which uncovered the coup 
networks. Chatuporn Phromphan (Prem had Ǯno role in coupǯ 2007) said:  
We're now coordinating with various alliances to join the anti-CNS protest as 
one team. We're not afraid about being arrested or having our stage 
demolished, because we haven't broken the law. They can arrest us 
whenever they like, but if the government and the CNS try to do anything to 
prevent us from airing our views they themselves will become the 
defendants in the eyes of society. The people won't put up with it. 
Nonetheless, the goals of the protestors changed when the verdicts from the 
Constitutional Tribunal revealed that Thaksin was banned from politics and TRT 
was dissolved. This time they were fully committed to ousting all the coup makers 
and paving the way for the return of Thaksin. This time the PTV rallies ȋǮStreet 
protest: PTV plans April 27 mass rally to demonstrate against coupǯ 2007) were 
supported by taxi drivers, students, and leading campaign groups such as the Philap 
Khao Group, the September 19 Network, and the Saturday Anti-Coup Group.  
The metaframes 
The democracy metaframe became significant in this mobilizing frame. The 
censorship, by the CNS, of the pro-Thaksin websites, radio stations, and PTV 
television station were framed as a violation of democracy. In the anti-coup groupsǯ 
view, the liberty and rights of people to follow any media was limited by the 
dictatorial practices of the junta. When Thaksinǯs live interviews were banned, 
grievances of Thaksinǯs supporters were distributed through the anti-coup media. 
Besides, the PTV station, which was founded to act as the mouthpiece of Thaksin 
and his supporters, was blocked from being launched. All of this led to big protests 
calling for the freedom of expression for the anti-coup groups and Thaksinǯs 
supporters. In the early movement, Veera Musigapong, Jakraphob Penkair, 
Natthawut Saikua, and Jatuporn Phromphan, the vanguard of PTV, announced that 
they did not purpose to overthrow the CNS. They stated that they required equal 
treatment with ASTV. However, PTV was upset by the Constitutional Tribunalǯs 
results; they mobilized their supporters to demand the resignation of Gens Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin and Prem Tinsulanonda and called for the return of Thaksin 
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Shinawatra. It could be seen that PTVǯs movements were allied with the other 
groups ultimately forming a united group to attack the CNS.  
 
6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame 
During this second phase, the violence in the southern provinces increased. Many 
Buddhists were harmed. The anti-coup groups used these events to attack the 
leaders of the CNS. In this frame, the attack was shifted to General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin and General Surayud Chulannont as the leaders of the country and 
former chiefs of the army.  The main issues focused on the troubles for Thai 
Buddhists resulting from the violence in the southernmost provinces. The 
inattention of the government to relieve the problem was highlighted. Interestingly, 
the religious views of General Sonthi, as a Muslim, were framed as the cause to 
abandon the Thai Buddhists and the army in the south. Also, the movement of some 
monks against the 2007 constitution had become another example used to portray 
the immorality of the CNS.  
The problem definition function 
The problem in this frame was the negligence of the junta to maintain Buddhism and 
protect the Buddhists in the southern provinces. The culprits were the CNS, but this 
time they personalized it by attacking General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and General 
Surayud Chulannont. Some groups of monks and Buddhists participated in the anti-
coup protests. It was interesting that those Buddhist groups demanded for a clause 
to recognise Buddhism as the national religion ȋǮRaingarn satanakan karnchumnum 
kong kloompitak poottasasanaǯ 2007).  
The next example to support the anti-coup groupsǯ accusation was about the losses 
of live and possession of the Buddhists from the southern turbulences.  The 
grievances of Thai Buddhists being tormented and assassinated by the separatists 
were published. An example was a declaration by, a Thai Buddhist group in the 
southernmost province, that announced: 
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We are the Thai Buddhists from the three southern provinces. We are here to 
demand that the government be responsible for finding measures to protect 
our lives and possessions. We have been brutally threatened and killed by 
those separatists; on the other hand the government shows no attention to 
guarding us. Worse, our protest is distorted by some wicked media outlets. 
This critical, national problem needs to be solved immediately.  Nonetheless, 
our troubles are regrettably abandoned by the government.  
This framing was similar to Sondhi Limthongkulǯs frame when he attacked Thaksin, 
nonetheless the anti-coup groups focused on the different religious views that 
caused the conflicts between Muslims and Buddhists in the southernmost areas. 
The causal attribution function 
In terms of the Buddhist issues, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, as the leader of the 
coup, was accused of his inattention to the security of Buddhism, and Thai 
Buddhists, in the southern provinces. General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was strongly 
condemned about the deaths of several military personnel and local people in an 
incident of unrest. A critical accusation about his religious views as a Muslim was 
emphasized to indicate his inattention toward Buddhist matters. It can be seen from 
an article (ǮRaingarn satanakan paktaiǯ 2007) that: 
General Sonthi might view the deaths of his military as a normal situation. 
These serious crimes could result from his inattentiveness or his attitude of ǲmaking friends with thievesǳ or his religious views as a ǲMuslim.ǳ  Thatǯs 
why he never feels remorseful for the loss and grief of his Thai people and 
the Thai Buddhists. 
This blame was interesting since the supporters of Thaksin were mainly Buddhists 
from the northern and northeastern provinces; on the one hand some of the 
Democrat partyǯs voters and General Sonthi were Muslims. Accordingly, conflicts 
between Muslims in the south and Buddhists were employed to undermine them. 
Furthermore, some of the anti-coup protesters were from the northern and 
northeastern provinces, where there were some negative attitudes toward Muslims 
and people from the south. Thus this framing seemed effective to convince some of Thaksinǯs followers.  
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The moral evaluation function 
The CNS were framed as sinners (khon bap) when they declined to follow the 
request of a monk group that came to protest the junta. An anti-coup author raised 
an example to support their accusation that when a group of senior monks 
demanded to give a letter to the CNS, they were insulted by many rude acts. The 
headline of this news item defined this practice of the CNS as committing a sin. 
According to the accusation, the monks had been waiting for hours before they were 
declined a meeting. The situation was portrayed ȋǮPrasong samhao tor pra pooyai 
eektang sairai kloompoochumnumǯ 2007) that:  
This is too much for us. Our fellow Buddhists wanted to have a meeting with 
the constitution drafters. They just wanted to ask the council to put a clause 
into this constitution recognizing Buddhism as the national religion. 
However, they had been made to wait in the sun, which is awful for some 
elderly monks. Moreover, they are accused of being hired by a political party 
to make the protest. This is a very bad accusation. 
The junta was portrayed as sinners that failed to protect Buddhism in Thailand. 
Furthermore their rude practices toward these monks were inappropriate. This is 
far stronger than the framing of Sondhiǯs because the former Yellow Shirts leader 
emphasized the violence in the south and avoided the controversial subject about 
Muslims and Buddhists.  
The treatment recommendation function   
The treatment, in this mobilizing frame, was to restore morality to politics. This 
could be seen from the making of amulets or ǲJatukham Rammathepǳ. Even though 
the anti-coup groups determined to appeal to the followers with the supernatural, 
the name of the amulet and the benefits of it could express the intentions of the anti-
coup groups. At that time Jatukham Rammathep amulets were very popular in 
Thailand as some Thais believed that it would bring the owner prosperity and 
protect them from bad luck. It was interesting that this special model of Jatukham 
Rammathep was called ǲprab kabotǳ or "coup defeat".  
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The maker ȋǮJatukamramathep roon prabkabotǯ 2007) revealed that it was made to 
protect Thailand from the evil coup, and that they had a magical power to change 
the coup makersǯ minds. He said the magical power would make the coup makers 
return the ruling power to the people, set the national election date, and bring back 
the 1997 peopleǯs constitution. Besides, Buddhism and the honour of King Bhumibol 
would be protected by the power of this Jatukham Rammathep. The protest leaders 
determined to give their participants the amulets in the demonstrations. This was 
certainly a wise strategy to appeal more to those protestors who had faith and 
reflected the goals of the movements at the same time.  
The metaframes 
The religion metaframe was applied into this framing. It was emphasized when 
differing religious views received unequal treatments.  The CNS, particularly 
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, was framed as a negligent leader who was not sincere 
about maintaining the security of the Thai Buddhists. Interestingly, his religious 
views, as a Muslim were raised as a cause of the inattention to protecting Thai 
Buddhists from being assassinated by Muslim separatists. The anti-coup groups 
framed General Sonthi, Premier Surayud, and their associates as ones who lacked 
the determination to protect the Buddhists.  
Another issue, to blame the CNS for, was the movement of some Buddhist groups. 
These groups were both lay people and monks. They ȋǮRaingarn satannakan 
chumnum kong kloom pitak poottasasanaǯ 2007) demanded the putting of a clause in 
the constitution identifying Buddhism as the national religion. They collaborated 
with the anti-coup groups for this movement. When their offer was rejected by the 
junta, the anti-coup groups pinpointed the junta as sinners.  
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7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame 
In the second phase of movement, this frame became a powerful one to arouse the 
grief and anger of Thaksinǯs supporters toward the junta, since it was framed on the 
losses of Thaksin, his family and the Thai Rak Thai party in terms of assets and 
political life. The verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal were a significant 
occurrence that stimulated Thaksinǯs supporters to focus on this mobilizing frame. 
Besides, the popularity of the junta declined, which was the right time for Thaksin 
and his subordinates to carry out a strong movement to oust the junta and bring 
Thaksin back to Thailand. This frame, hence, was one of the most powerful frames 
which was employed to recruit more participants in this second period before the 
formation of the Red Shirts.   
The problem definition function 
The problem in this frame was constructed as the misconducts of the dictators in 
eliminating Thaksin and his colleagues. Definitely, the culprits were the CNS, the old 
power group and their networks. The examples to support the accusation were 
focused around the verdicts from the Constitutional Tribunal toward the election 
fraud charges. The anti-coup groups published news, from the Asia Sentinel ȋǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs Over in Thailandǯ 2007), on their website to show the foreign mediaǯs opinion towards Thaksinǯs cases. It said: 
It was billed as "Judgment Day" in Bangkok, but Wednesday's decision by a 
military-installed court to dissolve ousted Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra's party and ban its executives from political activity for five years 
was in the works well before the army seized power last September... While 
Thaksin can justly be blamed for interfering with independent constitutional 
bodies during his tenure, the rulers that replaced him have gone even further 
by overthrowing an elected government, manipulating the justice system, 
rewriting the constitution, sending soldiers to television stations and 
enforcing ex post facto laws. Now they've wiped Thaksin's party off the map 
and banned 111 of the Partyǯs executive members from running in an 
election for five years the harshest possible punishment. Although the 
blatantly political decision has profound ramifications for the Thai political 
landscape, it was simply the culmination of a series of rulings over the past 
year that skirted or completely ignored the law. 
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Another news piece from the Financial Times ȋǮThai ban blundersǯ 2007) was 
posted: 
Although there were no immediate signs of serious unrest, time will show 
that the tribunal's decision was foolish and unjust. It does no credit to the 
generals who have already stumbled badly during their brief period in 
power, and will do little to foster a revival of Thailand's once-vibrant 
democracy. Perhaps it was inevitable that Mr Thaksin himself would be 
banned, but there was scant reason to dissolve his party and exclude 111 of 
its leaders from politics for five years. Invoking the rule of law to demand 
acceptance of the decision is absurd, given that the army casually took the 
law into its own hands when it seized power. 
As mentioned before, this time Thaksin and his supporters employed the 
international media as a tool to disseminate their frames to supporters and people 
around the world. They intended to defend themselves from accusations of the junta 
and recruit more supporters. This could be seen from the above statements. Also, 
Thaksin hired Michael Goldberg, the Chair of the International Dispute Resolution 
Section at Baker Botts LLP, to publish a statement ȋǮStatement on AEC Assets Seizureǯ 
2007) declaring his standpoint thus: 
Despite all of Dr. Thaksin's efforts, the junta is committed to finding means to 
circumvent any rule of law to persecute Dr. Thaksin, his family, his friends 
and his business activities. The junta's attacks on Dr. Thaksin amount to an 
arbitrary interference with his privacy and his family, his private property, 
his business interests as well as his honour and reputation which are 
abhorrent to the principles of international justice.  
It should also not be overlooked that, since overthrowing Thailand's civilian 
government and abrogating Thailand's 1997 constitution, the coup leaders 
have continually resorted to the most outrageous accusations against Dr. 
Thaksin: in January 2007, hours after a series of bombings rocked Bangkok, 
before any investigation could begin, the military accused Dr. Thaksin of 
ordering the attacks. After days of being called to task for these accusations, 
the coup leaders backed down from their accusations and affirmed that there 
was no evidence of Dr. Thaksin's involvement. 
This statement only explained Thaksinǯs feelings of being intimidated with no 
comments on the details of the verdicts from the Tribunal or the accusations against 
him. Thaksin used the service of this company to defend himself from the junta and 
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the later government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat party. These 
framing tactics have been used by the Red Shirtsǯ movement to effectively explain 
their situation to other democratic countries.  
The causal attribution function 
The reason for the junta to overthrow the Thaksin government was given that the 
tyrants viewed Thaksin, Thaksin regime, and his associates, as threats which must be 
removed. News from the Asia Sentinel ȋǮThaksinǯs Partyǯs Over in Thailandǯ 2007) was 
posted on the anti-coup website explained that: 
The real winners, however, are the military, judiciary and royalist elites who 
saw Thaksin as a threat to their traditional power base. With Thaksin gone, 
they can safely fade into the background once again and pull the strings from 
behind the scenes. Thaksin had egged them out into the open, and he paid the 
price. 
The above statement was in accordance with an article written by 
Tavivoot Chulavachana ȋǮTaveevut kui kub nakkolayut saiklang cheewit thaksin tok 
yoo nai antaraiǯ 2007), a journalist who supported Thaksin. He described the reason 
behind the acts of the CNS thus: 
In views of a political strategist, these people demand to take Thaksinǯs 
assets and his life, because they cannot rely on the Democrat Party to help 
them to reach their goals. If they can stop Thaksin, they can control Thai 
politics and become the powerful faction in Thailand. For someone, Thaksin 
is a burden to gaining money and power. 
We can see that in this second phase Thaksinǯs supporters used professional media 
to distribute news and movements of the groups. It was a good chance for them to 
make the world realize the dictatorship of the junta through international media. 
Simultaneously they also established their media, supported by huge budgets and 
experienced journalists and politicians. This worked effectively for their framing 
tactics.  
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The moral evaluation function 
This function was separated to brand the junta as the evil tyrants who robbed the 
ruling power from the elected government of Thaksin, on the other hand Thaksin was 
portrayed as the innocent exiled premier who was unjustly bullied by the old power 
group and its network.  Thaksin had done this by giving interviews and showing up 
on the anti-coup media. He framed himself as the beaten one. This could be seen 
from a speech he gave to his supporters which said ȋǮThaksin ron jodmai tung 
konthai penhuang lae korhai aodtonǯ 2007):  
Recently, )ǯve been unfairly bullied by many allegations. This has been done 
to my family as well. Weǯre really in trouble. Weǯve created many useful 
projects for this country. We are loyal to the King and the nation. When weǯve 
been unethically treated like this, my fellows feel sorry for us. Iǯm really 
appreciated your concerns. I never fear these charges, because I know I do no 
wrong. )ǯm ready to return to prove my innocence, but I donǯt want to cause 
the country turmoil. So, I chose to make peace by living abroad alone, far 
from my family. When everything is settled, I will return to serve Thailand 
and the monarchy again. )ǯm concerned about this undemocratic government 
which has decreased the confidence from other countries for investments. 
We all know that economic problems have a major impact on our grassroots. 
Many parents have to work harder to support their children, since my 
scholarship scheme was cut off by this government. )ǯd like to ask everyone 
to be patient on this. 
Thaksin at this time started to frame himself as a victim of the dictators. He 
communicated with his supporters through local media, while reminding them of 
his past projects and funds he used to provide to his voters. This was done to arouse 
the frustration of the voters. Morover, news from the Reuters (Wong-Anan 2007) 
was translated and posted on the Thai E-news to express the feeling of some 
grassroots about Thaksin that: 
I feel sorry for him. He was ousted in a coup and accused of cheating the 
country and thereǯs no truth in it,ǳ said Chei Taepin, a 75-year-old noodle 
soup vendor who said he knew Thaksin, 57, when he was at primary school 
in San Khamphaeng. Chei, like others, reckons the charges brought against Thaksinǯs wife and her brother this week are a proxy case against the 
charismatic billionaire who won two landslide elections on the back of 
massive support in the rural heartlands. ǲThey are afraid of him returning to 
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politics. They canǯt defeat him politically, so they have to come up with all 
sorts of allegations,ǳ said Chei, who hangs a huge campaign poster of Thaksin 
wearing an outfit worn for royal functions in his shop. 
This article portrayed how his voters felt about Thaksin, while Thaksin attempted to 
show his unconcerned attitude about the allegations. This function was used to 
frame the loyalty of the voters toward Thaksin, which could cause the junta anxiety 
about the movement of these supporters. 
The treatment recommendation function 
The anti-coup groups' solution was calling for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and 
democracy, while ousting the junta at the same time. It is interesting that a rumour 
about a plan to assassinate Thaksin was distributed. An anti-coup writer ȋǮTaveevut 
kui kub nakkolayut saiklang cheewit thaksin tok yoo nai antaraiǯ 2007) suggested 
Thaksin to have more security guards to protect him and his family. Also, he should 
create connections with international media and human rights organizations for 
helping him to reveal the evil and unjust nature of Thai justice. This suggestion from ǲa strategistǳ later became a strategic model for the movement of the anti-coup 
groups. When they wanted to seek attentions from other countries, the anti-coup 
groups would invite international organizations to investigate, observe, and perhaps 
intervene in their problems. The objective of this tactic was to distribute their 
grievances to the international community.  
 
The protest toward the Constitutional Tribunal, and ultimately the CNS, was 
proposed as an absolute means to end the problems. Shortly before the verdicts of 
the court were revealed, Thaksin Shinawatra showed himself to the public by giving 
interviews to three community radio programs. He encouraged his supporters to 
fight against the tyrants, as well as telling them of his wish to return to Thailand. 
Veera Musigapong, a former deputy leader of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party - who 
was banned by the Tribunal order - and PTV leader ȋǮThai politics ban sparks 
protestsǯ 2007), announced his plan to oppose the Constitutional Tribunal, which 
was reported on CNN news thus: ǲThis is a fight by the people who are rejecting the 
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judiciary's power. As someone who was personally affected (by the ruling), I am not 
accepting the decision of the tribunal which was set up by the coup leaders and their 
illegitimate power.ǳ 
When Thaksin and his factions started to strike back at the CNS, his supporters 
responded to his desire to return to Thailand by staging protests to oust the CNS, 
Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, General Prem Tinsulanonda, and to turn down 
the tyrannical 2007 draft constitution. A leader of PTV, Jatuporn Phromphan ȋǮStreet 
protest: PTV plans April 27 mass rally to demonstrate against coupǯ 2007), declared 
the mobilizing goals thus:   
The convergence of events in May and the following months could spell the 
end of military control. These include the debate leading to the referendum 
on the new constitution, the court verdicts on two cases of electoral fraud 
punishable by party dissolution, and the litigation involving Thaksin and his 
family members, he said. "From May onward, conditions will be ripe to sway 
the public to oppose the government and the Council for National Security," 
he said, adding that it was inevitable that Thaksin would end his exile in 
London in order to fight the charges against him in person. 
From this time, the verdicts from the Constitutional Tribunal prompted the anti-
coup groups and some of the TRT members to collaborate the movement in order to 
oppose the CNS forcefully.  
The metaframes 
The democracy and modernization metaframes were applied into the framing 
process of this mobilizing frame. In terms of democracy metaframe, the anti-coup 
groups and Thaksin framed the measures, to block the anti-coup media and the 
return home of Thaksin, as dictatorial actions. The unjust verdicts from the 
Constitutional Tribunal to ban the TRT and 111of its leading members from politics 
for five years were considered as undemocratic strategies to remove Thaksin and 
his regime from Thai politics. Obviously, it was framed as a plan of the CNS and amat 
to get rid of their major political enemies.  
This time, the modernization metaframe was used to construct an image of the 
modern, intelligent, and devoted Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin 
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activated the movement by reminding his supporters of the many projects he had 
done in the past. It was the time for him to remind his supporters of the glory times 
when he was in the premiership, on the other hand the junta were portrayed as 
conservative and dictatorial, and of being disapproved of by other countries.  
 
The conclusion 
The initial movement of the anti-coup groups in this study was started by the 
gathering of a collection of anti-coup groups to protest against the 19 September 
2006 coup. No different from the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, they created 
mobilizing frames to oppose the tyrannical government. Nonetheless, the frames of 
the anti-coup groups were mainly applied to attack the junta and demand for the 
restoration of democracy. This changed when the supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, 
such as the grassroots and TRT politicians, decided to join the movements. Thus, 
additional frames were constructed to focus on calling for the return of Thaksin 
Shinawatra and the overthrow of the coup makers and amat. I intend to summarize 
all of the seven mobilizing frames and the metaframes in the lower sections. 
The anti-coup mobilizing frame was created as the first frame of the anti-coup 
groups. Since, in this early time, the protestors came from various groups, such as 
ordinary people, activists, students, and scholars, their framings were diverse and 
inconsistent in terms of goals and contents. This could be seen by the problem being 
indicated, in this first frame in the first phase, as the severe damages to Thailand 
resulting from the 2006 coup in terms of democracy, economy, and the prestige of King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej. On the other hand, in the second phase of the movement, the 
anti-coup groupsǯ framed the problem as the intention of the coup group to remain in 
power. The coup makers, the amat, and the other networks were the culprits of this 
frame, while the reason to stage a coup was given that Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
associates were the major antagonists of the coup group in terms of benefits and 
economic ideas, as a result Thaksin must be get rid of to pave the way for them to 
remain in power.  
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The coup makers were framed as tyrants, rioters, robbers, fake heroic knights, 
crooked dictators, and people disloyal to the King. The anti-coup groups accused the 
coup makers of staging a coup that resulted in the destruction of Thai democracy, 
and of robbing the premiership from the elected Thaksin. However, this coup group 
defamed the honor of King Bhumibol by leading the public to understand that the 
coup was endorsed by the King.  As the solution to this problem, the anti-coup 
groups proposed the treatment of calling for the restoration of democracy, 
demanding a new national election, the restoration of the discarded 1997 constitution, 
and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. Obviously, the metaframes which were 
engaged in this mobilizing frame were the democracy, king, and nation metaframes. 
In the anti-coup groupsǯ view, this coup overthrew the democratic government of 
Thaksin and diminished the most democratic 1997 constitution. All of this led to the 
loss of democracy in Thailand. Moreover, the king metaframe was applied to portray 
the coup group as a disloyal group that violates the Kingǯs royal supremacy by 
overthrowing the government, which was approved by the King, and involving the 
King with this coup.  
The next major mobilizing frame of the anti-coup groups was the anti-amat frame. 
It was aimed at attacking the chief of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, 
and his network monarchy. The anti-coup groups believed that Prem and his 
network held the power in Thailand, in terms of economy and politics, for a long 
time. When Thaksin Shinawatra became the popular elected prime minister, he was 
seen as the major opponent of the amat. Thaksin challenged the amat with his 
modern economic policies and down-to-earth image. He was the only premier who 
provided many benefits to the abandoned grassroots; accordingly he became the 
most popular premier, which was considered a great threat to the amat. On the 
other hand, the amat were framed, by the anti-coup groups, as the major enemy of 
Thaksin, the anti-coup groups, and the grassroots. Thus, the problem, in this frame, 
was constructed as the destruction of Thai democracy by the monopolization of power 
and benefits by the amat. In the second phase, the anti-coup groupsǯ framed the 
problem as the mandate of the old power group to seize power from the new power 
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group of Thaksin Shinawatra, while the culprit in both phases was framed as the 
amat. The reasons for the amat to stage a coup were constructed as the amat 
determine to take over the ruling power from Thaksin since he is elected by a massive 
number of rural people. Thaksin became a great threat for the monarchy and the 
amat. Thus, the amat were framed by the anti-coup groups as fake good people, the 
democracy destroyers, and the oppressive group.  
Apparently, in this mobilizing frame General Prem Tinsulanonda became the key 
target of attack since he was the head of the amat. He, furthermore, was accused of 
taking advantage of being the head of the Privy Council; because of this he was 
unfaithful to the King. According to the anti-coup groups, his practices were 
inappropriate for the head of the Privy Council, thus they demanded to oust Prem 
from his position by collecting signatures for a petition to offer to the King. Besides, 
they invited people to take part in the protests to get rid of Prem and his network. The 
metaframes which were employed in this mobilizing frame were those of 
democracy and king. In terms of the democracy metaframe, Prem was the head of 
the coup group that demolished Thai democracy, besides the amat wanted to 
suppress the people, or grassroots, and make them their inferiors. To continue their 
plan, the amat overthrew the democratic premier and government, while the grassrootsǯ right to have their elected government was removed. All of this indicated 
the dictatorial practices of the amat. The king metaframe was applied to portray a 
disloyal image of the amat in applying the close relationship with the King to enrich 
their plans.  
The next mobilizing frame was that of the unproductive Surayud Chulanont 
government. During the first phase, Surayud was condemned hard on his unskillful 
governing, corruptions, and the undemocratic premiership which led to the 
disapproval of many democratic countries. Thus, the problem was framed as the 
damages to Thailand caused by the ineffective and unpopular government of Surayud 
Chulanont. The culprits were definitely Surayud Chulanont and his government. The 
anti-coup groups determined to attack Surayud since he was close to General Prem, 
furthermore he had the image of an honest Privy Councillor who worked for King 
286 
 
 
 
Bhumibol. Hence, attacking Surayud and his associates with corruption accusations 
seemed to be an effective way to ruin their clean image. The anti-coup groups 
defined the cause in this frame as the incompetence and inattention, to solve the 
nationǯs problems, of the government of Surayud Chulanont. The regression of the 
Thai economy caused by the lack of experience in administration was highlighted.  
The government of Surayud claimed that it was following the sufficiency economy 
concept of King Bhumibol, on the other hand this concept was condemned by the 
anti-coup groups because the ambiguity in its application led to the decline of the 
Thai economy.  
In this frame, the anti-coup groups framed Surayud Chulanont as the robber prime 
minister while his government became the illegal government. In terms of the 
solution, the anti-coup groups did not offer an particular means to get rid of 
Surayud. The anti-coup groupsǯ claimed that it looked as if Surayud had some 
conflicts with General Prem and General Sonthi, which seemed good for anti-coup 
groups. Accordingly, the attack towards him was restrained. The metaframes which 
were applied into this framing were those of modernization and the nation. The 
anti-coup groups attempted to portray Surayud's government as conservative and 
his sufficiency economy concept as old-fashioned which led to the overall 
deterioration of the Thai economy. On the other hand, capitalism, which Thaksin 
employed as an economic policy, was in accordance with other countriesǯ concepts. 
Thus, the modernizations of Thaksin, based on capitalist ideas, were framed as the 
best notion to expand the growth of the Thai economy. The king metaframe was 
employed when the anti-coup groups deemed that this government adopted the 
King's concept as their policy but could not identify how to apply this notion 
successfully. As a result, the Kingǯs concept was viewed, by other countries, as an 
ineffective and conservative concept that led to the disgracing of the Kingǯs honor.  
In the next mobilizing frame, the anti-coup groups styled their movement as the peopleǯs movement calling for democracy which was turned into another major 
frame. In this people’s democracy mobilizing frame, the anti-coup groups defined 
themselves as the people, or the grassroots, who were fighting against the amat and 
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undemocratic factions to restore the democracy of the people. The problem in this 
frame was constructed as the loss of the peopleǯs democracy due to the 19 September 
coup. The culprits were indicated as the coup makers, the junta, the old power group 
and its network such as the Yellow Shirts, some right-wing scholars and the media that 
support the coup. They were viewed by the anti-coup groups as the tyrannical 
thieves that robbed the peopleǯs democracy, while their appointed organizations, 
such as the government and the Constitutional Tribunal, were branded as illegal and 
undemocratic products of the dictators. The cause of this frame was indicated as the 
attempts of the junta to get rid of the power of Thaksin Shinawatra and the grassroots. 
In this frame, the anti-coup groups framed the old power group and its networks as 
ones who robbed their democracy by overthrowing their elected government and 
the premier. Besides, the 1997 peopleǯs constitution was demolished by this 19 
September coup and replaced by the dictatorial interim constitution.  
The protests of the anti-coup groups became stronger when the Constitutional 
Tribunal gave the verdicts on the cases of Thaksin and the TRT. Obviously, the anti-
coup groups were very upset and frustrated with the verdicts. As a result, the anti-
coup groups began their peopleǯs movement and portrayed themselves as the 
grassroots that were intimidated by the old power group and the middle class. 
Definitely, class conflicts were applied into this mobilizing frame. The solution was 
proposed as demanding the restoration of the 1997 peopleǯs constitution, a new 
election, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. The metaframes involved in this 
frame were those of democracy and the king. Definitely, the democracy metaframe 
was applied when the anti-coup groups began their movement. The class conflict 
was combined into this frame to stimulate the frustration of the grassroots. The king 
metaframe was involved when the anti-coup groups alleged that the junta claimed 
that this charter was approved by the King. Thus Thai people must vote for it to 
show their loyalty to the King. 
The media control became another major issue for the anti-coup groups. The 
problem in this frame was the unfair measures and favoritism of the coup group 
regarding media censorship. The culprits were the coup groups and some state 
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organizations. At the beginning of the protest, the anti-coup groupsǯ media were 
curbed in reporting news about Thaksin, while some websites and community radio 
stations were blocked when they aired interviews with Thaksin. The cause of the 
media censorship was portrayed as the fear of truth of the coup group. In the anti-
coup groupsǯ framing, the coup group determined to hide the truth which was 
distributed by the anti-coup groups. They did not want the general public to be 
aware of their dictatorial malpractices, besides they feared the lasting popularity of 
Thaksin among his supporters. If news of Thaksin was disseminated to his voters, a 
calamity from the protest might be a result which would disturb their power. The 
coup makers were framed as the evil dictators, moreover the media that supported 
the junta, such as the Manager of Sondhi Limthongkul, the Nation, Matichon, and 
Bangkokbiznews were also branded as unethical media. Sondhi Limthongkul was 
attacked hard as a major target of the anti-coup groups. He was labeled as the 
master of news spinning. The remedy was, certainly, calling for the freedom of press. 
Interestingly, they sent a letter to inform the international journalists of the 
censorship in order to put the pressure on the junta. This later became the tactic for 
the anti-coup groups to seek support and intervention from the international 
community. The metaframe engaged in this frame was that of democracy. During 
this time the members of the TRT established the PTV station to air their news. 
Apparently, it became the mouthpiece for the TRT, Thaksin, and the anti-coup 
groups. When PTV was blocked by the junta, it led to the movement to call for 
freedom of expression. Thus, the media censorship measure of the junta evidently 
violated democratic principles.  
The Buddhism issue was framed as the Buddhism mobilizing frame, since the 
anti-coup groups determined to encourage Buddhists to support their movements. 
Nonetheless, this frame was not raised as a major mobilizing frame. The problem 
was framed as the inattentiveness of the junta to protect Buddhism. The culprits 
were the junta with the focus on General Sonthi Boonyaratglin.  The anti-coup 
groups intended to condemn the ineffective plans of the junta to relieve the unrest 
incidents in the southernmost provinces. News of the killing of Buddhists and army 
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personnel in the south were reported, while the religious view of General Sonthi 
Boonyaratglin, as a Muslim, were claimed to be suspect. Another issue was the 
movements of groups of monks and their followers. They participated in the protest 
to demand the junta to recognize Buddhism as the national religion in the new 
constitution. Evidently, this offer was rejected by the junta since it might cause 
troubles between Buddhists and the followers of different faiths. It is interesting 
that the anti-coup groups did not give a clear cause of the problem in this frame, 
perhaps religious views were a controversial subject. The solution in this frame 
was offered as restoring morality into Thai politics, since they viewed the junta and 
the Yellow Shirts as immoral. The metaframe applied in this framing was that of 
religion which could be seen when they highlighted the hardships of Thai Buddhists 
in the southernmost provinces. In the anti-coup groupsǯ framing, the government 
seemed not to care about protecting the lives and possessions of the Thai Buddhists. 
Thus, the different religious view of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, as a Muslim, is 
questioned by the anti-coup groups.  
The last mobilizing frame was the Thaksin mobilizing frame which principally 
framed to attract Thaksinǯs supporters. This frame had been constructed to inform 
people of the movements of Thaksin and the evil practices of the CNS and amat 
against him. The suffering of Thaksin was constructed and disseminated to his 
supporters. The problem, in this frame, was the immoral practices of the dictators in 
intimidating Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates and the culprits were the CNS 
and amat. The cause was framed that the CNS and amat viewed Thaksin as their 
great enemy, thus Thaksin and his Thaksinomics must be got rid of. Because of this, 
the anti-coup groups framed the CNS and amat as the dictators that robbed the 
ruling power from the democratic premier, while Thaksin was portrayed as the 
innocent exiled premier who is bullied by the amat and its network.  In this frame, the 
examples to show the intimidation of the amat were focused on the censorship of 
news about Thaksin, his being banned from returning to Thailand and the 
corruption allegations towards him, the Thai Rak Thai party, and his family.  
Interestingly, Thaksin also applied himself into the frame through the anti-coup 
290 
 
 
 
media. For example, Thaksin told his followers of his need to return to Thailand and 
of the difficulties he received from the bullies. His followers seemed to have 
empathy for him, some even announced they would do anything to bring him back 
to Thailand. The major situation that triggered the anger of the anti-coup groups 
happened when the Constitutional Tribunal gave a verdict to dissolve the TRT, 
freeze Thaksinǯs assets, and ban him from any political activities. Accordingly, the 
movement to call for the return of Thaksin was activated and offered as a treatment 
for this frame. They demanded the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. It seemed the 
frustration of the anti-coup groups toward the verdicts of Constitutional Tribunal 
led to the mistrust of the justice system, which was consolidated in the later 
movements when the Red Shirts group was formed.  
The democracy /modernization metaframe was applied into the anti-coup groupsǯ 
framing. During the movement, the success of Thaksin in developing Thailand was 
constantly referred to by anti-coup groups. His modern economic policy and his 
persona as a global leader were employed into the movement messages to remind 
the grassroots of his potency, while the democracy metaframe was applied to frame 
the unjust verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal, which were accused of being 
undemocratic and coming from an undemocratic and illegal organization appointed 
by dictators, and the practices of the CNS to threaten Thaksin and his TRT.  
Taken together, the movements of the anti-coup groups, which have been separated 
into two phases, help us to see the alterations of the frames in each period. They 
created seven mobilizing frames which were used in both the first and the second 
phase. Some frames were emphasized as powerful frames, while some had their 
significance minimized. The frames that were most powerfully applied were: the 
anti-amat, the anti-coup, the media control, the peopleǯs democracy, and the Thaksin 
mobilizing frames. These five frames were concentrated on in the second phase 
when the anti-coup groups activated the fierce protests; in addition the protest 
groups changed the attack on to individuals in order to construct a precise enemy. 
Accordingly, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was chosen as the main culprit in the 
anti-coup mobilizing frame, while General Prem Tinsulanonda was presented as the 
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head of the amat and the mastermind of the 2006 coup. General Surayud Chulanont, 
was condemned hard in the first phase, but he was less focused on in the second 
phase of the movement. The reason was he expressed his standpoint to have a 
national election and had no intention to take part in a future government. On the 
other hand, General Sonthi had been the key person in demanding many measures 
to get rid of Thaksin and his associates, while General Prem continued to be seen as 
the major enemy who was behind the plans to overthrow Thaksin.  
 
An interesting thing about the framing of the anti-coup groups is that some frames 
were combined to create ǲa package of accusationsǳ.  For example, they combined 
the anti-coup and the anti-amat mobilizing frames to associate the issues with the 
culprits, or enemies. Besides, they promoted the anti-amat, peopleǯs democracy, and 
Thaksin mobilizing frames together to attract Thaksinǯs supporters. This was the 
tactic to bring to prominence specific issues and enemies; besides they could create 
the frame of the frustrations and grievances of the grassroots from these packages.  
In terms of the metaframes, the anti-coup groups concentrated most on promoting 
that of democracy, while the modernization frame became the second most 
important. This can be explained by the leaders, and the followers, receiving 
benefits from a democratic regime. The leaders of the anti-coup groups came from 
various factions such as politicians, scholars, and activists, but they all believed in a 
democratic regime that gave rights, equal opportunities, and political careers to 
them. Equivalently, the followers, who were mostly the grassroots and some middle 
class, were also given benefits by their elected government which they hardly ever 
had from other governments. Thus, they were all enthusiastic to protest and call for 
the return of their benefits and the premier under the movement of the peopleǯs 
movement to call for democracy.  
Additionally, the modernization metaframe was applied into the movements. The 
leaders of the protest intended to point out the importance of capitalism, the 
projects of Thaksin, and the modern style of development of both Thaksin and his 
government. All of this was created to mark the differences between Thaksin and 
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the conservative and old-fashioned amat, Surayud government and sufficiency 
economy concept. Apparently, Thaksin and his government outsmarted the 
dictatorial and conservative factions of the coup makers. 
Accordingly, the identity of the anti-coup groups was constructed around the 
democracy and modernization nationalist ideas. The followers and the movements 
were framed as the movements of the grassroots, which were suppressed by the 
amat. Their goal was to fight the old-fashioned tyrants and restore democracy to 
Thailand. They were a modern group of people who called for a modern democratic 
regime that allowed the people to have the right to vote for a democratic government. 
A government that ruled this country with modern economic policies and brought 
people an autonomous life as equals to the other classes.  
Taken together, the movements of the anti-coup groups had been separated into 
two phases to help us see the alterations of frames in each period. Seven mobilizing 
frames were created which were used in both the first and second phases. Some 
frames were emphasized as important frames, while the significance of the others 
was minimized. By far the most focused on frames were the anti-amat, the anti-
coup, the media control, the peopleǯs democracy, and the Thaksin mobilizing frames. 
These five frames were concentrated on in the second phase when the anti-coup 
groups activated the fierce protests; in addition the protest groups changed the 
focus of attack to individuals in order to construct a precise enemy for them. 
Accordingly, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was chosen as the main culprit in the 
anti-coup mobilizing frame, while General Prem Tinsulanonda was represented as 
the head of amat and the mastermind of the 2006 coup. General Surayud Chulanont 
was condemned hard in the first phase, but was less focused on in the second phase 
of the movement because of his standpoints of quitting the premiership, setting up a 
national election and showing no intention to take part in any future government. 
On the other hand, General Prem had been remained the major enemy of the anti-
coup groups. He created the plan to overthrow Thaksin, while General Sonthi was 
framed as Premǯs puppet that completed the plan to get rid of Thaksin and his 
associates. 
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An outstanding framing of the anti-coup groups was that they consolidated some 
frames as ǲa package of blamesǳ. For example, the anti-coup and the anti-amat 
mobilizing frames were connected and promoted as a package associated with the 
issues and culprits, or enemies, whereas the anti-amat, the peopleǯs democracy, and 
the Thaksin mobilizing frames were tied together to specifically appeal to the 
attention of Thaksinǯs supporters. This was the tactic to which brought to 
prominence specific issues and enemies that could be easily recognized. 
Furthermore, these packages of frames were potent in illustrating the inequality, 
frustrations, and grievances of the grassroots that were caused by their enemies.   
 
The anti-coup groups concentrated on promoting the democracy metaframe the 
most. The leaders of the anti-coup groups came from various factions such as 
politicians, scholars, and activists. However, they shared a belief in a democratic 
regime that provided rights, equality, opportunities, and a bright future in a political 
career to them. Simultaneously, the followers of the groups were mostly the 
grassroots, and some middle class who had been given rights and benefits by the 
Thaksin government. They were all enthusiastic to join the protest, under the 
movement of the Peopleǯs Movement to Call for Democracy, calling for the return of 
their popular premier, and lost benefits.  
Modernization was applied into the movements as the second most important 
metaframe. The protest leaders intended to point out the prominence and value of 
capitalism, and the populist policies and modernization projects of Thaksin and his 
government in developing Thailand. This was framed to contrast with the 
conservative and old-fashioned amat, the Surayud government, and the sufficiency 
economy concept.  
 
Accordingly, the identity of the anti-coup groups was constructed around the 
democracy and modernization nationalist ideas. The followers and the movements 
were framed as the movement of the inferior grassroots that had been suppressed 
by the amat. In essence, they were a modern group of people who called for a modern 
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regime of democracy that allowed them the right to vote for a democratic government. 
The elected government would rule this country with a modern economic policy and 
bring people an autonomous life equal to the other classes." 
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Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
In this dissertation I have investigated the movements of the ǲMuang Thai Rai 
Supdaǳ group, which was the initial Yellow Shirts led by Sondhi Limthongkul, and 
the anti-coup groups, with some groups later joined together as the Red Shirts 
group. It is believed that in successful social movements the leaders need to seek 
ways to enlarge and solidify their support. Having high numbers of participants is 
crucial to the longevity of the movements. To accomplish this goal, framing becomes 
a key strategy of the social movement leaders to select the right issues and events 
and frame them in ways that resonate with the participants and bystanders.  Every 
frame in social movements is built on metaframes, the large frames that are a part of 
culture. These powerful and persuasive frames are associated with identity. 
Correspondingly, social movement leaders in Thailand reshape the metaframes that 
are linked to the Thai identity.  These metaframes have been applied heavily in 
social movements to recruit supporters. The key identity frames in Thailand consist 
of nation, religion, king, and democracy/modernization. Nevertheless, identity can 
be reformed to meet the needs of each political crisis. This can be seen from the 
initial Yellow and Red Shirts movements. They performed effective movements by 
relying on metaframes and mobilizing frames which were formed from nationalist 
symbols. These mobilizing frames, which were rooted in the metaframes, were 
developed over time and resulted in the different focus of identity of the two 
movement groups.  Because of this, intensive conflicts between the different 
identities (a quasi-ethnic conflict) have taken place in Thailand.   
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Research questions and hypotheses 
 
In terms of background, Sondhi has a masters degree from Utah State University, 
while his family owned a Chinese newspaper. It is not surprising that he became a 
journalist and owned a media empire. This background was beneficial for his 
framing when he decided to oppose Thaksin. As a journalist and businessman, who 
later became a social movement leader, Sondhi initially activated his framing under 
the role of journalist. His framing in the early period, particularly in the first 
movement phase, is close to the framing definition of Entman (1993, p.50). He 
framed his messages, as a journalist, by selecting and highlighting the important 
issues and events that pointed out the faults of Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
government. He (Khamnoon, 2006, p.203) did not have the goal of protest when he 
moved the show to Thammasat, although some groups persuaded him to start the 
protest. However, framing became an important movement strategy for Sondhi to 
catch the attention of his audience and the public. It was also possible that he 
needed the audience to maintain his business, since the cancellation of his famous 
TV show had led to a loss of income. During the show, he invited the audience to 
follow his news media and support his products. Moreover, wishing to lay the blame 
on Thaksin and associates was another reason why effective metaframes and 
mobilizing frames were necessary for him. The movement in the second period was 
focused on organising for protest. Apparently, Sondhi had gained confidence from 
strong support from his audience, elites, royalists, activists, politicians, and the 
public. Sondhi employed framing tactics to construct mobilizing frames. This time 
he decided to protest organising a movement to oppose Thaksin and his 
subordinates. He could recruit more supporters from these frames which ultimately 
resulted in the establishing of the Yellow Shirts.  
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H1: In the earliest phases of social movements, as mobilizing frames are being  
developed, metaframes must be heavily employed. 
In this study the early periods of the initial Yellow and Red Shirts are examined to 
find out how they undertook their movements which, in turn, laid the firm 
foundations for their later movements. Definitely, framing played a major role in 
their movements. To create framing messages, both groups applied metaframes and 
mobilizing frames which were built on Thai nationalism. In this section the details of 
the metaframes and mobilizing frames of the two movement groups will be 
explained below to answer research question 1, hypothesis 1, and hypothesis 2 
respectively.   
 
To explain hypothesis 1, the alterations of Sondhi Limthongkulǯs framing over time 
must be examined, as he was the major initial movement leader. Sondhi started the 
movement when his popular political show ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ was cancelled 
from Channel 9 in September 2005 which resulted in his tough condemnation of 
Thaksin and the government. After the termination of the show, he decided to carry 
on with it in the form of a live political show at Thammasat University and later at 
Lumpini Park. The beginning of a major social movement group, the Yellow Shirts, 
started here.  
During the early movement,  Sondhi Limthongkul transformed nationalism into the 
metaframes. The four nationalist symbols of king, nation, religion, and democracy 
were reshaped into the king, nation, religion, and democracy/modernization 
metaframes. The seven mobilizing frames, which stemmed from the metaframes, 
were applied into his political show for specific mobilizing goals.  
A massive audience was necessary for Sondhi, since his political show ǲMuang Thai 
Rai Supdaǳ was terminated by Thaksinǯs subordinates. He had lost of income, while 
his future was not certain. When he decided to continue the show, he moved it to 
Thammasat University. It was a challenging situation for him to gain both money 
and an audience at that time. The need to appeal to a larger audience was greater for 
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those reasons.  Accordingly, the metaframes and mobilizing frames emerged from 
this point to complete his movement. Performing the protest was not in his mind at 
this early stage.  
In the early phases Sondhi did not know for certain which issues should be framed 
as the ǲright framesǳ. He primarily emphasized framing the misdeeds of Thaksin and 
his subordinates. The frames, however, evolved over time as they were adjusted to 
match the audienceǯs interests. Since he had the show on Channel 9, the frames that 
Sondhi had applied were the king, religion, nation, and democracy metaframes 
including seven mobilizing frames. Those frames were focused on to differing 
degrees. It is obvious that during the movement Sondhi focused most on the three 
metaframes and some of the mobilizing frames that involved King Bhumibol, 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and the corruption of Thaksin, while the importance of the 
democracy/modernization metaframe was lessened.  Sondhi realized that the 
practices of Thaksin which allegedly violated the Kingǯs royal supremacy could 
stimulate strong reactions from the audience, which could be seen from the show 
and web board of the Manager website ȋSondhiǯs media). In addition the issues 
involving Somdet Pra Sangkarat received much attention at the same time, while the 
corruption of Thaksin and his colleagues caused frustration amongst his audience.  
The pattern of framing changed when he moved the show to Lumpini Park, where 
the numbers in the audience increased. Sondhi thought to lead the group as the solo 
leader before collaborating with other factions as the Peopleǯs Alliance of 
Democracy. Accordingly, he had to find the ǲright framesǳ to attract the audience. In 
the last period of the movement at Lumpini Park, Sondhi still focused on the three 
main metaframes, while the democracy metaframe was asserted to present another 
type of Thai democracy. The metaframes were applied heavily within the 
development of the seven mobilizing frames and framing tactics. A turning point 
came on episode 10 ȋǮMuang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10ǯ, 2005), when he 
broadcasted the show from Wat Pa Ban Tard, Udonthani province. He claimed that 
he had been hunted and had just escaped from an assassination attempt.  He knew 
who the mastermind of the plan was. He announced and was supported by Luang Ta 
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Maha Bua, he would overthrow the Thaksin government, thus framing a strategy at 
this stage was necessary for Sondhi to form the protest. Also, the forceful frames 
used to recruit ǲthe future Yellow Shirt membersǳ were a crucial part of his success.   
In terms of the anti-coup groups, their frames had a different perspective from 
Sondhi's, right from the beginning of the movement. Sondhi started framing as 
journalist, while the anti-coup groups began with a variety of groups such as 
activists, scholars, students, and general people. Some anti-coup activists and 
scholars had previously joined the Yellow Shirtsǯ movement, hence their adopted 
tactics included frames used by the Yellow Shirts movement. They produced more 
specific frames to appeal to the participants, whilst employing some framing 
strategies of the Yellow Shirts.  
Similar to Sondhiǯs movement, the anti-coup groups applied the four nationalist 
symbols as metaframes, and constructed seven mobilizing frames. In the early 
movement, they activated the movement by protesting the 2006 coup, which 
focused on the democracy and nation metaframes. They rebuked the ǲevilǳ and ǲdictatorialǳ sides of the 2006 coup, as they sought to recruit participants who 
valued democracy. Apparently some of the mobilizing frames imitated those of the 
Yellow Shirts. The frame promoters had to adjust the mobilizing frames to fit with 
their participants.  
In the second phase, the intensity of the movement increased when PTV 
collaborated with the other anti-coup groups to form the better organised group. 
The metaframes and mobilizing frames were heavily used to recruit more 
participants. Thaksinǯs supporters, which were the grassroots, became major 
participants. Consequently, the framing tactics were changed to frame issues around 
Thaksin Shinawatra. His past works and achievements, and the harassment he 
suffered at the hands of the junta, were communicated to his voters. This was all 
done in order to call for the return of Thaksin, which needed to be supported by the 
masses.  
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We can see that both the groups of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups had to rely 
heavily on metaframes in their mobilizing frames to achieve their goals, especially in 
the early days of the movements. The mobilizing frames had been constantly 
developed through the movement periods while the metaframes were being densely 
applied simultaneously to acheive the mobilizing goals.  
 
RQ1: How did the social movement leaders in the early part of the movement 
employ the metaframes that were built on nationalism to create successful 
movements? And how did they construct the mobilizing frames? 
 
H2: The most effective metaframes are those focused on identity. 
 
The movement significances of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups was the application 
of metaframes which remodelled from Thai nationalism. Many of the past Thai 
political movements operated with nationalism. However, the metaframes that were 
employed by Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were effective and 
skillfully applied, which was proved by their later powerful movements under the 
bodies of the Yellow and Red Shirts. This is because they are educated and 
understanding on the power of media and its messages. Sondhi, nonetheless, must 
be regarded as the first of these leaders who employed nationalism to conduct his 
movements and disseminated them through his media networks. Those tactics were 
later imitated and adjusted by the anti-coup groups.  
Not only did he adopt nationalism into his social movement, Sondhi also 
transformed the four nationalist symbols by using theme as metaframes. This 
resulted in the collective identity of his ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ movement group. In 
the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul he developed seven mobilizing frames, based 
on the four metaframes, to communicate with his audience. Primarily, he provided 
the audience of ǮMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ with the faults of Thaksin Shinawatra and 
associates. Sondhi selected and framed the major issues and occurrences involved 
with the misconducts of Thaksin. He understood his audience, thus he chose the four 
metaframes and seven mobilizing frames which effectively appealed to his audience.  
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As mentioned previously, framing is an important mobilization resource for creating 
successful social movements. Sondhi framed messages with nationalism to 
effectively mobilize his factions. Nevertheless the success of his movement came 
from the identity which was formed through those frames. This benefitted him for 
recruiting more audience, participants, and bystanders. an identity could create 
bonds among him, the audience, and the ǲMuang Thai Rai Supdaǳ movement. Ganz 
(2009, p.6) explained that good relationships are the main reason for members to 
join social movements. Furthermore, the member ideologies, such as ǲgeneral 
political ideology, beliefs in strategies and goals of their social movement 
organization, personal beliefs of members, and religious background of members 
and movementsǳ, that are close to those of the social movement organization are the 
reasons that connect the member to the movement (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman, 
2003, p. 315). Consequently, the leaders of social movement groups must achieve in 
creating this close relationship.   
Sondhi had a degree in History which helped him to realize the importance and 
power of nationalism in persuasion. Furthermore he understood that the nature of 
those middle class Bangkokians and elites, which he identified as his audience. As 
Sondhi claimed on the show, these audiences were usually not inclined to 
participate in any political activities. They routinely followed his show, went to bed 
early, got up in the morning, and went to work. Until one day they discovered that 
their favorite political show was terminated with no appropriate explanation from 
the government. This made them upset and curious about the real reason behind 
this. They participated in his show at Thammasat which were the majority of his 
audience. In the end they turned into the major followers when the Yellow Shirts 
was formed. Among the crowds that showed up regularly at the live shows there 
were well-known technocrats, scholars, politicians, activists, lobbyists, journalists, 
and businessmen. Some of them were elites, royalists, and Thaksinǯs opponents who 
had the shared goals of opposing Thaksin. They intended to overthrow Thaksin to 
sustain the strength of the three primary institutions of the monarchy, religion, and 
the nation. Consequently, the effective metaframes produced by Sondhi were 
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focused on constructing an identity that matched the belief and culture of these 
types of people. The metaframes of Sondhi created to construct identity focused on 
love and respect towards the king, nation, and religion. 
This was similar to the anti-coup groups since they adopted strategies and 
metaframes used by Sondhi and the Yellow Shirts and applied them into their 
movements. However, the effective metaframes of the anti-coup groups focused on 
different nationalist symbols. According to the findings in chapter 4, they 
concentrated on democracy symbols, or the democracy/modernization metaframe. 
This was the collective identity or Thainess of the anti-coup groups, the various 
groups of people who shared the same belief in democracy. The anti-coup groups 
were different from Sondhiǯs movement group. Some came to protest based on their 
high opinion of democracy, while some were Thaksinǯs supporters. Thus, the 
metaframe that was used on to powerfully appeal to the high numbers of protestors 
was democracy; this democracy metaframe was applied to create the identity of the 
group. 
 
RQ2: What specific metaframes are applied and how are they engaged with the 
mobilizing frames? In what ways do social movement leaders highlight the 
problem definition, casual attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment 
recommendation functions of mobilizing frames? 
 
H3: As mobilizing frames develop, successful social movements will focus on 
certain metaframes and mobilizing frames that appeal to participants. 
 
Throughout the movement of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups, the four metaframes 
and seven mobilizing frames had been employed. Some frames were more focused 
on, while some were regarded as less significant. This could be seen from the 
findings of both groups. As I mentioned in previous chapters, the movements of 
Sondhi concentrated on protecting the three major nationalist symbols. Hence, the 
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most focused metaframes were king, religion, and nation respectively, while 
democracy/modernization was added and focused on in the second phase.  
It can be seen that the nation or Thailand was regarded by Sondhi as the prime goal 
that he sought to protect. The king nationalist symbol was the most concentrated on, 
while the religion was the second most important symbol. They were developed into 
the most important frames which were effective in terms of motivation. 
The king metaframe, as the most significant metaframe,  had been employed since 
Sondhi had his show on channel 9. This metaframe was effective in persuasion 
because of the love and respect of Thai people toward King Bhumibol. When Sondhi 
framed Thaksin and his colleagues as a group of disloyal people that had intentions 
to violate the Kingǯs supremacy, it outraged many people. 
Not only select was it necessary to important issues to produce the right frame, 
framing strategy was vital. As explained in the chapter 3, Sondhi stressed the 
significance and benevolence of King Bhumibol. He also devalued Thaksinǯs image 
and framed him as disloyal, attempting to challenge the Kingǯs power.  The moral 
branding became an important function in his mobilizing frame by legitimizing his 
movement as ǲthe loyal force of the Kingǳ. Simultaneously, he promoted the king 
metaframe through messages, activities, and symbols to strengthen its persuasive 
power. Throughout the show, Sondhi wore yellow shirts, and sometimes a white 
shirt with the ǲWeǯll fight for the Kingǳ slogan. He also invited his audience to wear 
yellow shirts every Friday to show their loyalty to the king, which ultimately became 
the symbol of the Yellow Shirts movement.  Once, he led the audience to pay respect 
to the statue of King Vajiravudh, which was located near the hall in Lumpini Park. 
This was how he stressed his frame and identity of the group. In this way the ǲdisloyal practicesǳ he accused Thaksin and subordinates of were felt, by his 
audience, to be critical misconduct.  
The second most important metaframe was religion. Sondhi (Khamnoon, 2006, p. 
55) alleged that Thaksin and his subordinates planned to destroy both Buddhism 
and Islam. Thaksin was blamed for wrongly appointing the acting Somdet Pra 
304 
 
 
 
Sangkarat and the secretary of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. Sondhi, 
however, focused on Bhuddism, particularly the appointment of the acting Somdet 
Pra Sangkarat. This issue involved important figures in Thailand. Sondhi determined 
to engage King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and Luang Ta Maha Bua to 
emphasize the damage that Thaksin did to those respectful and esteemed figures.  
In every movement phase the nation metaframe was promoted by focusing on the 
corruption of Thaksin and his associates that caused the destruction of the Thai 
economy. Moreover, the populism of Thaksin was also framed to show an increase 
of materialism and a decrease of morality among the grassroots. It is interesting that 
the dissatisfied feelings of the middle class toward the grassroots were constructed 
through this metaframe. Sondhi pointed out that Thaksin spent the taxes, which 
were paid by the middle class, to gain votes from the grassroots. The grassroots, 
according to Sondhiǯs framing, were deceived by Thaksin to take out loans. However 
the grassroots spent the loan money on luxury goods. This metaframe and some of 
the mobilizing frames were produced to frame a class conflict.  
The democracy/modernization metaframe was applied to attack the Western style 
democracy of Thaksin. It was concentrated on in the second phase of the movement 
when Sondhi proposed the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle, as a new democratic 
regime. The principle was explained  that the King rules the country by associating 
with the people. This principle was seen by the royalists as being similar to a 
democratic regime with the King as the Head of State. In episode eight Sondhi gave a 
vow to return to King Bhumibol his royal prerogative and presented this principle to 
the audience at Lumpini Park. This metaframe was entwined with the king 
metaframe to emphasize the significance of the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle and 
the vow. This metaframe was focused on when Sondhi initiated his movement to get 
rid of Thaksin.  
In terms of the mobilizing frames, Sondhi produced seven mobilizing frames and 
employed them throughout the two movement phases. However, as with the 
metaframes, he focused more on some frames more than others. Those mobilizing 
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frames were clearly developed from nationalism. Thus, the monarchy and Somdet 
Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frames were embedded in the king and religion 
metaframes. The corruption was promoted as the third most important mobilizing 
frame which was rooted in the nation metaframe.  The certain frames were effective 
in accentuating the faults of Thaksin and developing the loyalty of the audience 
toward nationalist symbols.  
 
In each mobilizing frame Sondhi would emphasize the problem, culprits, cause, 
moral branding, and solution, albeit in different degrees. As well, he focused on 
stressing the problems, repeating the important frames in both phases, providing 
new examples, and supporting his accusations with reliable evidence. 
 
The framing tecniques of the anti-coup groups mostly resembled Sondhiǯs. In the 
early movement, the anti-coup groups employed the four nationalist metaframes. 
Also, seven mobilizing frames were developed from this. Likely participants were a 
major consideration for the anti-coup groups to select the proper frames. They were 
activists, scholars, students, and some Thaksin supporters. The leaders of the groups 
had to produce frames to appeal to potential supporters who valued the democratic 
regime and to Thaksinǯs supporters. Similar to Sondhiǯs movement, the second 
period was significant since it was the time to motivate and prepare the followers to 
take part in protest. The frames at this time were co-produced by the PTV, a group 
of Thaksinǯs politicians.  
 
Nationalism was central to the four metaframes, which were parallel to Sondhiǯs. 
However, they focused on calling for the restoration of democracy. The democracy/ 
modernization metaframe became the frame most concentrated on with the nation 
next, then king, and finally religion. An interesting point about the framing of the 
anti-coup groups was that the frame promoters were from different groups. Most of 
them were general people who had no skills in framing, thus some of the messages 
were diverse and lacked cohesion. Nevertheless they shared the same goals of 
demanding the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, a new election, 
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the freedom of expression, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. All of this was 
framed with the democracy metaframe.  
 
The grievances of the participants were disseminated through the democracy 
metaframe in which the elected premier and the government, which had provided 
benefits and rights to them, had been overthrown. Democracy became the most 
important nationalist symbol to be promoted and protected by the anti-coup 
groups. In addition, it was used to portray undemocratic practices of the coup 
makers led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the government of Surayud Chulanont, 
the amat of General Prem Tinsulanonda, and the other factions such as the Yellow 
Shirts and the Democrat Party. Those factions were called tyrants, dictators, and 
democracy robbers who had stolen democracy from the people by getting rid of the 
elected Premier Thaksin Shinawatra, dissolving the elected Thai Rak Thai party, and 
discarding the 1997 peopleǯs constitution.   
 
Sometimes the leaders of the groups applied the modernization metaframe to praise 
the results and benefits that Thaksin had provided to develop Thailand. They 
determined to compare Thaksin to the old-fashioned image of amat. This 
modernization metaframe had been focused on in both phases of the movement to  
remind the grassroots of the benefits they had received from the policies of Thaksin 
and his party. In the first phase of the movement, they applied this metaframe to 
attack the government of Surayud. The economic policy, which the junta claimed 
they adopted from the sufficiency economy philosophy, was compared to the 
capitalism of Thaksin. Certainly, many modernization projects of Thaksin were 
praised as raising Thailand's prosperity, while slump of the Thai economy suffered 
under the rule of the junta was portrayed through this modernization metaframe. 
This frame was most focused on in the second phase when Thaksin expressed his 
desire to return to Thailand. He needed the support from his voters to bring him 
back.  
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The next effective metaframe was the nation metaframe. It was used to characterize  
the lack of results of the Surayud government and the damages from the 2006 coup.  
 
This metaframe was employed and focused on in both phases. The coup was 
portrayed as undemocratic and was unacknowledged by democratic countries. 
Accordingly, they limited business with Thailand. Besides the disappointing 
economic administration skills of the Surayud government had caused major 
destruction to the nation. To boost motivation, the nation and modernization 
metaframes were syncronously promoted.  
 
In terms of the mobilizing frames, the anti-coup groups produced seven mobilizing 
frames which the anti-coup, the anti-amat, and the unproductive government of 
Surayud Chulanont were principally promoted.  The three frames were created in 
conformity with the democracy/modernization and nation metaframes. The anti-
amat mobilizing frame, however, was concentrated on most in the second phase 
since the anti-coup groups attack General Prem and his amat as the masterminds 
behind the coup. Besides the TRT party was dissolved and 111 TRT politicians were 
barred from politics for five years, the anti-coup groups started to fiercely attack the 
amat, particulary General Prem, as the ones who had ordered these actions and 
verdicts.  
We can see that both Sondhi and the anti-coup groups applied the same tactics of 
focusing on certain frames that effectively and powerfully appealed to their 
participants. The results were growth in the number of followers. It can be seen 
from the table below what the specific frames each group employed.  
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Table 3: The focused mobilizing frames of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups 
 
 
 
H4: Successful social movements groups will adjust the focus of frames to 
appeal participants. 
 
In this study, we find that the movement groups of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups 
adjusted the focus of frames to increase effectiveness movements. Sondhi 
Limthongkul adjusted the focus of frames and synchronously promoted them to 
increase the power of the frames, attract the attention of participants,  and acheive 
movement goals.  
The second phase of the movement was an important moment for Sondhi. As 
revealed by his colleague, Khamnoon Sidhisamarn(Khamnoon, 2006, p.203), during 
hosting the show at Thammasat, some activists and opponents of Thaksin had 
 
The focused mobilizing frames 
 
 
Sondhi Limthongkul 
 
 
The anti-coup groups 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
The corruption 
mobilizing frame 
 
The monarchy 
mobilizing frame  
The anti-coup 
mobilizing frame 
 
The anti-amat 
mobilizing frame 
 
The monarchy 
mobilizing frame 
The Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat mobilizing 
frame 
 
The anti-amat 
mobilizing frame 
 
The peopleǯs 
democracy mobilizing 
frame 
The Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat mobilizing 
frame 
The corruption 
mobilizing frame 
 
 
The media control 
mobilizing frame 
The Thaksin mobilizing 
frame 
 
The media control 
mobilizing frame 
The media control 
mobilizing frame 
The unproductive 
Surayud Chulanont 
government 
The anti-coup 
mobilizing frame 
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persuaded Sondhi to undertake a protest. He had turned down the offer. Thus, in the 
first phase Sondhi focused on showing the problems caused by Thaksin and his 
colleagues. This function was significant in making people realize the bad sides of 
Thaksin, while the causal attribution was not always directly identified in every 
frame.  The moral evaluation function was very important for Sondhiǯs framing. He 
created an enemy by turning the frame into good versus evil. This function was 
effective since he pointed out the ǲevilǳ practices of Thaksin, which helped his 
followers to clearly recognize the alleged faults of the culprits. In contrast to the 
misconduct of Thaksin, Sondhi portrayed himself as a journalist who sacrificed 
himself to protect the nation, king, and Buddhism.  In terms of the treatment 
function, Sondhi did not propose clear and concrete solutions in every frame. In 
some social movements, frame promoters asserted the solution as performing 
mobilization. However, Sondhi did not invite his audience to protest against Thaksin 
in the first period at Thammasat. He encouraged his audience to follow the show 
and support King Bhumibol by wearing yellow shirts. The reason is he was not 
ready to lead the protest, since he was just a journalist with no experience in leading 
a movement. He realized that as an individual he had no money or political power to 
get rid of Thaksin. Besides, he had been attacked by legal and illegal measures. 
Sondhi, perhaps, focused on survive his business by hosting the show and selling his 
products. 
When he decided to lead the movement in the second phase, his framing was altered 
to prepare the audience for the future movement as the Yellow Shirts. The support 
from the audience and royalists was deemed sufficient for him to lead a protest 
movement. Accordingly, he decided to lead his audience and collaborate with other 
factions. This time, Sondhi focused on certain powerful frames and shifted the focus 
of those frames.  
The problem and culprit definition remained the most important functions in the 
scond phase. This framing tactic of Sondhi was employed to indicate the misdeeds of 
Thaksin to the nationalist symbols. Sondhi claimed that personal benefits for 
Thaksin and his colleagues were the main reason behind the acts. In terms of the 
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moral branding function, it remained as another significant way to portray the evil 
image of Thaksin. Sondhi intentionally concentrated on this function in the second 
period, because he prepared to carry out the protest. Consequently, he needed to 
construct his rivals as evil-minded while framing himself and his groups as a moral 
force with moral obligation to protect the country by ǲgetting rid ofǳ those wicked 
people. This moral function supported by Luang Ta Maha Bua, the revered monk.  
An interesting change in the second phase is that he attempted to associate King 
Bhumibol with the solutions. This was because he had begun to start the protest. 
Accordingly, the sufficiency economy concept of the King was proposed as the 
solution in most of the mobilizing frames. Also, the "Rajprachasamasaiǳ principle 
was proposed as a strategy for overthrowing Thaksin Shinawatra. When Sondhi 
decided to activate the protest seek the intervention of King Bhumibol in phase two, 
he stressed the intention of Thaksin and his subordinates to attempt to be 
comparable to the King. Some evidence was used to support the accusations.  
 
The metaframe focus was shifted and done with symbolic activities to stimulate the 
loyal sentiments of the audience. Two major activities involved with the king 
metaframe had been performed during this second phase.  The first activity 
(Khamnoon, 2006, p.146) was a rally to show loyalty by leading the audience to pay 
respect to the nearby statue of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI). This mini rally was 
performed to ǲcheckǳ the reaction from the government which resulted in 
suspicions from the media and Thaksinǯs subordinates that Sondhi might trigger the 
protest. The second performance was giving an oath event. This was done in the 
eight episode to protect King Bhumibol from Thaksin and restore the King his royal 
prerogative. Sondhi also asserted the principle of ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ as a new 
democratic regime to bring Thailand out of the crisis caused by Thaksin and the 
government. This activity was promoted in accordance with the democracy 
metaframe to oppose the western democracy of Thaksin. Thaksin had always 
claimed that he had been elected in conformity with democratic principles Sondhi 
challenged it by proposing a Thai style democracy.  
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Obviously, the focuses of the king and democracy metaframes were changed and 
promoted together in the second phase. Sondhi stressed that the power of the King 
was limited by Thaksin and his associates, accordingly Sondhi announced that they 
were a loyal group of people which would sacrifice themselves to protect King 
Bhumibol from Thaksin Shinawatra. Furthermore, they would fight to restore to the 
King his royal prerogative. Sondhi did not explain how to discharge Thaksin from 
the position of prime minister at this stage, thus it could be viewed that he 
demanded to rely on the Kingǯs power to complete his goal. The vow to return 
power to the King can be seen as a mean to authorize the movement to overthrow 
Thaksin Shinawatra.  
Sondhi also associated the king metaframe with that of religion. It is interesting that 
Buddhism was highlighted in Sondhiǯs movements. To emphasize the connection 
between King Bhumibol and Somdet Phra Sangkarat, he framed that Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was the mentor of King Bhumibol when the King ordained 
as Buddhist monk. They, furthermore, had had a long and close relationship since 
they were both, as claimed by Sondhi, Kings. According to Sondhiǯs framing, King 
Bhumibol was the King of the secular world and Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
Nyanasamvara was the King of spiritual world. Thus, the appointment of the acting 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat indicated an intention to violate the royal supremacy of both 
King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. In this framing, Thaksin 
and his associates were framed as a group of disloyal and immoral people who had 
committed a great sin against the two consecrated figures.  
Through the religion metaframe and Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame, 
Sondhi framed himself as a close devotee of Luang Ta Maha Bua. He also claimed 
that he had had a private audience with the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
Nyanasamvara who watched his political show regularly. By framing the connection 
between himself and the respected monks Sondhi could give himself the image of a 
reliable and honorable leader. Accordingly the Buddhist audience, who esteemed 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat and Luang Ta Maha Bua, was increased. At the same time, 
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some elite followers of the two revered monks became a magnet to attract more 
participants to join the protest against the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra 
Sangkarat. 
In terms of the anti-coup groups, the shifts in the mobilizing frame focus were found 
in the problem,causal, and solution functions.  They were framed differently in each 
phase. For example, in the anti-coup mobilizing frame the problem was the many 
aspects of damage caused by the 2006 coup, on the other hand in the second phase 
the problem was changed to be the goal of the coup makers to remain in power. The 
culprits of the problem changed in the second movement period. The culprits were 
attacked individually. For the other functions, the anti-coup groups applied the same 
tactics as Sondhi in framing. Mobilizing frames constructed the personal interests as 
motivating the junta and amat to stage the coup.   This happened in both movement 
phases. The anti-coup groups did not change the focus of moral branding.  For the 
treatment function, they stated in the early movement that their solutions for the 
problems were calling for democracy and the return of Thaksin, through protest. 
The overthrow of the amat was asserted in the last movement period before they set 
up the Red Shirts.  
The reason for the shift of the frame focus stemmed from the diversity of groups. 
They came from a variety of backgrounds which resulted in diverse and uncertain 
framing. However, they shared the same goal of overthrowing the coup makers and 
the amat. The collaboration of some anti-coup groups and the PTV had an impact on 
the framing of the anti-coup groups in the latee era. The change of the frame focus 
can be seen in the second phase since they aimed to recruit more supporters from Thaksinǯs voters and supporters.  
As aforementioned, the movement of the anti-coup groups in the initial era had not 
a great impact on the coup group and the Surayud government, since the protest 
groups had not united with the members of the Thai Rak Thai party. Thus, in the 
first phase of the movements, they performed the protests using simple tactics and 
media. When the PTV group joined the other groups, the protest were intensified. In 
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the second phase the PTV and some members of the TRT were the leaders of the 
protest along with the other groups. They brought a huge budget and skilful 
techniques into the movements. As a result, effective and powerful messages, 
framed by professionals, were produced to attack the junta.  
 
In the late period of the movement some of the anti-coup groups collaborated with 
PTV and established the Red Shirts, while some other groups continued their own 
movements. Before the Red Shirts formed, however, some anti-coup groups realized 
that they needed support from PTV, who had resources, skills in persuasion, and 
connections with the political elites and voters. Accordingly they held 
demonstrations together, as the PTV group gradually solidified their roles as the key 
leaders. The movement changed to focus on calling for the return of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, restoration of democracy, and overthrowing amat who were the major 
enemy of Thaksin. Framing this time was performed under the 
democracy/modernization and nation metaframes. 
 
The anti-coup groups expected the TRT voters to be the main followers of the 
movement. Not only did they frame issues involved with Thaksin, they applied other 
tactics to recruit more of Thaksin's voters. At that time, Thaksin began his moves 
from abroad by giving interviews to international media agencies in order to defend 
himself against the accusations of the CNS. To communicate with his supporters in 
Thailand, some websites and community radio stations broadcasted his interviews 
and his movements.  Accordingly, he could frame messages and send them to his 
supporters directly. Thaksin explained to the international media that he desired to 
go back to Thailand as a normal person. He did not want to be involved with any 
political activities. This gave hope to his voters and might be a reason for the 
increase of protesters. Thaksin and the anti-coup groups changed the focus of the frameǯs content to call for his return and get rid of amat. At this time Thaksin 
became a frame producer convincing his supporters to undertake the movement. 
From this, the number of supporters calling for his return to Thailand increased. 
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Table 4:  The four function framing tactics in the mobilizing frames of Sondhi and 
the anti-coup groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four function framing tactics in mobilizing frames 
 
 
 
 
Sondhi Limthongkul 
 
 
The anti-coup groups 
Problem 
definition/ 
culprits 
 
Most concentrated/ individualize the 
culprits by targeting at Thaksin  
Most concentrated and adjust the 
problem in each phase/ individualize 
the culprits by targeting General 
Prem, Sonthi, Surayud 
 
Casual attribution 
 
Connect with personal interests 
 
Connect with personal interests  
Moral evaluation 
 
Label Thaksin and associates as 
disloyal and immoral factions, on the 
other hand frame themselves as a 
moral force 
 
Label the amat and the coup makers 
as dictators, frame themselves as 
suppressed grassroots or people 
 
Treatment 
recommendation 
 
Propose the Rajprachsamasai 
principle and self-sufficiency 
economy philosophy of the King as 
the best solutions 
 
Demand democracy through protest 
and modernization is the best 
economic policy 
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RQ3: Do the frames reshape a collective identity?  Do the different social 
movement groups exhibit different identities? Does the different identity 
result in conflicts?    
 
H5: Over time, the focus on identity metaframes may reshape the 
identity of the participants. 
 
 
In this research, identities of the participants of the two groups are linked to the 
metaframes. However, this study focuses on the early movement of the two groups 
when the genuine and developed identities of the Yellow and Red Shirts had not yet 
appeared. We can only see the early signs of identity from their framings and some 
of their activities. Identities resulting from their frames in these early periods may 
have differences to those from the time when the stable Yellow and Red Shirts 
formed.  
 
In terms of Sondhi Limthongkul, identity was constructed from the four metaframes 
transformed from nationalism. When he found its power in recruiting the audience, 
he focused on it.  The identity metaframes had been employed since Sondhi hosted 
the show on channel 9. The highlighted issues were engaged with the corruption of 
Thaksin and his misdeeds in the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat, 
the discharge of the Ombudsman, and some disloyal acts toward King Bhumibol. 
Nonetheless corruption was the primary focus, while the other issues were grouped 
and framed as infringement on King Bhumibolǯs supremacy.   
 
The signs of identity were found in many speeches of Sondhi Limthongkul, but were 
obviously seen when he announced his intention to oppose Thaksin Shinawatra in 
the first episode of his show at Thammasat thus ȋǮPerd chak Muang Thai Rai Supda 
Sunjorn 1ǯ, 2005): 
 
"My philosophy in this war is fighting as a journalist with no succumbing to 
any power. As a journalist and devoted Thai, I determine to inform this 
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society of the truth.   Everyone please keep in mind that our nation is 
composed of two major elements: the King and religion, not by any populist 
policy. If the religion is impaired, consequently the Kingǯs supremacy will be 
undermined.  On the other hand, if the Kingǯs power is lessened, the strength 
of religion will be declined. As a result, our nation will fall apart. 
Every religion is the soul and spirit of our society. The King, more 
importantly, is our last guardian who is able to protect us from the immoral 
leaders. If the King is turned into a political rubber stamp, in the end this 
country will be traded and bargained by these greedy politicians. 
Furthermore, we cannot rely on the constitution which was created by those 
politicians who are under the control of the political parties owned by greedy 
capitalists. As a result, this country will be effortlessly sold to foreign 
investors similar to our state-owned enterprises. This means their cronies 
can occupy any major position, besides anyone can become the shareholders 
of the privatized enterprises. If this situation comes true, we will have 
nothing left not even our spirits and souls. If we share the same thoughts, 
we are all responsible to join this untiring battle to protect our 
monarchy and religion the two strong pillars which support the 
existence of our nation.ǳ 
 
In the speech, Sondhi persuaded the audience to be part of his movement to protect 
esteemed nationalist symbols. He pointed out the significance of this nationalism 
and claimed on obligation of every Thai to sacrifice their lives to sustain these 
nationalist symbols. This nationalism was adopted from King Vajiravudh, however, 
Sondhi altered it and it applied into his framing.  King Vajiravudh presented his 
traditional nationalism, mentioned in chapter 2, that among the three symbols, the 
King was put in the most important position. Furthermore the nation and the 
religion or Buddhism must be loved and protected by all Thais. Sondhi Limthongkul 
asserted his new type of nationalism. From this speech, he connected and 
prioritized three nationalist symbols.   
Sondhi explained that the monarchy and religion were connected, and that they 
supported and relied upon each other. They must be preserved and balanced in 
their power. The stability and strength of the monarchy and religion symbols 
brought about the strength, security, and existence of the nation. It is clear in the 
speech that the king and religion were balanced its importances to preserve 
317 
 
 
 
the nation. This was framed to mobilize the audience through the his 
movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  The relationships of the three nationalist symbols of Sondhi Limthongkul 
 
From the above statement, we can see that Sondhi declared he would protect two 
major institutions, which appeared as the primary elements of traditional 
nationalism. His followers must love, and be willing to sacrifice their lives to protect, 
the King, the religion, and the nation from their enemies or ǲthe other groupǳ, who 
were, apparently, the greedy politicians and pro-constitution capitalists such as 
Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates.  
In terms of the anti-coup groups, they adopted framing tactics from Sondhi and the 
Yellow Shirts. Accordingly their frames were also focused on identity. In the first 
period they employed the four metaframes from nationalism similar to Sondhiǯs, 
however they focused mostly on the democracy/modernization metaframe. The 
king and religion were concentrated on the least.  
 
The nation  
(Thailand) 
The religion  
(Somdet Pra Sangkarat) 
The monarchy/king  
(King Bhumibol) 
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At first, the anti-coup groups attempted to show their loyalty toward King Bhumibol 
since they recognized the power of this metaframe. Some leaders who supported 
Thaksin, besides, realized that Thaksin was suspected, by the public, about his 
loyalty to the King. Thaksin and his factions were allged on the abuse of King Bhumibolǯs royal power. The king metaframe was minimized in its role in the 
second phase when the anti-coup groups started to attack the amat and General 
Prem Tinsulanonda. According to the anti-coup groups, Prem, who was in the inner 
circle of King Bhumibol, had performed movements to overthrow Thaksin. It is 
interesting that before the 2006 coup Thaksin and some associates revealed that 
there was ǲa charismatic figureǳ who plotted a plan to get rid of him. They did not 
point out who he was, but some people believed that they implied King Bhumibol. 
Thus the king metaframe was not an effective frame for them to recruit people who 
against the monarchy, elite, and amat. Although the nationalism of King Vajiravudh 
was applied as metaframes in the early period, the anti-coup groups emphasized the 
nation, king, and religion respectively. The added democracy metaframe ultimately 
became the most important frame. Framing of the groups was proritized differently 
from King Vajiravudh, since the king metaframe was not given primary of focus in 
their movement.   
 
Consequently democracy became the most suitable metaframe to bring back 
Thaksin and fight against the amat. The identity of the anti-coup groups was 
constructed based primarily on the democracy/modernization metaframe. 
However, the frame producers, in a similar way to Sondhi, did not stress the 
importance and relationships of the nationalist symbols. They only focused on 
calling for the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, a new election, 
and the return of Thaksin, while they framed themselves as ǲthe democratic people,ǳ 
which can be seen as ǲthe nation.ǳ  
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Figure 2: The goal of the anti-coup groups 
From the above chart, we can see that the anti-coup groups undertook ǲthe peopleǯs 
movementǳ to call for ǲthe peopleǯs constitutionǳ and ultimately achieve ǲthe peopleǯs democracyǳ. However their peopleǯs democracy was included Thaksin 
Shinawatra since he was viewed as both symbol and as the democratic prime 
minister in Thailand. However I argue that, before joining the protest, most of the 
anti-coup participants had had a similar identity to the participants of Sondhi 
Limthongkul's. They had the love feelings toward the king, religion, and nation 
symbols. They were continually transformed by the identity metaframes when 
participated in the movements. However the true identity of them was apparently 
appeared when the Red Shirts established which completely different to the Yellow Shirtǯs.    
 
People’s Movement 
People’s Constitution 
People’s Democracy 
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H6: In such cases, when social movement groups compete over identity, the 
potential for conflict increases.  
 
 
This hypothesis is involved with the hypothesis 5, which I previously answered. The 
different identity of the two groups had been constructed, as a result the conflicts 
between two groups started. In terms of Sondhi, his identity was highlighted in the 
importance of the king, religion, and nation institutions and the Thais must sacrifice 
themselves to protect them. His followers must love and sacrifice their lives to 
protect the King, the religion, and the nation from their enemies or ǲthe other 
groupǳ who were, apparently, greedy politicians and capitalists such as Thaksin 
Shinawatra and his associates. Nonetheless, the establishment of the ǲYam Fao 
Pandinǳ or ǲThe guardian of the nation armyǳ of Sondhi Limthongkul was an 
apparent mean to originate the unique identity of the group.  
 
This group was the origin of the Yellow Shirts with a specific identity. Sondhi 
(Khamnoon, 2006: 104) explained the objectives of the ǲYam Fao Pandin armyǳ 
thus:  ǲI would like to invite everyone to participate in the ǲYam Fao Pandinǳ army 
together. Even though in the future this tyrant might disappear from this 
country we still have four main obligations to accomplish: (1) to demand the 
transparency of every government in administration, (2) to protect the 
freedom of the media, (3) to support political reform, and (4) to empower the 
middle classes.ǳ  
The above four obligations were added as the practical tasks of the group, while the 
love toward the nation, religion, and king nationalist symbols were indoctrinated 
through frames. The last mission, however, was very interesting, since it clearly 
stated they were the middle classes who were highly involved with politics. Traces 
of the democracy metaframe were seen in the obligations of ǲThe Yam Fao Pandin 
army,ǳ but were not concentrated on at this early stage. From the oaths and the Yam 
Fao Pandin army, it could be seen that Sondhi created a strong sentiment to oppose 
his enemies, who were not only Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates, but also 
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some other opponents. Apparently, they sacrificed themselves to protect the king 
(King Bhumibol), religion (Somdet Pra Sangkarat), and nation (the security and 
prosperity of Thailand) from the evil politicians. When those major figures were 
engaged in the framing of Sondhi, the criticisms of Thaksinǯs misconduct were 
amplified. The participants of Sondhiǯs group felt their esteemed symbols had been 
harmed, as well as their lives, and that those symbols were important enough for 
them to sacrifice themselves to protect. In addition the threats that intended to 
destroy their loved symbols were framed as evil, greedy, and sinful, which led to the 
belief that these malevolent threats must be got rid of.  
The Thainess proposed by Sondhi recognized him and his participants as the ǲtrue 
Thaisǳ (we or us), and their enemies were viewed as the ǲunThaiǳ (the others or 
them). The ǲtrue Thaisǳ identity, from the framing of Sondhi, was composed of being 
loyal to the king, nation, and religion symbols as a ǲgood Thaiǳ.  One who sacrificed 
to preserve these institutions must join the ǲmoral forceǳ ȋSondhiǯs movement) to 
oppose those ǲunThaiǳ, the people who intended to destroy the Thai nationalist 
symbols; i.e, the Thaksin faction.  This is the character of the ǲtrue Thaiǳ Thainess, or 
the identity of Sondhi and his participants, that was shaped by the four metaframes.  
For the identity of the anti-coup groups, frames of the anti-coup groups were 
obviously constructed to attack the coup makers and the Yellow Shirts, who 
cooperated in overthrowing the Thaksin government. The participants of the anti-
coup groups were primarily the grassroots included some middle class, whereas the 
leaders of the protest were politicians, activists, and scholars. Their enemies were 
framed as being the amat, elites, royalists, and the middle class.  
To against those upper class rivals, the anti-coup groups carried on the sentiments 
of injustice and unequal status. They framed themselves as the grassroots that had 
been gained rights and advantages from the Thaksin government. It was the first 
time they had realized the rights and empowerment to choose their own paths 
through the 1997 peopleǯs constitution. When the democratic government of 
Thaksin was demolished by the 2006 coup, all benefits and rights were taken away 
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by the junta and amat. The losses and grievances of the grassroots were well 
understood by the leaders of the anti-coup groups who were Thaksinǯs supporters, 
activists, and the TRT politicians. They had faced the disappearances of democracy 
and political power caused by the 2006 coup. Accordingly, the restoration of 
democracy was the only means for the groups to regain their rights and benefits.  
The constructed identity of the group was ǲthe peopleǳ and ǲdemocracyǳ. They 
identified themselves as ǲthe peopleǳ who undertook the movement to call for the ǲpeopleǯs democracyǳ. Interestingly, the definition of their democracy was different 
from the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle of Sondhi Limthongkul. The democracy 
concept of Sondhi resided with the King and the people; nonetheless the King would 
be the one who exercised his power, which would be given by the people. 
Interestingly, in the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle only the kings were the rulers. On 
the other hand, the democracy of the anti-coup groups was Western-style 
democracy in which people have the right to vote and elect their leaders.  
During this early movement, the anti-coup groups adopted views from scholars to 
support accusations and produced frames. Some works of Phichit 
Likhitkitchasombun were applied into the identity framing of the anti-coup groups. 
They posted a view of Phichit which described the identity of the groups, thus 
(Serichon, 16-22 January 2007 p.12): 
The 1997 constitution helps the middle and lower classes realize their 
democratic awareness. When the 19 September coup occured, they were 
powerfully impacted. For the grassroots, their rights, freedoms, and 
sovereignty are completely stolen. Also, the benefits, which they received 
from the populist policies of Thaksin Shinawatra, were demolished. Thatǯs 
why they entirely resist this coup. Those dictators have made a major 
mistake by overrating their power. So far the middle and lower class are fully 
awake to recognize the real agents who intervened in the establishment of Thailandǯs democracy. Thais are forced, heartlessly, to choose between ǲthe 
Thai style democracyǳ which is the authoritarian regime of the amat and ǲthe peopleǯs democracyǳ created by the peopleǳ.  
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The above statement portrayed the movement of the anti-coup groups as the people 
or the grassroots who were woken up by the 2006 coup. They realized that their 
major enemies were the coup makers, amat, and the Yellow Shirts. The anti-coup 
groups thought of themselves as a suppressed class that had been intimidated by 
the elites, the amat, and the urban middle class. Previously they had had the chance 
to elect their government, which had provided benefits and equalities to them, but 
this right and the resultant prosperity had been robbed by those middle classes and 
the amat. Furthermore, their beloved and down-to-earth premier was unjustly 
bullied by these dictators. Their people's democracy had been demolished in only 
one night. Those dictators robbed the peopleǯs democracy and forced them to be 
ruled by ǲthe Thai style democracyǳ of amat.  Consequently, those dictatorial elite 
and the Yellow Shirts must be got rid of to restore their democratic government and 
the rights and benefits which resulted from the Thaksin government. 
 
From this, the identity of the two groups was antagonistically framed so as to 
compete with the rivals who destroyed their loved and protected nationalist 
symbols. This led to the deep conflicts between the two identity groups which, in 
turn, led Thailand into quasi-ethnic conflicts. 
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Practice and Theory  
This study draws attention to the areas where social movement theory and framing 
theory need to extend in order to examine the content of the metaframes, the 
mobilizing frames, the strategies applied, and the identities. The following sections 
will suggest and argue about which aspects of social movement framing theory 
should be more focused on and will also develop new views. 
In the study of social movement framing theory the framing tactics are important in 
framing issues, especially the metaframes which are reshaped from nationalism. The 
movements of Sondhi and of the anti-coup groups applied nationalism into their 
movements where the four nationalist symbols were employed as metaframes. It is 
in line with Swartǯs argument (1995, p.468) that metaframes are successful and 
culturally potent ideational themes which resonant with ǲthe social, cultural, and 
historical contextǳ. They are used in ǲto make specific historical situations 
meaningfulǳ (Stanbridge: 2002, p.532; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p.10).   
Even though Sondhi and the anti-coup groups applied the four nationalist symbols 
as metaframes, they had a tactic to amplify the efficiency by connecting them with 
famous figures. In the framing of Sondhi, for instance, the king, religion, nation, and 
democracy metaframes were represented by King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, 
Thailand, and the ǲRajprachasamasaiǳ principle respectively. The anti-coup groups 
focused on the democracy/modernization metaframe which was represented by 
Thaksin Shinawatra and his populism/capitalism. This tactic was fruitful for their 
framing, because they could connect the esteemed figures, that were respected and 
loved by their participants, into the frames. This could arouse the feelings, in the 
participants, that they were protecting real people, not just abstract symbols. This 
framing tactic should get more intention in the study of metaframes and social 
movements. 
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The four metaframes 
 
 
Sondhi Limthongkul 
 
The anti-coup groups 
 
King 
 
 
King Bhumibol  
 
Early period King Bhumibol 
 
Religion 
 
 
Somdet Pra Sangkarat 
 
- 
 
Nation 
 
 
Thailand and self-sufficiency 
economy philosophy 
 
 
Thailand and ǲthe peopleǳ 
 
Democracy/modernization 
 
 
 
Rajprachsamasai/ 
anti-capitalism 
 
Thaksin Shinawatra/ 
capitalism   
 
Table 5   The focused metaframes and personalization tactics of the two groups 
 
In social movements, mobilizing frames are ǲaction-oriented sets of beliefs and 
meaningsǳ which specify the important issues and events by convincing the support 
to mobilize from the potential constituents, adherents, and bystanders (Benford and 
Snow, 2000, p.614; Johnston and Noakes, 2005, 2; Hewitt and McCommon, 34, 
2005).  In each mobilizing frame (Entman, 2003, p, 53) there are four functions of 
problem definition, casual attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment 
recommendation. This study demonstrates that focus on the problem definition, 
causal attribution, and moral evaluation functions increases the appeal of those 
frames.  
In the case study of Sondhi, he framed by emphasizing the functions of problem 
definition, culprits, causal attribution, and moral evaluation, while the solution was 
less important for his movement. He intended to reveal the faults of Thaksin and the 
culprit, for each problem, was primarily indicated as Thaksin. The causes of the 
problems were framed as personal interests to highlight greedy images (Gerhards 
1995, p. 231). Also Sondhi focused on the moral branding function to legitimize his 
movement as a moral force and brand Thaksin as immoral. Since religion was 
focused on as the second most important metaframe, a moral image of the 
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movement was needed. As the movement was anti-democratic, morality became 
even more important.  
For the framing of the anti-coup groups, they focused on the problem function and 
adjusted it to be appropriate to altered situations and participants. In some 
mobilizing frames they addressed the problem as one thing in the first phase, but 
changed it in phase 2. As well, culprit identification was a tactic that proficient in the 
framing of the anti-coup groups. They pointed out the culprits as a group in the first 
phase and identified the culprits as individuals in the second phase instead. This 
strategy made their framing uncomplicated and easy for their followers to recognize 
the key culprits, which was similar to that of Sondhi Limthongkul. The solution 
functions of the anti-coup groups were calling for democracy and the return of 
Thaksin by protesting. Performing protests in public places, which is what the anti-
coup group did right from the start, should be included in the solution function of 
the framing theory of social movement groups.  
The overall tactics that the social movement framing theory should develop is 
focusing on certain frames. Both the movements of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups 
produced a number of frames, but a few of those frames were concentrated on. The 
most important frames were linked with the key nationalist symbols which resulted 
in the construction of collective identity. The leaders of the two cases grew their 
numbers of participants through effective frames which were powerful in 
persuasion. They, furthermore, promoted frames as a package. For example, Sondhi 
synchronously promoted the king and religion metaframes, the same as the 
collective promotion of the monarchy and Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frames. 
Likewise,  the anti-coup and the anti-amat mobilizing frames were jointly promoted 
in the movement of the  anti-coup groups. 
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Limitations of the study  
This research has some limitations not different from all studies. There are two 
major issues that have had an impact on the results and scope of this thesis which 
are the capability to access the data sources and the timeline of the study.   
The study set up to examine the social movements of Sondhi Limthongkul and of the 
anti-coup groups in their initial periods, before the establishment of the Yellow and 
Red Shirts. However, I encountered difficulty in accessing the data sources of the 
anti-coup groups. The reason is that Thailand had a coup, led by the Thai army Chief 
General Prayuth Chan-ocha, which staged on May 22, 2014. At the moment, the 
civilian government of Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of Thaksin 
Shinawatra, was replaced by the junta government. The martial law was announced 
after the coup, which led to the terminations of some media. This includes the ban of 
the ǲthaienews.blogspot.comǳ which is the data source to study the anti-coup 
groupsǯs information. Some of the electronic newspapers collected in this website 
could not be accessed, consequently some aspects of the anti-coup groupsǯ 
movement in the early period are excluded. Moreover, information from other 
sources was limited due to the martial law. An interesting point is the information of 
the anti-coup groups was broadly produced and distributed to public when they 
activated the movements under the Red Shirts body from 2009. This could be seen 
through many means of media; on the one hand the information of their early era 
movement was scarcity. From this, the scope and result of this research have been 
obstructed and uncompleted by political situations.  
As well, the timelines of the study becomes a limitation of this research since I 
decide to examine only the beginning of the movements, which is the strength of 
this research. Hence the ultimate identities of the two groups are not fully examined 
and revealed in this research.  
Of the metaframes, which are reshaped from the four nationalist symbols, the 
application of democracy metaframe in the case of Sondhi Limthongkul was touched 
upon in this study.   
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Although this study encountered some limitations, as indicated above, the central 
argument holds. The findings of this research have revealed important factions of 
the early movements of the Yellow and Red Shirts. Also examined in this study is 
how the metaframes and mobilizing frames are employed by the two groups to 
construct collective identities. The results of this study reveal the beginning of a new 
Thainess identity of the Yellow and Red Shirts that has caused the long and deep 
conflicts between them for the last decade.  
 
Directions for future research 
The focus of this research is to understand how social movement groups in Thailand 
undertake the movements through framing and collective identity.  
Appealing to a high number of participants in the early periods is necessary for the 
longevity and stability of social movement organizations. Thus the leaders of the 
groups applied metaframes and mobilizing frames to recruit participants. As a 
result, the identities of the groups originated from those frames. This thesis, 
however, only study the formations of the movements in the initial periods. There is 
a need for more investigation in order to understand the developments of the 
framing and the identities of the groups throughout the mobilizing process. The 
absolute identity of the two groups when they established the Yellow and Red Shirts 
should be deliberately examined in the future research.  
Although this research focused on the powerful metaframes and mobilizing frames, 
which were reshaped from nationalism, the identities of the groups in their early 
periods was examined. However there are some areas that need to be more 
emphasized. In framing theory, metaframes are a part of culture and are employed 
to construct new meanings of the issues, while mobilizing frames are specific for 
forming social movements. This study has shown, however, that effective frames are 
constructed based on cultural ideas so as to resonate with the experience of 
participants. Also, the selections of effective frames and functions strengthen the 
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persuasive power of the frames. Im future research the shifts of the framing as a 
tactic to appeal to more participants, should be focused on.  
Lastly, the study could be further strengthened by focusing more on the collective 
identities. The Thai social movement cases provided the result that collective 
identity was a crucial part in appealing to participants and in creating conflicts. The 
continuity of identity construction, however, was not examined in this thesis since 
the timeline of study is limited to the beginning period of the movements. 
Accordingly, the development of later identities of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups, 
as the Yellow and Red Shirts, are not investigated. Thus examination of the 
development of the identities from the beginning periods up to the final stages of 
the movements could provide insight into the alterations and tactics used by the 
leaders over that time.  This needs to be studied further in the future social 
movement research. Also, survey research of the participants should be conducted 
to clearly understand other aspects of identity of the two groups.   
 
This thesis demonstrates clearly the value of focusing on the very earliest phases of 
new movements, when metaframes are heavily used and mobilization frames are 
being developed. The development of persuasive frames which attract a large 
number of participants as a major key to achieve movement goals are examined 
closely in this study.  
This thesis also demonstrates  successful movements produce frames which focus 
on a specific identity, ideology (nationalism), and significant figures. From the cases 
of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups, it is clear that metaframes and mobilizing 
frames which were rooted in nationalism could be applied to construct group 
identities. The diverse  identities of the two movement groups resulted in a strong 
bond between the movement and the participants, while the opposition groups 
were framed as their rivals, or even enemies,  with different identity, as the ǲothersǳ.  
Important figures, that are respected and loved by participants, are also effective 
symbols, as leaders convince their participants to protect their beloved figures from 
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the abuse of the opposition groups. Furthermore adding important figures 
personalises the grievance, where complaints about policy or corruption or ideals 
do not.  
Thus, an effective formula to acheive a successful social movement consists of 
framing, identity, and significant figures. This have been employed by Sondhi 
Limthongkul, the anti-coup groups, and later, it seems, by the Yellow and Red Shirts, 
and by other movement groups up to the present time.  
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